In this paper, I first discuss Augustine’s description of time and relate this to Boethius’ explanation of the distinction between time and eternity. I then connect this distinction to Augustine’s understanding of memory as an image of eternity, showing that the analogy between God and the human with reference to time involves a comparison not between eternity and time, but rather, between eternity and a limited experience of eternity within the mind and its distension: time is not the image of (...) eternity, the human mind is, particularly its power of memory (memoria). The accounts of time and eternity of both thinkers provide further evidence for Augustine’s influence on and importance for the thought of Boethius. Both figures describe the past and future as united in the present under the divine purview of God. (shrink)

The future state of the redeemed human being in heaven is difficult, if not impossible, to pin down in this life. Nevertheless, Augustine and Anselm speculate on the heavenly life of the human being, proceeding from certain theological premises gathered from Scripture, and their arguments often both mirror and complement one another. Because Anselm and Augustine hold the premise that human beings in heaven are “equal to the angels” (Luke 20:36), our understanding of the heavenly condition of the human can (...) be illuminated by angelology, and vice-versa; each reveals the nature of the other. The paper examines aspects of the positions of Augustine and Anselm on the original state of the angels, their fall, and their confirmation, and then explores the condition of prelapsarian Adam and the transformation of the elect in order to illuminate how these figures conceive the afterlife. The angelologies (and demonologies) of Augustine and Anselm help one to understand the heavenly goal of human life, how the redeemed state of human beings differs from their original condition in Eden, and why there is no redemption for the fallen angels. (shrink)

This paper, as a response to Mark K. Spencer’s, “Perceiving the Image of God in the Whole Human Person” in the present volume, argues in defence of Aquinas’s position that the Imago Dei is limited in the human being to the rational, intellective soul alone. While the author agrees with Spencer that the hierarchical relation between body and soul in the human composite must be maintained while avoiding the various permeations of dualism, nevertheless, the Imago Dei cannot be located in (...) the human body or the principle of the body considered within the body/soul composite without betraying a number of fundamental Thomistic metaphysical principles. Essential to these includes Aquinas’s position that an image of God should image not only the Divine Nature, but also the Trinitarian relations between the Divine Persons. Further, the paper also argues that a phenomenology of sense experience could not, on principle, attain to an image of God in the whole human person within a Thomistic framework generally. (shrink)

Although recent scholarship has begun to clarify Porphyry’s position on the first principle in its distinction from that of Plotinus we must be careful not to gloss over the crucial ramifications of Porphyry’s developments. The Plotinian One is beyond Being, and thus beyond all relation and difference. In his attempt to understand how such a principle can be productive of all else that follows from it, Porphyry considers the Plotinian One in both its transcendent and creative aspects, introducing the notions (...) of difference and self-relation within the One itself. Porphyry’s modifications of Plotinus’s doctrine, however, result in a first principle having a character utterly distinct from what Plotinus envisioned, and from what I believe Plotinus would have accepted. Because Porphyry’s first principle is relational, it loses its decisive Plotinian character as absolutely transcendent. This distinction between the first principles of Porphyry and Plotinus has important ramifications for each of their philosophical itineraria, and further strengthens the status of Plotinus within the Neoplatonic tradition. Plotinus is a unique thinker within the Neoplatonic tradition, and we must be careful not to equate Neoplatonism with Plotinus, when in fact, it is Plotinus who against both his own predecessors and successors often stands alone. (shrink)

This paper examines demonic agency and epistemology in the thought of Augustine. When Augustine claims that demons can “work miracles,” he means this in a specific sense: the actions and intelligence of demons are only miraculous from the standpoint of humans, whose powers of perception and action are limited in relation to those of demons. The character of demons’ bodies and the length of their lives provide abilities beyond what humans possess, but, as natural, created beings, demons adhere to the (...) physical rules of nature. Demons possess neither supernatural powers, nor perfect knowledge. Just as our wonder ceases when we are shown how a magic trick is executed, human astonishment makes way for rational understanding once we comprehend demonic nature. (shrink)

