Purpose The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion of “trust in technology” against the philosophical view that this concept is misled and unsuitable for ethical evaluation. In contrast, it is shown that “trustworthy technology” addresses a critical societal need in the digital age as it is inclusive of IT-security risks not only from a technical but also from a public layperson perspective. Design/methodology/approach From an interdisciplinary perspective between philosophy andIT-security, the authors discuss a potential instantiation of a (...) “trustworthy information and communication technology ”: a solution for privacy respecting video surveillance. Here, strong data protection measures address grave concerns such as the threat of bulk biometric tracking of citizens. In a logical argument, however, the authors show that this technical notion of “trust” needs to be complemented by interlocking trust relations to justify public trust. Findings Based on this argument, the authors demonstrate that the philosophical position considering “trust in technology” to denote either “reliability” or “interpersonal trust” is too limited as it fails to address critical aspects of IT-security. In a broader, socio-technical sense, however, it is shown that several distinct accounts of trust – technical, interpersonal and institutional – should meaningfully interlock, to address concerns with ICTs. Originality/value This conceptual study demonstrates the potential of “trust in technology” for a more comprehensive evaluation of ICTs within the context of operation. Furthermore, it adds to the discussion of trust in IT-security by highlighting the layperson’s challenge of judging a technology’s trustworthiness. Vice versa, it contributes to Ethics of Technology by highlighting crucial IT-security needs. (shrink)

Die gesellschaftspolitischen Konflikte um die Verschärfung von Fluggastkontrollen belegen, dass es bei Entscheidungen darüber, wie und mit welchen Techniken derartige Kontrollprozesse zu organisieren sind, einen Bedarf an ethischer Expertise gibt. Getroffen werden müssen solche Entscheidungen vor einem komplexen Horizont von Wertvorstellungen, der sich nicht auf den Gegensatz ‚entweder Sicherheit oder Freiheit‘ reduzieren lässt. Entsprechend muss eine informierte Entscheidungsfindung berücksichtigen, welche impliziten Wertvorstellungen uns bei der Forderung nach mehr Sicherheit durch Fluggastkontrollen leiten und welche Wertungskonflikte verschiedene Kontrolltechniken jeweils konkret implizieren. Über (...) eine hermeneutische Lesart von John Deweys Moralpragmatismus werden in dieser Arbeit jene Wertvorstellungen rekonstruiert, die uns bei der Forderung nach Sicherheit leiten, wie auch jene, die dabei auf dem Spiel stehen. Auf dieser Basis präsentiert die Arbeit eine Methode zur operationalisierten Technikbewertung, über die verschiedene Kontrollprozesse verglichen sowie Handlungsempfehlungen generiert werden können. (shrink)

In “Risk Based Passenger Screening in Aviation Security: Implications and Variants of a New Paradigm”, Sebastian Weydner-Volkmann describes the current paradigm shift from ‘traditional’ forms of screening to ‘risk based passenger screening’ (RBS) in aviation security. This paradigm shift is put in the context of the wider historical development of risk management approaches. Through a discussion of Michel Foucault, Herfried Münkler and Ulrich Beck, Weydner-Volkmann analyses the shortcomings of such approaches in public security policies, which become especially (...) evident in the aviation security context. As he shows, the turn towards methods of RBS can be seen as an attempt to address a trade-off ‘trilemma’ between the effective provision of security, the implied costs for industry and passengers, and the ethical, legal and societal implications of the screening procedures. In order to analyse foreseeable outcomes of embracing RBS, he differentiates three prototypical variants of the new paradigm on the basis of their main referent and rationale. For each variant, he then subsequently assesses the implications for the ‘trilemma’, after having unveiled the criteria of analysis that will necessarily have to be followed within a serious appraisal of RBS methods. (shrink)

This article explores what John Dewey’s political philosophy can offer in regard to the current crisis in digital democracy. It focuses on two digital mechanisms, the “filter bubble” and the “echo chamber”. While there is a prominent, Dewey-inspired debate on “digital publics” in the literature, a reconstruction of the Deweyan concepts of the public and of shared experience shows that it does not adequately reflect the aspect of situated and embodied experience. Based on this, it is shown that digital media (...) offerings must also be rooted in local contexts of experience in order to answer the challenge of those two problematic mechanisms. (shrink)

