Results for 'Second-order false belief'

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  1.  77
    Children’s First and Second-Order False-Belief Reasoning in a Verbal and a Low-Verbal Task.Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek van Hout & Petra Hendriks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3).
    We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false-belief (...)
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  2.  79
    Children's First and Second-Order False-Belief Reasoning in a Verbal and a Low-Verbal Task.Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek Hout & Petra Hendriks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3).
    We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false-belief (...)
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  3.  12
    Being Deceived: Information Asymmetry in SecondOrder False Belief Tasks.Torben Braüner, Patrick Blackburn & Irina Polyanskaya - 2020 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (2):504-534.
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  4.  5
    Five-Year-Olds’ Systematic Errors in Second-Order False Belief Tasks Are Due to First-Order Theory of Mind Strategy Selection: A Computational Modeling Study.Burcu Arslan, Niels A. Taatgen & Rineke Verbrugge - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
  5. Language and Second Order Thinking (the Analysis of False Belief Task).Arkadiusz Gut - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (3):99.
  6. Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief.Sydney Shoemaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):35-51.
    The paper defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are “available” in the (...)
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  7.  5
    Language and second order thinking (the analysis of false belief task)(jezyk a myslenie drugiego rzedu (analiza testów falszywego przekonania)).Gut Arkadiusz - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (3 (67)).
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  8.  5
    Seeing Is Believing: Formalising False-Belief Tasks in Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Thomas Bolander - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game Theoretical Semantics. Springer. pp. 207-236.
    In this paper we show how to formalise false-belief tasks like the Sally-Anne task and the second-order chocolate task in Dynamic Epistemic Logic. False-belief tasks are used to test the strength of the Theory of Mind of humans, that is, a human’s ability to attribute mental states to other agents. Having a ToM is known to be essential to human social intelligence, and hence likely to be essential to social intelligence of artificial agents as (...)
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  9. Animal Minds: The Possibility of Second-Order Beliefs in Non-Linguistic Animals.Robert W. Lurz - 1998 - Dissertation, Temple University
    I defend the thesis that it is conceptually possible for non-linguistic creatures to possess second-order beliefs--that is, beliefs about their own beliefs and those of others. I defend this thesis against Donald Davidson and Jonathan Bennett who argue that the thesis is false on the grounds that non-linguistic creatures cannot manifest second-order beliefs. In reply, I present a case that I argue shows a non-linguistic creature manifesting second-order beliefs. Also, I examine and criticize (...)
     
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  10.  77
    Children’s Application of Theory of Mind in Reasoning and Language.Liesbeth Flobbe, Rineke Verbrugge, Petra Hendriks & Irene Krämer - 2008 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (4):417-442.
    Many social situations require a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, goals, and intentions of others: a Theory of Mind (ToM). If a person can reason about other people’s beliefs about his own beliefs or intentions, he is demonstrating second-order ToM reasoning. A standard task to test second-order ToM reasoning is the second-order false belief task. A different approach to investigating ToM reasoning is through its application in a strategic game. Another task (...)
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  11.  28
    Second-Order Probabilities and Belief Functions.Jonathan Baron - 1987 - Theory and Decision 23 (1):25-36.
  12. Mental Files and Belief: A Cognitive Theory of How Children Represent Belief and its Intensionality.Josef Perner, Michael Huemer & Brian Leahy - 2015 - Cognition 145:77-88.
    We provide a cognitive analysis of how children represent belief using mental files. We explain why children who pass the false belief test are not aware of the intensionality of belief. Fifty-one 3½- to 7-year old children were familiarized with a dual object, e.g., a ball that rattles and is described as a rattle. They observed how a puppet agent witnessed the ball being put into box 1. In the agent’s absence the ball was taken from (...)
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  13. Naughty Beliefs.Andrew Huddleston - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):209-222.
    Can a person ever occurrently believe p and yet have the simultaneous, occurrent belief q that this very belief that p is false? Surely not, most would say: that description of a person’s epistemic economy seems to misunderstand the very concept of belief. In this paper I question this orthodox assumption. There are, I suggest, cases where we have a first-order mental state m that involves taking the world to be a certain way, yet although (...)
