There is an extensive literature on the allocation of medical resources in many disciplines including ethics, law, medicine, psychology and sociology (Cicognani et al., 2007; Krütli et al., 2016; P...

A scientifically proven method to overcome obstacles and make choices that lead us closer to our goals. WITH A FOREWORD BY MARTINA NAVRATILOVA What do weight gain, poor employee engagement, and climate change all have in common? All three are persistent problems for which solutions are known and readily available. Yet, on an individual and collective level, we continually make choices that lead us not closer to but further away from our stated objectives. Whether we choose the burger and fries (...) over the salad, top-down management over collaboration, or leniency over rigor in combatting climate change, it all comes down to the same thing. The Choice Point. The moment at which we each choose to take an action that we know will undermine our success, but we do it anyway. The Choice Point explains how we experience thousands of thoughts every day: 80 percent are negative, while only 5 percent are new thoughts. We make most of our decisions within two seconds, using mental autopilot systems that we've built through years of experiences, and some of our thoughts (like quitting during a challenge) can compromise our goals. But there's a strategy to change this: Functional Imagery Training (FIT). FIT teaches us how to pick the thoughts that deserve our attention, and how to stop the other, negative thoughts from impacting our actions. Through FIT, we can pause decisions that would typically conflict with our goals, lengthen our Choice Point, and go from passenger to driver of our own minds. Initially developed in 2005 by academics in the UK and Australia, with formal principles emerging through research in 2018, FIT blends motivational interviewing with imagery into a user-friendly model so we can learn, adapt, and adjust our behavior to go beyond what we think is possible. (shrink)

Here we reconsider teachers’ changing subjectivities as autonomous agents whose practices acknowledge risk as an essential element in intellectual inquiry. We seek alternative descriptions to the limiting language of teachers’ current practices within the primacy of the market. We are convinced by Levinas’s claim that ethics is the first philosophy with its concomitant responsibility for the Other. This provides a valuable point of departure and our understanding of its relevance is expanded by Biesta and Todd. This perspective allows interruption of (...) the global reform ensemble with its reductionist understandings of teachers’ subjectivities within concerns for a ‘visible pedagogy’ and performativity. We illustrate how this global policy imperative is reworked in policies in the Republic of Ireland and share reflexive insights from our tutoring of teachers studying for a Master’s degree in Education. We show that teachers’ autonomy, which we understand as the capacity of teachers to facilitate risk and make ethically informed local judgements, is severely restricted by imposed standards, codes and laws to which there is tightly policed adherence. Instead we describe teachers’ practices occurring within an Invisible Pedagogy, which is not concerned with totalising and limited performativity but instead, explores risks associated with existential possibilities beyond commodification. (shrink)

In a number of influential articles published since 1972, Dorothy Grover has developed the prosentential theory of truth. Brought together and published with a new introduction, these essays are even more impressive as a group than they were as single contributions to philosophy and linguistics. Denying that truth has an explanatory role, the prosentential theory does not address traditional truth issues like belief, meaning, and justification. Instead, it focuses on the grammatical role of the truth predicate and asserts that (...) “it is true” is a prosentence, functioning much as a pronoun does. Grover defends the theory by indicating how it can handle notorious paradoxes like the Liar, as well as by analyzing some English truth-usages. The introduction to the volume surveys traditional theories of truth, including correspondence, pragmatic, and coherence theories. It discusses the essays to come and, finally, considers the implications of the prosentential theory for other theories. Despite the fact that the prosentential theory dismisses the “nature of truth” as a red herring, Grover shows that there are important aspects of traditional truth theories that prosentential theorists have the option of endorsing. (shrink)

Theories of Truth introduces readers to issues that have been connected with truth—the only book of its kind. Richard Kirkham has an easy writing style and a good sense of what needs to be explained to students new to the literature. These facts make Theories of Truth a serious contender for use in the classroom. As with most introductions, use of the book should be supplemented with readings from the major authors covered. Beyond that supplementation, however, the text still needs (...) to be used with some caution, for there are shortcomings that could seriously mislead students. (shrink)

