This article has a dual purpose: on the one hand, it aims to add to the study of text production from a formulation-centered perspective ; on the other, since the analysis and discussion of linguistic problems presented here focus on a specific discourse type within scientific communication, this article is intended as a contribution to scientific communication studies. As I am particularly interested in text production as a process, the corpus I examine consists of oral interviews. In particular, (...) I explore the oral interaction between scientists and specialized journalists that precedes the writing of science popularization texts targeted for the lay reader. I analyze and assess, from a structural and functional point of view, two types of recurrent formulation procedures usually deployed by experts: `illustration' and `reformulation', and claim they constitute resources for the construction of the interlocutors' discursive identities. (shrink)

Community engagement in research, including public health related research, is acknowledged as an ethical imperative. While medical care and public health action take priority over research during infectious disease outbreaks, research is still required in order to learn from epidemic responses. The World Health Organisation developed a guide for community engagement during infectious disease epidemics called the Good Participatory Practice for Trials of Emerging (and Re‐emerging) Pathogens that are Likely to Cause Severe Outbreaks in the Near Future and for which (...) Few or No Medical Counter‐Measures Exist (GPP‐EP). This paper identified priorities for community engagement for research conducted during infectious disease outbreaks drawing on discussions held with a purposive sample of bioethicists, social scientists, researchers, policy makers and laypersons who work with ethics committees in West Africa. These perspectives were considered in the light of the GPP‐EP, which adds further depth and dimension to discussions on community engagement frameworks. It concludes that there is no presumptive justification for the exclusion of communities in the design, implementation and monitoring of clinical trials conducted during an infectious disease outbreak. Engagement that facilitates collaboration rather than partnership between researchers and the community during epidemics is acceptable. (shrink)

In 2014, an international group of scholars from various fields analysed the “societal dimensions” of synthetic biology in an interdisciplinary summer school. Here, we report and discuss the biologists’ observations on the general perception of synthetic biology by non-biologists who took part in this event. Most attendees mainly associated synthetic biology with contributions from the best-known public figures of the field, rarely mentioning other scientists. Media extrapolations of those contributions appeared to have created unrealistic expectations and irrelevant fears that were (...) widely disconnected from the current research in synthetic biology. Another observation was that when debating developments in synthetic biology, semantics strongly mattered: depending on the terms used to present an application of synthetic biology, attendees reacted in radically different ways. For example, using the term “GMOs” rather than the term “genetic engineering” led to very different reactions. Stimulating debates also happened with participants having unanticipated points of view, for instance biocentrist ethicists who argued that engineered microbes should not be used for human purposes. Another communication challenge emerged from the connotations and inaccuracies surrounding the word “life”, which impaired constructive debates, thus leading to misconceptions about the abilities of scientists to engineer or even create living organisms. Finally, it appeared that synthetic biologists tend to overestimate the knowledge of non-biologists, further affecting communication. The motivation and ability of synthetic biologists to communicate their work outside their research field needs to be fostered, notably towards policymakers who need a more accurate and technical understanding of the field to make informed decisions. Interdisciplinary events gathering scholars working in and around synthetic biology are an effective tool in addressing those issues. (shrink)

Around 97% of climate scientists endorse anthropogenic global warming (AGW), the theory that human activities are partly responsible for recent increases in global average temperatures. Clearly, this widespread endorsement of AGW is a reason for non-experts to believe in AGW. But what is the epistemic significance of the fact that some climate scientists do not endorse AGW? This paper contrasts expert unanimity, in which virtually no expert disagrees with some theory, with expert consensus, in which some non-negligible proportion either rejects (...) or is uncertain about the theory. It is argued that, from a layperson’s point of view, an expert consensus is often stronger evidence for a theory’s truth than unanimity. Several lessons are drawn from this conclusion, e.g. concerning what laypeople should infer from expert pronouncements, how journalists should report on scientific theories, and how working scientists should communicate with the public. (shrink)

