This study constructs a measurement scale for Socially Responsible Consumption in the particular context of Colombia. It uses a mixed qualitative and quantitative methodological approach, beginning with four focus groups and ending with a quantitative validation exercise employing Exploratory Factor Analysis. The result is a Socially Responsible Consumption measurement scale consisting of four dimensions that reflect paradigms found in the existing literature. These are, however, expressed differently in Colombia. In particular, Socially Responsible Consumption involves consumer behavior that favors corporate social (...) responsibility practices and the rational consumption of resources and products while recognizing the importance of maintaining a healthy lifestyle through healthcare. (shrink)

Socially responsible consumption reflects a consumer's political and ethical act. Its measurement is dependent on the socio-economic and cultural context. Consequently, measurement instruments reflecting various behaviour profiles of global consumers have been developed. This study employs a Latin-American-specific measurement instrument to compare socially responsible consumption behaviours in Colombia, Mexico and Peru, countries with the same cultural cluster, that is they reflect a set of values shaped by religion, family, a sense of authority and a nationalist bias in their cultural pattern. (...) The empirical test included confirmatory factorial analysis exercise, factorial invariance analysis and a contrast analysis of variance. The results for the three Latin American countries show the following. (i) The Mexican consumer, compared to the Peruvian and Colombian one, exhibits a stronger tendency to evaluate external practices of corporate social responsibility as a criterion of consumption. (ii) The rationality of the Mexican consumer is better in terms of consumption volume of products, resources and services. Finally, (iii) Peruvian and Mexican consumers (vs. Colombian consumers) exhibit a tendency to assess the responsible practices of companies in labour matters more as a consumption criterion. This study provides empirical evidence of the context-dependent nature of measuring socially responsible consumption. For practitioners, identifying consumer profiles based on the market context enables them to customise goods and services. Moreover, policymakers should implement a sustainable consumption agenda with public policy guidelines tailored to the specific context. (shrink)

Schools are an essential part of students’ lives and can promote and facilitate their well-being. Although research on well-being among school-aged children and adolescents has distinguished subjective well-being from social well-being, very few studies examined student’s social well-being at school. SWS is understood as students’ valuation of the circumstances and functioning of their school. This framework posits that the context of the schools can shape students’ perception of feeling integrated and making significant contributions to their schools. However, not much is (...) known regarding the joint contribution of individual, family, and school characteristics to students’ SWS. This study analyzed these joint contributions in a nationally representative sample of 6,389 children and adolescents enrolled in 5th–11th grades. Findings show that being female and younger were individual predictors of SWS. Students’ satisfaction with their family and fewer changes of schools were also significant contributors. When students’ perceptions of their schools were incorporated, the individual and family characteristics decreased or lost significance. In the full model, the highest contribution to SWS was explained by the school-level aggregated perception of school climate. These findings call for integrated policies and practices to foster students’ sense of belonging, feeling integrated, and contribution to their schools, with a focus on school-level interventions to improve SWS through positive and engaging school climates that foster students’ sense of agency. (shrink)

This paper argues for the normative significance of attention. Attention plays an important role when describing an individual’s mind and agency, and in explaining many central facts about that individual. In addition, many in the public want answers and guidance with regard to normative questions about attention. Given that attention is both descriptively central and the public cares about normative guidance with regard to it, attention should be central also in normative philosophy. We need an ethics of attention: a field (...) of study of which normative pressures, if any, govern attention. Like the ethics of belief, the ethics of attention will connect those normative questions to issues regarding the nature of attention, i.e. to what is subject to such normative pressures. Philosophers should develop an ethics of attention that helps to provide normative guidance and that is commensurate in its richness to the descriptive significance of attention. The second half of the paper sketches a framework that may help us to get started at developing the ethics of attention. (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

The presence of women in possession cults has frequently been noted. Thus women are usually the priviliged religious participants in Haitian Voo-doo and in the African Bori Hausa. Even allowing for the distinction of whether the role of religious chief is held by a male or a female, it seems women are in the majority in the cases representing almost the totality of those cultists who fall into a trance. In this article we propose to compare the position of women (...) within two possession cults in Brazil. One, Candomblé is of African origin; the other, Umbanda, is a synthesis of African religions, Catholicism, and the spiritism of Allan Kardec. We shall attempt in each case to associate the religious position of women with the social position they exercise in each society. (shrink)

Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest that reasons-first (...) epistemology might have within an evidentialist framework. (shrink)

How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and in ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. Responsibility for Rationality is the first book that connects recent debates on responsibility and on rationality in a unifying dialectic. It achieves four main goals: first, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility (...) for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality; second, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by defending a hybrid view; third, it provides novel support to recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by arguing that epistemic reasons and other ‘right-kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons; fourth, it sets the foundations and the research agenda for an ‘ethics of mind’, including an illustration of how to approach applied issues in epistemology within the presented framework. After spelling out connections between responsibility and rationality (part I), the book engages in debates in normative epistemology (part II) and brings them to bear on the broader field of an ethics of mind (part III). -/- Full draft of current version available on request, comments welcome! (shrink)

This book compares and contrasts publicly espoused security concepts in the Nordic region, and explores the notion of societal security. Outside observers often assume that Nordic countries take similar approaches to the security and safety of their citizens. This book challenges that assumption and traces the evolution of 'societal security', and its broadly equivalent concepts, in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. The notion of societal security is deconstructed and analysed in terms of its different meanings and implications for each country, (...) through both country- and issue-focused studies. Each chapter traces the evolution of key security concepts and related practices, allowing for a comparison of similarities and differences between these four countries. Using discourses and practices as evidence, this is the first book to explore how different Nordic nations have conceptualised domestic security over time. The findings will be valuable to scholars from across the geographical and theoretical spectrum, while highlighting how Nordic security discourses and practices may deviate from traditional assumptions about Nordic values. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, Nordic politics and International Relations. (shrink)

In the traditional understanding, human dignity is often portrayed as a «final», «inherent», and «absolute» value. If human dignity as the core of the status of a human being did indeed have thos characteristics, this would yield a severe limitation for obligations that stem from the moral status of non-human animals, plants, eco systems and other entities discussed in environmental ethics; for obligations that arise from human dignity standardly take priority over the duties toward entities with non-human moral status. Yet, (...) many theorists of human dignity nowadays have given up the traditional picture in favour of a more «contingent» understanding of human dignity that abandons one or more of its traditional characteristics.In this paper, I argue that to the contrary, we have good reasons to think that the three characteristics of human dignity just mentioned can indeed be attributed to a value that deserves the name «human dignity». In a first part, I argue for a specific understanding of the three value characteristics under consideration. After these preliminaries, I show in a second part that given such an understanding, we have ample evidence that we can indeed say that human dignity is an inherent, absolute and final value; and also that these three characteristics are properties of a single value. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

Tienen razón Francisco Lara y Olga Campos en afirmar en la introducción de su libro que “un mérito importante de este libro es que, de manera muy divulgativa, pretende dar respuestas filosóficas al debate sobre nuestra relación con los animales al aplicar ideas bási- cas a cuestiones prácticas como si debemos ser o no vegetarianos, si hay que experimentar con animales o hasta qué punto son justifica- bles las corridas de toros” (p. 15). Y efectivamente, de una manera muy clara, (...) el libro no sólo pretende, sino que en efecto da respuestas a cuestiones centrales sobre nuestra relación con los animales, en particular a la cuestión acerca de cuál es su estatus o su valor moral y, por ende, sobre si tenemos obligaciones morales hacia ellos. Su tesis es que los animales sí tienen un estatus moral independiente de los intereses humanos, que tienen derechos y que es nuestra obligación moral respetarlos. Parte de ese respeto consiste en no tratarlos como meros instrumentos o recursos al servicio de los inte- reses de los humanos. (shrink)

