Most contemporary accounts of the nature of faith explicitly defend what we call ‘the positivity theory of faith’ – the theory that faith must be accompanied by a favourable evaluative belief, or a desire towards the object of faith. This paper examines the different varieties of the positivity theory and the arguments used to support it. Whilst initially plausible, we find that the theory faces numerous problematic counterexamples, and show that weaker versions of the positivity theory are ultimately implausible. We (...) discuss a distinct property of faith that we call ‘true grit’, such that faith requires one to be resilient toward the evidential, practical, and psychological challenges that it faces. We show how true grit is necessary for faith, and provides a simpler and less problematic explanation of the evidence used to support the positivity theory. (shrink)

Faith occupies an important place in human lives in both religious and secular contexts: faith may be directed towards God, friends, governments, political systems and football teams. It is said to help people through crises and motivate people to achieve life goals. But what is faith? Philosophers and theologians have for centuries been concerned with questions about the rationality of faith, but more recently, have focussed on what kind of psychological attitude faith is. We bring together, for the first time, (...) the different elements of this recent debate, staking out the different positions and arguments, and defend a novel 'true grit' theory of faith, from which we assess questions about the rationality of faith from a fresh perspective. The book engages with a range of questions about the nature of faith, including: Does faith require belief? How is faith expressed in language? Is faith motivational? What is the relationship between faith and cognate attitudes, such as trust and hope? What is the role of faith in our long-term plans? And, in what sense is faith steadfast, resilient or constant, as is commonly supposed? This last issue leads us to additional literature from the social sciences, and we defend a distinctive conception of faith as resistance to practical, psychological and epistemic challenges, that forms the basis of the true grit theory defended in the book. (shrink)

_Reading Philosophy of Religion_ combines a diverse selection of classical and contemporary texts in philosophy of religion with insightful commentaries. Offers a unique presentation through a combination of text and interactive commentary Provides a mix of classic and contemporary texts, including some not anthologized elsewhere Includes writings from thinkers such as Aquinas, Boethius, Hume, Plantinga and Putnam Divided into sections which examine religious language, the existence of God, reason, argument and belief, divine properties, and religious pluralism.

Religious fictionalism is the theory that it is morally and intellectually legitimate to affirm religious sentences and to engage in public and private religious practices, without believing the content of religious claims. This article discusses the main features of fictionalism, contrasts hermeneutic, and revolutionary kinds of fictionalism and explores possible historical and recent examples of religious fictionalism. Such examples are found in recent theories of faith, pragmatic approaches to religion, and mystical traditions in religious theology.

Is propositional religious faith constituted by belief? Recent debate has focussed on whether faith may be constituted by a positive non-doxastic cognitive state, which can stand in place of belief. This paper sets out and defends the doxastic theory. We consider and reject three arguments commonly used in favour of non-doxastic theories of faith: (1) the argument from religious doubt; (2) the use of ‘faith’ in linguistic utterances; and (3) the possibility of pragmatic faith. We argue that belief is required (...) to maintain a distinction between genuine faith, pretend faith, and fictionalist faith. (shrink)

From both popular and scholarly works, the images Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad alGhazālī and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola often emerge in stark contrast: Ghazali, as the champion of mystical Islam, purportedly undermined philosophy in the Muslim world with The Incoherence of the Philosophers, a critique of his predecessors in the Arabic philosophical tradition such as al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.1 In contradistinction to Ghazali's alleged destruction of philosophy, Pico della Mirandola seemingly wrote the manifesto of philosophy's rebirth in the Italian Renaissance with (...) his Oration on the Dignity of Man (Oratio De... (shrink)

This is the second of two articles describing the influence of Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī on Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. The first article critically analyzed common and contrasting images of Ghazali, often presented as the religiously motivated destroyer of philosophy in Islamic traditions,1 and Pico della Mirandola, who is romantically associated with philosophy's "rebirth" in the Italian Renaissance.2 In fact, both Pico della Mirandola and Ghazali attempted to create a coherent synthesis of philosophical and religious tradition; and the first article (...) demonstrated that Ghazali actually influenced Pico della Mirandola in this respect. Supporting Craig... (shrink)

