Many environmental scientists, scholars and activists characterise our situation as one of alienation from nature, but this notion can easily seem meaningless or irrational. In this book, Simon Hailwood critically analyses the idea of alienation from nature and argues that it can be a useful notion when understood pluralistically. He distinguishes different senses of alienation from nature pertaining to different environmental contexts and concerns, and draws upon a range of philosophical and environmental ideas and themes including pragmatism, eco-phenomenology, climate change, (...) ecological justice, Marxism and critical theory. His novel perspective shows that different environmental concerns - both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric - can dovetail, rather than compete with, each other, and that our alienation from nature need not be something to be regretted or overcome. His book will interest a broad readership in environmental philosophy and ethics, political philosophy, geography and environmental studies. (shrink)

It is often claimed by environmental philosophers and green political theorists that liberalism, the dominant tradition of western political philosophy, is too focused on the interests of human individuals to give due weight to the environment for its own sake. In "How to be a Green Liberal", Simon Hailwood challenges this view and argues that liberalism can embrace a genuinely 'green', non-instrumental view of nature. The book's central claim is that nature's 'otherness', its being constituted of independent entities and processes (...) that do not reflect our purposes, is a basis for value and can be incorporated within liberal political philosophy as a fundamental commitment alongside human freedom and equality. Hailwood argues that the conceptual resources already exist within mainstream liberalism for a thoroughly non-instrumental perspective. Adopting a rigorous philosophical approach Hailwood tackles a wide range of themes across environmental ethics, including holistic theories, deep ecology, eco-feminism and eco-anarchism, as well as issues in value theory and political philosophy more generally. In making the case for liberalism's green credentials "How to be a Green Liberal" is a formidable challenge to recent green political theory and will be required reading not only for students of political philosophy but for all those interested in the natural world and man's relationship to it. (shrink)

It is often claimed by environmental philosophers and green political theorists that liberalism, the dominant tradition of western political philosophy, is too focused on the interests of human individuals to give due weight to the environment for its own sake. In "How to be a Green Liberal", Simon Hailwood challenges this view and argues that liberalism can embrace a genuinely 'green', non-instrumental view of nature. The book's central claim is that nature's 'otherness', its being constituted of independent entities and processes (...) that do not reflect our purposes, is a basis for value and can be incorporated within liberal political philosophy as a fundamental commitment alongside human freedom and equality. Hailwood argues that the conceptual resources already exist within mainstream liberalism for a thoroughly non-instrumental perspective. Adopting a rigorous philosophical approach Hailwood tackles a wide range of themes across environmental ethics, including holistic theories, deep ecology, eco-feminism and eco-anarchism, as well as issues in value theory and political philosophy more generally. In making the case for liberalism's green credentials "How to be a Green Liberal" is a formidable challenge to recent green political theory and will be required reading not only for students of political philosophy but for all those interested in the natural world and man's relationship to it. (shrink)

In this paper I address the issue of how far libertarianism can serve as the theoretical framework for a political morality excluding serious obligations to the needy. This issue has been raised recently by Gillian Brock who argues that even those adopting a thoroughgoing libertarianism, such as that of Robert Nozick, must recognise significant obligations to the needy as a condition of claiming exclusive property rights. I argue that Brock fails to demonstrate this. After briefly describing Brock's main argument I (...) discuss the acquisition of libertarian property rights, and try to show there are sufficient resources in Nozick's account for him to accept her main conclusion in principle without recognising significant obligations. Then, after some supplementary discussion, I sketch two different lines of argument. One uses the issue of corporate liability. The other focusses on problems with Nozick's "entitlement" principle of rectification. I try to show that even if the libertarian entitlement theory of property rights, their acquisition and transfer, is accepted, this gives no grounds for resisting claims for redistribution based on others' needs. (shrink)

A popular if controversial claim, and troublesome for environmental philosophy, ethics, and related disciplines, is that “there is no such thing as nature.” The social constructionist version of this claim makes it difficult to draw a distinction between human and nonhuman nature. In response, first, the concept of landscape can be helpful in drawing this distinction. Second, taking this approach is consistent with at least one interpretation of Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism. Constructionism can be divided into two forms: moderate and radical. (...) Moderate constructionism allows the landscape/nature distinction; radical constructionism excludes it. Rorty’s claim that independent reality is “the world well lost” apparently marks him as a radical constructionist. Nevertheless, the core doctrines of his neopragmatism constitute a moderate constructionism, allowing the nature/landscape distinction. The real problem is Rorty’s anthropocentric instrumentalist characterization of pragmatic justification. Left in place, it rendersneopragmatism a form of radical social constructionism. Redescribing the terms of justification in less anthropocentric instrumentalist terms is consistent with the anti-Platonist core of neopragmatism. Thus redescribed, neopragmatism is fully consistent with the landscape/nature distinction. Anthropocentric instrumentalism, not social constructionism per se, is the problem. (shrink)