Bryant’s paper, "A Logic of Multiplicities: Deleuze, Immanence, and Onticology," is useful for showing how the historical legacy of hierarchy in its many philosophical forms is still present, important, and, in fact, required even by those such as Bryant who would seek to deconstruct or ignore it. The following response will discuss Bryant’s presentation of his alternative position and throughout point out: a) the straw-man versions of hierarchy that Bryant employs; b) why what Bryant claims to be inherent negatively in (...) hierarchy is not the case; c) how Bryant’s position actually relies upon hierarchy for its own explication, and finally; d) the various principles of hierarchical metaphysics that are required in order to make sense of experience and reality. These latter include the notions that i) there are many kinds of hierarchy; ii) Being and Unity are prior to Multiplicity; iii) relation without substance is incoherent; iv) hierarchy is not inherently tyrannical; v) the distinction between essentially and accidentally ordered causal series is a real and useful one; and vi) the existence of hierarchy is more self evident than is flat ontology. (shrink)

Augustine asserted that demons (and angels) have material bodies, while Aquinas denied demonic corporeality, upholding that demons are separated, incorporeal, intelligible substances. Augustine’s conception of demons as composite substances possessing an immaterial soul and an aerial body is insufficient, in Thomas’s view, to account for certain empirical phenomena observed in demoniacs. However, Thomas, while providing more detailed accounts of demonic possession according to his development of Aristotelian psychology, does not avail of this demonic incorporeal eminence when analysing demonic attacks: demonic (...) agency is still confined to the material body. Aquinas’s account of demonic possession need not, on the face of it, require an immaterial cause. In his renouncement of the strong Christian tradition affirming demonic corporeality, Aquinas either conflates the need for a demonic agent with a requirement for a super corporeal one, or subordinates his demonology and angelology to a deeper, more fundamental Dionysian metaphysical principle of creative diffusion to which these adhere in a secondary way. (shrink)

Neoplatonic Demons and Angels is a collection of studies which examine the place reserved for angels and demons not only by the main Neoplatonic philosophers, but also in Gnosticism, the Chaldaean Oracles and Christian Neoplatonism.

This chapter describes Porphyry’s demonology, focusing specifically on the nature of the demonic body and Porphyry’s reliance upon it within his account in order to highlight certain difficulties in the demonology of Iamblichus, which, although denying the materiality of demons, nevertheless has to account for the very things that demonic bodies were understood to address. Through an examination of Porphyry’s demonology and his explanation of the classification of demons and their nature, this paper will raise questions needing to be answered (...) within Iamblichean demonology. In fact, these questions are more important for Iamblichus than they are for Porphyry; given the state of the entirely descended Iamblichean soul and its need for material forms and avenues of mediation and purification, the function of demons is more essential for Iamblichus than it is for Porphyry. We cannot speak of ‘demons’ in Iamblichus without qualification, or without at least making the distinction between the good and the evil, recognizing that whatever one says about the former, the same might not apply to the latter. (shrink)

There is a tension in Porphyry’s writings concerning his attitude towards sorcery in general and the invocation of demons in particular. In his De Abstinentia, which contains his most extended surviving demonology, Porphyry distinguishes between good and evil demons and the respective groups of people by whom they are invoked and with whom they are associated. While association with evil demonic entities is condemned by Porphyry, he nevertheless suggests that there is a role for a philosophical treatment of demonic agency. (...) The beneficent demons warn humanity of the impending dangers brought on by the maleficent “so far as they are able … by revelations in dreams, or through an inspired soul, or in many other ways” (De Abs. 2.41.3). The meanings of the signs and revelations granted by the beneficent demons, however, are not explicitly apparent, for “not everyone understands what the signs mean, just as not everyone can read what is written, but only the person who has learned letters” (De Abs. 2.41.4). Porphyry claims that it is partially the role of the philosopher to recognize and interpret these signs and to distinguish them from the lies and deceptions of the evil demons (De Abs. 2.49.2). In the Letter to Anebo, however, Porphyry is much more skeptical about the efficacy of demons (good and evil): the effectiveness of theurgy and sorcery is called into doubt. While Porphyry does claim that certain things can be divined from natural signs, he denies here that divinities or demons are involved in such predictions (Letter to Anebo 25, 28), and he doubts the sorcerous power to bind and control demonic forces. It seems then, that at least the Letter, theurgy and sorcery could be ineffective, and therefore, unnecessary for the salvation of the human soul. Indeed, for Porphyry, for the purification of the soul, theurgy and demonic aid are unnecessary at best, and dangerously counterintuitive at worst. (shrink)