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  14.  42
    The Misinformation Age: How False Beliefs Spread.Cailin O'Connor & James Owen Weatherall - 2019 - New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press.
    "Why should we care about having true beliefs? And why do demonstrably false beliefs persist and spread despite consequences for the people who hold them? Philosophers of science Cailin O’Connor and James Weatherall argue that social factors, rather than individual psychology, are what’s essential to understanding the spread and persistence of false belief. It might seem that there’s an obvious reason that true beliefs matter: false beliefs will hurt you. But if that’s right, then why is (...)
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  15.  34
    Costly False Beliefs: What Self-Deception and Pragmatic Encroachment Can Tell Us About the Rationality of Beliefs.Melanie Sarzano - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2):95-118.
    Melanie Sarzano | : In this paper, I compare cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment and argue that confronting these cases generates a dilemma about rationality. This dilemma turns on the idea that subjects are motivated to avoid costly false beliefs, and that both cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment are caused by an interest to avoid forming costly false beliefs. Even though both types of cases can be explained by the same belief-formation (...)
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  16.  78
    Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief.Anthony Brueckner - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):361-64.
    In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.
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  17. The Developmental Paradox of False Belief Understanding: A Dual-System Solution.L. C. De Bruin & A. Newen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3).
    We explore the developmental paradox of false belief understanding. This paradox follows from the claim that young infants already have an understanding of false belief, despite the fact that they consistently fail the elicited-response false belief task. First, we argue that recent proposals to solve this paradox are unsatisfactory because they (i) try to give a full explanation of false belief understanding in terms of a single system, (ii) fail to provide psychological (...)
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  18.  40
    Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception.Byeong D. Lee - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (2):279-289.
    In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.
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  19.  4
    False Re-Representations in Self-Knowledge.Anita Pacholik-Żuromska - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    Self-knowledge (SK) is a natural ability of the human cognitive system and is defined as a complex re-representation of knowledge subject has about her own internal states. It is composed of two basic representations: the representation of I and the representation of the experienced state. SK has a propositional (i.e. language-like) form and can be expressed in the form of self-reports like “I believe that I believe that p”. It has then the form of a second-order belief (...)
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  20. Hypotheses That Attribute False Beliefs: A Two‐Part Epistemology.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (5):664-682.
    Is there some general reason to expect organisms that have beliefs to have false beliefs? And after you observe that an organism occasionally occupies a given neural state that you think encodes a perceptual belief, how do you evaluate hypotheses about the semantic content that that state has, where some of those hypotheses attribute beliefs that are sometimes false while others attribute beliefs that are always true? To address the first of these questions, we discuss evolution by (...)
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  21.  9
    Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief.Anthony Brueckner - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):361-364.
    In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argument.
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  22. And He Ate Jim Crow: Racist Ideology as False Consciousness.Vanessa Wills - 2021 - In Brandon Hogan, Michael Choldbi, Alex Madva & Benjamin S. Yost (eds.), The Movement for Black Lives: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 35-58.
    Why do racist oppression and capitalist exploitation often seem so inescapable and intractable? To describe and explain adequately the persistence of racist ideology, to specify its role in the maintenance of racial capitalism, and to imagine the conditions of its abolition, we must understand racist ideology as a form of false consciousness. False consciousness gets things “right” at the level of appearance, but it mistakes that appearance for a “deep” or essential truth. This chapter articulates a novel, positive (...)
     
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  23.  17
    Existential Monadic Second Order Logic of Undirected Graphs: The Le Bars Conjecture is False.S. N. Popova & M. E. Zhukovskii - 2019 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 170 (4):505-514.
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  24.  5
    Pragmatics in the False-Belief Task: Let the Robot Ask the Question!Jean Baratgin, Marion Dubois-Sage, Baptiste Jacquet, Jean-Louis Stilgenbauer & Frank Jamet - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    The poor performances of typically developing children younger than 4 in the first-order false-belief task “Maxi and the chocolate” is analyzed from the perspective of conversational pragmatics. An ambiguous question asked by an adult experimenter can receive different interpretations based on a search for relevance, by which children according to their age attribute different intentions to the questioner, within the limits of their own meta-cognitive knowledge. The adult experimenter tells the child the following story of object-transfer: “Maxi (...)
