This book taps the best American thinkers to answer the essential American question: How do we sustain our experiment in government of, by, and for the people? Authored by an extraordinary and politically diverse roster of public officials, scholars, and educators, these chapters describe our nation's civic education problem, assess its causes, offer an agenda for reform, and explain the high stakes at risk if we fail.

PriestGraham. Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2016. 2nd ed. ISBN 978-0-19-878359-6 ; 978-0-19-878360-2. Pp. xxxvi + 368.

Moral dilemmas can arise from uncertainty, including uncertainty of the real values involved. One interesting example of this is that of experimentation on human embryos and foetuses, If these have a moral stauts similar to that of human persons then there will be server constraitns on what may be done to them. If embryous have a moral status similar to that of other small clusters of cells, then constraints will be motivated largely by consideration for the persons into whom the (...) embryos may develop. If the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes, the embryo having neither the full moral weight of persons, nor a completely negligible moral weight, then different kinds of constraints will be appropriate. On the face of it, in order to know what kinds of experiements, if any, we are morally justified in performing on embryos we have to know what the moral weight of the embryo is. But then an impasse threatens, for it seems implausible that we can settle with certainty the exact moral status of the human embryo. It is the purpose of this paper to show that moral uncertainty need not make rational moral justification impossible. I develop a framework which distinguishes between what is morally right/wrong, and what is morally justified/unjustified, and applies standard decision theoretic tools to the case of moral uncertainties. (This was the first published account of what has subsequently become known as Expected Moral Value Theory. An earlier version of the paper, "A decision theoretic argument against human embryo experimentation", was published in M. Fricke (ed.), Essays in honor of Bob Durrant. (University of Otago Press, 1986) 111-27.). (shrink)

This paper is my second contribution to the Szatkowski volume. In the first paper, I provide a critical discussion of Bob Maydole's ontological arguments. In this second paper, I respond to Maydole's critical response to my first paper. My overall verdict is that Maydole does not successfully defend his arguments against my critical attack.

Review of *New Essays on the A Priori*, an excellent collection edited by Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke. Contributors include: Tyler Burge; Quassim Cassam; Philip Kitcher; Penelope Maddy; Hartry Field; Paul Horwich; Peter Railton; Stephen Yablo; Bob Hale; Crispin Wright; Frank Jackson; Stewart Shapiro; Michael Friedman; Martin Davies; Bill Brewer; and Thomas Nagel.

Lieutenant Bob Kerrey, later Governor and Senator Kerrey, revealed in the spring of 2001 that he was being accused by a former military subordinate that he had ordered a massacre during the Vietnamese War. Kerrey denied most parts of the charge. If guilty, however, he would be a war criminal of roughly the same kind that a court martial found Lieutenant Rusty Calley to be. I examine the available evidence and argue that a court martial would probably find Kerrey (...) guilty and I compare him in many ways to Calley. (shrink)

The fourteen papers in this collection offer a variety of original contributions to the epistemology of modality. In seeking to explain our knowledge of possibility and necessity, they raise some novel questions, develop some unfamiliar theoretical perspectives, and make some intriguing proposals. In the Introduction (penultimate draft available for download), I give some general background about the contemporary literature in the area, by sketching a timeline of the main tendencies of the past twenty-five years or so, up to the present (...) debates. Next, I focus on four features that largely characterize the latest literature, and the papers in the present collection in particular: (i) an endorsement of the importance of essentialism; (ii) a shift to a “metaphysics-first” approach to modal epistemology; (iii) a focus on metaphysical modality as opposed to other kinds of modality; and (iv) a preference for non-uniform modal epistemology. Then I turn to present the individual papers in the volume, which are organized based on their topic around the following four chapters: (A) Skepticism & Deflationism; (B) Essentialism; (C) Non-Essentialist Accounts; (D) Applications. LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS: Francesco Berto; Stephen Biggs & Jessica Wilson; Justin Clark-Doane; Philip Goff; Bob Hale; Frank Jackson; Mark Jago; Boris Kment; Antonella Mallozzi; Graham Priest; Gabriel Rabin; Amie Thomasson; Anand Vaidya & Michael Wallner; Jennifer Wang. The volume is dedicated to the memory of Bob Hale. (shrink)

