It seems natural to think of an unwilling addict as having a pattern of preferences that she does not endorse—preferences that, in some sense, she does not ‘identify’ with. Following Frankfurt (1971), Jeffrey (1974) proposed a way of modeling those features of an agent’s preferences by appealing to preferences among preferences.Th„e addict’s preferences are preferences she does not prefer to have. I argue that this modeling suggestion will not do, for it follows from (...) plausible assumptions that a minimally rational agent must prefer those first-order preferences she actually has. I close by considering two different but related ways to think about the initial phenomenon. (shrink)

A second-order preference is a preference over preferences. This paper addresses the role that second-order preferences play in a theory of instrumental rationality. I argue that second-order preferences have no role to play in the prescription or evaluation of actions aimed at ordinary ends. Instead, second-order preferences are relevant to prescribing or evaluating actions only insofar as those actions have a role in changing or maintaining first-order (...) class='Hi'>preferences. I establish these claims by examining and rejecting the view that second-order preferences trump first-order preferences. I also examine and reject the view that second-order preferences give additional normative force to an agent’s preferred first-order preferences. I conclude by arguing that second-order preferences should be integrated into an agent’s object-level preference ordering, and by explaining how best to make sense of this integration. (shrink)

The cognitive critique of the goals and desires that are input into the implicit calculations that result in instrumental rationality is one aspect of what has been termed broad rationality (Elster, 1983). This cognitive critique involves, among other things, the search for rational integration (Nozick, 1993)—that is, consistency between first-order and second-order preferences. Forming a second-order preference involves metarepresentational abilities made possible by mental decoupling operations. However, these decoupling abilities are separable from the motive (...) that initiates the cognitive critique itself. I argue that Velleman (1992) has identified that motive (“the desire to act in accordance with reasons”), and that it might be operationalisable as a thinking disposition at a very superordinate cognitive level. This thinking disposition, the Master Rationality Motive, is likely to be of particular importance in explaining individual differences in the tendency to seek rational integration. Preliminary research on related constructs suggests that this construct is measurable. (shrink)

I argue that procrastination with respect to environmental preservation is in the class of procrastination problems that are particularly difficult to overcome because of the presence of factors that support second-order procrastination. If my reasoning is correct, then second-order procrastination can help explain the distressing fact — assuming it is a fact — that, despite widespread professions of serious concern, the issue of environmental preservation is not getting as much of our attention as it deserves. My (...) reasoning also suggests that improving our situation may require that some of the efforts now focused on promoting concern for environmental preservation be rerouted into tracking procrastination and deploying insights on how to cope with it. (shrink)

The physical activity-related health competence model assumes that individuals require movement competence, control competence, and self-regulation competence to lead a healthy, physically active lifestyle. Although previous research has already established some measurement factors of the three dimensions, no attempts have so far been made to statistically aggregate them on the sub-competence level. Therefore, the goal of the present study was to test two additional factors for PAHCO and subsequently model the second-order structure with two samples from the fields (...) of rehabilitation and prevention. We conducted two questionnaire surveys with persons with multiple sclerosis and teaching students undergoing a basic qualification course in physical education. After performing exploratory items analysis, we used second-order confirmatory factor analysis and multidimensional scaling to investigate whether the scales could be bundled in accordance with the PAHCO model. The CFAs with 10 factors demonstrated a good model fit. In contrast, the second-order analysis with a simple loading structure on the three sub-competencies revealed an unacceptable model fit. Instead, a second-order model variant was preferred [comparative fit index = 0.926, root mean square error of approximation = 0.048, standardized root mean square residual = 0.065] in which body awareness and self-efficacy had theory-conform cross-loadings. The results of multidimensional scaling were in line with the extracted second-order structure. The present results suggested that the extension of the measurement instrument to 10 first-order factors was psychometrically justified for the two populations. The results from the second-order analyses provided the basis for the creation of sum scores, representing manifest indicators of movement competence, control competence, and self-regulation competence. Future studies are needed that cross-validate the extended measurement model with other populations and that relate the sub-competencies of PAHCO to indicators of health-enhancing physical activity. (shrink)

A method is presented for collecting data which yield a scale on which the entities are ranked in preference and all combinations of value distances are ranked. The method is based on the concept of secondary preference, i.e. preference among preferences. This method is compared with a classical method based on 50–50 game comparison. Two empirical studies are presented. The first examines whether both methods yield the same ordering of value distances. The second involves empirical derivation of a (...) higher-ordered metric scale. (shrink)

To the normal reasons that we think can justify one in preferring something, x (namely, that x has objectively preferable properties, or has properties that one prefers things to have, or that x's obtaining would advance one's preferences), I argue that it can be a justifying reason to prefer x that one's very preferring of x would advance one's preferences. Here, one prefers x not because of the properties of x, but because of the properties of one's having (...) the preference for x. So-revising one's preferences is rational in paradoxical choice situations like Kavka's Deterrence Paradox. I then try to meet the following objections: that this is stoicist, incoherent, bad faith; that it conflates instrumental and intrinsic value, gives wrong solutions to the problems presented by paradoxical choice situations, entails vicious regresses of value justification, falsifies value realism, makes valuing x unresponsive to x's properties, causes value conflict, conflicts with other standards of rationality, violates decision theory, counsels immorality, makes moral paradox, treats value change as voluntary, conflates first- and second-order values, is psychologically unrealistic, and wrongly presumes that paradoxical choice situations can even occur. (shrink)

Accounts of adaptive preferences are of two kinds: well-being accounts fully theorized for their own sake and political accounts theorized to facilitate the political project of reducing oppression and marginalization. Given their practical role, the latter are often less fully theorized, and are therefore less robust to theoretical criticism. In this paper, I first draw on well-being accounts to identify the well-theorized elements that political accounts should want to adopt in order to strengthen their project and avoid common (...) criticisms. Second, I appeal to the political project to show the shortcomings of the well-being accounts on which I draw. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse higher-order risky choices by the representative cumulative prospect theory (CPT) decision maker from three alternative reference points. These are the status quo, average payout and maxmin. The choice tasks we consider in our analysis include binary risks, and are the ones employed in the experimental literature on higher order risk preferences. We demonstrate that the choices made by the representative subject depend on the reference point. If the reference point is the status (...) quo and the lottery choices exhibit symmetric risk, we demonstrate that there is no third order reflection effect of lottery choices but there is a fourth order reflection effect. When the average payout is the reference point, we demonstrate that any third or fourth order lottery choice is possible dependent upon the lottery payoffs. However, under the assumption of maxmin reference point, the risky choices are prudent and temperate. In addition to these results, our analysis reveals that the representative CPT subject can choose combinations of second with third and fourth order risky options that differ from those in other major models of decision under risk. We contrast our theoretical predictions with the empirical results reported in the literature on higher order risk preferences and are able to reconcile some conflicting experimental evidence. (shrink)