This monograph examines the relationship between science and democracy. The author argues that there is no clear-cut division between science and the rest of society. Rather, scientists and laypeople form a single community of inquiry, which aims at the truth. To defend his theory, the author shows that science and society are both heterogeneous and fragmented. They display variable and shifting alliances between components. He also explains how information flow between science and society is bi-directional through “transactional” processes. In other (...) words, science and society mutually define themselves. The author also explains how science is both objective and laden with values. Coverage includes a wide range of topics, such as: the ideal of value-free science, the is/ought divide, “thick terms” and the language of science, inductive risk, the dichotomy between pure science and applied science, constructivism and the philosophy of risk. It also looks at the concepts of truth and objectivity, the autonomy of science, moral and social inquiry, perfectionism and democracy, and the role of experts in democratic societies. The style is philosophical, but the book features many examples and case-studies. It will appeal to philosophers of science, those in science and technology studies as well as interested general readers. (shrink)

The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Dialogue on Science, Ethics, and Religion (DoSER) program has embarked on an exciting project, “Scientists and Religious Communities: Investigating Perceptions to Build Understanding.” The project will provide the first quantitative data on the underlying assumptions and concerns that shape national attitudes on science. A nationally representative survey conducted in collaboration with sociologists at Rice University has reached 10,000 people, including evangelical Christians, mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. The survey probed how a (...) broad range of religious people, particularly evangelical Christians, understands and thinks about science, and what they perceive about scientists. Scientists, broadly defined, were likewise surveyed to gauge their perceptions of how religious people regard science. The goal for AAAS is to increase understanding between the scientific and evangelical Christian communities and redefine this critical relationship. DoSER will bring together leaders from scientific and evangelical communities to discuss the implications of survey results and to use them for building better understanding and communication strategies. Building relationships between scientists and religious communities has the potential to create a new paradigm of understanding. Finding out what each group actually thinks, through a survey, is only the beginning. (shrink)

In this paper, I address a question in social epistemology about the unity of a scientic community to- wards its inner groups (teams, labs...). I investigate the reasons why these groups might want to \go it alone", working among themselves and hiding their discoveries from other groups. I concentrate on the intermediate results of a longer project, where the first steps can help to achieve a more advanced result. I study to what extent the isolation of research groups might be (...) damaging to the epistemic progress of the whole community. In order to get an idea of the reason why scientists might not share their intermediate results with others, consider for example Schawlow and Townes in the summer of 1958 (the historical material is drawn from Broberg, 1991, chap. 3): together they had just designed the principle of functioning of what would be known as the laser, with the intention of constructing the rst laser, relying on their theoretical ideas. Should they have published their theoretical discovery, or rather taken advantage of their advance on possible oppo- nents and start the experimental work? They chose to publish their theoretical ideas in a scientic journal, and they also led a patent application. On the one hand, it was a valuable choice: the patent was granted and their paper was published, making them soon famous. Further- more, another scientist called Gould was to le a simi- lar patent application a few months later, in March 1959; it was refused, because of the priority of Schawlow and Townes. If the latter had not submitted their idea in 1958, the patent would certainly have been acknowl- edged to Gould. In this sense, publishing their intermediate result was a worthy strategy. On the other hand, history showed that their publication had also some drawbacks for them. Schawlow and Townes' publication triggered a race among many American laboratories for the rst experimental construction of the laser. In addition to bringing them competitors, their publication helped these competitors in crucial ways; so much so that it was another scientist, Maiman, and not Schawlow and Townes, who was able to build the rst working laser, in May 1960, and to publish the result. If Schawlow and Townes had not published their theoretical idea, there are chances that they would have been the first ones to build a laser. Their publication of the first theoretical result certainly prevented them from getting the second experimental one. In short, the best publishing strategy about an intermediate result is no easy question for a scientist. Consider now the whole community, concerned with the results available to all and with the pace of the epistemic progress. Schawlow and Townes' publication enabled the rst laser to be built quicker, as other teams could rely on their theoretical work. More generally, being able to reuse other's works seems to be a rm basis of scientic progress. Thus, for the whole community, it seems that there are only benets if intermediate results are published. As this is not necessarily the best strategy for those who reach these intermediate results, there might be a conflict between the interests of individuals and those of the whole community. The question Schawlow and Townes faced was whether they should make their discovery publicly known, or keep it for themselves to progress alone. This alternative can also arise for an entire lab, when competing with other labs on some long-run project: should it make its discoveries known to its opponents, or only share them internally among its members? At a higher level still, this question arises for what can be called scientic schools, which are groups of labs sharing some particular approach|methodological, experimental or interpre- tational, for example. At each level within the scientic community, there are competitive groups of scientists which may decide to go it alone and to prevent their results from being accessible to others. If they had good reasons for doing so, there would be dramatic consequences for the whole community: other groups would not be able to reuse their results, labour force would be wasted in achieving them again, and the progress of the eld would be slowered. 9 The aim of this paper is to investigate this risk of division: to assess the conditions under which it may oc- cur, its damage for the community, and to draw the limit of an acceptable pluralism. The reasoning with benets and drawbacks which has been sketched for Schawlow and Townes seems to be implicitly an informal economic argument. In order to clarify and to rene such an argument, I will investigate it in a rational decision framework, supposing some utility or preferences for the groups of scientists, and I will propose a formal model, in game theory. In social epistemology of science, formal models have been proposed for various questions (for example, Kitcher 1990, 1993, Goldman 2009, Strevens 2003, 2006, Weisberg and Muldoon, forthcoming, Zollman 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), but not for the question of the division of the scientic community. I will concentrate on the normative aspect of the question, ignoring the descriptive and historical question of whether groups do go it alone or not. The model I propose is sequential: two groups are competing on a research program, which consists of several results which have to be obtained in order. The groups always carry out some research for the next result, which they reach with some probability per unit of time. When a group, say A, reaches a result, it can either make it public for the other group, or continue its research. After a result is made public, the competitor B can start from it so as to continue its own research. Thus, when A publishes it loses its lead, and its competitor will be able to compete with it in the near future. But it is also recognized as the rst to reach this step. I consider two dierent cases, one in which the number of steps is limited, another where the limit concerns the number of temporal intervals. In both cases, assuming that all steps are equally dicult and equally rewarding, it turns out that the best strategy for a group concerned with its own reward is to make public every step it takes. Thus, there is no risk that groups might separate: a scientist, whatever its group, will publish for all. Finally, I turn to more complex situations, where results have varying size or diculty: there, groups can indeed be better o going it alone. (shrink)