El súbito consenso que se ha producido en nuestros días alrededor de la importancia de la noción democracia no se ha acompañado de una reflexión filosófica sobre su sentido moderno. La obra filosófica de Claude Lefort ha contribuido a llenar este vacío teórico. Para Lefort, el sentido de la democracia moderna no puede revelarse, como ha supuesto la ciencia política, a través de la descripción del funcionamiento de sus instituciones, sino puede estudiarse mediante la exploración de su dimensión simbólica. En (...) efecto, la fundación y el destino de la democracia son inseparables de la indeterminación de sus fundamentos y de la infigurabilidad del poder, de la ley y del saber. Origen y destino que bien pueden ser rastreados a la luz del contraste entre la sociedad democrática y la sociedad totalitaria. El presente ensayo se ocupa de contrastar la dimensión simbólica de ambas formas de sociedad. Palabras clave: Democracia; totalitarismo; dimensión simbólica; político; Claude Lefort Democracy and totalitarianism: The Symbolic Dimension of the Political according to Claude LefortThe sudden consensus prevailing nowadays on the importance of the concept of democracy has not been accompanied by a philosophical reflection on its modern sense. Claude Lefort’s philosophical work has helped to fill this theoretical vacuum. According to Lefort, the sense of modern democracy cannot be disclosed, as political science has assumed, just by describing the operation of its institutions. Rather, it may be studied by exploring its symbolic dimension. In fact, democracy’s origin and fate are inseparable from the indeterminacy of its foundation and the non-figurable nature of power, law and knowledge. Such an origin and fate may indeed be tracked in light of the contrast between the democratic society and the totalitarian one. This essay aims to contrast the symbolic dimension of both forms of society. Keywords : Democracy; totalitarianism; symbolic dimension; political; Claude Lefort. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another element (...) of the mind, but constituted by structures that organize, integrate, and coordinate the parts of our mind. Attention thus integrates the perceptual and intellectual, the cognitive and motivational, and the epistemic and practical. The second half of the book concerns the relationship between attention and consciousness. Watzl argues that attentional structure shapes consciousness into what is central and what is peripheral. The center-periphery structure of consciousness cannot be reduced to the structure of how the world appears to the subject. What it is like for us thus goes beyond the way the world appears to us. On this basis, a new view of consciousness is offered. In each conscious experience we actively take a stance on the world we appear to encounter. It is in this sense that our conscious experience is our subjective perspective. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

Sowohl in der analytischen Philosophie als auch im verwandten Projekt einer erneuerten Praxisphilosophie gewinnt sinnkritisches Philosophieren derzeit eine neue Dringlichkeit. Beide begreifen die menschliche, vernünftige Praxis als primäre Quelle von Sinn und als privilegierten Gegenstand philosophischer Analyse. Der Band vereint Beiträge zu zentralen Aspekten sinnkritischer, praxisformanalytischer Philosophie: von der Frage nach dem Sinn religiöser Rede und Praxis über das Problem der Struktur und die Form menschlichen Handelns bis hin zu Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Wissen und Wahrnehmung. Beiträge u. a. von (...) Robert Brandom, James Conant, Christoph Demmerling, Thomas Rentsch, Sebastian Rödl, Hans Julius Schneider, Henning Tegtmeyer und Holm Tetens. (shrink)

En este trabajo realizamos una revisión historiográfica sobre la fabricación de anatomías artificiales que fueron ampliamente demandadas como herramientas didácticas en la enseñanza de la naturaleza, entre finales del siglo XVIII y principios del XX. Se analizan los contextos educativos y sociales que favorecieron la amplia difusión de este tipo de artefactos en el comercio de la cultura científica, y se describen las técnicas de manufactura. Se concluye que estos artefactos, fruto del ingenio humano, son fuentes materiales de extraordinario valor (...) para comprender la construcción y evolución de la ciencia, los avances en los recursos pedagógicos y las innovaciones tecnológicas. (shrink)

The concept of "life" has always been part of the basic philosophical topoi. In Greek antiquity, the question of what constitutes a "good" or "successful" life was regarded as a fundamental question of philosophy. As a result, early philosophers engaged in practice-oriented philosophizing which regarded philosophy as a form of life. In Modern philosophy, the term "life" became a technical term in different philosophical traditions such as the philosophy of life, philosophy of existence, and phenomenology. This volume brings together contributions (...) in German and French that explore the concept of "life" historically and systematically, focusing on metaphysical, anthropological, and ethical issues. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Don't Laugh at “Slow” Sailing: Average Versus Instantaneous Motion Motion Relative to What? – Galilean Relativity But There are No Fixed Reference Frames – Special Relativity General Relativity – Can it Really Matter?