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  25. Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties.Andy Egan - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48-66.
    Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...)
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  26.  50
    How to Give a Piece of Your Mind: Or, The Logic of Belief and Assent.Ronald B. de Sousa - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 25 (1):52-79.
    Nothing seems to follow strictly from 'X believes that p'. But if we reinterpret it to mean: 'X can consistently be described as consistently believing p'--which roughly renders, I think, Hintikka's notion of "defensibility"--we can get on with the subject, freed from the inhibitions of descriptive adequacy. But defensibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for truth: it tells us little, therefore, about the concept of belief on which it is based. It cannot, in particular, specify necessary conditions for the (...)
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  27. False Beliefs and Naive Beliefs: They Can Be Good for You.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.
    Naive physics beliefs can be systematically mistaken. They provide a useful test-bed because they are common, and also because their existence must rely on some adaptive advantage, within a given context. In the second part of the commentary we also ask questions about when a whole family of misbeliefs should be considered together as a single phenomenon.
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  28.  8
    Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception.Byeong D. Lee - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (2):279-290.
    RÉSUMÉ: L'autorité de la première personne au sujet de ses propres états mentaux semble entrer en conflit avec l'occurrence de certaines illusions sur soi-même. Sydney Shoemaker avance une suggestion intéressante pour régler ce type de conflit. Selon cette suggestion, on peut expliquer l'autorité de la première personne au sujet de ses propres états mentaux en maintenant que les croyances positives de second ordre sont toujours correctes, tandis qu'on peut expliquer les illusions au sujet de soi-même en termes de croyances (...)
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  29.  5
    Second-Order Assessment of Scientific Expert Claims and Sharing Epistemic Burdens in Science Communication.George Kwasi Barimah - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    When laypersons are presented with scientific information which seeks to modify their way of life, they are expected to believe, suspend belief, or reject it. Second-order assessment of scientific experts helps laypersons to make an informed decision in such situations. This is an assessment of the trustworthiness of the person making the scientific claim. In this paper I challenge the optimistic view of Anderson, regarding the ease with which laypersons can perform second-order assessment of experts, (...)
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  30. What Does the so-Called False Belief Task Actually Check?Hanoch Ben-Yami, Maya Ben-Yami & Yotham Ben-Yami - manuscript
    There is currently a theoretical tension between young children’s failure in False Belief Tasks (FBTs) and their success in a variety of other tasks that also seem to require the ability to ascribe false beliefs to agents. We try to explain this tension by the hypothesis that in the FBT, children think they are asked what the agent should do in the circumstances and not what the agent will do. We explain why this hypothesis is plausible. We (...)
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  31.  33
    How to Give a Piece of Your Mind: Or, the Logic of Belief and Assent.Ronald B. De Sousa - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 25 (1):52 - 79.
    Nothing seems to follow strictly from 'X believes that p'. But if we reinterpret it to mean: 'X can consistently be described as consistently believing p'--which roughly renders, I think, Hintikka's notion of "defensibility"--we can get on with the subject, freed from the inhibitions of descriptive adequacy. But defensibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for truth: it tells us little, therefore, about the concept of belief on which it is based. It cannot, in particular, specify necessary conditions for the (...)
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  32.  75
    On-Line False Belief Understanding Qua Folk Psychology?Martin Capstick - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):27-40.
    In this paper, I address Mitchell Herschbach’s arguments against the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Central to Herschbach’s arguments is the introduction of Michael Wheeler’s distinction between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ intelligence to the debate on social understanding. Herschbach uses this distinction to describe two arguments made by the phenomenological critics. The first is that folk psychology is exclusively off-line and mentalistic. The second is that social understanding is on-line and non-mentalistic. To counter the phenomenological critics, Herschbach argues for the (...)
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  33. Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Noûs 26 (3):281-302.
    Pristine belief/desire psychology has its limitations. Recognizing this, some have attempted to fill various gaps by adding more of the same, but at higher levels. Thus, for example, second-order desires have been imported into a more stream- lined view to explicate such important notions as freedom of the will, personhood, and valuing. I believe that we need to branch out as well as up, augmenting a familiar 'philosophical psychology' with psychological items that are irreducible to beliefs and (...)
