A School By Every Other Name calls for a revolution that would reconceptualize the institution of education. That effort begins with overcoming our national cultural identity crisis. Rather than prescribing what must be done, A School By Every Other Name presents poignant perspectives and background and then invites the reader to begin answering the questions that could lead to building a new institution of education. Not just a book about education, A School By Every Other Name is a workbook for (...) beginning the dialogue toward systemic change in American schools. (shrink)

Scientists seeking hard evidence of prayer's curative powers misunderstand the nature of prayer in the Western theistic traditions. Yet theistically consonant ways in which religious belief may influence health do not figure as they should in current professional practice.

At the forefront of international concerns about global legislation and regulation, a host of noted environmentalists and business ethicists examine ethical issues in consumption from the points of view of environmental sustainability, economic development, and free enterprise.

The chapter explores the sufferingSufferingassociated with MAIDMedical Assistance in Dying (MAID) giving special attention to assessmentAssessment and the psychological responses elicited in caregivers highlighting the need for all MAIDMedical Assistance in Dying (MAID) enquiries to activate a period of intense assessmentAssessment and the provision of detailed treatment alternatives. This chapter calls for a renewed commitment to compassionCompassion (‘sufferingSuffering together with’) as the communal dynamic to relieve and assuage such sufferingSuffering. Using the four domains of ‘total pain’ (Saunders in The management (...) of terminal malignant disease. Edward Arnold, London, UK, 1978), we summarize the evidence for the multiple opportunities available to ‘relieve often and comfort always.’ Finally, we review evidence on the impactImpactof MAIDMedical Assistance in Dying (MAID) suggesting that the overall burden of sufferingSuffering in Canada has increased since legalization. (shrink)

Posing a powerful challenge to dominant trends in cultural analysis, this book covers the whole history of the concept of culture, providing the broadest study of this notion to date. Johnson and Michaelsen examine the principal methodological strategies or metaphors of anthropology in the past two decades (embodied in works by Edward Said, James Clifford, George Marcus, V. Y. Mudimbe, and others) and argues that they do not manage to escape anthropology's grounding in representational practices. To the extent that it (...) remains a practice of representation, anthropology, however complex, critical, or self-reflexive, cannot avoid objectifying its others. Extending beyond a critique of anthropology, the book reads the twinned notions of the human and culture across the long history of the human sciences broadly conceived, including anthropology, cultural studies, history, literature, and philosophy. Although there is no chance, they argue, for a "new" anthropology that would not repeat the old anthropology's problem of disciplining the other, they also recognize that there may be no way out of anthropology. We are always writing, thinking, and living in anthropology's wake, within its specific compass or horizon. Moreover, they demonstrate, we have been doing so for a very long time, since at least the beginning of the institution of philosophy in Plato and Aristotle. (shrink)

In this reply to J. Edward Hackett’s “Why James Can Be an Existential Pluralist,” we show that Hackett’s argument against our 2005 thesis that pragmatism and pluralism are inconsistent fails. First, his rejection of our distinction between epistemic and metaphysical forms of pluralism does not affect our original argument’s soundness. Second, his proposed existential pluralism is a form of monism, and so fails as an example of pragmatist pluralism. Though we no longer hold the inconsistency thesis that we defended in (...) 2005, Hackett’s criticism of it nevertheless fails. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003) 369-372 [Access article in PDF] Unity of Agency and Volition:Some Personal Reflections Stephen Weiner The issues of unity of agency, self-as-narrative, and more generally, volition are highly personal to me. Indeed, I would say I have frequently been obsessed with them. I am 52 years old, and date the onset of my psychiatric symptoms—my long-term misery—very specifically: 11:00 pm Pacific Standard Time, August (...) 28, 1965. At almost precisely that time, I started obsessing that I was homosexual and, in fact, turning into a girl. Within days, derealization followed: for instance, the houses in my neighborhood seemed one-dimensional—they seemed as though they were painted, as though I could stick my hand or an object through them. Colors seemed less bright as well—but I hardly had words for all this at the time: it was an overwhelmingly preverbal feeling, but I found some words for it.I was also depressed, and knew I was depressed—that is, I was worried, had trouble sleeping, and had suicidal thoughts and feelings. Within weeks, I asked my parents if I could see a psychiatrist, and I did. I remember asking my psychiatrist if he ever thought about the possibility that everything might be an illusion, and he quoted the refrain from "Row, Row, Row Your Boat": "merrily, merrily, merrily, merrily, life is but a dream." But just asking him produced a chilling feeling that he did not exist and, largely for this reason, I did not mention unreality feelings again to therapists for another 20 years.So, like Dr. Wells' patient Edward, described by James Phillips (2003), I was in trouble; like Edward, I was starting to construct a narrative. I started feeling that I had "to tell my story" at about this time—before then, I had not felt a need to do that. That may be partly because young children take life for granted (at least, I did), and it may be partly because suffering, by its very nature, demands explanation; both reasons were probably operating—certainly, both my parents told me years later that I had seemed emotionally distressed as a child, and my mother told they would have given me Ritalin if it had been available. So, to other people (my parents and my teachers) I was mentally ill in some sense, and I have some pretty clear memories of what I now recognize as depression, especially in the second and third grades; but I did not think of myself as sick and I did not think of myself as suffering—and I did not experience the duality (at least) of selves that I started to experience almost immediately in August 1965.Phillips further points out that the "future Edward" could look back in his narrative, at a later age, and reconstruct his history either as someone with a continuing mental illness, or as someone who had attained a secure, healthy adulthood and saw his experience as adolescent pain in the service of ultimate adult health and integration. I see my story, I am sorry to report, as [End Page 369] one of unremitting basic pain but with the positive dimension that I was able to go on, obtain a good education, work a good deal in my adult life, and father a child. But my narrative—and am I not, as a highly verbal person, almost constrained to think of my life as a narrative?—has been one, as Phillips (following Kleinman) realizes, of suffering. It is, above all else, an illness narrative. I find the approach of J. Melvin Woody (2003)—of privileging performing and performing arts and spatial metaphors over story—less relevant and true to myself, although I see no reason to argue with Mary's preference for such forms. It may be that the temporal discontinuities she has experienced predispose her to see herself in such terms—may, in fact, necessitate doing so. I am not exactly sure why, but it probably has to do with acting, with trying on and performing one role... (shrink)