This article explores the potential for “trust in technology” to make a productive conceptual contribution to the ethical evaluation of technology, complementing the concepts of “acceptance” and “acceptability” already established in technology assessment. It shows that for digital technologies in particular, “trust” can better address aspects of security against attacks as it allows to integrate concepts of IT security. Furthermore, “trustworthy technology” allows for a better inclusion of lay perspectives, since rationally justified trust in the sense of risk expectations can (...) be mediated interpersonally by experts. Especially for the evaluation of digital technologies, “trust in technology” can thus bridge a conceptual gap between acceptance and acceptability. (shrink)

Der Artikel beschreibt, welches Angebot über einen moralpragmatischen Ansatz in der Technikfolgenabschätzung (TA) konkret gemacht werden kann. Ethisch argumentierende TA, so die These, lässt sich mit John Dewey als eine Kartografie situativer Wertungskonflikte begreifen. Die entstehenden „moralischen Landkarten“ zu konkreten technischen Entscheidungssituationen zielen darauf ab, den Bedarf an wissenschaftsgestützter, möglichst neutraler Beratung für den öffentlich-politischen Prozess zu ermitteln. Pragmatisch kann „Neutralität“ allerdings nicht als normative Abstinenz verstanden werden. Vielmehr soll der Ausgang von einer Rekonstruktion der normativen Konflikte genommen werden, wobei (...) die Wertvorstellungen, die in den Entscheidungssituationen technischen Handelns jeweils relevant sind, bewusst aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven erschlossen werden. (shrink)

Der Beitrag geht davon aus, dass es die immer stärkere Ausweitung von Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung öffentlicher Sicherheit durch den Staat notwendig macht, sich innerhalb der philosophischen Ethik dezidiert mit dem Feld der öffentlichen Sicherheit zu befassen. Von der Zielvorstellung her, wissenschaftliche Politikberatung leisten und gesellschaftliche Debatten strukturierend unterstützen zu können, entwickelt Volkmann dabei in seinem Aufsatz eine Reihe von bereichsbezogenen sowie anwendungsbezogenen Anforderungen, die eine solche angewandte Ethik für öffentliche Sicherheit inhaltlich und methodisch einlösen können muss.

Anhand der Mechanismen „Filterblase“ und „ Echokammer“ in digitalen Medien beleuchtet der Artikel, inwiefern Deweys funktionaler Öffentlichkeitsbegriff für die aktuelle Demokratiekrise mögliche Lösungsperspektiven erschließen lässt. Eine Rekonstruktion von Deweys Begriffen der Öffentlichkeit und der geteilten Erfahrung legt offen, dass der Aspekt der situativ-leiblich eingebundenen Erfahrung in der Forschungsdebatte zu digitalen Öffentlichkeiten nicht adäquat berücksichtigt wird. Darauf aufbauend lässt sich im Widerspruch zu einigen Debatten-Beiträgen zeigen, dass eine stärkere Rückbindung an lokale Lebenskontexte eine Voraussetzung dafür ist, diesen problematischen Mechanismen digitalisierter Medien (...) zu begegnen. (shrink)

Videoüberwachung ist heute allgegenwärtig. Sie dient dazu, Delikte im Nachhinein aufzuklären, zur Echtzeit-Überwachung oder zur Abschreckung. Darüber hinaus gibt es aber auch wirtschaftliche Interessen für eine Videoüberwachung und automatische Erfassung von Personen – z.B. zur Erstellung von Kundenprofilen und somit zur Analyse von Kaufverhalten. Dem gegenüber stehen Rechtsanspruche sowie ethische und gesellschaftliche Grundnormen, etwa dass Menschen nicht unter Generalverdacht gestellt oder ohne Zustimmung aufgezeichnet werden dürfen. In dieser Arbeit wird ein technischer Lösungsansatz behandelt, der eine flexible Handhabung der Videoüberwachung erlaubt. (...) Es werden in diesem Zusammenhang neben der technischen Umsetzung auch ökonomische, ethische und juristische Fragen betrachtet. Der Lösungsansatz besteht darin, Personen auf Videoaufnahmen durch ein kryptographisches Verfahren unkenntlich zu machen, noch bevor die Aufnahmen die Kamera-Elektronik verlassen. Nur mittels eines geheimen kryptographischen Schlüssels können einzelne Zeit- und Bildbereiche einer Aufnahme wieder deanonymisiert werden, wodurch rechtlichen wie ethischen Bedenken Rechnung getragen werden kann. In kommerziellen Szenarien erlaubt es diese digitale Tarnkappe, dass Kunden z.B. im Rahmen eines Prämien-Programms freiwillig auf Anonymisierung verzichten. Während in der Literatur der Informatik bereits seit längerem Technologien für solche System beschrieben werden, werden in dieser Arbeit Wege gezeigt, wie dessen Einbettung in die Gesellschaft wirklich realisiert werden könnte. (shrink)