A study of research scientists working at the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute.

After a long period during which the involvement of laypersons was considered undesirable in the Western tradition of science, we have recently witnessed numerous collaborations which suggest that the desirability of societal involvement in the scientific practice is becoming recognized. This article argues that the historical considerations that once led to this division in cognitive labour have been in transformation, having undergone diverse shifts. In a first instance, the exclusion of laypersons from science is analysed in terms of the key (...) concepts of systematicity, universality, and authority. For that, two examples are given: the case of the British photographic survey and that of the American Museum of Natural History. Next, the dissolution of these barriers between scientists and laypersons is discussed and illustrated by examples: the Dystrophic Epidermolysis Bullosa Research Association in Austria, Fukushima nuclear monitoring stations, and the French Association of Muscular Dystrophy. It is concluded that, for science to be truly democratized, co-produced knowledge needs to be integrated in political decision-making processes, which is currently still lacking. Furthermore, since expertise can also be found in society, non-certified experts should work in conjunction with scientists, yet at the same time, the divide between experts and non-experts must be maintained. The inclusion of non-scientific experts in decision-making is fundamentally different from the inclusion of lay stakeholders. Hence, different participatory roles should be expected from stakeholders, experts, or scientists, and the most important challenge now is how to formally define such roles. (shrink)

Nanotechnologies are a controversial topic, as they seem promising but also cause concern. Previous research has highlighted the potential link between nanotechnologies and other hazardous technologies. The aim of this research was to analyse the discourse on this topic by three groups of participants: laypersons, scientists and environmentalists. Thirty-four people (13 laypersons, ten scientists and eleven environmentalists) were interviewed using a semi-structured interview. Lexical and thematic analyses showed that scientists engage in explanatory discourse and perceive fewer risks than laypersons and (...) environmentalists. The latter two groups describe applications and list the main actors in the development of nanotechnologies. Environmentalists are significantly more likely to make spontaneous associations with other technologies, such as electromagnetic waves, and perceive more risks than the other two groups. Contrary to our expectations, laypersons make fewer associations with biotechnologies than experts or environmentalists. The results are discussed in terms of the interest of a qualitative approach to uncovering new objects spontaneously associated with nanotechnologies, as well as in terms of a risk governance framework. (shrink)