The anchoring focus of this paper is a cluster of complaints that have been raised against reference-based approaches to semantics, in particular against the view defended by Scott Soames (2002). I am going to lump the complaints that I have in mind under the heading of the Threat of Collapse (or the Threat, for short). At the heart of the Threat of Collapse is the accusation that various moves referentialists make in dealing with well-known problems end up undercutting the (...) motivations for a reference-based semantics in the first place. (shrink)

John T. Scott has written a scholarly assessment of Rousseau’s psychological and theological thought. Following in the path of Leo Strauss and his followers such as Allan Bloom, Roger Masters, Arth...

Volume 25, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 103-114.

This paper responds to material from Scott Soames’s wide ranging book The World Philosophy Made, material which I am actually tempted to overlook. Soames adds a detail to a criticism H.L.A. Hart makes of John Rawls, but I argue that Soames cannot consistently endorse this criticism, given his acceptance of trickle-down economics and his aspiration to cohere with a dominant strand of right-wing American philosophy.

This is a two-page handout covering the subtle differences between H.L.A. Hart and Scott Soames on whether the protection of basic liberties would be prioritized using the original position method.

The form of Western mainstream film is the crux of its ideological efficiency: by using established formal techniques, films ensure audiences un- derstand that aesthetic decisions support and clarify the narrative to ensure maximum spectatorial satisfaction. However, some films exploit their formal aesthetics in order to prevent clarification, thwarting satisfaction in favour of viewing practices that can be considered perverse in that they withhold, suspend or obstruct immediate pleasure. Contemporary Western filmmaking in the mid-1990s witnessed the emergence of a distinct (...) group of filmmakers and films that, in the popular discourse of cinematic criticism, were together coded as “difficult” or “perverse.” These films were, as a result of the characteristics we identify below, situated obliquely in relation to the larger economic and artistic struc- tures of a commercially oriented “mainstream” cinema. Included in this new form of cinematic production were films from directors such as Tim Burton: Edward Scissorhands ; David Cronenberg: eXistenZ ; David Fincher: Se7en ; Peter Greenaway: The Baby of Maçon ; David Lynch: Lost Highway ; Quentin Tarantino: Pulp Fiction and Lars von Trier: Breaking the Waves . Whilst Western cinema as a whole has a long history of exploring “difficult” or “perverse” material within the overt or covert content of narrative, plot and story, such films demonstrate a particular relationship between the content being explored and the specific formal characteristics utilised in the delivery of that content. Thus where previous examples would utilise standardised formal techniques as a way of both delivering and containing the difficult or objectionable material, the films instead offer instances where the material of the narrative content seems to bleed backwards, affecting the form and rendering the very materiality of the film itself suspect and problematic. (shrink)

"Like Foucault and Levinas before him, though in very different ways, Scott makes an oblique incision into phenomenology... [it is] the kind of book to which people dazed by the specters of nihilism will be referred by those in the know." —David Wood "... refreshing and original." —Edward S. Casey In The Lives of Things, Charles E. Scott reconsiders our relationships with ordinary, everyday things and our capacity to engage them in their particularity. He takes up the Greek (...) notion of phusis, or physicality, as a way to point out limitations in refined and commonplace views of nature and the body as well as a device to highlight the often overlooked lives of things that people encounter. Scott explores questions of unity, purpose, coherence, universality, and experiences of wonder and astonishment in connection with scientific fact and knowledge. He develops these themes with lightness and wit, ultimately articulating a new interpretation of the appearances of things that are beyond the reach of language and thought. (shrink)

In this essay, I will respond to the several charges laid at my feet by Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin engaged in their response entitled “Pragmatism and ‘Existential’ Pluralism: A Response to Hackett” about my article that also appeared in Contemporary Pragmatism entitled “Why James Can Be an Existential Pluralist”. At the heart of my response lies a concern with what I call the principle of hermeneutic charity and the final view James offers us of his entire philosophy. One (...) can recognize the need for historical accuracy and the need to investigate first-order claims that come from historically accurate interpretations. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to revisit the revisiting of Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin’s response to Joshua Anderson. My work here will not render judgment about how they respond to Anderson, but instead, my thinking is that the response to the restatement of their argument is the most current iteration of “Why Pragmatists Cannot Be Pluralists.” In this way, I am responding to their most updated version of their argument and the substantial issues raised in the original (...) paper. My concern here is that a spirited Jamesian response to their restated problem should be forthcoming. My response is motivated by the fact that pluralism is misunderstood with respect to James and what they dub meaning pragmatism, even though I know they are painting with a big brush of those, like myself, who find inspiration and identification with James’s philosophy. Therefore, my overall thesis is that pluralism is severely misunderstood, and this misunderstanding has several interesting consequences for the argument they want to make against it. (shrink)

The problem of generating generally capable agents is an important frontier in artificial intelligence (AI) research. Such agents may demonstrate open-ended, versatile, and diverse modes of expression, similar to humans. We interpret the work of Heintz & Scott-Phillips as a minimal sufficient set of socio-cognitive biases for the emergence of generally expressive AI, separate yet complementary to existing algorithms.