Infolge der tiefgreifenden Durchdringung unserer Lebenswelt mit digitalen Systemen hat sich die gesamtgesellschaftliche Anforderung formiert, diese Systeme gegen immer neue Formen von Angriffen absichern zu können. In diesem Beitrag zeigen wir, inwiefern der IT-Sicherheitsforschung hierbei eine zentrale Rolle zukommt, aber auch, dass im Rahmen dieser Rolle eine besondere forschungsethische Problematik entsteht. Weil IT-Sicherheitsrisiken strukturell neuartige Probleme für die gesellschaftliche Gewährleistung von Sicherheit aufwerfen, treten Forschende systematisch auch in die Rolle der Angreifenden. Dabei erhöhen Forschende durch den notwendigen Schritt der Veröffentlichung (...) gefundener Lücken die Gefährdungslage von IT-Systemen. Zugleich zielt die Entwicklung von Angriffstechniken normativ auf eine Stärkung gesamtgesellschaftlicher Sicherheit: die Sicherheitslücken sollen geschlossen und die Robustheit von IT-Systemen vergrößert werden. Hier wird ein Konflikt im Umgang mit IT-Sicherheitsrisiken deutlich, der einen Bedarf an ethischer Orientierung erzeugt. Im Beitrag zeigen wir, inwiefern sich in der Forschungspraxis auch bereits Anfänge einer systematischen ethischen Reflexion als Antwort auf diesen Bedarf herausgebildet und institutionalisiert haben. Da die Problematik im Umgang mit Sicherheitslücken aber noch nicht adäquat adressiert wird, vertreten wir die These, dass in der IT-Sicherheitsforschung der Schritt hin zu einer Bereichsethik für IT-Sicherheitsforschung erforderlich ist, um so adäquatere Orientierungsangebote für Forschende entwickeln und um die breitere gesellschaftspolitische Rolle der Sicherheitsforschung reflektieren zu können. (shrink)

Sicherheitsfragen spielen für die Gestaltung technischer Innovation und Entwicklung sowie für deren gesellschaftliche Implementierung eine zentrale Rolle. Wonach hierbei im Einzelfall konkret gefragt wird, ist aber keinesfalls eindeutig. Vielmehr verweist der Sicherheitsbegriff immer auf ein komplexes Gefüge von Urteils- und Wertungszusammenhängen, die es im situativen Kontext von Mensch-Maschine-Interaktionen zu explizieren gilt.

Sicherheitsfragen spielen für die Gestaltung technischer Innovation und Entwicklung sowie für deren gesellschaftliche Implementierung eine zentrale Rolle. Wonach hierbei im Einzelfall konkret gefragt wird, ist aber keinesfalls eindeutig. Vielmehr verweist der Sicherheitsbegriff immer auf ein komplexes Gefüge von Urteils- und Wertungszusammenhängen, die es im situativen Kontext von Mensch-Maschine-Interaktionen zu explizieren gilt.

Um berechtigten Bedenken gegenüber Videoüberwachung zu begegnen, wird ein soziotechnisches Konzept vorgeschlagen, das eine reversible Anonymisierung von Bilddaten mit einer (möglichst zivil eingesetzten) Kontrollinstanz kombiniert, um so technische und interpersonelle Vertrauenskonzepte stimmig zu vermitteln.

