In medical research, it is not unusual that risks are ruled out without any specification the exact risk that was ruled out. This makes it difficult to balance expected health benefits and risk of harm when choosing between alternative treatment options. International guidelines for reporting medical research results are sufficiently specific when it comes to establishing health benefits. However, there is a lack of standards for reporting on ruling out risks. We argue that transparency is needed, as in the case (...) of non-inferiority trials. The Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials and the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses statements should be revised accordingly. (shrink)

Conceptual engineers seek to revise or replace the devices we use to speak and think. If this amounts to an effort to change what natural language expressions mean, conceptual engineers will have a hard time. It is largely unfeasible to change the meaning of e.g. ‘cause’ in English. Conceptual engineers may therefore seem unable to make the changes they aim to make. This is what I call ‘the implementation problem’. In this paper, I argue that the implementation problem dissolves if (...) we expand our view of how conceptual engineers could implement the products of their work. I describe four implementation options: Standing Meaning, Meaning Modulation, Speaker-Meaning and Different Language. I query the feasibility and worth of pursuing these options. Unless each option fails because it is unfeasible or not worthwhile, conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about. I argue that some of the options are feasible and worthwhile, and therefore, that conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about. (shrink)

On a representationalist view, conceptual engineering is the practice of changing the extensions and intensions of the devices we use to speak and think. But if this view holds true, conceptual engineering has a bad rationale. Extensions and intensions are not the sorts of things that are better or worse as such. A representationalist account of conceptual engineering thus falls prey to the objection that the practice has a bad rationale. To account for the assumption that conceptual engineering is worthwhile, (...) we propose to view what is being engineered as inferential devices, as opposed to representational devices. The objective is not to establish that being or having an inferential role is all there is to meaning or conceptual content. Rather, our agenda is to recommend a shift of focus from the representational features of content to the inferential features of content for the purposes of doing and thinking about conceptual engineering. Inferentialism about conceptual engineering makes better sense of the practice than a representationalist approach: In addition to accounting for the rationality of engaging in conceptual engineering, inferentialism provides a sound interpretation of what is at stake in concrete examples of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Many theorists of conceptual engineering appeal to the functions, roles, purposes or aims of concepts to articulate how conceptual engineering ought to be done. The functional approach to conceptual engineering is well-motivated: It promises a good account of the limits of revision, and of what makes some concept good. In this paper, I raise a problem for the functional approach which concerns the existence of harmful and methodologically insignificant concept functions. I examine whether we can deal with these problematic functions (...) by adopting a technical notion of function. I thus review the prospects for using the notions of a contextually stable function, of a designed function, of a proper function, and of a system function as our operative notion of function. None of them help us resolve the problem. On this basis, I argue that advocates of the functional approach should be committed to a comparatively weak claim, according to which functions must be assessed case-by-case, and that we are best served by employing an unsophisticated notion of function, according to which the function of a concept just is something the concept is used for. (shrink)

1911. The philosophical writings of Sigurd Ibsen, son of the famous dramatist Henrik Ibsen.

Many moral and political theorists have recently argued that the fact that an agent has innocently benefited from wrongdoing or injustice can ground special moral duties to help out the victims or simply give up the benefits. This idea is often referred to as the ‘Beneficiary Pays Principle’. This article critically assesses three recent attempts at providing a rationale for the BPP and argues that there are profound problems with each of them. It argues that even if we accept plausible (...) versions of the different normative ideas these accounts appeal to, we have no reason to accept the BPP. (shrink)

During his lifetime, Friedrich Schleiermacher went on many journeys, not only within Germany but also abroad. His last journey took him, in the last year of his life (1833), to Scandinavia, where he during many weeks travelled through parts of Sweden, Norway and Denmark. His stay in Copenhagen at the end of the journey is sufficiently documented by scholars but there exists, as far as I know, no corresponding account of the many weeks on Swedish and Norwegian soil. The aim (...) of the present paper is therefore to examine this longest part of the journey: Which way did Schleiermacher travel, which towns and places did he visit, whom did he have contact with and what else did he experience on his way? And – finally: what was the motivation of this 64 years old scholar for embarking on such a strenuous undertaking which a journey of many weeks – on land and at sea – certainly must have been in this period of our history? (shrink)

During his lifetime, Friedrich Schleiermacher went on many journeys, not only within Germany but also abroad. His last journey took him, in the last year of his life (1833), to Scandinavia, where he during many weeks travelled through parts of Sweden, Norway and Denmark. His stay in Copenhagen at the end of the journey is sufficiently documented by scholars but there exists, as far as I know, no corresponding account of the many weeks on Swedish and Norwegian soil. The aim (...) of the present paper is therefore to examine this longest part of the journey: Which way did Schleiermacher travel, which towns and places did he visit, whom did he have contact with and what else did he experience on his way? And – finally: what was the motivation of this 64 years old scholar for embarking on such a strenuous undertaking which a journey of many weeks – on land and at sea – certainly must have been in this period of our history? (shrink)

