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    Decision, irreversibility and flexibility: The irreversibility effect re-examined.Shyama V. Ramani & Alban Richard - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (3):259-276.
  2. Does trust matter for R&D cooperation? A game theoretic examination.Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Shyama V. Ramani - 2004 - Theory and Decision 57 (2):143-180.
    The game theoretical approach to R&D cooperation does not investigate the role of trust in the initiation and success of R&D cooperation: it either assumes that firms are non-opportunists or that the R&D cooperation is supported by an incentive mechanism that eliminates opportunism. In contrast, the present paper focuses on these issues by introducing incomplete information and two types of firms: opportunist and non-opportunist. Defining trust as the belief of each firm that its potential collaborator will respect the contract, it (...)
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  3. R&D cooperation in emerging industries, asymmetric innovative capabilities and rationale for technology parks.Vivekananda Mukherjee & Shyama V. Ramani - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (3):373-394.
    Starting from the premise that firms are distinct in terms of their capacity to create innovations, this article explores the rationale for R&D cooperation and the choice between alliances that involve information sharing, cost sharing or both. Defining innovative capability as the probability of creating an innovation, it examines firm strategy in a duopoly market, where firms have to decide whether or not to cooperate to acquire a fixed cost R&D infrastructure that would endow each firm with a firm-specific innovative (...)
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