A much discussed topic in the theory of choice is how a preference order among options can be derived from the assumption that the notion of ' choice' is primitive. Assuming a choice function that selects elements from each finite set of options, Arrow (Económica 26: 121-127,1959) already showed how we can generate a weak ordering by putting constraints on the behavior of such a function such that it reflects utility maximization. Arrow proposed that rational agents can be modeled (...) by such choice functions. Arrow's standard model of rationality has been criticized in economics and gave rise to approaches of bounded rationality. Two standard assumptions of rationality will be given up in this paper. First, the idea that agents are utility optimizers (Simon). Second, the idea that the relation of ' indifference' gives rise to an equivalence relation. To account for the latter, Luce (Econometrica 24: 178-191, 1956) introduced semi-orders. Extending some ideas of Van Benthem (Pac Philos Q 63: 193-203, 1982), we will show how to derive semi-orders (and so-called interval orders) based on the idea that agents are utility satisficers rather than utility optimizers. (shrink)

Philosophers have advocated different kinds of freedom, but each has value and none should be neglected in a complete theory of freedom and responsibility. There are three kinds of freedom of preference and action that should be distinguished. A person S may fully prefer to do A at every level, and that is one kind of freedom. A person S may autonomously prefer to do A when S has the preference structure concerning doing A because S prefers to have that (...) very preference structure, and that is a second kind of freedom. A person S may prefer to do A when S could have preferred otherwise, and that is a third kind of freedom. These forms of freedom may be combined, but they are valuable and essentially independent. They all involve the metamental ascendence of preference over desire, but it is autonomous preference that makes a person the author of his or her preference. The responsibility a person has for what he or she does out of a preference for doing it depends on the kinds of freedom of preference the person has and must be ranked in terms of them. (shrink)

BackgroundDespite severe cognitive dysfunction in Alzheimer's disease, aesthetic preferences in AD patients seem to retain some stability over time, similarly to healthy controls. However, the underlying mechanisms of aesthetic preference stability in AD remain unclear. We therefore aimed to study the role of emotional valence of stimuli for stability of aesthetic preferences in patients with AD compared to cognitively unimpaired elderly adults.MethodsFifteen AD patients score 12–26) without visual impairment and/or psychiatric disorder, as well as 15 healthy controls without (...) cognitive impairment matched in age, sex, art interest and highest level of education were included in this study. All participants were asked to rank-order eight artworks per stimulus category according to their preference twice with a 2-week span in-between. Based on these two rankings a preference change score was calculated. In order to assess explicit recognition memory of the artworks in the second testing session, four artworks of each stimulus category used in the preference ranking task were presented together with a content-matched distractor artwork painted by the same artist. Participants had to indicate which of the stimuli they had seen 2 weeks previously.ResultsAD patients [MMSE = 18.9 ± 3.6; Age = 85.4 ± 6.9; 33.3% male] had no explicit recognition memory of the artworks, whereas healthy controls [MMSE = 27.7 ± 1.4; Age = 84.3 ± 6.7; 33.3% male] correctly recognized 85% of stimuli after 2 weeks. AD patients had equally stable preferences compared to the control group for negative artworks, but less stable preferences for positive and neutral images.ConclusionEven in cognitively impaired AD patients, aesthetic preference for negatively-valenced artworks remains relatively stable. Our study provides novel evidence that AD patients may have a somewhat preserved implicit valence system for negative compared to neutral or positive visual information, especially in the domain of aesthetics. However, more studies need to further uncover the details of the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms of preference stability in pathological aging. (shrink)

According to normative decision theory there exists a principle of procedure invariance which states that a decision maker's preference order should remain the same, independently of which response mode is used. For example, the decision maker should express the same preference independently of whether he or she has to judge or decide. Nevertheless, previous research in behavioral decision making has suggested that judgments and choices yield different preference orders in both the risky and the riskless domain. In the latter, (...) the prominence effect has been demonstrated. The main purpose of the present series of experiments was to test cognitive explanations which account for the prominence effect. One of the explanations provided a psychological account based primarily on decision-strategy compatibility. Two other explanations built on information structuring approaches. In the first one, the general idea was that decision makers differentiate between alternatives by value and belief restructuring. In the second approach, violations of invariance were assumed to be attributed to the information structure of the task which in many cases demand problem simplification. A prominence effect was in most experiments found for both choices and preference ratings. This finding spöke against the strategy compatibility explanation. Instead, the different forms of cognitive restructuring provided a better account. However, none of these provided a single explanation. Yet, the structure compatibility explanation appeared to be the more viable one, in particular of the relation between experimentäl manipulations and response mode outcomes. The predictions of the value-belief restructuring explanation, on the other hand, seemed to be more valid for the prominence effect found in choice than for preference ratings. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such (...) access to become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

In his featured article, Makins suggests that healthcare professionals ought to defer to patients’ higher-order attitudes towards their risk attitudes when making medical decisions under uncertainty.1 He contends that this deferential approach is consistent with widely held antipaternalistic views about medicine. While Makins offers novel, insightful and provocative perspectives, we illustrate in this commentary that the theory suffers from some weaknesses and shortcomings that limit its persuasiveness and applicability and professionals should take a cautious approach when applying it to (...) their healthcare practice. While Makins does not provide a clear and consistent definition of higher-order risk attitudes, in mathematics, higher-order attitudes should be defined by the sign and shape of the derivatives of the utility or value function beyond the second order. Prudence is defined by a positive third derivative (convex marginal utility), while temperance is defined by a negative fourth derivative (concave second derivative).2 It is worth noting that higher-order attitudes are domain-specific, context-dependent and situation-sensitive. They vary depending on the framing, wording, format or presentation of the choice problem, …. (shrink)