This timely collection of essays by leading international scholars across religious studies and the environmental humanities advances a lively discussion on materialism in its many forms. While there is little agreement on what 'materialism' means, it is evident that there is a resurgence in thinking about matter in more animated and active ways. The volume explores how debates concerning the new materialisms impinge on religious traditions and the extent to which religions, with their material culture and beliefs in the Divine (...) within the material, can make a creative contribution to debates about ecological materialisms. Spanning a broad range of themes, including politics, architecture, hermeneutics, literature, and religion, the book brings together a series of discussions on materialism in the context of diverse methodologies and approaches. The volume investigates a range of issues including space and place, hierarchy and relationality, the relationship between nature and society, human and other agencies, and worldviews and cultural values. Drawing on literary and critical theory, and queer, philosophical, theological and social theoretical approaches, this ground-breaking book will make an important contribution to the environmental humanities. It will be a key read for postgraduate students, researchers and scholars in religious studies, cultural anthropology, literary studies, philosophy and environmental studies. (shrink)

Magt og ideal.--Retfærdighet og kultur.--Kapitalisme og kollektivisme.--Nytteværdier og stemningsværdier.--Krig og fred.--Nationalisme og folkebrorskap.

Some normative theorists believe that there is a principled moral reason not to retain benefits realized by injustice or wrongdoing. However, critics have argued that this idea is implausible. One purported problem is that the idea lacks an obvious rationale and that attempts to provide one have been unconvincing. This paper articulates and defends the idea that the principled reason in question has an expressive quality: it gets its reason-giving force from the symbolic aptness of such an act as an (...) expressive response to wrongdoing. The paper thus argues that at least in a certain subset of cases, renouncing benefits realized by injustice amounts to a powerful and uniquely apt expression of protest against the disrespect for the victim that is implied by the wrongdoer’s actions. The paper shows how this idea can inform the question of reparations for slavery and its aftermath in the United States. Lastly it develops an important objection to the argument presented and gives an account of how this objection can be met. (shrink)

This paper proposes that the “beneficiary pays principle” may be grounded in a brand of respect for autonomy. I first argue that on one understanding, such respect implies that as far as we are not morally required to make some sacrifice in service of some purpose, we each have legitimate authority to ourselves decide the purposes for which we should make sacrifices. I then argue that the problem with retaining benefits realized by imposed sacrifices, which the victim was not required (...) to make in order to realize the benefits in question, is that doing so is disrespectful of the victim’s autonomy. (shrink)

A recurring theme in the thought of Hans Skjervheim is the following question: How to live good lives together with others? But Skjervheim’s «the other» is always a human other. In the light of the ecological crisis we should also ask ourselves: How can we live good lives together with nonhuman others? I suggest that a part of the answer to that question is an extended critique of objectivism. Through interpretations of Hans Jonas’ The Phenomenon of Life and Arne Johan (...) Vetlesen’s The Denial of Nature, I argue, in contrast to Skjervheim, that nonhuman others are subjects with a kind of freedom, and that their subjectivity and freedom marks a limit to the exercise of human power. Further I argue that humans and nonhumans can share a common world and that humans can suffer a kind of alienation in the relation to nature, as well as the better known kinds of alienation in relation to other humans. I conclude that Skjervheim deserves to be read because he provides good critiques of objectivism of humans, but that the ecologically concerned philosopher has to move beyond Skjervheim’s philosophical framework. (shrink)

This book examines the speculative core of Karl Barth’s theology, reconsidering the relationship between theory and practice in Barth’s thinking. A consequence of this reconsideration is the recognition that Barth’s own account of his theological development is largely correct. Sigurd Baark draws heavily on the philosophical tradition of German Idealism, arguing that an important part of what makes Barth a speculative theologian is the way his thinking is informed by the nexus of self-consciousness, reason and, freedom, which was most (...) fully developed by Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. The book provides a new interpretation of Barth’s theology, and shows how a speculative understanding of theology is useful in today’s intellectual climate. (shrink)

Exploring Nature's Texture brings together a collection of internationally-known group of artists, theologians, anthropologists and philosophers to look at the imaginative possibilities of using the visual arts to address the breakdown of the human relationship with the environment.

Natur og menneske.--Hvorfor politiken bliver tilbage.--Om menneskeanlæg og om menneskekunst.--Om store mænd. Et vurderingsforsøg.