Video surveillance is an omnipresent phenomenon in today’s metropolitan life. Mainly intended to solve crimes, to prevent them by realtime-monitoring or simply as a deterrent, video surveillance has also become interesting in economical contexts; e.g. to create customer profiles and analyse patterns of their shopping behaviour. The extensive use of video surveillance is challenged by legal claims and societal norms like not putting everybody under generalised suspicion or not recording people without their consent. In this work we propose a technological (...) solution to balance the positive and negative effects of video surveillance. With automatic image recognition algorithms on the rise, we suggest to use that technology to not just automatically identify people but blacken their images. This blackening is done with a cryptographic procedure allowing to revoke it with an appropriate key. Many of the legal and ethical objections to video surveillance could thereby be accommodated. In commercial scenarios, the operator of a customer profiling program could offer enticements for voluntarily renouncing one’s anonymity. Customers could e.g. wear a small infrared LED to signal their agreement to being tracked. After explaining the implementation details, this work outlines a multidisciplinary discussion incorporating an economic, ethical and legal viewpoint. (shrink)

The book introduced in this text is based on the premise that the trade-off between privacy and security is both unsound and conceals important aspects of surveillance and control. Accordingly, the authors analyse the symbiotic relationship between liberty and security, and the emptiness of both concepts when considered in isolation. They explore and contextualise different notions of risk, surveillance practices and the value of the rights to private life and data protection. Thereby, they show that surveillance and control neither necessarily (...) attain security, nor always pose a threat to privacy and, conversely, that protecting privacy does not necessarily hamper security provision. Moreover, they appreciate how surveillance and control, mediated through technology, express and sustain specific power relationships. The book thus offers a kaleidoscope of perspectives, ranging from critical studies to international relations, law, philosophy and sociology, to rethink surveillance and control. (shrink)

This book is based on the premise that the trade-off between privacy and security is both unsound and con-ceals important aspects of surveillance and control. Accordingly, the authors analyse the symbiotic relati-onship between liberty and security, and the emptiness of both concepts when considered in isolation. They explore and contextualise different notions of risk, surveillance practices and the value of the rights to pri-vate life and data protection. Thereby, they show that surveillance and control neither necessarily attain security, nor always (...) pose a threat to privacy and, conversely, that protecting privacy does not necessarily hamper security provision. Moreover, they argue that surveillance and control, mediated through technolo-gy, express and sustain specific power relationships. The book offers a kaleidoscope of perspectives, ranging from critical studies to international relations, law, philosophy and sociology, to rethink surveillance and control. (shrink)

This book is based on the premise that the trade-off between privacy and security is both unsound and conceals important aspects of surveillance and control. Accordingly, the authors analyse the symbiotic relationship between liberty and security, and the emptiness of both concepts when considered in isolation. They explore and contextualise different notions of risk, surveillance practices and the value of the rights to private life and data protection. Thereby, they show that surveillance and control neither necessarily attain security, nor always (...) pose a threat to privacy and, conversely, that protecting privacy does not necessarily hamper security provision. Moreover, they appreciate how surveillance and control, mediated through technology, express and sustain specific power relationships. The book thus offers a kaleidoscope of perspectives, ranging from critical studies to international relations, law, philosophy and sociology, to rethink surveillance and control. (shrink)

Die Tiefe Hirnstimulation hat sich in den vergangenen Jahren bei der Behandlung schwer ausgepragter neurologischer Storungen wie dem Morbus Parkinson bewahrt. WEgen dieses Erfolges werden neue therapeutische Anwendungsmoglichkeiten intensiv erforscht. AUssichtsreiche Ergebnisse liefern dabei auch die ersten Studien an Patienten mit verschiedenen psychiatrischen Erkrankungen, bei denen alle anderen Therapieansatze erfolglos geblieben sind. DIe Tiefe Hirnstimulation weckt jedoch auch Angste. DIese beziehen sich zum Teil auf den fur ihre Anwendung erforderlichen neurochirurgischen Eingriff, bei dem Elektroden dauerhaft in das Gehirn implantiert werden, (...) die uber eine ebenfalls implantierte Stimulatoreinheit mit Strom versorgt werden. ALlerdings wirft insbesondere die Moglichkeit, mit einer neurotechnischen Intervention Einfluss auf das Verhalten bzw. Die Psyche von Menschen nehmen zu konnen, neben medizinethischen auch viele Fragen grundsatzlicher philosophischer Natur auf. IN diesem Sachstandsbericht wird der Stand der medizinischen Anwendung und Erforschung der Tiefen Hirnstimulation in einem neurologischen und einem psychiatrischen Teil zusammengefasst, gefolgt von einer ausfuhrlichen Auswertung der philosophischen Literatur zum Thema. (shrink)