The fourteen papers in this collection offer a variety of original contributions to the epistemology of modality. In seeking to explain how we might account for our knowledge of possibility and necessity, they raise some novel questions, develop some unfamiliar theoretical perspectives, and make some intriguing proposals. Collectively, they advance our understanding of the field. In Part I of this Introduction, I give some general background about the contemporary literature in the area, by sketching a timeline of the main tendencies (...) of the past twenty-five years or so, up to the present debates. Next, I focus on four features that largely characterize the latest literature, and the papers in the present collection in particular: (i) an endorsement of the importance of essentialism; (ii) a shift to a “metaphysics-first” approach to modal epistemology; (iii) a focus on metaphysical modality as opposed to other kinds of modality; and (iv) a preference for non-uniform modal epistemology. In Part II, I present the individual papers in the volume. These are organized around the following four chapters, based on their topic: (A) Skepticism & Deflationism; (B) Essentialism; (C) Non-Essentialist Accounts; (D) Applications. -/- LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS: Francesco Berto; Stephen Biggs & Jessica Wilson; Justin Clark-Doane; Philip Goff; Bob Hale; Frank Jackson; Mark Jago; Boris Kment; Antonella Mallozzi; Graham Priest; Gabriel Rabin; Amie Thomasson; Anand Vaidya & Michael Wallner; Jennifer Wang. -/- The volume is dedicated to the memory of Bob Hale. -/- . (shrink)

The judicial appointments regime in England and Wales is unbalanced. The pre-2005 appointments regime conferred excessive discretion on the Lord Chancellor, but the post-2005 regime has gone much too far in the opposite direction. Today, the Lord Chancellor is almost entirely excluded from the process of selecting lower level judges and enjoys only limited say over the selection of senior judges. In this article I argue that the current regime places too little weight on the sound reasons for involving the (...) minister in individual selection decisions, including the scope for ministerial input to enhance judicial independence, to supply political leadership on judicial diversity and to render more effective the discharge of the Lord Chancellor’s systemic responsibility for the justice system as a whole. I argue that shortlists reconcile the need to more fully involve the Lord Chancellor whilst at the same time ensuring that candidates satisfy a merit threshold. (shrink)

What I wish to argue for in this essay is the theological advantage of turning from the stasis of analogy and symbol to the dynamism and semiosis of allegory. The move from static, atemporal discussions of analogy and symbol to allegory will lend itself to a rather different model for the hermeneutical task. It is one that is founded upon narrative, mimesis and participation, and one that presents a more dynamic view of the relationship between revelation , disclosure , representation (...) and knowledge. I begin by examining a constellation of inter‐related ideas—narrative, participation in an unfolding tradition, knowledge and discipleship—in what is often read as an appeal in the Lukan Preface to historical facts. I then return to Aristotle, to develop the rich association between mimesis and phronesis, rhetoric and knowledge, and to point out the ambiguous nature of analogy to ontology. The practice of living, for Aristotle, I suggest, is allegorical. It is with Gregory of Nyssa's work on allegory that I put together the Lukan emphasis upon participation and discipleship with an account of reading creation allegorically. With Gregory, we learn how to read the world in the light of its Christic watermark and in the power of a Trinitarian desire. In modernity such allegorical reading fell out of favour, and it is a recapitulation of that theologically informed, allegorical reading that this essay finally exhorts. (shrink)

A Christian theology that is orientated towards understanding incarnation must be interested in the nature of embodiment. As the experience of those involved in sports centres on the body and its attunement to the situation and environment in which it finds itself, so we can compare the states of immersion in the material world in the athlete’s experience and the experience of Christian piety. This essay offers a comparative phenomenology of two forms of embodiment: the athlete’s entry into ‘the zone’ (...) and the contemplative’s centring of the embodied soul in Christ. In doing so it opens up areas of both similarity and difference that are coming to be explored by neuropsychology and neurophysiology. and points to the development of a radical account of incarnation that takes embodiment and affectivity seriously. (shrink)

