ḥeleḳ 1. Maʼamar rishon -- ḥeleḳ 2. Maʼamar sheni -- ḥeleḳ 3. Maʼamar shelishi -- ḥeleḳ 4. Maʼamar reviʻi-ḥamishi.

ḥeleḳ 1. Oraḥ ḥayim. Mikhtavim -- ḥeleḳ 2. Hadrakhot be-ʻinyene Talmud-Torah ṿe-ḥinukh ... -- ḥeleḳ 3. Liḳuṭim, mikhtavim --.

In a recent paper, Selim Berker develops an abductive argument against practical reasons for belief that exploits an alleged difference between epistemic and practical reasons. According to Berker, epistemic reasons for belief balance to suspension. If I have equally strong epistemic reasons to believe and disbelieve some proposition, I lack sufficient reason either to believe or disbelieve it. Rather, I have decisive reason to suspend judgment. In contrast, practical reasons balance to permission. If I have equally strong practical reasons to (...) φ or ψ, I have sufficient reason to do either. Given this difference, Berker argues that defenders of practical reasons for belief cannot offer a plausible explanation of how practical and epistemic reasons interact in order to yield all-things-considered normative verdicts. In this essay, I defend a non-interactionist “pure” form of pragmatism against Berker’s objection. I outline a pure pragmatist theory, recapitulate why Berker thinks it also falls prey to his objection, and explain why the objection fails to undermine pure pragmatism. Finally, I consider an additional reason Berker’s argument might seem persuasive and show that it depends on conflating Berker’s objection and a separate challenge to pure pragmatism. Once these distinct challenges are disambiguated, it is easier to see why Berker’s objection is not a significant concern for pure pragmatists. (shrink)

Torat Yesharim -- Tehilat Yesharim -- Avot Yesharim -- Sheʼelat Yesharim.

[1] ʻAl ʻinyene ḥinukh ha-banim ṿeha-banot ṿi-yeme ha-baḥarut-- [2] ʻAl ʻinyene derekh ha-Ḥasidut lesayeaʻ le-zulato be-ruḥaniyut ṿe-nilṿeh elaṿ mikhteve ḳodesh be-ʻinyan zeh.

[1] Elul. Seliḥot. Rosh ha-Shanah -- [2] ʻAśeret Yeme Teshuvah. Yom Kipur.