In order to account for non-traditional preference relations the present paper develops a new, richer framework for preference relations. This new framework provides characterizations of non-traditional preference relations, such as incommensurateness and instability, that may hold when neither preference nor indifference do. The new framework models relations with swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. The traditional framework analyses dyadic preference relations in terms of a hypothetical choice between the two compared alternatives. The (...) swap framework extends this approach by analysing dyadic preference relations in terms of two hypothetical choices: the choice between keeping the first of the compared alternatives or swapping it for the second; and the choice between keeping the second alternative or swapping it for the first. (shrink)

When discussing the general inertia in climate change mitigation, it is common to approach the analysis either in terms of epistemic obstacles (climate change is too scientifically complex to be fully understood by all in its dramatic nature and/or to find space in the media) and/or moral obstacles (the causal link between polluting actions and social damage is too loose, both geographically and temporally, to allow individuals to understand the consequences of their emissions). In this chapter I maintain that both (...) categories of obstacles now play a secondary role: many people have a clear understanding of the physical and social dynamics involved in climate change. The main reason why so few manage to reduce their ecological footprint is an ethical short-circuit that does not allow most people to reveal their “true” climate-related preferences in their daily choices. This short-circuit manifests itself in two phenomena that can be analysed through the lens of moral psychology. First, as the possibility of anticipated utility approaches, individuals further discount expected future utility and may even reverse their preferences (due to the so-called immediacy multiplier, in addition to the better known and discussed future utility discounting). Second, individuals struggle to order their preferences transitively when presented with the opportunity to obtain small net marginal utilities in the short run. The intertemporal and collective structure of the climate problem creates fertile ground for both phenomena, which means that even those who are sincerely convinced of the need to contribute to climate change mitigation end up trapped in loops of procrastination, both first and second level. If, however, we can understand the origin of these phenomena, then we will be able to devise counteracting solutions that will speed up individual mitigation efforts. I will therefore briefly propose three ethical/public strategies to break the procrastination loop: pre-commitment; increasing the costs of marginal postponements; reducing the disutility of action that is likely to be postponed. (shrink)

In order to account for non-traditional preference relations the present paper develops a new, richer framework for preference relations. This new framework provides characterizations of non-traditional preference relations, such as incommensurateness and instability, that may hold when neither preference nor indifference do. The new framework models relations with swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. The traditional framework analyses dyadic preference relations in terms of a hypothetical choice between the two compared alternatives. The (...) swap framework extends this approach by analysing dyadic preference relations in terms of two hypothetical choices: the choice between keeping the first of the compared alternatives or swapping it for the second; and the choice between keeping the second alternative or swapping it for the first. (shrink)

In order to account for non-traditional preference relations the present paper develops a new, richer framework for preference relations. This new framework provides characterizations of non-traditional preference relations, such as incommensurateness and instability, that may hold when neither preference nor indifference do. The new framework models relations with swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. The traditional framework analyses dyadic preference relations in terms of a hypothetical choice between the two compared alternatives. The (...) swap framework extends this approach by analysing dyadic preference relations in terms of two hypothetical choices: the choice between keeping the first of the compared alternatives or swapping it for the second; and the choice between keeping the second alternative or swapping it for the first. (shrink)

If our moral beliefs rest on a mistake, as moral error theorists claim, what should we do with them? According to Richard Joyce’s revolutionary moral fictionalism, error theorists should pretend to believe moral propositions in order to keep the benefits moral thinking has for their preference satisfaction. This, he claims, frees error theory from radical practical implications. In response, I argue that implementing fictionalism would not preserve our moral practices, but disrupt them. The change from moral belief to make-belief (...) yields an unintended second revolution: a revolution in the content of morality. I show that fictionalism necessarily relies on a similar justification of moral practices as David Gauthier’s contractarianism, and consequently has similar implications for moral content. Because fictionalists engage in moral thinking purely for its instrumental value, they should only accept moral obligations that are useful to them into their fiction. This restriction is important: the most useful moral fiction departs substantially from conventional moral views. Revolutionary moral fictionalism is therefore more radical than it is promised to be. (shrink)

Many epistemologists have endorsed a version of the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. That is to say, even a fully rational belief state can be defeated by misleading higher-order evidence, which indicates that the belief state is irrational. In a recent paper, however, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio calls this view into doubt. Her argument proceeds in two stages. First, she argues that higher-order defeat calls for a two-tiered theory of epistemic rationality. Secondly, she argues that (...) there seems to be no satisfactory way of avoiding epistemic dilemmas within a two-tiered framework. Hence, she concludes that the prospects look dim for making sense of higher-order defeat within a broader theoretical picture of epistemic rationality. Here I aim to resist both parts of Lasonen-Aarnio’s challenge. First, I outline a way of accommodating higher-order defeat within a single-tiered framework, by amending epistemic rules with appropriate provisos for different kinds of higher-order defeat. Secondly, I argue that those who nevertheless prefer to accommodate higher-order defeat within a two-tiered framework can do so without admitting to the possibility of epistemic dilemmas, since epistemic rules are not always accompanied by ‘oughts’ in a two-tiered framework. The considerations put forth thus indirectly vindicate the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. (shrink)

The concept of spontaneous order is an important framework in many fields of research in the natural and social sciences today, and it bears heavily on methodological problems related to economics in particular. In fact, all domains of scientific and philosophical research where it can be maintained intelligibly that an undesigned but nevertheless effective order has emerged solely through the interaction of the constituent parts of a given system and also through the interaction of this system as a (...) whole with its environment fall under what is now often preferably called the "paradigm of auto-organization". This paradigm can be traced back to Leibniz (Dobuzinkis 1989, p. 245) or even to the Spanish Jesuits of the Salamanca School of the XVIth century (Lepage 1983, p. 347), and a lot of scientific work has now been done from within its conceptual framework, for instance Varela & Maturana's theory of "autopoiesis", Heinz von Foerster's second generation cybernetic models, Ilya Prigogine's thermodynamics of open systems and dissipative structures, and chaos theory. In economics, the concept of social spontaneous order is intimately linked with Friedrich Hayek's work, and Hayek has himself insisted on the effective kinship of such approaches (Hayek 1979, p. 158). One can say that there is today in economics a full-fledged Theory of Spontaneous Order (TSO) which articulates four distinct arguments. (shrink)