Utilizing Carnap's notions of "questions [or assertions] within a framework" and "questions [or assertions] about a framework" and his account of A-truth (analyticity in the broad sense), a theory of the ontological status of entities--in particular, that of theoretical entities--is adumbrated. In addition to the usual L-rules, each conceptual framework considered embodies a set of sentences whose truth value is quickly decidable on other than purely linguistic grounds, a set of A-true formulae, and a set of rules for the confirmation (...) and disconfirmation of non-L-true, non-A-true formulae which are not quickly decidable. Criteria which acceptable sets of A-true formulae must fulfill are given. Using this apparatus, a schema for a realistic interpretation of scientific theories is outlined. (shrink)

In discussing propositional quantifiers we have considered two kinds of variables: variables occupying the argument places of connectives, and variables occupying the argument places of predicates.We began with languages which contained the first kind of variable, i.e., variables taking sentences as substituends. Our first point was that there appear to be no sentences in English that serve as adequate readings of formulas containing propositional quantifiers. Then we showed how a certain natural and illuminating extension of English by prosentences did provide (...) perspicuous readings. The point of introducing prosentences was to provide a way of making clear the grammar of propositional variables: propositional variables have a prosentential character — not a pronominal character. Given this information we were able to show, on the assumption that the grammar of propositional variables in philosopher's English should be determined by their grammar in formal languages (unless a separate account of their grammar is provided), that propositional variables can be used in a grammatically and philosophically acceptable way in philosophers' English. According to our criteria of well-formedness Carnap's semantic definition of truth does not lack an ‘essential’ predicate - despite arguments to the contrary. It also followed from our account of the prosentential character of bound propositional variables that in explaining propositional quantification, sentences should not be construed as names.One matter we have not discussed is whether such quantification should be called ‘propositional’, ‘sentential’, or something else. As our variables do not range over (they are not terms) either propositions, or sentences, each name is inappropriate, given the usual picture of quantification. But we think the relevant question in this context is, are we obtaining generality with respect to propositions, sentences, or something else?Because people have argued that all bound variables must have a pronominal character, we presented and discussed in the third section languages in which the variables take propositional terms as substituends. In our case we included names of propositions, that-clauses, and names of sentences in the set of propositional terms. We made a few comparisons with the languages discussed in the second section. We showed among other things how a truth predicate could be used to obtain generality. In contrast, the languages of the second section, using propositional variables, obtain generality without the use of a truth predicate. (shrink)

This study examines the conditions under which apologies help to elicit forgiveness and restore trust following trust violations between leaders and followers. The intentionality and severity of violations are examined in a critical incident study and a laboratory study. The results support a model in which forgiveness mediates the relation of apology quality and trust. More importantly, the moderation–mediation model shows that apology quality influenced forgiveness and subsequent trust following violations that were moderate in severity–intentionality combination. The effect of apologizing (...) affects trust directly without forgiveness when the severity–intentionality combination held minor or extreme intensity. The results suggest a range in which apologies are effective and enrich understanding of the conditions under which trust can be recovered through an apology–forgiveness process in leader–follower relationships. The contribution of the study lies in elucidating that the combination of severity and intentionality of leaders’ trust violations has greater importance than either one separately. (shrink)

The self-interest paradigm predicts that unethical behavior occurs when such behavior benefits the actor. A recent model of lying behavior, however, predicts that lying behavior results from an individual''s inability to meet conflicting role demands. The need to reconcile the self-interest and role conflict theories prompted the present study, which orthogonally manipulated the benefit from lying and the conflicting role demands. A model integrating the two theories predicts the results, which showed that both elements — self benefit and role conflict (...) — influenced lying, separately and interactively. Additionally, the relative strength of the roles in conflict affected their level of influence. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

In “The Best of All Possible Worlds” William E. Mann argues that some possible worlds are morally incommensurable with some others, because some choices are between incompatible alternatives that are themselves incommensurable. The best possible world must be better than, and hence commensurable with, every other world. So if anyone in the actual world ever faces a choice between incompatible alternatives that are morally incommensurable, this is not the best possible world. But it seems that some of us do, on (...) occasion, face such choices. So this is not the best possible world. (shrink)