Beginning with a discussion of Fritz Lang's ‘Metropolis’, this paper considers the rise of the city from a theological perspective. The ideal of the modern city was, it is argued, a secularised version of the City of God: the city was to be a place where all human desires might be met, a city without a church because the moral perfection of each human being has been fulfilled. The advent of the postmodern city of consumerist desire undermines this secular dream, (...) and opens a space for theologians to frame alternative visions of cities of erotic participatory desire. (shrink)

We start with Fodor's critique of cognitive science in "The mind doesn't work that way: The scope and limits of computational psychology": he argues that much mental activity cannot be handled by the current methods of cognitive science because it is nonmonotonic and, therefore, is global in nature, is not context-free, and is thus not capable of being formalized by a Turing-like mental architecture. We look at the use of nonmonotonic logic in the artificial intelligence community, particularly with the discussion (...) of the so-called frame problem. The mainstream approach to the frame problem is, we argue, probably susceptible to Fodor's critique; however, there is an alternative approach, due to McCain and Turner, which is, when suitably reformulated, not susceptible. In the course of our argument, we give a proof theory for the McCain-Turner system and show that it satisfies cut elimination. We have two substantive conclusions: first, that Fodor's argument depends on assumptions about logical form which not all nonmonotonic theories satisfy and, second, that metatheory plays an important role in the context of evolutionary accounts of rationality. (shrink)

Axiomatic utility theory plays a foundational role in some accounts of normative principles. In this context, it is sometimes argued that transitivity of “better than” is a logical truth. Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels use various examples to argue that “better than” is non–transitive, and that transitivity is not a logical truth. These examples typically involve some sort of “discontinuity.” In his discussion of one of these examples, John Broome suggests that we should reject the claim which involves “discontinuity.” We (...) can, I suggest, make sense of the examples which Temkin uses while sacrificing neither transitivity nor “discontinuity.” This response to Temkin's examples involves developing and modifying James Griffin's account of “discontinuity.” If the account of “discontinuity” seems implausible, that is because of a failure to allow for vagueness. A similar argument can be made in the context of the well-known “repugnant conclusion.” Footnotes1 This paper emerged from a discussion in one of John Broome's seminars. I am very grateful to John Broome, Erik Carlson, James Griffin, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Stuart Rachels, and Larry Temkin for allowing me to read various forthcoming manuscripts which are mentioned in the paper. I am also extremely grateful to Gustaf Arrhenius, Walter Bossert, Luc Bovens, John Broome, Richard Cookson, Robin Cubitt, James Griffin, Graham Loomes, Ben McQuillin, Shepley Orr, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Stuart Rachels, Bob Sugden, and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions. Any errors or omissions are mine. (shrink)

This collection presents, for the first time in English, Jean-Francois Lyotard's major essays on film: 'Acinema', 'The Unconscious as Mise-en-scene', 'Two Metamorphoses of the Seductive in Cinema' and 'The Idea of a Sovereign Film'. Then, eight critical essays by philosophers and film theorists examine Lyotard's film work and influence across two sections: 'Approaches and Interpretations' and 'Applications and Extensions'. These works are complemented by an introductory essay by leading French scholar Jean-Michel Durafour on Lyotard's film-philosophy, an overview of Lyotard's practical (...) film projects written by his collaborators Claudine Eizykman and Guy Fihman, and the synopsis for a later film project Memorial Immemorial, which Lyotard proposed but was not produced. Jean-Francois Lyotard was the most significant aesthetician of the poststructuralist generation, but this dimension of his thought is only recently beginning to receive the attention it deserves in the English-speaking world. He devoted a number of essays to film, and was involved in making several experimental short films. Lyotard's reflections on film offer a perspective which seeks to do justice to it as an art by focusing on its aesthetic, material qualities. His work in this area remains a largely untapped resource, with the potential for inaugurating exciting new directions in film-philosophy. (shrink)