In light of world globalization, three visions of the world order have been examined. The naive cosmopolitanism has been examined first and then rejected as being unrealistic because it overlooks the reasons for state pluralism in the international order. On this naive view, the world state is the only source of sovereignty and the individual is the only focal point of moral concern. Second subject matter of our investigation were Kantian and Rawlsian views which still defend the (...) state-centered view on international relations with peoples as a major subject of moral concern. However, on Rawls view, the principle of peoples' self-determination should be combined with the principles of universal morality which protect some individuals' fundamental rights thus enabling his theory to be classified into moderate liberal internationalism. Third, the idea of functional sovereignty as a foundation of the system of international sovereignty has been abandoned as being too unrealistic given recent tendencies in the world which associate the identities of individuals with cultures and civilizations rather than with practices and professions. Finally, some reasons have been given for preferring Rawlsian approach. The major reason is that there are close cultural ties between nations and their states and that this fact can contribute greatly to the resolution of coordination problem among states both internally and externally.. Pokusacemo, krecuci se u oblasti politicke normativne teorije, i to pre svega u okviru problema vezanih za analizu pojma suvereniteta drzave i teorije medjunarodnih odnosa, da na adekvatan nacin pojmovno odgovorimo na kulturne, politicke i ekonomske fenomene u svetu koji se u strucnoj literaturi, a i u javnosti uopste, cesto jednim imenom nazivaju "globalizacija". Razmotricemo pre svega klasicno shvacen pojam suvereniteta i ispitacemo kakvu ulogu taj pojam moze da ima u jednoj normativnoj viziji savremenih medjunarodnih odnosa. Branice se teza da uprkos globalizacijskim trendovima u svetu, drzavno shvatanje suvereniteta vezano za pojam nacije-drzave mozda treba i dalje da ima kljucnu ulogu u sistemu medjunarodnih odnosa jer je to najcelishodniji nacin da se ostvare zahtevi za pravdom i mirom na nivou kolektivnog delanja naroda kako unutar drzave tako i na medjunarodnom planu. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 28 Recent debates over climate change policy have made it clear that the choice of a social discount rate has enormous consequences for the amount of mitigation that will be recommended. The social discount rate determines how future costs are to be compared to present costs. Philosophers, however, have been almost unanimous in endorsing the view that the only acceptable social rate of time preference is zero, a view that, taken literally, has either absurd or extremely (...) radical implications. The first goal of this paper is to show that the standard arguments against temporal preference are much less persuasive than they are usually taken to be. The second goal is to explore two different avenues of argument that could be adopted, in order to show that temporal discounting of welfare may be permissible. The first involves simply an application of the method of reflective equilibrium, while the second involves consideration of the way that our abstract moral commitments are institutionalized. (shrink)

Recent debates over climate change policy have made it clear that the choice of a social discount rate has enormous consequences for the amount of mitigation that will be recommended. The social discount rate determines how future costs are to be compared to present costs. Philosophers, however, have been almost unanimous in endorsing the view that the only acceptable social rate of time preference is zero, a view that, taken literally, has either absurd or extremely radical implications. The first goal (...) of this paper is to show that the standard arguments against temporal preference are much less persuasive than they are usually taken to be. The second goal is to explore two different avenues of argument that could be adopted, in order to show that temporal discounting of welfare may be permissible. The first involves simply an application of the method of reflective equilibrium, while the second involves consideration of the way that our abstract moral commitments are institutionalized. (shrink)

Legal moralists hold that the immorality of an action is a sufficient reason for the state to prevent it. Liberals in the tradition of Mill generally reject legal moralism. However, Larry Alexander has recently developed an argument that suggests that a class of legal restrictions on freedom that most liberals endorse is, and perhaps can only be, justified on moralistic grounds. According to Alexander, environmental restrictions designed to preserve nature or beauty are forms of legal moralism. In this paper, I (...) explore two liberal lines of response to Alexander’s argument. The first argues that an aesthetic interest is among our basic legally protectable interests. This argument claims that environmental and other regulations designed to protect beauty and nature are justified in order to prevent setbacks to this aesthetic interest. The second focuses on a democratic conception of the public interest. It holds that democratic communities are entitled, through their institutions, to shape the community and environment they live in. On this view, the community need not appeal to moralism to justify its adoption of environmental regulations, since in adopting such regulations it is simply enacting its collective preferences. On these grounds, I claim that Alexander’s case for the claim that aesthetic regulations can only be justified on moralistic grounds is much weaker than he takes it to be. (shrink)

The resurgence of religion around the globe poses a challenge for both empirical and normative social scientists. For the former, the question is whether the terms at their disposal are adequate to comprehend religious self-understanding and, therefore, human motivation and conduct. For the latter, the question is whether those terms confuse or clarify the way in which religion may be brought into public dialog without violating the tenets of pluralism or toleration. How, then, do social scientists of both persuasions currently (...) understand religion? I begin by distinguishing religious experience from other sorts of experience, with a view to demonstrating, first, that the two preeminent terms adopted by social scientists today preference and choice cannot comprehend religious experience. To do this, I provide a brief exposition of what I call the fable of liberalism, in order to explain why the terms preference and choice have achieved the currency that they have and what problems their invocation was intended to address. Second, I consider two other terms social scientists often invoke value and identity and suggest that these terms also are inadequate for understanding religious experience. The first set of terms arises in the eighteenth century, out of the Anglo-American tradition; the second set of terms arises in the nineteenth century, out of the German tradition. None of these terms are able to comprehend religious experience, which antedates these sets of terms by centuries. I end by suggesting, first, that empirical social scientists would do well to reconsider whether terms that arose during specific historical moments in order to circumvent or to supersede religious experience can help them understand human motivation, let alone predict human conduct, whenever or wherever religion is involved; and, second, that the attempt by well-meaning normative social scientists to bring religion into the public sphere by treating it in terms of preference, choice, value, or identity distorts religious experience, and cannot succeed as a strategy for reintroducing religion into public dialog, since religion is not what they wish to render it in terms of. (shrink)

The consistency of a second-order version of Morley’s Theorem on the number of countable models was proved in [EHMT23] with the aid of large cardinals. We here dispense with them.