Lässt sich der Einsatz militärischer Gewalt zum Schutz der Menschenrechte innerhalb fremder Staaten rechtfertigen? Die Arbeit beleuchtet die Frage nach der Rechtfertigung humanitärer Interventionen. Dazu werden Interventionsargumente in der Geschichte des politischen Denkens ausgehend von Wurzeln in Antike und Mittelalter über die Kriegsethik der spanischen Spätscholastik, das politische Denken der Neuzeit bis zur Kritik jeglicher Form von Interventionen vor dem Hintergrund der Dominanz des Souveränitätsprinzips im politischen Denken des 18. Jahrhunderts rekonstruiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund argumentiert der Autor dafür, dass die (...) Souveränität der Staaten nicht unabhängig vom Schutz der grundlegenden Menschenrechte ihrer Bürger gedacht werden kann. Staaten haben eine primäre Verantwortung für den Schutz ihrer Bürger, die, wenn der einzelne Staat sie nicht erfüllt, als sekundäre Verantwortung auch der Staatengemeinschaft als Schutzverantwortung (responsibility to protect) zukommt und militärische Interventionen im Falle massiver Menschenrechtsverletzungen als letztes Mittel erlaubt. (shrink)

Für Aristoteles ist das Kontinuum ein potentiell Unendliches. Dieser Unendlichkeitsbegriff, den er neben dem prozessualen und aktualen einführte, wurde im Laufe der Philosophiegeschichte nicht mehr berücksichtigt. So verwenden ihn u.a. weder Kant noch Weyl in ihren Kontinuumsbetrachtungen, obwohl ihr Kontinuumsverständnis ihn geradezu nahelegt. - In dieser Arbeit werden zum einen die ontologischen Kontinuumslehren des Aristoteles und späterer Philosophen und Mathematiker behandelt, zum anderen erfährt die von Aristoteles im 6. Buch der «Physik» vorgelegte strukturelle Kontinuumsuntersuchung eine eingehende Würdigung.

Bernard Rollin argues that it is permissible to change an animal's telos through genetic engineering, if it doesn't harm the animal's welfare. Recent attempts to undermine his argument rely either on the claim that diminishing certain capacities always harms an animal's welfare or on the claim that it always violates an animal's integrity. I argue that these fail. However, respect for animal dignity provides a defeasible reason not to engineer an animal in a way that inhibits the development of those (...) functions that a member of its species can normally perform, even if the modification would improve the animal's welfare. (shrink)

For different reasons, Husserl's original, thought-provoking ideas on the philosophy of logic and mathematics have been ignored, misunderstood, even despised, by analytic philosophers and phenomenologists alike, who have been content to barricade themselves behind walls of ideological prejudices. Yet, for several decades, Husserl was almost continuously in close professional and personal contact with those who created, reshaped and revolutionized 20th century philosophy of mathematics, logic, science and language in both the analytic and phenomenological schools, people whom those other makers of (...) 20th century philosophy, Russell, Frege, Wittgenstein and their followers, rarely, if ever, met. Independently of them, Husserl offered alternatives to the well-trodden paths of logicism, nominalism, formalism and intuitionism. He presented a well-articulated, thoroughly argued case for logic as an objective science, but was not philosophically naive to the point of not seeing the role of subjectivity in shaping the sense of the reality facing objective science. Given the preeminent role that philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics have played in transforming the way philosophy has been done since Husserl's time, and given the depth of his insights and his obvious expertise in those fields, his ideas need to be integrated into present-day, mainstream philosophy. Here, philosopher Claire Ortiz Hill and mathematician-philosopher Jairo da Silva offer a wealth of interesting insights intended to subvert the many mistaken idees recues about the development of Husserl's thought and reestablish broken ties between it and philosophy now. (shrink)

