Confessional Protestant ethics is commonly presented nowadays as opposite to virtue. This article establishes the inaccuracy of this presentation from the centrality of virtue and its compatibility with grace in the ethics of the Protestant Reformer Pietro Martire Vermigli (1499–1562). It argues that the notion of virtue is not only central but also consistent with the notion of grace from the distinction between acquired and infused virtue.
This paper aims to counter the recent opinion that there is a peculiar epistemology in the reformed Church which made it negative to natural theology. First, it is shown that there was an early and unanimous adoption of natural theology as the culmination of physics and the beginning of metaphysics by the sixteenth and seventeenth century philosophers of good standing in the reformed Church. Second, it is argued that natural theology cannot be based on revelation, should not assume a peculiar (...) analysis of knowledge and must not pass over demonstration. (shrink)
This paper argues that we care especially about human health because of what we are and because of how we function properly. First, an argument is made against a mechanistic and for a holistic account of human nature. Second, it is argued that humans function properly when they are disposed to deliberate and decide easily and accurately about the means of health, deem that unrestraint pleasure hinders health as well as that combated disease furthers health, and judge it right to (...) will what health others are due. (shrink)
The issue of faith and reason arises from the claim that there are two kinds of truths: some truths are discoverable to human understanding and some are not. This paper argues that the epistemology of the prominent orthodox protestant theologian John Owen (1616–1683) does not fit the labels of evidentialism and fideism. According to evidentialism, every cognitive act (including faith) must depend on evidence available to reason. According to fideism, there is no relation between faith and reason so that nothing (...) of reason can be counted for or against faith. But Owen is a fideist in the sense that faith is not based on rational evidence, and an evidentialist in the sense that Christian faith ought to have some rational or cognitive support. Philosophical arguments count in favour of faith and are not the ground of faith. The paper suggests that this nuanced view is a viable alternative and option. (shrink)
First it is argued that the linkage of natural theology to epistemology is invalid historically, epistemologically and metaphysically. Second it is argued that knowledge claims about the ultimate cause of everything should be evaluated not in terms of justified true belief but in terms of the intellectual virtue of wisdom.