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  1.  42
    Projectivism and the Metaethical Foundations of the Normativity of Law.Shivprasad Swaminathan - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (2):231-266.
    A successful account of the ‘normativity of law’ is meant to inter alia establish how legal requirements come to be morally binding. This question presupposes taking a stance on the metaethical debate about the nature of morality and moral bindingness between the cognitivist and non-cognitivist camps. An overwhelming majority of contemporary legal philosophers have an unspoken adherence to a cognitivist metaethic and the model of normativity of law emerging from it: the impinging model. Consequently, the problematic of the normativity of (...)
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  2. Moore’s Paradox and Normative Detachment.Shivprasad Swaminathan - forthcoming - Journal of Human Values:097168582210934.
    Journal of Human Values, Ahead of Print. It is paradoxical to make a moral statement and, in the same breath, disavow commitment to it. Following G. E. Moore, who first identified an analogous paradox—albeit, in the case of factual statements and disavowal of belief in them—these are called Moore paradoxical statements. Richard Hare argues that in order to determine whether an ‘ought’ is a moral one, one only needs to examine if this attitudinal adherence necessarily accompanies the judgement in question. (...)
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  3. Moore’s Paradox and Normative Detachment.Shivprasad Swaminathan - forthcoming - Sage Publications India: Journal of Human Values.
    Journal of Human Values, Ahead of Print. It is paradoxical to make a moral statement and, in the same breath, disavow commitment to it. Following G. E. Moore, who first identified an analogous paradox—albeit, in the case of factual statements and disavowal of belief in them—these are called Moore paradoxical statements. Richard Hare argues that in order to determine whether an ‘ought’ is a moral one, one only needs to examine if this attitudinal adherence necessarily accompanies the judgement in question. (...)
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    What the Centipede Knows: Polycentricity and ‘Theory’ for Common Lawyers.Shivprasad Swaminathan - 2020 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 40 (2):265-290.
    For Michael Polanyi, ‘polycentricity’ was a method of decision making—of which he saw the common law as a prime exemplar—where numerous decision makers mutually adjust their decisions to their expectations of what will pass muster with the community of decision makers, without the use of any common blueprint. This article argues that Polanyi’s idea of polycentricity—once disentangled from Lon Fuller’s borrowed, but unrelated, use of the term—has the potential to illuminate much for the legal theorist. First, from several elements in (...)
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