In ‘Patients, doctors and risk attitudes,’ Makins argues that, when physicians must decide for, or act on behalf of, their patients they should defer to patient risk attitudes for many of the same reasons they defer to patient values, although with a caveat: physicians should defer to the higher-order desires of patients when considering their risk attitudes. This modification of what Makins terms the ‘deference principle’ is primarily driven by potential counterexamples in which a patient has a first-order (...) desire with one risk attitude (either risk-seeking or averse) and a second-order desire that this risk attitude not be effective in guiding their choices.1 There are two reasons we might think people with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) are particularly relevant patients for evaluating Makins’ proposal. Not only might their first-order risk attitudes be irrational, but many people with OCD also judge their own OCD behaviours to be excessive or unwarranted making them structurally similar to the counterexamples outlined above. Yet, I argue that recent research about risk and decision-making under uncertainty for those with OCD complicates Makins’ proposal by raising questions of whether and to what degree their risk attitudes are irrational such that they should not play a part in the surrogate decisions made by physicians. This places more …. (shrink)

Is the minimum wage ethically justifiable? In this chapter, we attempt to answer this question from an order-ethical perspective. To this end, we develop two simple game theoretical models for different types of labour markets and derive policy implications from an order-ethical viewpoint. Our investigation yields a twofold conclusion. Firstly, order ethicists should prefer a tax-funded wage subsidy over minimum wages, if they assume that labour markets are perfectly competitive. Secondly, order ethics suggests that the minimum (...) wage can be ethically justified if employers have monopsony power in the wage setting process. As it turns out, then, order ethics neither favours nor disfavours the minimum wage. Rather, it implies conditions under which this form of labour market regulation is justified and, hence, allows empirical science to play a great role in answering the ethical questions that arise in the context of the minimum wage debate. This illustrates one of order ethics’ strengths, viz. the fact that it tends to de-ideologize the debate about ethical issues. (shrink)

Evolution and geometry generate complexity in similar ways. Evolution drives natural selection while geometry may capture the logic of this selection and express it visually, in terms of specific generic properties representing some kind of advantage. Geometry is ideally suited for expressing the logic of evolutionary selection for symmetry, which is found in the shape curves of vein systems and other natural objects such as leaves, cell membranes, or tunnel systems built by ants. The topology and geometry of symmetry is (...) controlled by numerical parameters, which act in analogy with a biological organism’s DNA. The introductory part of this paper reviews findings from experiments illustrating the critical role of two-dimensional (2D) design parameters, affine geometry and shape symmetry for visual or tactile shape sensation and perception-based decision making in populations of experts and non-experts. It will be shown that 2D fractal symmetry, referred to herein as the “symmetry of things in a thing”, results from principles very similar to those of affine projection. Results from experiments on aesthetic and visual preference judgments in response to 2D fractal trees with varying degrees of asymmetry are presented. In a first experiment (psychophysical scaling procedure), non-expert observers had to rate (on a scale from 0 to 10) the perceived beauty of a random series of 2D fractal trees with varying degrees of fractal symmetry. In a second experiment (two-alternative forced choice procedure), they had to express their preference for one of two shapes from the series. The shape pairs were presented successively in random order. Results show that the smallest possible fractal deviation from “symmetry of things in a thing” significantly reduces the perceived attractiveness of such shapes. The potential of future studies where different levels of complexity of fractal patterns are weighed against different degrees of symmetry is pointed out in the conclusion. (shrink)

Second-order logic and modal logic are both, separately, major topics of philosophical discussion. Although both have been criticized by Quine and others, increasingly many philosophers find their strictures uncompelling, and regard both branches of logic as valuable resources for the articulation and investigation of significant issues in logical metaphysics and elsewhere. One might therefore expect some combination of the two sorts of logic to constitute a natural and more comprehensive background logic for metaphysics. So it is somewhat surprising (...) to find that philosophical discussion of secondorder modal logic is almost totally absent, despite the pioneering contribution of Barcan. (shrink)

Recently, Wilcox (JGPS 51: 65–87, 2020) argued against the so-called wide interval view and in favor of the principle of indifference as the correct response to unspecific evidence. Embedded in a formal model of the beliefs of an agent, the former presupposes imprecise probabilities and the latter numerically precise degrees of belief. His argument is illustrated by a thought experiment that comes with a fundamental intuition. According to Wilcox, the wide interval view is incompatible with this intuition and, thus, undermined. (...) In contrast, I show that the intuition behind the thought experiment is, in fact, compatible with the wide interval view if it is embedded into a specific conception of imprecise probabilities as model of belief. This conception is an extension of a framework which I call modified supervaluationism (MSV) and which I recently presented elsewhere (Karge 2021, 175–191). To accommodate the thought experiment’s fundamental intuition, it introduces a notion of second-order beliefs. (shrink)

A rather promising value theory for environmental philosophers combines the well-known fitting attitude (FA) account of value with the rather less well-known account of value as richness. If the value of an entity is proportional to its degree of richness (which has been cashed out in terms of unified complexity and organic unity), then since natural entities, such as species or ecosystems, exhibit varying degrees of richness quite independently of what we happen to feel about them, they also possess differing (...) degrees of mind-independent and subject-independent value. In particular, their value is not dependent on the desires or preferences of humans. The fitting attitudes account of value, at least as it is standardly developed, demands isomorphic evaluative responses on the part of all valuers. In particular, it entails that all valuers should have isomorphic preferences. But this seems absurd. I consider three different strategies with which the fitting attitude theorist can deflect this challenge. The first makes use of an account of non-standard value relations in terms of permissible preference orderings. The second appeals to value appearances and the associated notions of value distance and value perspective. The third involves an account of the ultimate bearers of value as properties, rather than as propositions or states of affairs. These strategies are not all mutually incompatible. While it isn’t possible to combine the first and second strategies, it is possible to combine the first and third strategies, and also to combine the second and the third. (shrink)

“Libertarian paternalism” aims to harness cognitive biases in order to improve prudential decision-making. Some critics have objected that libertarian paternalism is wrongly manipulative. I argue that this objection is mostly unsuccessful. First, I point out that some strategies endorsed by libertarian paternalists can help people to better appreciate reasons. Second, I develop an account of manipulation according to which an agent manipulates her target by worsening the target’s deliberative position. The means of influence defended by libertarian paternalists—for instance, (...) the judicious use of default rules—are not manipulative in this way. (shrink)

