Euthanasia and physician assisted-suicide are terms used to describe the process in which a doctor of a sick or disabled individual engages in an activity which directly or indirectly leads to their death. This behavior is engaged by the healthcare provider based on their humanistic desire to end suffering and pain. The psychiatrist's involvement may be requested in several distinct situations including evaluation of patient capacity when an appeal for euthanasia is requested on grounds of terminal somatic illness or when (...) the patient is requesting euthanasia due to mental suffering. We compare attitudes of 49 psychiatrists towards euthanasia and assisted suicide with a group of 54 other physicians by means of a questionnaire describing different patients, who either requested physician-assisted suicide or in whom euthanasia as a treatment option was considered, followed by a set of questions relating to euthanasia implementation. When controlled for religious practice, psychiatrists expressed more conservative views regarding euthanasia than did physicians from other medical specialties. Similarly female physicians and orthodox physicians indicated more conservative views. Differences may be due to factors inherent in subspecialty education. We suggest that in light of the unique complexity and context of patient euthanasia requests, based on their training and professional expertise psychiatrists are well suited to take a prominent role in evaluating such requests to die and making a decision as to the relative importance of competing variables. (shrink)

Review: Shlomi Segall (2013) Equality and opportunity.

“Chance as a Positive Space of Indetermination in the Thomistic Assimilation of Aristotle’s Physics”. This article analyzes Thomas Aquinas’s assimilation of the Aristotelian theory of chance. The analysis highlights Thomas Aquinas’s unequivocal acceptance of Aristotelian philosophy, as well as the issues regarding which he abandoned the Aristotelian position by offering a new interpretation related to the role of chance in the context of the created cosmos. All in all, the confluence of these two great systems of thought –Aristotelian thought and (...) late Medieval Christianity– provided new ways to understand nature, by expanding the scope of physics from the absolutely determined to the anomalous and irregular. (shrink)

La migración internacional nos enfrenta con problemas irresolubles desde la figura moderna del Estado nacional, su concepto de ciudadanía y su noción de justicia. Juan Carlos Velasco critica las limitaciones y la orientación de las políticas contemporáneas que nos hacen percibir a la migración como una “invasión”, y propone un modo radicalmente diferente de entender e intervenir el fenómeno desde lo trasnacional. Nacer de uno u otro lado de una línea divisoria es un evento azaroso, no obstante delimitar la frontera (...) es una construcción histórico-política: la desigualdad en las oportunidades que ofrecen las naciones es una situación estructural de injusticia que se perpetúa con las políticas de exclusión de los migrantes y la deslegitimación de su derecho a buscar una vida mejor. Esa circunstancia genera fracturas sociales, injustificables pero normalizadas, que imposibilitan alcanzar la justicia global. Velasco presenta un análisis completo que abarca las dimensiones política, jurídica y moral del tema, en el que lleva a la filosofía política a un terreno práctico del que se desprenden las claves para entender y actuar en esta nueva era en la que, debido a los conflictos sociales y políticos, la migración vuelve a ser argumento de discusión relevante. (Texto de la CONTRAPORTADA del libro). (shrink)

Las relaciones que pueden establecerse entre azar, igualdad y biotecnología suscitan un debatebien prolijo en el campo de la filosofía moral, generando dudas y numerosas discusiones. La reflexión sobre el alcance moral de ciertas hipotéticas posibilidades que podría brindar la biotecnología, permite iluminar el debate sobre la suerte bruta en materia de justicia distributiva.

Shlomi Segall’s Why Inequality Matters contains many novel ideas. It should engage researchers with an interest in debates between luck egalitarians and two of their principal opponents, prioritarians and sufficientarians. While, as I shall argue below, not all of its arguments succeed, it also makes contributions which deserve to profoundly influence debates on distributive justice. I proceed as follows. In Section 1, I summarize the book’s central points; in Section 2, I evaluate some of its arguments.

The article considers the notion of contingency and chance in Thomas Aquinas.

Equality is a key concept in our moral and political vocabulary. There is wide agreement on its instrumental value and its favourable impact on many aspects of society, but less certainty over whether it has a non-instrumental or intrinsic value that can be demonstrated. In this project, Shlomi Segall explores and defends the view that it does. He argues that the value of equality is not reducible to a concern we might have for the worse off, or to ensuring (...) that individuals do not fall into poverty and destitution; instead he claims that undeserved inequalities, wherever and whenever we might find them, are bad in themselves. Assessing the strength of competing accounts, such as sufficientarianism and prioritarianism, he brings together for the first time discussions of the moral value of equality with luck- or responsibility-sensitive accounts of distributive justice. His book will interest readers in political and moral philosophy. (shrink)

1. Ḥidushe sugyot -- 2. Sheʼelot u-teshuvot -- 3. Sugyot derushim.

