This volume collects nine essays that investigate the work of Gottlob Frege. The contributors address Frege’s work in relation to literature and fiction (Dichtung), the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), and science (Wissenschaft). Overall, the essays consider internal connections between different aspects of Frege’s work while acknowledging the importance of its philosophical context. There are also further common strands between the papers, such as the relation between Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches to philosophical investigations, the relation between Frege and Kant, and the place of (...) Frege’s work in the philosophical landscape more generally. The volume is therefore of direct relevance to several current debates in philosophy in general, in addition to Frege and Wittgenstein research in particular. Even though Frege’s great significance for contemporary philosophy is not disputed, the question of how we are to understand the character and aims of his project is debated. The debate has a starting point in Frege’s specific conception of logic. The volume elucidates this conception as well as the relation between natural language and the Begriffsschrift. It will help philosophers, researchers, and students better understand the nuances of this great thinker. By extension, it will also help readers seeking to understand Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical difficulties and his struggle to find an apt form of presentation for his philosophical investigations. (shrink)

The debate surrounding Open Access publishing moved into a new and heated stage after the launching of the so called ”plan S” earlier this autumn.The plan is an initiative of cOAlition S, a consortium consisting of major national research agencies and funders from twelve European countries, coordinated bytheEuropean Research Council,and it requires that all scholarly publications resulting from research funded by members of the coalition must be openly available immediately upon publication without any embargo period, and be permanently accessible under (...) an open license allowing for re-use for any purpose, subject to proper attribution of authorship. This means that the CC BY Attribution 4.0 license will be demanded for scholarly articles. (shrink)

The debate surrounding Open Access publishing moved into a new and heated stage after the launching of the so called ”plan S” earlier this autumn.The plan is an initiative of cOAlition S, a consortium consisting of major national research agencies and funders from twelve European countries, coordinated bytheEuropean Research Council,and it requires that all scholarly publications resulting from research funded by members of the coalition must be openly available immediately upon publication without any embargo period, and be permanently accessible under (...) an open license allowing for re-use for any purpose, subject to proper attribution of authorship. This means that the CC BY Attribution 4.0 license will be demanded for scholarly articles. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nordic Wittgenstein Review Jahrgang: 2 Heft: 1 Seiten: 5-6.

This paper attempts to elucidate Wittgenstein’s remark about the “strange resemblance between a philosophical investigation (especially in mathematics) and an aesthetic one” from 1937 by looking at its textual and philosophical context. The conclusion is that the remark can be seen both as a description of a particular conception of philosophy, a prescription or declaration of intent (to proceed in a particular way), and a reminder (to Wittgenstein himself) about the form of a philosophical investigation. Furthermore, it is concluded that (...) the Darstellungsform he has in mind is the one that finds expression especially in the first part of the PI. (shrink)

A note on the special issue from the editor-in-chief.

J.S. Mill has formulated a classical statement of the "argument from analogy� concerning knowledge of other minds: "I must either believe them [other human beings] to be alive, or to be automatons� (Mill 1872, 244). It is possible that Wittgenstein had this in mind when writing the following: "I believe he is suffering.�—Do I also believe that he isn"t an automaton? It would go against the grain to use the word in both connexions. (Or is it like this: I believe (...) he is suffering, but am certain the he is not an automaton? Nonsense!) Suppose I say of a friend: "He isn"t an automaton�.—What information is conveyed by this, and to whom would it be information? To a human being who meets him in ordinary circumstances? What information could it give him? (At the very most that this man always behaves like a human being, and not occasionally like a machine.) "I believe he is not an automaton�, just like that, so far makes no sense. My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul [eine Einstellung zur Seele]. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul. (PI p. 178) Here Wittgenstein contrasts opinion (Meinung) and attitude (Einstellung). How should this contrast be understood? On a view such as Mill"s, to regard someone as a conscious being is to hold certain beliefs about him, beliefs that can perhaps ultimately be grounded in a theory of some sort. To have an "attitude towards a soul� is, on the contrary, to see a person"s gestures and facial expressions as "filled with meaning�. We have an attitude towards a soul when confronted with a person, which means that we react to his presence and behaviour in a certain way. (shrink)

The debate surrounding Open Access publishing moved into a new and heated stage after the launching of the so called ”plan S” earlier this autumn.The plan is an initiative of cOAlition S, a consortium consisting of major national research agencies and funders from twelve European countries, coordinated bytheEuropean Research Council,and it requires that all scholarly publications resulting from research funded by members of the coalition must be openly available immediately upon publication without any embargo period, and be permanently accessible under (...) an open license allowing for re-use for any purpose, subject to proper attribution of authorship. This means that the CC BY Attribution 4.0 license will be demanded for scholarly articles. (shrink)

Originally published March 20, 2020. This version published December 30, 2020.

Originally published March 20, 2020. This version published December 30, 2020.