The intra-school controversies in Hanafī school are remarkable. These controversies pose a risk for legal safety and stability and creates difficulties for muqallīd Hanafī judges and muftīs. In the historical process, different types of literature such as mukhtaṣar and fatwa (legal opinion) books, and applications such as aṣṣaḥ-ı aqvāl and maʻrūdhāt, emerged to solve this problem. One of the last example of these applications is the codification movement. The subject of this study is the relationship between the Majalla al-Aḥkām al-ʿAdliyyah, (...) which is the first product of codification based on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and the intra-school preference. In order to describe this relationship, it is briefly emphasized that one of the aims of codification of Majalla is to satisfy the need for intra-school preference. The function and content of Majallaʼs necessary reasons, (asbāb al-mūjiba) was analyzed in terms of intra-school preference. The interventions on the preferences of the Majalla Commission are also emphasized. The Majalla is a text of the intra-school preference. The analysis of its content in relation to intra-school preference is very important. Therefore, in order to reveal what kind of method is used in intra-school preferences and to determine different aspects of intra-school preference in the Majalla, the chapter about ‘sale’ (Kitāb al-Buyūʿ) of the Majalla are examined.Summary: The intra-school controversies in Hanafī School, which is quite important in terms of freedom of ijtihād (independent legal judgment) and legal wealth, possible to threaten legal safety and stability. These controversies also make difficult for judges to reach a judgment or fatwa in controversial affairs. For this reason, determination of the rājiḥ (preferred opinion) in controversial issues in the school, is a need that must be eliminated.The intra-school preference can be described as "to determine the superior, preponderant of different opinion or narrations about a specific issue in the school". In the historical process different types of literature such as mukhtaṣar and fatwa books, and different applications such as asaḥḥ-ı aqvāl and maʻrūzāt, emerged to meet this need. One of the applications aimed to meet this need is the codifications in the last period of the Ottoman State.The relationship between the Majalla al-Ahkam al-Adliyyah, which is the first example of codification based on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and the intra-school preference; and in this context, while preparing the Majalla how a method was followed in the intra-school preference; at what rate be obeyed the rājiḥ (preferred) opinion; articles contrary to the rājiḥ (preferred) opinion in Majalla and their reasons; whether legal arrangements have been made in all controversial issues; at what rate be met the need of determination of rājiḥ (preferred) opinion are the issues that need to be examined.One of the main reasons for the need for a law text such as Majalla al-Ahkam al-Adliyyah is the multitude of the intra-school controversies in Hanafī School. Therefore, the goal of Majalla is to prepare a code that contains rājiḥ opinion.When Majallaʼs necessary reasons, i.e. asbāb al-mūjiba, are examined in terms of the intra-school preference, it is seen that there are two basic functions of necessary reasons. The first of them is, emphasizing that the code is prepared substantially in accordance with the râjih opinion in the school. In fact, that this issue in the asbāb al-mūjiba of the first ten books of Majalla is expressly stated. The other function of the asbāb al-mūjiba is to justify that why rājiḥ opinion are not be confirmed in some article. In the necessary reasons it is stated that twelve articles are prepared in the direction of unrâcih (unpreferable) opinion. Considering that Majalla is formed of 1851 article, it will be better understood that how the rājiḥ opinions are effective in Majalla's content. Essentially, the conditions of the period also make it necessary. The preference of the non-preferred opinion of Züfer (d. 158/775) in 692nd article of Kitāb al-Ḥavala, caused the reaction of some circles mainly Şeyhülislam Hasan Fehmi Efendi (d.1298/1881) and for this reason Ahmet Cevdet Pasa (d.1895) was dismissed from the ministry of Divan al-Ahkâm al-Adliyyah and the chairman of the Majalla Commission.When the asbāb al-mūjibas of contrary articles to rājiḥ opinions are examined, it is seen that maṣlaḥa and customs are determinative in these preferences. It is also seen that the preferences of some jurists are also mentioned as a reason of preference. The most widespread preference’s reason in Hanafī sources is in congruity with the texts. On the contrary, it is noteworthy that, besides the interdiction of extravagant (safih), it is not operated as a preference’s reason in Majalla.Some preferences of the Majalla Commission were intervened by other institutions. The chapters prepared by the commission were examined both by Majlis-i Wukalā and Mashihat, and these chapters were subject to some revisions at this time. Here, two articles prepared on the basis of the non-preferred opinion were intervened by Majlis-i Wukalā. The first of these is 216th article that written in the direction of opinion of Mashāyikh Balkh, which argues that it is permissible to sell separately ḥaqq al-murūr (the right of passage) and ḥaqq al-shirb (water right), the second is the 611th article which regulates the liability to damage of ajīr al-mushtarak (joint salaried employee).When the content of Kitāb al-Buyū, the first and the most voluminous book of Majalla, is examined in terms of the intra-school preference, it is seen that the rājiḥ opinions in the school are generally taken as basis. It is stated that in the asbāb al-mūjiba of the Kitāb al-Buyūʿ the four issues are prepared basing on the non-preferred opinion and these preferences are justified with custom and maṣlaḥa. However, the contrary articles to the rājiḥ opinion in the Kitāb al-Buyūʿ are not limited to these. According to our research, in addition to these, three articles were prepared with the preference of non-preferred opinion. These are the 118th article regarding that the bayʻ bi-l-wafā is permissible in chattels, 165th article on the definition of al-ghabn al-faḥiş (lesion), and the 309th article concerning the provision of the khiyār al-sharṭ (right of cancellation). These three articles show that the regulations contrary to the rājiḥ opinion in Majalla are not just those explained in the asbāb al-mūjiba and this situation is contrary to the method that is followed when preparing the Majalla.In some controversial issues in the Hanafi School, authorized jurists to preference (asḥāb al-tarjīh) disagreed over which opinion is rājiḥ. It wasn’t explained that how a method would be followed in Majalla when the legal arrangements were made in these matters. When these issues are examined, it can be said that the preferences of the majority, the providing of convenience and the preference by some jurists are effective.Preferences in Majalla have not been occurred only among the sharʻī (related to Islamic Law) provisions. In addition, the definitions and the inscription in the definitions are also the subject of preference. In this context, the preferences related to the definition of the sales contract, the suspended contract (al-ʻaqd al-maqqūf) and the al-ghabn al-faḥiş in Kitāb al-Buyūʿ can be mentioned as an example.Some controversial issues in the Hanafi School are not regulated in Majalla. When considering the multiplicity of controversial issues and therefore the difficulty of making legal arrangements to cover all of them, this situation is natural. Moreover, some of these issues may not have been regulated in Majalla because they are not frequent and necessary. However, it is not possible to explain all the controversial issues that have not been regulated for these reasons. Because some of the controversial issues that have not been legislated are basic, relatively important issues and they are included in the mukhtaṣars. This indicates that when preparing the Majalla, instead of making preference on some controversial issues, the method of non-regulation of these matters is adopted. It can be said that this method is applied as a way of creating law text which is clear of controversy. Thus, the determining of the rājiḥ opinion in these matters has been left to the judges. This situation is not suitable to meet the need of determining the rājiḥ opinion, which is the goal of Majalla. But it is the result of the difficulty of making a law that encompasses all legal issues. (shrink)