Is propositional religious faith constituted by belief? Recent debate has focussed on whether faith may be constituted by a positive non‐doxastic cognitive state, which can stand in place of belief. This article sets out and defends the doxastic theory. We consider and reject three arguments commonly used in favour of non‐doxastic theories of faith: (1) the argument from religious doubt; (2) the use of ‘faith’ in linguistic utterances; and (3) the possibility of pragmatic faith. We argue that belief is required (...) to maintain a distinction between genuine faith, pretend faith, and fictionalist faith. (shrink)

This study reviews some of the principal themes in contemporary work on religious language. Unlike other recent surveys, the most pressing issues about religious language are addressed from the perspective of the philosophy of language; different positions taken on these issues by philosophers of religion and theologians are considered. Topics that are covered include: the subject matter of religious discourse, reductionism and subjectivism, expressivism, the nature of religious metaphor, religious fictionalism and truth in religious discourse. The study also looks at (...) the relationship between questions about religious language and cognate areas of philosophy of religion such as epistemology and metaphysics, and potential future directions of research. (shrink)

According to a simple formulation of doxasticism about propositional faith, necessarily faith that p requires belief that p. Support of doxasticism is long-standing and was rarely a matter of dispute until William Alston (1996) proposed that that the content of propositional faith need not be believed if it is accepted. Subsequently non-doxastic theories that reject the belief requirement have proliferated and have come to dominate literature in the field. This paper aims to redress the balance by identifying a dilemma for (...) non-doxasticism that comes into view when we draw out the implications of non-doxasticism for the interpretation of affirmations of religious propositional faith. One horn of this dilemma commits non-doxasticists to hermeneutic fictionalism: a substantive, contentious and little explored theory about religious discourse. The other appears to render the affirmation of faith prima facie bullshitting, leading to problems about the integrity of religious discourse and its speakers. (shrink)

In everyday speech we seem to refer to such things as abstract objects, moral properties, or propositional attitudes that have been the target of metaphysical and/or epistemological objections. Many philosophers, while endorsing scepticism about some of these entities, have not wished to charge ordinary speakers with fundamental error, or recommend that the discourse be revised or eliminated. To this end a number of non-revisionary antirealist strategies have been employed, including expressivism, reductionism and hermeneutic fictionalism. But each of these theories faces (...) forceful objections. In particular, we argue, proponents of these strategies face a dilemma: either concedes that their theory is revisionary, or adopt an implausible account of speaker-meaning whereby the content of certain types of utterance is opaque to their speakers. In this paper we introduce a new type of antirealist strategy, which is thoroughly non-revisionary, and leaves speaker-meaning transparent to speakers. We draw on work on pragmatics in the philosophy of language to develop a theory we call ‘pragmatic antirealism’. The pragmatic antirealist holds that while the sentences of the discourses in question have metaphysically contentious truth conditions, ordinary utterances of them are pragmatically modified in context in such a way that speakers do not incur commitment to those truth conditions. After setting out the theory, we show how it might be developed for both mathematical and ethical discourse, before responding to some likely objections. (shrink)

Kenneth Surin has argued that theoretical theodicies of the kind associated with Swinburne and Hick face two major moral criticisms: first that they tacitly sanction evils; second that they display moral blindness in the face of unconditional evils. The paper upholds Surin's criticisms in the light of recent defences of theodicy. It concludes by considering and criticizing Wetzel's arguments for saying that theodicy is unavoidable for those who believe in God.