Se presenta la reflexión sobre el papel de una ética crítica que acompañe los procesos de innovación tecnológica, a partir de los aportes de la filosofía de la tecnología, específicamente las propuestas de Floridi y Verbeek. Se análizará el caso de digitalización de servicios de gobierno, en la ciudad de Medellín, Colombia, centrado en el comportamiento de los usuarios de la plataforma Movilidad en Línea. La tesis principal que se esboza es que con los procesos de digitalización se pretende eliminar (...) la intermediación entre el ciudadano y el acceso al Estado Plataforma. Sin embargo, encontramos que las mediaciones persisten y transitan hacia mediaciones tecnológicas. Esta constatación y la demostración de la agencialidad y moralidad de los artefactos tecnológicos fundamenta la propuesta de una ética critica que acompañe de manera participativa la innovación y transición digital. (shrink)

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine raises fundamental ethical issues. As one example, AI systems in the field of mental health successfully detect signs of mental disorders, such as depression, by using data from social media. These AI depression detectors (AIDDs) identify users who are at risk of depression prior to any contact with the healthcare system. The article focuses on the ethical implications of AIDDs regarding affected users’ health-related autonomy. Firstly, it presents the (ethical) discussion of AI (...) in medicine and, specifically, in mental health. Secondly, two models of AIDDs using social media data and different usage scenarios are introduced. Thirdly, the concept of patient autonomy, according to Beauchamp and Childress, is critically discussed. Since this concept does not encompass the specific challenges linked with the digital context of AIDDs in social media sufficiently, the current analysis suggests, finally, an extended concept of health-related digital autonomy. (shrink)

The main objective of this study is to identify the socioemotional competencies of adolescents in secondary education who are currently in the first grade of secondary school (school year 2022-2023), which contribute to a better interaction with their peers and environment, in addition to preventing possible risk behaviors. It will be approached from a quantitative approach, with a descriptive scope. The sample consists of 19 students from a private institution, located in the municipality of Guadalupe, Zac. A questionnaire called emociogram (...) was applied through the Habilmind platform, to identify the main characteristics regarding the emotional scale, which in turn is composed of five subscales such as: empathy, assertiveness, interpersonal emotional regulation, teamwork and conflict resolution. The results show us some areas of opportunity that should be emphasized in order to improve the results and thus improve the socioemotional competencies of adolescents. (shrink)

This essay elaborates on Rodolfo Corky Gonzales’s “Yo soy Joaquín” as an inter-American articulation of the critical commitments of Chicanismo, which is here identified as the sociopolitical philosophy and ideological/normative leanings of Mexican Americans who call themselves Chicanas/os. The purpose of this essay is to show both how syncretism frames Chicanismo as a philosophy of growth and identity beyond borders and that this worldview can be critically explained as seeking alliances to communities and contexts defined by struggle. It engages the (...) historical groundwork, philosophical influences on, and cultural ideals and values voiced through this poem by proponents of Chicanismo among its multiple forms and various representatives. (shrink)

This essay elaborates on Rodolfo Corky Gonzales’s “Yo soy Joaquín” as an inter-American articulation of the critical commitments of Chicanismo, which is here identified as the sociopolitical philosophy and ideological/normative leanings of Mexican Americans who call themselves Chicanas/os. The purpose of this essay is to show both how syncretism frames Chicanismo as a philosophy of growth and identity beyond borders and that this worldview can be critically explained as seeking alliances to communities and contexts defined by struggle. It engages the (...) historical groundwork, philosophical influences on, and cultural ideals and values voiced through this poem by proponents of Chicanismo among its multiple forms and various representatives. (shrink)

Schools in Germany are frequently named after people. Thus, these persons are remembered in the public sphere. This article answers the question to what extent the school names in the federal state of Thuringia correspond with the history of scientific pedagogy. For this purpose, in a first step, the controversial discussion about key figures in pedagogy and history of education is presented. In a second step the entirety of all school names in Thuringia is considered and individual results are discussed. (...) As a rule, it is not pedagogues who lend their names to schools but writers, artists and political figures. Only one fifth of all schools named after a person are named after educators. It is found that the key figures in pedagogy are rarely available as namesakes, whereas in practice successful school founders are preferred as name-givers. Accordingly, the history of pedagogy is represented in a filtered way in school names. Based on these results, further research perspectives for research on school names are formulated. (shrink)