This paper examines Dante’s treatment of the suicides in Canto 13 of Inferno in light of certain Platonic arguments against suicide. I argue that Dante’s presentation of the suicides in many ways illustrates a similar philosophical understanding of the body-soul relation and the subsequent concerns about the effect of suicide on the human being. Dante’s Christian position emphasizes the importance of the body and shows how it is necessary for the human body-soul composite. I focus on two of Dante’s problems (...) with suicide. First, his association of the suicides with the harpies of the Aeneid demonstrates that suicide is an act of pride whereby the human being overestimates his capacity to foresee future events and fails to trust in Divine Providence. Second, Dante presents the suicides as being still tied to, and concerned for their reputation in, the world of the living, despite their own violent severing of their bodily connection to it—a connection required for human activity. By focusing on these Neoplatonic arguments against suicide, I shed light on Dante’s Christian understanding of the body-soul relation and how this understanding contributes to the condemnation of suicide. Human nature requires the body and bodily activity in the world of finite affairs. In Dante’s depiction, suicide is violence. Although there were pagans who defended suicide for certain escapist or intellectual reasons, both they and Dante’s suicides share a common error: they fail to accept the essential nature of the human essence as having a bodily as well as a spiritual end. Returning directly to the Neoplatonic texts that influenced and resonate throughout the tradition that Dante inherits allows us to elucidate and highlight certain features of Dante’s thought and interpret his contrapasso in ways that might otherwise remain unnoticed. (shrink)

Peter Lombard lamented the abandonment of Augustine’s position affirming the materiality of demons and the demonic body, since by his time (some 700 years after Augustine), under the influence of the Pseudo-Dionysius, it was generally agreed within the Christian tradition that demons (and angels) are intelligible, disembodied substances. The principles that the cosmos is spatially and materially divided and stratified and that demons share ontologically in the nature of the part that they inhabit allowed figures such as Apuleius, Porphyry, and (...) Augustine to account for various aspects of demonic nature and activity that seemed to follow from reason, revelation, and practical experience. The material body of the demon and its relation to the pneuma, or vehicle of the soul, is often invoked to explain demonic agency and the extent of demonic knowledge and to distinguish between evil and good demons (or angels). The following paper weighs in on and clarifies Augustine’s demonic ontology. Although scholars generally recognise Augustine’s position maintaining that demons possess aerial bodies, nevertheless, the ambiguity surrounding Augustine’s opinion, attested to even by Peter Lombard, is overlooked, and Augustine’s conviction is often taken for granted and supported by citing the prominent City of God, the very work in which Augustine’s own views are suspect. This paper provides support to the assessment of Augustine’s doctrine of the demonic body by examining his cosmology, particularly his spatial and elemental division of the cosmos, and exhibits his adherence to the spatio-material principle according to which a creature’s bodily constitution is cognate with the elemental composition of the physical stratum of the cosmos in which they dwell. The paper concludes by indicating how Augustine’s explanations of demonic agency, far from being ambiguous on the nature of the demonic body, are in fact premised on their aerial corporeality, thereby demonstrating more definitively his conviction that demons possess material bodies. (shrink)