Resumen En 1976, Nagel y Williams presentaron -en una reunión de la Aristotelian Society- dos célebres textos dirigidos a exhibir el desafío que el azar y la fortuna representan para la imputación kantiana de responsabilidad moral. Desde entonces han proliferado cientos de artículos centrados en analizar este dilema. Dicho debate, no obstante, rara vez es situado al interior del análisis de las implausibles y falsas premisas que dan lugar a él. En este trabajo reconstruyo las coordenadas centrales en las (...) que esta problemática filosófica se origina. Posteriormente muestro que la imputación de responsabilidad ética a un agente no sólo no excluye, sino incluso presupone, lo que llamaré una capacidad impura de agencia donde la suerte ocupa un lugar central.In 1976, Nagel and Williams presented -at the congress of the Aristotelian Society- two famous texts aimed at exposing the challenge that chance and fortune represent for moral thought. Since then, hundreds of articles have proliferated in the literature focused on analyzing this dilemma. This debate, however, is rarely situated within the analysis of the implausible and false premises that give rise to it. In this paper I reconstruct the central coordinates in which this philosophical problem originates. Later, I show that imputation of ethical responsibility to an agent not only does not exclude, but even presupposes, what I will call an impure capacity for agency where luck occupies a central place. (shrink)

Egalitarians have traditionally been suspicious of equality of opportunity, but recently there has been a sea-change in thinking about that concept. Shlomi Segall brings together these developments and offers a new account of 'radical equality of opportunity', which removes all obstacles (to one's opportunity-set) that lie outside one's control.

Health, Luck, and Justice is the first attempt to systematically apply luck egalitarianism to the just distribution of health and health care.

This work is the first monograph devoted to the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of chance in Physics II 4-6 and its implications and projections in other treatises, including an original and comprehensive account of the Aristotelian conception of chance, of accidental causality in the realm of nature, and of accidental causality in the realm of human action. One of the main interpretative issues around Aristotle’s discussion of chance is its relation to the four causes and to teleology. In this sense, (...) it is particularly difficult to find the common features which fortune (tyche) and spontaneity (automaton) share. This work, offers such an interpretation of Aristotle’s general concept of chance (i.e. common to fortune and spontaneity), which shows clearly its relation with his theory of causality (Phys. II 3), with teleology, and with the application of this theory to the study of nature. It also shows how fortune and spontaneity can be interpreted consistently with this general characterization of chance, and how the specific differences between them can be accounted for paying attention to the different structures of causality in the realm of nature and in the realm of human action. Regarding the specific concept of spontaneity (automaton), a crux interpretum, the book offers one of the few independent discussions this issue in Aristotelian literature, and proposes a sub-classification in two kinds of spontaneity based on an analysis of Aristotle’s different examples and characterizations: ‘mixed spontaneity’ (which shares some features with fortune), and ‘pure spontaneity’ (which takes place strictly in the realm of nature). These different structures had not been recognized in specialized literature before. The problem of chance has projections into Aristotle’s natural philosophy, as well as into Aristotle’s theory of action and practical philosophy. This ample perspective of Aristotle’s work, and of the different explanatory models and ontological structures therein involved, constitutes an interesting groundwork for future developments in some or many of these realms of investigation. (shrink)

This paper aims to analyze the idea of randomness in Greek philo-sophy since Empedocle to Plato to show determinism as unavoidable companion of most deterministic doctrines. Despite their adherence to determinism, even Plato and Aristotle introduce randomness to account for the various forms of reality, following so Empedocle and the atomists. There are as many contentions for randomness as for necessity in Greek and Latin thought.

The Seville Statement on Violence rejected the view that violence and war were in any way rooted in human nature and proclaimed that they were merely a cultural artifact. This paper points out both the valid and invalid parts of the statement. It concludes that the potential for both war and peace is embedded in us. The human behavioral toolkit comprises a number of major tools, respectively geared for violent conflict, peaceful competition, or cooperation, depending on people’s assessment of what (...) will serve them best in any given circumstance. Conflict is only one tool—the hammer—in our diverse behavioral toolkit. However, all three behavioral strategies are not purely learned cultural forms. This naive nature/nurture dichotomy overlooks the heavy and complex biological machinery that is necessary for the working of each of them and the interplay between them. They are all very close under our skin and readily activated because they have all been very handy during our long evolutionary past. At the same time, they are variably calibrated to particular conditions through social learning, which means that their relative use may fluctuate widely. Thus, state authority has tilted the menu of human choices in the direction of the peaceful options in the domestic arena, and changing economic, social, and political conditions may be generating a similar effect in the international arena. (shrink)

Part 1: Philosophical inquisitions -- Labyrinthal paradigms: western philosophy in Borges' Oeuvre -- Literary philosophers: Mythos and Logos in Borges and Plato -- Philosophy and ideology: dialectical Orientalism in Borges' writings -- Part 2: Comparative perspectives -- Borges and Schopenhauer: microcosms and aesthetic observation -- Borges, Herclitus, and the River of Time -- A view from eternity: the archetypal quest -- Borges and Levinas face to face: writing and riddle of subjectivity -- Narrative aspect change and alternating systems of justice: (...) A Wittgensteinian reading of Borges -- Borges, Wittgenstein, and Kierkegaard on the boundaries of language: mystical silence and indirect communication -- Borges and Berkeley: idealism and the ontology of the fantastical object. (shrink)

This paper essays to show the path, that lead from Keynes' conception of chance to his conception of economy. In order to this, we analyze what understand Keynes as chance, his theory of the probability and in what way this, across the expectation, determine the keynesian concept of economy.