Quine’s most important charge against second-, and more generally, higher-order logic is that it carries massive existential commitments. The force of this charge does not depend upon Quine’s questionable assimilation of second-order logic to set theory. Even if we take second-order variables to range over properties, rather than sets, the charge remains in force, as long as properties are individuated purely extensionally. I argue that if we interpret them as ranging over properties more reasonably (...) construed, in accordance with an abundant or deflationary conception, Quine’s charge can be resisted. This interpretation need not be seen as precluding the use of model-theoretic semantics for second-order languages; but it will preclude the use of the standard semantics, along with the more general Henkin semantics, of which it is a special case. To that extent, the approach I recommend has revisionary implications which some may find unpalatable; it is, however, compatible with the quite different special case in which the second-order variables are taken to range over definable subsets of the first-order domain, and with respect to such a semantics, some important metalogical results obtainable under the standard semantics may still be obtained. In my final section, I discuss the relations between second-order logic, interpreted as I recommend, and a strong version of schematic ancestral logic promoted in recent work by Richard Heck. I argue that while there is an interpretation on which Heck’s logic can be contrasted with second-order logic as standardly interpreted, when it is so interpreted, its differences from the more modest form of second-order logic I advocate are much less substantial, and may be largely presentational. (shrink)

We examine second order intuitionistic propositional logic, IPC². Let $F_\exists $ be the set of formulas with no universal quantification. We prove Glivenko's theorem for formulas in $F_\exists $ that is, for φ € $F_\exists $ φ is a classical tautology if and only if ¬¬φ is a tautology of IPC². We show that for each sentence φ € $F_\exists $ (without free variables), φ is a classical tautology if and only if φ is an intuitionistic tautology. As (...) a corollary we obtain a semantic argument that the quantifier V is not definable in IPC² from ⊥, V, ^, →. (shrink)

A normative reason for a person to? is a consideration which favours?ing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person?s. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons to? for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I (...) then show that prominent views in contemporary epistemology are committed to the existence of second-order reasons, specifically, views about the epistemic norms governing practical reasoning and about the role of higher-order evidence. If there are no second-order reasons, those views are mistaken. (shrink)

There are some radical practices of asceticism, such as wearing ṣūf (wool clothes), traveling without provisions, choosing to be single, and avoiding earning a living by working, which were generally seen in the 2nd century A.H. and were subject to criticism with the formation of classical Ṣūfism. Criticisms of these practices have started to appear in the literature since the 3rd century A.H. Early Ṣūfī writers such as Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Muḥāsibī, Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz, al-Sarrāj focused on this issue and criticized (...) these practices. How are these practices of ascetics viewed in the sects that were formed and spread in the 6th and 7th centuries? Our research seeks the answer to this question, but limits it to the example of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī, the founder of Shādhiliyya. This question is important in two respects: First of all, it is investigated whether the determination of some researchers that al-Shādhilī taught comfort in the face of worldly blessings is also correct. Because, among contemporary researchers, there are those who believe that al-Shādhilī wears ostentatious clothes, rides horses, encourages economic competitiveness, and is therefore open to benefiting from worldly blessings to the fullest. Secondly, it includes an investigation of the validity of the belief that these practices belong to an early period in the history of Sûfism and have been completely abandoned over time. Although al-Shādhilī seems to have completed his spiritual education in Morocco with his sheikh, he later went to Tunisia with the latent command of his master. We see that in his first years in Tunisia, he went into seclusion in a cave and was completely isolated from the society and engaged in worship in a way that reminds us of the practices of the early ascetics. But in the second phase of his life in Tunisia, he went to the city on a spiritual sign, socialized, started to give sermons to people, and started to behave more flexible about eating and drinking. al-Shādhilī specifically states that he did not prefer socialization at this stage, but with a spiritual sign. Later, he went to Egypt again with a spiritual sign and got married there, started to deal with agriculture, and continued to socialize by establishing relations with the rulers. Therefore, it can be said that this new social period is a break both from the radical practices of the early ascetics and from the early period in Tunisia itself. It is also seen that in this new period of al-Shādhilī, he did not wear the clothes of ascetics like sūf (wool clothes) and did not want his followers to wear them. He also encouraged to have a profession and was generally against traveling without provisions. But there are two points to be noted here: First, these milder and more comfortable practices should not lead to a search for comfort and luxury. He continued to keep his distance from worldly blessings and to advise asceticism. Secondly, he had some of his distinguished disciples make some practices of the ascetics. The reason for the existence of these seemingly contradictory practices is that while he recommends moderate and sustainable practices to the general public and his followers, he can make the specialized sūfis more strict and difficult practices. While he was encouraging work and earning in general, not ignoring experience, including avoiding work; not ignoring seclusion while leading to sociality in general; while generally suggesting to resort to occasions, he also follows a path of implementing and enforcing radical practices such as traveling without food. Thus, al-Shādhilī is able to encompass all the seemingly incompatible practices of the previous sūfi accumulation with a point of view of spiritual rank and hierarchy. (shrink)

Intuitionistic dependence logic was introduced by Abramsky and Väänänen [1] as a variant of dependence logic under a general construction of Hodges’ (trump) team semantics. It was proven that there is a translation from intuitionistic dependence logic sentences into second order logic sentences. In this paper, we prove that the other direction is also true, therefore intuitionistic dependence logic is equivalent to second order logic on the level of sentences.