This paper argues for the normative significance of attention. Attention plays an important role when describing an individual’s mind and agency, and in explaining many central facts about that individual. In addition, many in the public want answers and guidance with regard to normative questions about attention. Given that attention is both descriptively central and the public cares about normative guidance with regard to it, attention should be central also in normative philosophy. We need an ethics of attention: a field (...) of study of which normative pressures, if any, govern attention. Like the ethics of belief, the ethics of attention will connect those normative questions to issues regarding the nature of attention, i.e. to what is subject to such normative pressures. Philosophers should develop an ethics of attention that helps to provide normative guidance and that is commensurate in its richness to the descriptive significance of attention. The second half of the paper sketches a framework that may help us to get started at developing the ethics of attention. (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest that reasons-first (...) epistemology might have within an evidentialist framework. (shrink)

How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and in ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. Responsibility for Rationality is the first book that connects recent debates on responsibility and on rationality in a unifying dialectic. It achieves four main goals: first, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility (...) for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality; second, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by defending a hybrid view; third, it provides novel support to recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by arguing that epistemic reasons and other ‘right-kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons; fourth, it sets the foundations and the research agenda for an ‘ethics of mind’, including an illustration of how to approach applied issues in epistemology within the presented framework. After spelling out connections between responsibility and rationality (part I), the book engages in debates in normative epistemology (part II) and brings them to bear on the broader field of an ethics of mind (part III). -/- Full draft of current version available on request, comments welcome! (shrink)

This book compares and contrasts publicly espoused security concepts in the Nordic region, and explores the notion of societal security. Outside observers often assume that Nordic countries take similar approaches to the security and safety of their citizens. This book challenges that assumption and traces the evolution of 'societal security', and its broadly equivalent concepts, in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. The notion of societal security is deconstructed and analysed in terms of its different meanings and implications for each country, (...) through both country- and issue-focused studies. Each chapter traces the evolution of key security concepts and related practices, allowing for a comparison of similarities and differences between these four countries. Using discourses and practices as evidence, this is the first book to explore how different Nordic nations have conceptualised domestic security over time. The findings will be valuable to scholars from across the geographical and theoretical spectrum, while highlighting how Nordic security discourses and practices may deviate from traditional assumptions about Nordic values. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, Nordic politics and International Relations. (shrink)

In the traditional understanding, human dignity is often portrayed as a «final», «inherent», and «absolute» value. If human dignity as the core of the status of a human being did indeed have thos characteristics, this would yield a severe limitation for obligations that stem from the moral status of non-human animals, plants, eco systems and other entities discussed in environmental ethics; for obligations that arise from human dignity standardly take priority over the duties toward entities with non-human moral status. Yet, (...) many theorists of human dignity nowadays have given up the traditional picture in favour of a more «contingent» understanding of human dignity that abandons one or more of its traditional characteristics.In this paper, I argue that to the contrary, we have good reasons to think that the three characteristics of human dignity just mentioned can indeed be attributed to a value that deserves the name «human dignity». In a first part, I argue for a specific understanding of the three value characteristics under consideration. After these preliminaries, I show in a second part that given such an understanding, we have ample evidence that we can indeed say that human dignity is an inherent, absolute and final value; and also that these three characteristics are properties of a single value. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another (...) element of the mind, but constituted by structures that organize, integrate, and coordinate the parts of our mind. Attention thus integrates the perceptual and intellectual, the cognitive and motivational, and the epistemic and practical. The second half of the book concerns the relationship between attention and consciousness. Watzl argues that attentional structure shapes consciousness into what is central and what is peripheral. The center-periphery structure of consciousness cannot be reduced to the structure of how the world appears to the subject. What it is like for us thus goes beyond the way the world appears to us. On this basis, a new view of consciousness is offered. In each conscious experience we actively take a stance on the world we appear to encounter. It is in this sense that our conscious experience is our subjective perspective. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