Are religious commitments beliefs or some other kind of mental state? Do religious affirmations express beliefs or other non-doxastic attitudes? These questions have been prominent in philosophical research on the language and psychology of religion since the mid-twentieth century, but the history of interest in these topics traces back to late antiquity. In a recent paper, Tim Crane approaches these questions from the perspective of research on theories about the nature of belief. According to some accounts, he argues, the attitudes (...) that we call religious “beliefs” do not exhibit the properties requisite for belief. He raises grounds for dissatisfaction with the proposed account of belief and cognate debates about cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and concludes by setting out a more descriptive approach as the basis for an understanding of religious attitudes. This paper argues that Crane’s argument relies on an unduly demanding theory of belief. However, the concerns that he raises about the belief status of religious commitment can be motivated – and are extensively debated – in recent research on religious faith. Crane’s characterisation of the cognitive/non-cognitive debate is also disputed. The paper concludes by raising concerns about Crane’s description of the scope of the field of religious language. (shrink)

A number of arguments have been put forward by D. Z. Phillips which purportedly establish that the problems that lie at the heart of the theological realism/nonrealism controversy are confused, and that realism itself is incoherent and may be refuted. These arguments are assessed and several different theories of realism are considered. The questions of the nature of religious belief and whether God is an object are addressed. Phillips' arguments are shown to fail to supply a substantial objection to any (...) interesting variety of theological realism. (shrink)

It is clear from both his writings and lectures on religion that Wittgenstein thought that there are many differences in the standards and forms of justification informing religious and scientific discourses. However, the evidence of such differences can be used to support two quite different and conflicting lines of argument. On one apparently realist argument, the differences are taken to show that religious discourse describes different kinds of fact (or offers different kinds of description) to scientific discourse; on the other (...) seemingly antirealist argument, the differences show that religious discourse does not have a descriptive function at all. This paper evaluates these arguments both as contributions to the debate concerning religious realism and as interpretations of Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This paper considers a range of infinite exchange problems, including one recent example discussed by Barrett and Arntzenius, and propose a general taxonomy based on cardinality considerations and the possibility of identifying and tracking the units of exchange.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Context of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of ActionMichael Scottmore than any other topic examined by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations,1 his writings on action and the will are perhaps in greatest need of being put into a historical and theoretical context. Not only do his remarks seem unhelpfully concise, as if intermediary reasoning had been excised by ruthless editing, but also the rationale for several of his arguments is mysterious. Even (...) in the light of the additional comments on action in Zettel, the position or positions with which Wittgenstein is disagreeing are difficult to identify. For example, Wittgenstein introduces his remarks by indicating his opposition to the reduction of willing to an experience:‘Willing too is merely an experience,’ one would like to say (the ‘will’ too only ‘idea’). It comes when it comes, and I cannot bring it about.(PI §611) [End Page 595]But who claims that willing is merely an experience, and is this experience constituted exclusively by ideas or may it also involve feelings? Do the proponents of the theory include those who would respond positively to Wittgenstein’s question: “Are my kinaesthetic sensations my willing?” (PI §621), and who would make use of the finger crossing experiment described in PI §617?Wittgenstein scholars have hoped to answer questions about the nature and provenance of the theories he addresses by examining the manuscript sources of Philosophical Investigations, his later work on the philosophy of psychology, and some of his earlier writings on voluntary action. Wittgenstein himself suggested that his later thought should be read against the background of his earlier work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (PI, viii), and the problem of the will offers a rare opportunity for a direct comparison, it being one of the few issues that seriously occupied him in both his later and earlier investigations. But a comparison with Wittgenstein’s early philosophy of the will—and also with Schopenhauer, a primary influence—offers only partial insights.2 While we may confidently take Wittgenstein’s comments on willing and wishing in PI §614–6 to be a critique of his own earlier views, most of his remarks on the will, which are closely enmeshed with his writings on other psychological issues such as kinaesthetic sensations and feelings of tendency, appear largely to be directed elsewhere. The consensus has been that William James’ The Principles of Psychology (PP) is the source in question, and that James’ ideo-motor theory of action is the main target of Wittgenstein’s remarks.3In this paper I will take issue with this contention, and propose that Wittgenstein’s writings are more suitably read as a response not only to James but to the theories and arguments adduced by late nineteenth century and early twentieth century psychologists on the nature of the will. Specifically, I will argue that the available evidence indicates Wittgenstein’s familiarity with the on-going debate between ideo-motor theorists (of whom James was one significant representative) and innervation theorists concerning the psychic antecedents of voluntary action. I will begin with an outline of the history of this [End Page 596] debate before turning to an evaluation of the evidence for Wittgenstein’s philosophical interest in it.the psychic antecedents of voluntary actionWhen James first proposed his ideo-motor theory,4 the dominant psychological account of the will was the theory of innervation. This latter theory, which was supported by the majority of psychologists including pioneers such as Wundt, Helmholtz and Bain, states that willing consists in a feeling of innervation, that is, a sensation accompanying discharge from the central nervous system into the motor apparatus.5 The intensity of the feeling was thought to vary in accordance with the intensity of the outgoing, or efferent, current.William James, while largely in agreement with innervation theorists on the physiological processes that lead to action, disagreed with their psychological account of willing. James denied that we are conscious of motor discharge, and proposed instead that the psychic antecedent necessary for a voluntary action is a memory image of the experience that is distinctive of the consequent movement. This experience consists in kinaesthetic impressions (the bodily sensations which inform one of the attitude... (shrink)

