Scientific normativity, one of the contentious issues in the philosophy of science, warrants thorough exploration to situate the epistemic role of the norms governing methodological choices in science. This paper endeavors to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of it by using Lewis' account of convention. The attempt is to develop a social conventional framework for scientific normativity. It is an epistemological framework that recognizes scientific norms governing methodological choices as social conventions. These social conventions are arrived at by appealing to (...) the values, goals, desires, and assumptions that characterize the sociality of the situation in which they emerge. We argue for a pluralistic notion of scientific normativity without being dismissive of the universalists’ central concerns. (shrink)

Larry Laudan (Philosophy of Science, 57(1), 44-59, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 21(2), 315-322) proposes and defends a naturalistic philosophy of science called normative naturalism. The paper will delineate the cardinal features of normative naturalism and some of the critiques against it. The objective of the paper is to present an analytical review of normative naturalism. The objections raised in this paper are limited to evaluating Laudan’s normative naturalism in the light of his theory of axiology. We will (...) assess whether Laudan’s interpretation of the hierarchical model is historically accurate, the instrumental conception of scientific methodology, and the naturalness of the axiological criterion. The analysis of Laudan’s account of axiology reveals some inherent contradictions in his normative naturalism. We propose a strategy to rectify these inconsistencies in order to make Laudan’s normative naturalism compatible with his naturalistic project. (shrink)

Quine has been charged with eliminating the normative dimension from his naturalized epistemology. The aim of the paper is to look at the role of empathy in Quine's language learning situation, which in its simplest form is constituted by the parent-child relation. We will explore the normativity of the role of empathy thereof by exploiting the sociality of the language learning situation. Since the sociality of Quine's notion of empathy is implicit, to explore the normativity expression thereof, we will examine (...) the explicit sociality of Wittgenstein's language learning situation-also constituted in its simplest form by the master-novice relation-and the normative character of it. By explicating the normativity of the calibrating role of the master and of rule following generally, we will parse the social dimensions of the empathizing role of the linguist in Quine's language learning situation. Finally, by examining the nature of normativity in empathizing, we will establish that the normativity of empathizing involved in Quine's language learning situation is socially grounded without denying its individual dimension. We will conclude that the normativity objection against Quine's naturalism thus stands refuted. (shrink)

Examing the question, which is the title of the paper, in the light of the works of some prominent philosophers of science.