Since 1994 and the coming of democracy to South Africa there has been a concerted attempt to develop a coherent, unified educational system that will redress the inequities of the apartheid systems. Significant to this ongoing process is the field of higher education, where relevant legislation has been enacted in order to bring coherence and consistency to the education system in the public and private sectors. Significant issues have arisen with regard to the provision made by private religious educational institutions, (...) especially those who have experienced difficulties in being accredited by statutory bodies. This paper seeks to explore these issues and suggest ways forward that are appropriate within an emerging unitary system of education that is fit for purpose in Africa and particularly South Africa, taking as a case study the formation of the Association of Christian Religious Practitioners. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill's thought on education and schools reflects his wider educational project for individuals and society. As a writer, activist and Member of Parliament, he contributed to the educational debates of his day regarding the form that the new institutions of mass education should take and how they should be funded. He argues that schools should be funded by the state but not controlled by it and advocates a system of competing experiments, monitored by competitive examinations based on facts (...) and payment of teachers by their pupils' results. The democratic and participatory vision of education that he advocates, even for the working class, anticipates the progressive education of Dewey. (shrink)

Wildlife Ethics A systematic account of the ethical issues related to wildlife management and conservation Wildlife Ethics is the first systematic, book-length discussion of the ethics of wildlife conservation and management, and examines the key ethical questions and controversies. Tackling both theory and practice, the text is divided into two parts. The first describes key concepts, ethical theories, and management models relating to wildlife; the second puts these concepts, theories, and models to work, illustrating their significance through detailed case studies (...) on controversies in wildlife management and conservation. The book explores pressing topics including human responsibilities due to climate change, tradeoffs when managing zoonotic disease risks, the ethics of the wildlife trade, culling non-native species, indigenous wildlife use, and zoo-based conservation programs. Readers are encouraged to explore different ways of valuing wild animals and their practical implications. This essential text: Explains and explores relationships between valuing biodiversity, human utility, ecosystems, species, and animal welfare Describes established approaches to wildlife management, such as sustainable use, and emerging concepts, such as compassionate conservation Discusses key ethical theories, including utilitarianism, ecocentrism, and animal rights Offers a practical model of how to analyze ethical issues in wildlife management and conservation Wildlife Ethics: The Ethics of Wildlife Management and Conservation is an accessible introduction to complex ethical issues, making the book an important resource for students in fields such as conservation biology, ecology, environmental science and policy, game management, public health and veterinary medicine. It will also be an invaluable tool for wildlife managers, conservationists, One Health practitioners, practicing veterinarians and animal rehabilitation staff, contemporary wildlife professionals and other stakeholders. (shrink)

Il existe une abondante littérature qui confirme le lien cyclique existant entre pauvreté et handicap. Cependant, bien que certaines études aient cherché à comprendre le lien entre pauvreté monétaire et invalidité et la manière dont le handicap recoupe d’autres facteurs influençant la pauvreté, la plupart n’indiquent pas comment cette relation s’influence, en particulier en raison de la disponibilité limitée des données de panel. En outre, peu de recherches ont été menées sur l’effet des subventions sociales et de l’emploi sur la (...) pauvreté monétaire, ainsi que sur la manière dont le handicap recoupe d’autres facteurs influant sur la pauvreté. Guidé par l’approche par les capacités, cet article a donc mis l’accent sur la dynamique de la relation entre handicap et deux aspects de la pauvreté, à savoir le revenu et l’emploi, qui sont essentiels à la réalisation des capacités. Les résultats montrent que les personnes handicapées en Afrique du Sud risquent davantage de vivre avec un faible revenu et de le rester avec le temps, mais que les subventions sociales servent à réduire la pauvreté liée au revenu. La pauvreté de revenu s’explique en partie par le fait que les personnes handicapées ont moins de chances d’être employées et que lorsqu’elles le sont, elles sont confrontées à un écart d’âge important. Le handicap recoupe également la race, le sexe et l’emplacement géographique pour influer sur la pauvreté monétaire de manière à avoir des incidences importantes sur l’élaboration des politiques et des programmes. (shrink)