This article discusses Hans Jonas’ argument for teleology in living organisms, in light of recently raised concerns over enactivism’s “Jonasian turn.” Drawing on textual resources rarely discussed in contemporary enactivist literature on Jonas’ philosophy, we reconstruct five core ideas of his thinking: 1) That natural science’s rejection of teleology is methodological rather than ontological, and thus not a proof of its non-existence; 2) that denial of the reality of teleology amounts to a performative self-contradiction; 3) that the fact of evolution (...) makes it implausible that only humans actualize purpose; 4) that the concept of metabolism delimits and gestures towards beings performing purposive activity; and 5) that concrete encounters with living organisms are indispensable for the judgment that they are purposive. Lastly, we draw attention to how Jonas’ understanding of teleology and inwardness in nonhuman life in terms of degrees of identity with human life poses a problem for his view. In this way, we hope to clarify what Jonas, as an important source of inspiration for the enactivist project, is proposing. (shrink)

Advance directives (ADs) have for some time been championed by ethicists and patient associations alike as a tool that people newly diagnosed with dementia, or prior to onset, may use to ensure that their future care and treatment are organized in accordance with their interests. The idea is that autonomous people, not yet neurologically affected by dementia, can design directives for their future care that caregivers are morally obligated to respect because they have been designed by autonomous individuals. In this (...) paper, we first criticize the idea that ADs can retain moral authority in severe dementia by arguing that it is paradoxical. Second, we consider two arguments that initially seem to refute this critique of ADs, but we eventually dismiss them. The first argument states that ADs retain moral authority in severe dementia because autonomously formed interests, for example, ADs, can only be appropriately discarded by autonomous persons. This we term the historical autonomy argument. We dismiss it by demonstrating how we, in analog cases, are not obligated to continue to respect autonomously formed interests even though they have been discarded under nonappropriate conditions. The second argument is that ADs can be justified by what we term external interests. While we agree that people with severe dementia plausible can be said to have external interests, we show that ADs cannot express such interests and hence cannot be justified by them. We conclude that none of the discussed arguments support the use of ADs and because of this, the idea of ADs should be reassigned. (shrink)

PhD, Institute of Public Health, Unit of Medical Philosophy and Clinical Theory, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, P.O. Box 2099 1014 Copenhagen. Tel: +45 30 32 33 63; Email: s.lauridsen{at}pubhealth.ku.dk ' + u + '@ ' + d + ' '/ /- ->Citizens’ consent to political decisions is often regarded as a necessary condition of political legitimacy. Consequently, legitimate allocation of healthcare has seemed almost unattainable in contemporary pluralistic societies. The problem is that citizens do not agree on any (...) single principle governing priorities among groups of patients. The Accountability for Reasonableness framework suggests an ingenious solution to this problem of moral disagreement. Rather than advocating any substantive distributive principle, its advocates propose a feasible set of conditions, which, if met by decision makers at the institutional level, provide, so it is promised, legitimate decisions. While we agree that A4R represents an important contribution to the priority-setting debate, we challenge the framework in two respects. First, we argue that A4R, and more specifically the relevance condition of A4R, does not enable healthcare institutions to generally distinguish between relevant and irrelevant reasons for priority-setting. Second, we criticize Daniels’ and Sabin's argument that A4R and deliberative democracy constitute necessary and sufficient conditions of a feasible procedure for setting legitimate limits within healthcare. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Written for both theoretical and practical purposes, Dysfunctional Culture discusses how to understand and identify political ideologies as cultural systems. Using examples related to family morality and reproduction, this book argues that belief in individual rights as the main basis for morality is not an adequate response to the moral challenges of the future.

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft Jahrgang: 22 Heft: 2 Seiten: 150-175.

The inevitable need for rationing of healthcare has apparently presented the medical profession with the dilemma of choosing the lesser of two evils. Physicians appear to be obliged to adopt either an implausible version of traditional professional ethics or an equally problematic ethics of bedside rationing. The former requires unrestricted advocacy of patients but prompts distrust, moral hazard and unfairness. The latter commits physicians to rationing at the bedside; but it is bound to introduce unfair inequalities among patients and lack (...) of political accountability towards citizens. In this paper I shall argue that this dilemma is false, since a third intermediate alternative exists. This alternative, which I term 'administrative gatekeeping', makes it possible for physicians to be involved in rationing while at the same time being genuine advocates of their patients. According to this ideal, physicians are required to follow fair rules of rationing adopted at higher organizational levels within healthcare systems. At the same time, however, they are prohibited from including considerations of cost in their clinical decisions. (shrink)