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  34. If You Believe You Believe, You Believe. A Constitutive Account of Knowledge of One’s Own Beliefs.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Logos and Episteme:389-416.
    Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that (...)
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  35.  16
    A Defense of First and Second-Order Theism: The Limits of Empirical Inquiry and the Rationality of Religious Belief.Charles Taliaferro & Christophe Porot - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (3):213-235.
    We argue that the use of the term “supernatural” is problematic in philosophy of religion in general, and in the contribution by Thornhill-Miller and Millican in particular. We address the disturbing parallel between Hume’s case against the rationality of belief in miracles and his dismissal of reports of racial equality. We do not argue that because Hume was a racist therefore his view against miracles is faulty, but we draw attention to how Hume sets up a framework that, for (...)
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  36.  20
    Can We Forget What We Know in a FalseBelief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default.Paula Rubio-Fernández - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (1):218-241.
    It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing (...)
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  37.  43
    On a Second Order Propositional Operator in Intuitionistic Logic.A. S. Troelstra - 1981 - Studia Logica 40 (2):113 - 139.
    This paper studies, by way of an example, the intuitionistic propositional connective * defined in the language of second order propositional logic by. In full topological models * is not generally definable, but over Cantor-space and the reals it can be classically shown that; on the other hand, this is false constructively, i.e. a contradiction with Church's thesis is obtained. This is comparable with some well-known results on the completeness of intuitionistic first-order predicate logic.Over [0, 1], (...)
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  38.  8
    On a second order propositional operator in intuitionistic logic.A. A. Troelstra - 1981 - Studia Logica 40:113.
    This paper studies, by way of an example, the intuitionistic propositional connective * defined in the language of second order propositional logic by * ≡ ∃Q. In full topological models * is not generally definable but over Cantor-space and the reals it can be classically shown that *↔ ⅂⅂P; on the other hand, this is false constructively, i.e. a contradiction with Church's thesis is obtained. This is comparable with some well-known results on the completeness of intuitionistic first- (...) predicate logic. Over [0, 1], the operator * is undefinable. We show how to recast this argument in terms of intuitive intuitionistic validity in some parameter. The undefinability argument essentially uses the connectedness of [0, 1]; most of the work of recasting consists in the choice of a suitable intuitionistically meaningful parameter, so as to imitate the effect of connectedness. Parameters of the required kind can be obtained as so-called projections of lawless sequences. (shrink)
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  39.  39
    Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks.Anna Ciaunica - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):527-542.
    Several studies demonstrated that children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false-belief task, can anticipate others’ actions based on their attributed false beliefs. This gave rise to the so-called “Developmental Paradox”. De Bruin and Kästner recently suggested that the Developmental Paradox is best addressed in terms of the relation between coupled and decoupled processes and argued that if enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able (...)
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  40.  53
    Uncertainty, Credal Sets and Second Order Probability.Jonas Clausen Mork - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):353-378.
    The last 20 years or so has seen an intense search carried out within Dempster–Shafer theory, with the aim of finding a generalization of the Shannon entropy for belief functions. In that time, there has also been much progress made in credal set theory—another generalization of the traditional Bayesian epistemic representation—albeit not in this particular area. In credal set theory, sets of probability functions are utilized to represent the epistemic state of rational agents instead of the single probability function (...)
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  41.  55
    On the Connection Between Lying, Asserting, and Intending to Cause Beliefs.Vladimir Krstic - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ (...)
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  42.  11
    The FAN Principle and Weak König's Lemma in Herbrandized Second-Order Arithmetic.Fernando Ferreira - 2020 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 171 (9):102843.
    We introduce a herbrandized functional interpretation of a first-order semi-intuitionistic extension of Heyting Arithmetic and study its main properties. We then extend the interpretation to a certain system of second-order arithmetic which includes a (classically false) formulation of the FAN principle and weak König's lemma. It is shown that any first-order formula provable in this system is classically true. It is perhaps worthy of note that, in our interpretation, second-order variables are interpreted by (...)