Horace Williams received a B.A. and an M.A. simultaneously at the University of North Carolina around 1883, taught in a preparatory school, received a Bachelor of Divinity degree at Yale in 1888, studied at Harvard for three years without working for a Ph.D., taught philosophy at the University of North Carolina from 1890 to 1940, and died in the latter year. His students included Senator Sam Ervin and U.S. Representative to the United Nations Frank Graham. Thomas Wolfe, who (...) called Williams the "Hegel of the cotton patch," modeled the character Virgil Weldon, in Look Homeward, Angel, after Williams. In 1968, a profile of Williams was published in the Reader’s Digest series "My Most Unforgettable Character.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In and Out of MeGeorge Graham (bio)An important role in many recent philosophical analyses of personal well-being and psychological health has been played by a principle I call the "the principle of responsible innerness." This principle states that a person is psychologically healthy and well only if she or he acts in critical situations on preferences and desires that are responsibly in her or him rather than being (...) merely in her or him. Various analyses have been proposed of what it means for a desire or preference to be responsibly in a person—namely, that he or she identify with it or that the desire or preference be part of his or her wholehearted or decisive identity as a person. Harry Frankfurt (1988) has formulated a version of the principle in his accounts of personal caring and freedom of will. Charles Taylor (1976) has deployed a version of the principle in his account of self-assessment and personal redefinition. In this issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, Mark Rego with deference to Frankfurt suggests how a responsible innerness principle (Rego does not name the principle as such, of course, because the neologism is my own) might be deployed in a therapeutic setting. In this brief commentary I explore an obvious commitment of the principle, namely that there is a difference between the responsible psychological inside of a person and both the mere (nonresponsible) inside and the outside. In connection with the presupposition I include some comments on Rego's thoughtful and suggestive paper.Individuating MeWhat individuates a person? What makes a person one person or individual as opposed to another person or individual?One hypothesis is that an individual person is individuated by their being a particular living human animal (see Olson 2003; Van Inwagen 1990). Mark Rego (the name) refers to one particular living human animal. George Graham (the name) refers to another. In my case an animalist (someone who holds that an individual human person is a particular living human animal) would say that I am nothing other than the six-foot tall living human animal whose photograph you would take if you were to take a picture of me writing this brief commentary. I am not an immaterial substance nor am I a composite made out of any such substance and this animal body (or some part of it). I am, instead, a biological being, made of biological parts—the organs, cells, and so forth of which living human animals are made.Although one might worry about just how animals themselves are individuated, it is not too hard to appreciate what philosophers (like Eric Olson and others) who favor animalism must be attracted to. The attraction of animalism is this: individuation requires limits or boundaries and, for animalism, whatever is in the animal as a proper part of its being alive therein is in the person, whereas whatever is outside of the animal therein is outside of the person. So, if I am a particular living human animal, and if something is in or out of me, this means it is inside or [End Page 323] outside, respectively, my living body. Various neurons are in me; the heavenly stars are out of me. Various information processes are in me; the athletic dispositions of the Boston Red Sox are out of me.Suppose animalism is true. Suppose I am nothing other than this particular six-foot tall living human animal. Suppose also that I have a mental health problem. Suppose I am a pathological gambler. Suppose, in addition, that I am under the care of a therapist. With her help I have learned various facts about my addiction: that it thrives on a variable ratio schedule of reinforcement, that it is strengthened by my quasi-prayerful invocations of a mythic figure I call "Lady Luck," and that it relieves albeit severely imprudently assorted stresses and strains in my professional career. Alas, though, such lessons notwithstanding, I gamble. I am in the grips of an addiction. My therapist tells me that I should avoid self-deception and acknowledge or own up to the fact that I am addicted. She claims, too, that I should disown or... (shrink)