This book draws together a distinguished group of philosophers and theologians to present new thinking on realism and religion.

This paper evaluates Brian Zamulinski's argument from considerations of relative likelihood for preferring a ‘religion-as-fiction’ hypothesis to metaphysical realism. The paper finds that the argument fails to consider numerous variant hypotheses, and that the ‘religion-as-fiction’ hypothesis is poorly formulated. It is concluded that an argument from likelihood about the status of religious belief will not, in the way Zamulinski constructs it, give support to a hypothesis unless supplemented by an estimate of its probability. Moreover, once probability is taken into account, (...) the ‘religion-as-fiction’ hypothesis looks very weak. (shrink)

Seeing, hearing and touching are phenomenally different, even if we are detecting the same spatial properties with each sense. This presents a prima facie problem for intentionalism, the theory that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. The paper reviews some attempts to resolve this problem, and then looks in detail at Peter Carruthers' recent proposal that the senses can be individuated by the way in which they represent spatial properties and incorporate time. This proposal is shown to be ineffective in (...) distinguishing auditory from either visual or tactual perception, and substantial classes of visual and tactual perceptions are found that the posited spatial and temporal features fail to individuate. (shrink)

This paper begins with a revaluation of Carnap's critique of existence questions, and finds that with modification his argument is successful in giving a prima facie cause for doubt that the ontological question addressed by religious realists and non-realists has content. The second part of the paper argues that these doubts can be met with proper attention to the role of truth in the religious realism debate. The paper concludes by arguing for a close relationship between the semantic and the (...) ontological varieties of religious realism. (shrink)

Can one have faith that something is the same as itself, or hope that a triangle has four sides? Accounts of the proper object of faith or of hope typically exclude modal cases, where the object of faith or hope is understood by the agent to be either necessary or impossible, on the basis of their intuitive implausibility or their incompatibility with beliefs that the agent has about the probability or possibility of the object of faith or hope. This paper (...) argues that the noncognitive components of the psychology of these attitudes—evidential resistance in the case of faith and desire in the case of hope—provide a more plausible and economical explanation for restrictions on their proper objects. (shrink)

This study reviews some of the principal themes in contemporary work on religious language. Unlike other recent surveys, the most pressing issues about religious language are addressed from the perspective of the philosophy of language; different positions taken on these issues by philosophers of religion and theologians are considered. Topics that are covered include: the subject matter of religious discourse, reductionism and subjectivism, expressivism, the nature of religious metaphor, religious fictionalism and truth in religious discourse. The study also looks at (...) the relationship between questions about religious language and cognate areas of philosophy of religion such as epistemology and metaphysics, and potential future directions of research. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 5, Page 1029-1030, September 2022.