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  43. Properties and the Interpretation of Second-Order Logic.B. Hale - 2013 - Philosophia Mathematica 21 (2):133-156.
    This paper defends a deflationary conception of properties, according to which a property exists if and only if there could be a predicate with appropriate satisfaction conditions. I argue that purely general properties and relations necessarily exist and discuss the bearing of this conception of properties on the interpretation of higher-order logic and on Quine's charge that higher-order logic is ‘set theory in sheep's clothing’. On my approach, the usual semantics involves a false assimilation of the logic (...)
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  44.  3
    Linguistic Recursion and Danish Discourse Particles: Language in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder.Patrick Blackburn, Torben Braüner & Irina Polyanskaya - 2021 - In Maxime Amblard, Michel Musiol & Manuel Rebuschi (eds.), Coherence of Discourse: Formal and Conceptual Issues of Language. Springer Verlag. pp. 21-42.
    In a study involving 62 Danish children with autism spectrum disorder, we obtained results showing that the mastery of linguistic recursion is a significant predictor of success in second-order false belief tasks. The same study also showed that the mastery of linguistic recursion was not significantly correlated with success in a task involving three heavily used Danish discourse particles. This calls for further explanation, as the reasoning involved in both types of tasks seems similar. In this (...)
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  45.  70
    On Successful Communication, Intentions and False Beliefs.Matheus Valente - 2021 - Theoria 87 (1):167-186.
    I discuss a criterion for successful communication between a speaker and a hearer put forward by Buchanan according to which there is communicative success only if the hearer entertains, as a result of interpreting the speaker's utterance, a thought that has the same truth conditions as the thought asserted by the speaker and, furthermore, does so in virtue of recognizing the speaker's communicative intentions. I argue, against Buchanan, that the data on which it is based are compatible with a view (...)
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  46. Mackie Vs Plantinga on the Warrant of Theistic Belief Without Arguments.Domingos Faria - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (1):77.
    My aim in this paper is to critically assess two opposing theses about the epistemology of religious belief. The first one, developed by John Mackie, claims that belief in God can be justified or warranted only if there is a good argument for the existence of God. The second thesis, elaborated by Alvin Plantinga, holds that even if there is no such argument, belief in God can be justified or warranted. I contend that the first thesis (...)
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  47. Fallibilism, Contextualism and SecondOrder Skepticism.Alexander S. Harper - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.
    Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains‐in‐vats, it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge‐claims is much reduced (...)
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  48.  17
    Models with Second Order Properties in Successors of Singulars.Rami Grossberg - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (1):122-137.
    Let L(Q) be first order logic with Keisler's quantifier, in the λ + interpretation (= the satisfaction is defined as follows: $M \models (\mathbf{Q}x)\varphi(x)$ means there are λ + many elements in M satisfying the formula φ(x)). Theorem 1. Let λ be a singular cardinal; assume □ λ and GCH. If T is a complete theory in L(Q) of cardinality at most λ, and p is an L(Q) 1-type so that T strongly omits $p (= p$ has no support, (...)
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  49.  12
    Pecularities of Some Three- and Four-Valued Second Order Logics.Allen P. Hazen & Francis Jeffry Pelletier - 2018 - Logica Universalis 12 (3-4):493-509.
    Logics that have many truth values—more than just True and False—have been argued to be useful in the analysis of very many philosophical and linguistic puzzles. In this paper, which is a followup to, we will start with a particularly well-motivated four-valued logic that has been studied mainly in its propositional and first-order versions. And we will then investigate its second-order version. This four-valued logic has two natural three-valued extensions: what is called a “gap logic”, and (...)
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  50.  30
    Querying Linguistic Treebanks with Monadic Second-Order Logic in Linear Time.Stephan Kepser - 2004 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 13 (4):457-470.
    In recent years large amounts of electronic texts have become available. While the first of these corpora had only a low level of annotation, the more recent ones are annotated with refined syntactic information. To make these rich annotations accessible for linguists, the development of query systems has become an important goal. One of the main difficulties in this task consists in the choice of the right query language, a language which at the same time should be powerful enough to (...)
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