It is widely supposed that liberal political theory must exclude direct concern for nature, that its anthropocentric individualism can allow only indirect, instrumental value to the non‐human world. This is perhaps thought to be especially true of contractarian versions of liberalism. In this paper I try to show that this is not so by outlining an argument based on an analogy between the ‘neutrality’ of Rawls' political liberalism and the ‘otherness’ of external nature. I consider some possible objections to the (...) argument, and try to explain why I think that the analogy is strong enough to justify modifying the Rawlsian approach to encompass direct concern for external nature (as other). If I am right then it is not necessary completely to abandon that approach in order to construct a more adequately ecocentric political theory. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with two senses of disowning in the context of climate change and human modification of nature generally. In one of these senses disowning is something to be encouraged; but in the other sense discussed here, disowning is to be discouraged. Both raise problems for liberal theory. There is no space here to do little more than indicate some of these problems; consequently the paper is mainly negative and critical in tone. Although I focus mainly on the (...) other sense, I begin in the first part of the paper with the kind of disowning to be discouraged. This is the tendency to deny, or ignore, the responsibility we have for – and in that way ‘disown’ – the world we are in fact in the process of making including its climatic component. The other sense of disowning I go on to discuss mainly in relation to Hegel’s account of property. (shrink)

In this paper I address the question of what it is to be alienated from nature. The focus is alienation in the sense of estrangement, a ‘being cut off from’ a wider world. That we are so estranged is a claim associated with ecological critique of contemporary society. But what is it to be estranged from nature given that everything we are, do and produce, always remains within a wider nature? I explore the possibility that this might be understood with (...) reference to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘flesh’. I set the scene for this with some discussion of Honneth’s recent account of reification as a ‘distorted praxis’ and then, drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and especially his later ontology of flesh, develop the idea of estrangement from the natural world as an inadequate participation in a ‘primordial’ perceptual relation. This idea of estrangement brings together various elements of ecological critique. However, I argue that although this idea of estrangement might inform and help to articulate such a critique, it cannot be the sole concern of an environmental political philosophy: other kinds of alienation within the humanised environmental context need to be considered too. (shrink)

This book examines the general liberal aspiration of neutrality whilst moving discussion of Nozick's moral and political philosophy on from Anarchy, State and Utopia. Using neutralism as a unifying theme it connects his views on ethics, value and pluralism with the earlier libertarianism, combining an up to date critique of Nosick with a fresh view of neutrality.

A popular if controversial claim, and troublesome for environmental philosophy, ethics, and related disciplines, is that “there is no such thing as nature.” The social constructionist version of this claim makes it difficult to draw a distinction between human and nonhuman nature. In response, first, the concept of landscape can be helpful in drawing this distinction. Second, taking this approach is consistent with at least one interpretation of Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism. Constructionism can be divided into two forms: moderate and radical. (...) Moderate constructionism allows the landscape/nature distinction; radical constructionism excludes it. Rorty’s claim that independent reality is “the world well lost” apparently marks him as a radical constructionist. Nevertheless, the core doctrines of his neopragmatism constitute a moderate constructionism, allowing the nature/landscape distinction. The real problem is Rorty’s anthropocentric instrumentalist characterization of pragmatic justification. Left in place, it rendersneopragmatism a form of radical social constructionism. Redescribing the terms of justification in less anthropocentric instrumentalist terms is consistent with the anti-Platonist core of neopragmatism. Thus redescribed, neopragmatism is fully consistent with the landscape/nature distinction. Anthropocentric instrumentalism, not social constructionism per se, is the problem. (shrink)

This paper restates my argument that certain forms of liberalism can and should accept a non-instrumental perspective on the natural world. This perspective is unpacked in terms of ‘respect for nature’s otherness’. Liberalism is represented by Rawlsian political liberalism. I claim there are important congruencies between respect for nature’s otherness and the ‘reasonableness’ involved in political liberalism, such that the latter should incorporate the former. Following a suggestion of B. Baxter I reconsider these congruencies with particular emphasis on the roles (...) of toleration and integrity. I also explain further why I think it arbitrary, rather than logically inconsistent, of the political liberal to exclude respect for nature’s otherness from her conception of the political. Finally I argue that insofar as liberalism embraces ecological justice on the basis of the considerability of non-human interests, it cannot consistently exclude respect for nature’s otherness. (shrink)