Human mobility is dramatically on the rise; globalization and modern technology have increased transportation and migration. Frequent journeys over large distances cause huge energy consumption, severely impact local and global natural environments and raise spiritual and ethical questions about our place in the world. 'Spaces of Mobility' presents an analysis of the socio-political, environmental, and ethical aspects of mobility. The volume brings together essays that examine why and how modern modes of transport emerge, considering their effect on society. The religious (...) significance of contemporary travel is outlined, namely its impact on pilgrimage, Christology and ethics. The essays examine the interaction between humans and their surroundings and question how increased mobility affects human identity and self-understanding. 'Spaces of Mobility' will be of interest to students and scholars seeking to understand the impact of mobility on modern culture and society, the ethics behind contemporary transport systems and the conditions of immigrants in a world of constant travel. (shrink)

Human mobility is dramatically on the rise; globalization and modern technology have increased transportation and migration. Frequent journeys over large distances cause huge energy consumption, severely impact local and global natural environments and raise spiritual and ethical questions about our place in the world. 'Spaces of Mobility' presents an analysis of the socio-political, environmental, and ethical aspects of mobility. The volume brings together essays that examine why and how modern modes of transport emerge, considering their effect on society. The religious (...) significance of contemporary travel is outlined, namely its impact on pilgrimage, Christology and ethics. The essays examine the interaction between humans and their surroundings and question how increased mobility affects human identity and self-understanding. 'Spaces of Mobility' will be of interest to students and scholars seeking to understand the impact of mobility on modern culture and society, the ethics behind contemporary transport systems and the conditions of immigrants in a world of constant travel. (shrink)

Triage is a widespread principle for prioritizing patients in emergency departments. The purpose of triage is to ensure that in emergency situations, whenever medical demand exceeds medical supply, limited resources should be directed to the case with the greatest clinical need. Triage fulfills this purpose by ranking patients according to how acute their condition is and then giving priority to the most acute ones. In this paper, I argue that this current practice of triage needs to be supplemented. Contemporary triage (...) is based on a principle of preserving patients’ core capabilities, which is relevant when it comes to prioritizing acute patients above sub‐acute ones, but not for prioritizing among sub‐acute patients, which is the largest group of emergency patients. Henceforth, I propose to supplement triage with what I term the real dialogue model, a framework that, when combined with enhanced professional autonomy for clinical decision‐makers, enables fair prioritizing among sub‐acute patients. (shrink)

This article examines the concepts of alienation and identification in the context of the Anthropocene. It is a common claim in environmental thinking that alienation from nature drives ecological destruction and that a part of the cure for such an unhealthy relationship to nature is to recover a sense of identification with nature. The article challenges this view, by arguing that in the Anthropocene identification with nature may not be solely good, alienation from nature may not be solely bad, and (...) identification and alienation may not be mutually exclusive phenomena. This thesis is defended through a critique of Arne Næss’s view on identification and alienation, and by drawing and elaborating on Simon Hailwood’s study of alienation in environmental philosophy and Adorno’s critique of “identity-thinking.” It also considers a specific case, the so-called “Plastic Whale” that was stranded outside the coast of Norway in 2017. (shrink)

IntroductionExercise at high intensity may cause lower affective responses toward exercise compared with moderate intensity exercise. We aimed to elucidate affective valence and enjoyment in high- and moderate-high interval exercise.MethodsTwenty recreationally active participants underwent three different treadmill running exercise sessions per week over a 3-week period, in randomized order; CE70: 45 min continuous exercise at 70% of heart rate maximum, INT80: 4 × 4 min intervals at 80% of HRmax, INT90: 4 × 4 min intervals at 90% of HRmax. Pre-tests (...) included graded submaximal steady state intensities and a test to exhaustion for determining peak oxygen uptake and HRmax. Affective valence was measured before, during and after the sessions using the Feeling Scale. Enjoyment was assessed before and after the sessions applying the Physical Activity Enjoyment Scale and during the sessions using the Exercise Enjoyment Scale.ResultsThe participants felt lower pleasure during INT90 sessions compared with INT80 and CE70 sessions, with no differences between INT80 and CE70 sessions. There were higher enjoyment after INT80 sessions versus CE70 sessions, and no differences between INT90 and CE70 or INT80. For enjoyment during exercise, CE70 were perceived more enjoyable, and INT80 and INT90 less enjoyable in week 2 and 3 than in week 1.ConclusionThe negative affective consequences associated with high intensity interval exercise can be alleviated by keeping the intensity at or around 80% of HRmax while preserving the beneficial enjoyment responses associated with interval exercise. (shrink)