One fine day, Hermann Sörgel receives the complete memory of William Shakespeare. A scholar who has devoted his life to studying the bard's works, the professor understands that he has been given a priceless treasure. With the key to understanding the poet's consciousness in his hand, he will be able to perfectly interpret all his writings. Gradually, Shakespeare's memories are being absorbed into his mind. He is surprised to realize, however, that possession of the bard's memory has only given him (...) access to a "chaos of vague possibilities." At this point, he begins to grasp that he still cannot decipher the enigma of Shakespeare's luminous oeuvre, the poet's memory revealing only the "circumstances of the man... (shrink)

This article engages the analogy of Palestine/Israel to apartheid South Africa, and probes the political imaginary that contours this discussion while explicating the circumstances of its emergence. Accordingly, it contends that apartheid is not merely a system of institutionalized separation; rather, it organizes the facts and reality of separation(s) within a frame and against a background unity that effectively allows it to be perceived as such. To that end, the article explores four key factors that created background unity in apartheid (...) South Africa: labor relations; political theology; role of language; and geo-political unit(y), and scrutinizes their political and experiential ramifications in Palestine/Israel. (shrink)

What is true? (Though never the whole truth) -- What is right? How morality should be conceived -- Religious ideological fixation : examined by a non-hostile atheist -- The major contenders of modernity : liberalism, socialism, fascism -- The West's guilt towards the 'rest' -- Nature or nurture? : nations and nationhood -- Nature or nurture? : gender and sexual behavior -- Can anything be done? Some very tentative reflections on current ideological battlefields -- Conclusion: Ideological fixation : now and (...) ever. (shrink)

This paper essays to show the path, that lead from Keynes' conception of chance to his conception of economy. In order to this, we analyze what understand Keynes as chance, his theory of the probability and in what way this, across the expectation, determine the keynesian concept of economy.

The debate over group selection shows no signs of abating. If existent, group selection is likely to have significantly reinforced prosocial and altruistic behavior. This article is theoretical and argues that there have been some major lacunae in the debate as concerns humans. The traits that are most uniquely and universally human—such as prolonged rearing of dependent offspring, the family, large-scale, tribal networks, and cultural-linguistic diversity and exclusivity—have been largely overlooked. These most salient and mutually reinforcing human specifics vastly increased (...) individuals' stake in and commitment to ancestral tribal groups. Tribal members were in the same boat, and risked massive fitness loss if it were sunk. This suggests that group selection existed and was much stronger among humans than among any other animal species. (shrink)

This article explore the limitations of progressive and feminist legal change through a study of the development of gender-based refugee policy in Canada. I argue that the actual impact of feminist and progressive legal change is determined in interaction with the wider bureaucratic and administrative contexts of its implementation; administrative strategies and bureaucratic procedures may, in fact, capably undermine the potentially expansive effects of progressive jurisprudence. As I will show, feminist legal interventions in Canada’s refugee policy did not increase actual (...) access to refugee protection. Not only were these interventions delivered in a decidedly limited administrative form, they occurred simultaneously with highly innovative and coordinated bureaucratic practices that limited the access of large groups of refugee claimants to protection. Thus, while the Canadian refugee system expanded jurisprudentially, access to this system was tightly restricted through administrative and bureaucratic measures. (shrink)

The article argues that discrimination is bad as such when and because it undermines equality of opportunity. It shows, first, that other accounts, such as those concerning intent, efficiency, false representation, prejudice, respect and desert cannot account for the badness of discrimination as such. The inequality of opportunity account, in contrast, captures everything that is bad about discrimination. The article then addresses some counter-examples of practices that are discriminatory without arguably entailing inequality of opportunity, where the notable case is that (...) of segregation. It is further demonstrated that the account successfully handles some of the tricky aspects associated with discrimination, such as those concerning the confinement of discrimination to salient groups, discriminatees by means of financial compensation, in the selection of life partners, and the duties of employers. (shrink)

Telic sufficientarians hold that there is something special about a certain threshold level such that benefiting people below it, or raising them above it, makes an outcome better in at least one respect. The article investigates what fundamental value might ground that view. The aim is to demonstrate that sufficientarianism, at least on this telic version, is groundless and as such indefensible. The argument is advanced in three steps: first, it is shown that sufficientarianism cannot be grounded in a personal (...) value. Neither, secondly, is it committed to the person-affecting view, the view that says that nothing can be better if there is no one for whom it is better. This, in itself, is of interest because some sufficientarians reject egalitarianism precisely for its alleged incompatibility with the person-affecting view. Sufficientarians' disavowal of the person-affecting view implies that their view, similarly to egalitarianism, must be anchored in some impersonal value. But crucially, and this is the third step of the argument, there is no apparent value that can fit that role. We must conclude, then, that telic sufficientarianism is groundless. (shrink)