The book discusses the central notion of logic: the concept of logical consequence. It shows that the classical definition of consequence as truth preservation in all models must be restricted to all admissible models. The challenge for the philosophy of logic is therefore to supplement the definition with a criterion for admissible models. -/- The problem of logical constants, so prominent in the current debate, constitutes but a special case of this much more general demarcation problem. The book explores the (...) various dimensions of the problem of admissible models and argues that standard responses are unwarranted. As a result, it develops a new vision of logic, suggesting in particular that logic is deeply imbued with metaphysics. (shrink)
Voluntary sustainability standards that establish global rules for firms’ environmental and/or social conduct and allow for verification of firm compliance via third-party certification hold the promise to govern firms’ sustainability conduct in a globalizing world economy. However, the recent proliferation of competing and overlapping global sustainability standards that have been developed by various stakeholders with different agendas, creates uncertainties for firms that likely reduce their propensity to adopt any standard. Without widespread adoption these standards cannot effectively govern firm conduct and (...) in contrast create barriers for firms’ access to export markets. We suggest that the uncertainties associated with competing standards and the effect of these uncertainties on standard certification decisions are especially large for firms in emerging economies because these firms lack access to information about current and future standards and the resources to obtain certifications to multiple standards. We theoretically propose and empirically identify three distinct sources of sustainability standard uncertainty: diversity of customer requirements, dynamism of customer requirements, and the unpredictability of the future evolution of standard and propose that each of these sources reduces firms’ propensity to obtain certification to any standard. Our empirical results based on certifications to food safety standards by a sample of 97 Mexican food exporting firms confirm that three distinct sources of sustainability standard uncertainty exist and that all of them negatively impact certification. We discuss ethical implications and offer recommendations for both suppliers as well as standard setting organizations. (shrink)
The book discusses the central notion of logic, the concept of logical consequence, and its model-theoretic definition as truth-preservation in all models. Whether the model-theoretic definition captures the modal and epistemological features of our pre-theoretic notion depends on what models model. The book argues that, given a non-formal understanding of models, the universal quantifier used in the definition of consequence must be restricted: if literally all models had to be considered, no argument would ever be logically valid. A central challenge (...) of the philosophy of logic is therefore to supplement the model-theoretic definition by a criterion for admissible models. The problem of logical constants, so prominent in the current literature on logical consequence, constitutes but a special case of this much more general demarcation problem. The book explores the various dimensions of the problem of admissible interpretations and proposes that the standard views are unjustified or even unjustifiable. As a consequence, it develops a new vision of logic and suggests in particular that our notion of logical consequence is deeply imbued with metaphysics. (shrink)
The paper provides a new argument against the classical invariance criterion for logical terms: if all terms with a permutation invariant extension qualify as logical, then for any arbitrary true contingent sentence K of the meta-language, there would be a logically true object-language sentence 'φ' such that K follows from the sentence 'φ is true'. Thus, many logically true sentences would be a posteriori. To prevent this fatal consequence, we propose to alter the invariance criterion: not only the term's extension, (...) but also its semantic clause must satisfy certain invariance conditions. The paper ends with the observation that the new criterion makes explicit the dependency of the classification of terms into logical and non-logical ones at the different levels of the Tarskian hierarchy of languages. (shrink)
It has recently been argued that some cases of naked statistical evidence license a high credence, but not an outright belief. If this is correct, there cannot be an unconditional bridge principle from credence to outright belief. We show that at least one prominent putative counterexample to such a bridge principle is based on a mistake, by demonstrating that the statistical evidence falls short not only of licensing rational belief, but also of justifying a high credence.
Background Knowledge and attitude towards organ donation are critical factors influencing organ donation rate. We aimed to assess the knowledge and attitude towards organ donation in adolescents in Austria and Switzerland. Methods A paper-based survey was performed in two secondary schools in Austria and Switzerland. 354/400 surveys were sufficiently answered and analyzed. Results Our study found that knowledge on organ donation is scarce in adolescents. Less than 60% of those surveyed thinks that a person is dead when declared brain dead. (...) 84.6% would authorize organ donation after brain death for themselves, but only 69% would authorize organ donation after brain death for a close relative. 93.7% would accept a donor organ if they needed one. Family discussions, rather than school discussions, influenced knowledge on organ donation, the percentage of respondents who have a firm opinion on organ donation and the rate of declaration of this opinion. Age, gender, nationality and religion also influenced knowledge and attitude towards organ donation. Nearly one third of adolescents are of the opinion that selling non-vital organs should be legalized. Conclusion Since having had family discussions, a potentially modifiable factor, was positively associated with knowledge and attitude towards organ donation, we postulate that educational programs stimulating family discussions on organ donation may be a promising strategy to increase knowledge. (shrink)
The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) waiting list was designed as a just and equitable system through which the limited number of organs is allocated to the millions of Americans in need of a transplant. People have trusted the system because of the belief that everyone on the list has an equal opportunity to receive an organ and also that allocation is blind to matters of financial standing, celebrity or political power. Recent events have revealed that certain practices and (...) policies have the potential to be exploited. The policies addressed in this paper enable those on the list with the proper resources to gain an advantage over other less fortunate members, creating a system that benefits not the individual most in medical need, but the one with the best resources. These policies are not only unethical but threaten the balance and success of the entire UNOS system. This paper proposes one possible solution, which seeks to balance the concepts of justice and utility. (shrink)