Sowohl in der analytischen Philosophie als auch im verwandten Projekt einer erneuerten Praxisphilosophie gewinnt sinnkritisches Philosophieren derzeit eine neue Dringlichkeit. Beide begreifen die menschliche, vernünftige Praxis als primäre Quelle von Sinn und als privilegierten Gegenstand philosophischer Analyse. Der Band vereint Beiträge zu zentralen Aspekten sinnkritischer, praxisformanalytischer Philosophie: von der Frage nach dem Sinn religiöser Rede und Praxis über das Problem der Struktur und die Form menschlichen Handelns bis hin zu Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Wissen und Wahrnehmung. Beiträge u. a. von (...) Robert Brandom, James Conant, Christoph Demmerling, Thomas Rentsch, Sebastian Rödl, Hans Julius Schneider, Henning Tegtmeyer und Holm Tetens. (shrink)

The concept of "life" has always been part of the basic philosophical topoi. In Greek antiquity, the question of what constitutes a "good" or "successful" life was regarded as a fundamental question of philosophy. As a result, early philosophers engaged in practice-oriented philosophizing which regarded philosophy as a form of life. In Modern philosophy, the term "life" became a technical term in different philosophical traditions such as the philosophy of life, philosophy of existence, and phenomenology. This volume brings together contributions (...) in German and French that explore the concept of "life" historically and systematically, focusing on metaphysical, anthropological, and ethical issues. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Don't Laugh at “Slow” Sailing: Average Versus Instantaneous Motion Motion Relative to What? – Galilean Relativity But There are No Fixed Reference Frames – Special Relativity General Relativity – Can it Really Matter?

Lässt sich der Einsatz militärischer Gewalt zum Schutz der Menschenrechte innerhalb fremder Staaten rechtfertigen? Die Arbeit beleuchtet die Frage nach der Rechtfertigung humanitärer Interventionen. Dazu werden Interventionsargumente in der Geschichte des politischen Denkens ausgehend von Wurzeln in Antike und Mittelalter über die Kriegsethik der spanischen Spätscholastik, das politische Denken der Neuzeit bis zur Kritik jeglicher Form von Interventionen vor dem Hintergrund der Dominanz des Souveränitätsprinzips im politischen Denken des 18. Jahrhunderts rekonstruiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund argumentiert der Autor dafür, dass die (...) Souveränität der Staaten nicht unabhängig vom Schutz der grundlegenden Menschenrechte ihrer Bürger gedacht werden kann. Staaten haben eine primäre Verantwortung für den Schutz ihrer Bürger, die, wenn der einzelne Staat sie nicht erfüllt, als sekundäre Verantwortung auch der Staatengemeinschaft als Schutzverantwortung (responsibility to protect) zukommt und militärische Interventionen im Falle massiver Menschenrechtsverletzungen als letztes Mittel erlaubt. (shrink)

Für Aristoteles ist das Kontinuum ein potentiell Unendliches. Dieser Unendlichkeitsbegriff, den er neben dem prozessualen und aktualen einführte, wurde im Laufe der Philosophiegeschichte nicht mehr berücksichtigt. So verwenden ihn u.a. weder Kant noch Weyl in ihren Kontinuumsbetrachtungen, obwohl ihr Kontinuumsverständnis ihn geradezu nahelegt. - In dieser Arbeit werden zum einen die ontologischen Kontinuumslehren des Aristoteles und späterer Philosophen und Mathematiker behandelt, zum anderen erfährt die von Aristoteles im 6. Buch der «Physik» vorgelegte strukturelle Kontinuumsuntersuchung eine eingehende Würdigung.

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine raises fundamental ethical issues. As one example, AI systems in the field of mental health successfully detect signs of mental disorders, such as depression, by using data from social media. These AI depression detectors (AIDDs) identify users who are at risk of depression prior to any contact with the healthcare system. The article focuses on the ethical implications of AIDDs regarding affected users’ health-related autonomy. Firstly, it presents the (ethical) discussion of AI (...) in medicine and, specifically, in mental health. Secondly, two models of AIDDs using social media data and different usage scenarios are introduced. Thirdly, the concept of patient autonomy, according to Beauchamp and Childress, is critically discussed. Since this concept does not encompass the specific challenges linked with the digital context of AIDDs in social media sufficiently, the current analysis suggests, finally, an extended concept of health-related digital autonomy. (shrink)