Some recent views of action have claimed that a correct conceptual account of action must include second-order motivational states. This follows from the fact that first-order motivational states such as desires account for action or mere behavior in which the agent's participation is lacking; thus, first-order motivational states cannot by themselves account for action in which the agent participates, so-called full-blooded action. I argue that representing the agent's participation by means of second-order states is (...) bound to fail because it misrepresents what an agent is doing when acting in the full-blooded sense. I begin by characterizing full-blooded action and explaining the failure of first-order accounts to explain it. I next show that while second-order accounts have some success in explaining full-blooded action, they fail to distinguish it from action which exhibits motivational alienation. I then argue that even if this problem were resolved, the second-order accounts more fundamentally misrepresent full-blooded action by depicting such action in an introverted manner. I conclude by considering a sketch of agency and full-blooded action that does not rely on second-order states and by addressing a primary concern thought to favor the second-order accounts, the concern of agent causation. (shrink)

“Second-order Logic” in Anderson, C.A. and Zeleny, M., Eds. Logic, Meaning, and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Pp. 61–76. -/- Abstract. This expository article focuses on the fundamental differences between second- order logic and first-order logic. It is written entirely in ordinary English without logical symbols. It employs second-order propositions and second-order reasoning in a natural way to illustrate the fact that second-order logic is (...) actually a familiar part of our traditional intuitive logical framework and that it is not an artificial formalism created by specialists for technical purposes. To illustrate some of the main relationships between second-order logic and first-order logic, this paper introduces basic logic, a kind of zero-order logic, which is more rudimentary than first-order and which is transcended by first-order in the same way that first-order is transcended by second-order. The heuristic effectiveness and the historical importance of second-order logic are reviewed in the context of the contemporary debate over the legitimacy of second-order logic. Rejection of second-order logic is viewed as radical: an incipient paradigm shift involving radical repudiation of a part of our scientific tradition, a tradition that is defended by classical logicians. But it is also viewed as reactionary: as being analogous to the reactionary repudiation of symbolic logic by supporters of “Aristotelian” traditional logic. But even if “genuine” logic comes to be regarded as excluding second-order reasoning, which seems less likely today than fifty years ago, its effectiveness as a heuristic instrument will remain and its importance for understanding the history of logic and mathematics will not be diminished. Second-order logic may someday be gone, but it will never be forgotten. Technical formalisms have been avoided entirely in an effort to reach a wide audience, but every effort has been made to limit the inevitable sacrifice of rigor. People who do not know second-order logic cannot understand the modern debate over its legitimacy and they are cut-off from the heuristic advantages of second-order logic. And, what may be worse, they are cut-off from an understanding of the history of logic and thus are constrained to have distorted views of the nature of the subject. As Aristotle first said, we do not understand a discipline until we have seen its development. It is a truism that a person's conceptions of what a discipline is and of what it can become are predicated on their conception of what it has been. (shrink)

Sellars [1960, ‘Grammar and existence: A preface to ontology’] argues that the truth of a second-order sentence does not incur commitment to there being any sort of abstract entity. This paper begins by exploring the arguments that Sellars offers for the above claim. It then develops those arguments by pointing out places where Sellars has been unclear or ought to have said more. In particular, Sellars's arguments rely on there being a means by which language users could come (...) to understand sentences of a second-order language wherein the truth of second-order existential sentences do not require there to be abstract entities. In addition to this, as Sellars [1979, Naturalism and Ontology] notes, a formal account of quantification is required that does not make use of the apparatus of sequences. Both such a translation of and a formal account of quantification are provided in this article. (shrink)

This dissertation develops an inferentialist theory of meaning. It takes as a starting point that the sense of a sentence is determined by the rules governing its use. In particular, there are two features of the use of a sentence that jointly determine its sense, the conditions under which it is coherent to assert that sentence and the conditions under which it is coherent to deny that sentence. From this starting point the dissertation develops a theory of quantification as marking (...) coherent ways a language can be expanded and modality as the means by which we can reflect on the norms governing the assertion and denial conditions of our language. If the view of quantification that is argued for is correct, then there is no tension between second-order quantification and nominalism. In particular, the ontological commitments one can incur through the use of a quantifier depend wholly on the ontological commitments one can incur through the use of atomic sentences. The dissertation concludes by applying the developed theory of meaning to the metaphysical issue of necessitism and contingentism. Two objections to a logic of contingentism are raised and addressed. The resulting logic is shown to meet all the requirement that the dissertation lays out for a theory of meaning for quantifiers and modal operators. (shrink)

The logic of paradox, LP, is a first-order, three-valued logic that has been advocated by Graham Priest as an appropriate way to represent the possibility of acceptable contradictory statements. Second-order LP is that logic augmented with quantification over predicates. As with classical second-order logic, there are different ways to give the semantic interpretation of sentences of the logic. The different ways give rise to different logical advantages and disadvantages, and we canvass several of these, concluding (...) that it will be extremely difficult to appeal to second-order LP for the purposes that its proponents advocate, until some deep, intricate, and hitherto unarticulated metaphysical advances are made. (shrink)

In his paper, ‘Patients, doctors and risk attitudes,’ Nicholas Makins1 argues that healthcare professionals should defer to a patient’s higher-order risk attitudes (ie, the risk attitudes they desire to have or endorse within themselves upon reflection) when making medical decisions. We argue against Makins’ deference to higher-order risk attitudes on the basis that (1) there are significant practical concerns regarding our ability to easily and consistently access and verify the higher-order risk attitudes of patients, (2) there is (...) a lack of a theoretical limit on higher-order risk attitudes (eg, second, third, fourth order), and (3) the consideration of higher-order risk attitudes is actually more paternalistic than Makins suggests because it narrows what counts as an autonomous preference to the limited occasions in which an individual actually reflects on his or her own risk attitude. On the issue of practicality, we can reasonably expect that healthcare professionals would find difficulty eliciting the higher-order risk attitudes of their patients. Take for example the patient who has never expressed his higher-order desire to be more risk adverse and who is not willing nor comfortable expressing this desire. What is the healthcare professional expected to do in this situation? This is even more of a concern for the incapacitated patient, to which Makins seems to imply that …. (shrink)

We discuss the differences between first-order set theory and second-order logic as a foundation for mathematics. We analyse these languages in terms of two levels of formalization. The analysis shows that if second-order logic is understood in its full semantics capable of characterizing categorically central mathematical concepts, it relies entirely on informal reasoning. On the other hand, if it is given a weak semantics, it loses its power in expressing concepts categorically. First-order set theory (...) and second-order logic are not radically different: the latter is a major fragment of the former. (shrink)