The paper investigates the prospects of Spohn’s ranking theory with respect to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Based on a novel analysis of the riddle (Freitag [manuscript]), we show it to be an inductive extension of Hansson’s puzzle (Hansson 1992, 1999). As a consequence, a solution needs to take into account the dependence relations between evidential beliefs: “grue” is unprojectible because it depends on evidence whose projection is defeated. It will be suggested that this solution can be implemented into Spohn’s (...) ranking theory, but that ranking theory is unable to provide a proper explanation of the required conditional ranks. (shrink)
We investigate a construction schema for first-order logical systems, called “form logic”. Form logic allows us to overcome the dualistic commitment of predicate logic to individual constants and predicates. Dualism is replaced by a pluralism of terms of different “logical forms”. Individual form-logical systems are generated by the determination of a range of logical forms and of the formbased syntax rules for combining terms into formulas. We develop a generic syntax and semantics for such systems and provide a completeness proof (...) for them. To illustrate the idea of form logic, and the possibilities it facilitates, we discuss three particular systems, one of which is the form-logical reconstruction of standard first-order predicate logic. (shrink)
We can distinguish two non-equivalent ways in which a natural language argument can be valid: it can be interpretationally or representationally valid. However, there is just one notion of classical first-order validity for formal languages: truth-preservation in all classical first-order models. To ease the tension, Baumgartner suggests that we should understand interpretational and representational validity as imposing different adequacy conditions on formalizations of natural language arguments. I argue against this proposal. To that end, I first show that Baumgartner’s definition of (...) representational validity is extensionally inadequate. I present a number of natural language arguments that we pre-theoretically hold to be representationally valid, but are not representationally valid according to Baumgartner’s definition. I then point to two further untenable features of Baumgartner’s definitions: according to Baumgartner’s definition of a representationally correct formalization, we cannot arrive at formalizations in a recursive way, and Baumgartner’s definition of representational validity is non-monotonic. I conclude that interpretational and representational validity cannot be understood as merely imposing different adequacy conditions on formalizations. If we want to capture our interpretational and representational intuitions, we need two different formal definitions of validity. (shrink)
Dans l’avant-propos de ce recueil d’actes, Jacques Jouanna rappelle que la quatorzième édition du colloque hippocratique a fait date en ce qu’elle célébrait les quarante ans d’une série ininterrompue de conférences, inaugurée en 1972 par Louis Bourgey et lui-même. Parmi les vingt-quatre contributions rassemblées, onze portent sur les textes du Corpus hippocratique, tandis que les treize autres sont consacrées aux « hippocratismes », c’est-à-dire à la transmission et à la réception d’Hippocrat...
According to the classical invariance criterion, a term is logical if and only if its extension is isomorphism-invariant. However, a number of authors have devised examples that challenge the sufficiency of this condition: accepting these examples as logical constants would introduce objectionable contingent elements into logic. Recently, Gil Sagi has responded that these objections are based on a fallacious inference from the modal status of a sentence to the modal status of the proposition expressed by that sentence. The present paper (...) demonstrates that Sagi’s response, though successful, is futile. There is another objection, based on the same type of example, that is not susceptible to Sagi’s criticism: accepting the examples as logical terms would have the fatal consequence that any contingent metalanguage sentence is entailed by the truth of some logically true object-language sentence. I conclude with a sketch of an alternative to the classical invariance criterion. (shrink)
Treatment-resistant symptoms complicate the clinical course of schizophrenia, and a large proportion of patients do not reach functional recovery. In consequence, polypharmacy is frequently used in treatment-refractory cases, addressing psychotic positive, negative and cognitive symptoms, treatment-emergent side effects caused by antipsychotics and comorbid depressive or obsessive-compulsive symptoms. To a large extent, such strategies are not covered by pharmacological guidelines which strongly suggest antipsychotic monotherapy. Add-on strategies comprise combinations of several antipsychotic agents and augmentations with mood stabilizers; moreover, antidepressants and experimental (...) substances are applied. Based on the accumulated evidence of clinical trials and meta-analyses, combinations of clozapine with certain second-generation antipsychotic agents and the augmentation of antipsychotics with antidepressants seem recommendable, while the augmentation with mood stabilizers cannot be considered superior to placebo. Forthcoming investigations will have to focus on innovative pharmacological agents, the clinical spectrum of cognitive deficits and the implementation of cognitive behavioral therapy. (shrink)
The paper develops an inductive extension of AGM-style belief base revision theory with the aim of formally implementing Freitag’s :254–267, 2015, Dialectica 70:185–200, 2016) solution to Goodman’s paradox. It shows that the paradox dissolves once belief revision takes place on inductively closed belief bases, rather than on belief sets.
The article investigates Dostoevsky 's juridical discourse and demonstrates that the apologist of the Russian soul had a genuinely European mind. In his novel The Idiot in particular, in which the death penalty and imprisonment are explored, Dostoevsky unmasks— more radically even than Victor Hugo— the supposedly civilised and lenient forms of modern criminal justice. Dostoevsky 's criticism is ahead of its time; his arguments resemble those subsequently put forward by Foucault. A comparison with Anatoly Pristavkin's report on post-Communist crime (...) and jurisdiction underscores the topicality of these reflections. (shrink)