It is essential for scientists to introduce their research in a comprehensible manner and to communicate with colleagues in the same/different fields and with the public. As genome research requires the massive expenditure of public funds, and raises ethical, legal, and social issues, genome scientists have communicated extensively with the public. In addition, they have established interdisciplinary collaborations that resulted in the creation of a new research field known as bioinformatics.We examined the history of communication activities involving Japanese genome (...) scientists between 1989 and 2005 using extensive literature surveys and interviews. We found that genome researchers went through much trial and error, particularly with respect to collaborative interdisciplinary efforts, and although they early on recognized the necessity of communicating with colleagues in different fields, it was not until the introduction of a large governmental research budget, the Millennium Project (2000 - 2004), that individual researchers began to be actively engaged in communication activities. In conclusion, to facilitate the participation of scientists in communication activities, researchers who are acquainted with different research fields, community, and society should proactively function as coordinators of interdisciplinary programs or mediators of collaborative research. It is also of primal importance to present to scientists the advantage of dialogue with society scientifically and to design effective communication programs that provide researchers with such opportunities. (shrink)

Scientists and their supporters often portray as exasperatingly irrational all those laypersons who refuse to accede to practical recommendations issued by expert scientists and 'science appliers'. After first considering the latter groups’ standard explanations for such non-deference, which focus upon irrationalities besetting the laity, I will propose that a better explanation for at least some of the non-deference is that many laypersons are rationally electing to substitute their own judgments for those urged upon them by the scientific community. Science-based recommendations, (...) as I treat them, have the general form In light of the science on X, if you seek outcome O, you ought to V. Non-deferring laypersons deny the soundness or cogency of the V-supporting argumentation—though they are supposedly not competent to do so, given their gross epistemic inferiority to the scientific authorities who create and endorse the arguments. On account of thus being epistemically irrational, they end up being instrumentally irrational, pursuing courses of action that are poor choices for serving their own interests. The non-deferring laypersons are thought to violate two mandates of rationality: for internal deference to the underlying science as true enough to constitute an unproblematic background for decisionmaking, and for external deference to the practical application of that science to the concrete extra-scientific circumstances in question. I claim that rationality does not require categorical adherence to these mandates. In any given case, non-deference by some laypersons might be warranted by one or more of four distinct rationales. 1. Value-ladenness: The science-based recommendation discernibly includes non-scientific value-choice or value-weighting assumptions. It embodies a certain prioritizing of the plurality of specific values packed within its O parameter, and some laypersons may permissibly substitute their own. 2. Non-scientific-reasoning-ladenness: The science-based recommendation discernibly relies upon reasoning moves that are not distinctive to science, moves whose critical assessment demands no scientific expertise. Error-free reasoning is difficult to attain, and the laypersons may justifiably take themselves to have found weaknesses in the V-supporting argumentation that undermine the case for conformity to the recommendation. 3. Overgeneralization: The science-based recommendation discernibly is not adequately tailored to the specific situation of the laypersons in question. 4. Untrustworthy science: The science-based recommendation discernibly is based upon scientific research that is of doubtful quality. The first three rationales cast doubt upon the External Deference Mandate, questioning not the existence of sound underlying research but the recommendation’s judgments about how this research ought to be applied. The fourth is a challenge to the Internal Deference Mandate. (shrink)

Previous research has shown that uncertainty communication by scientists (i. e., expressing reservations towards their own research) increases the public’s trust in their work. The reasons for this have not been elucidated, however. In the present study, we provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon. Specifically, we expected that attributed communicator bias would mediate the effect of uncertainty communication on trust. Results from a mixed-design experiment (N = 88), using modified science news articles, revealed support for this hypothesis. (...) Positive effects of uncertainty communication on trust and donation intention were both mediated by attributed communicator bias. (shrink)

This exploratory study is focused on the perceptions of science communication practitioners about the activities of scientists and the audiences of the marine sciences outreach in Portugal. Using the qualitative method of thematic analysis and collecting data through semistructured interviews of 14 practitioners of diverse professions, backgrounds, ages, and stages of career, it was found that the role of marine scientists in this area is traditionally viewed as reduced, but with a slight improvement in the past 5 to 10 (...) years. Despite having a historical connection with and curiosity about the sea, audiences were considered to have a mostly utilitarian interest in the marine sciences. Most practitioners had a view of science communication connected to the knowledge deficit model, with a minority articulating a more dialogical model. Although there are signs of conflict between science communicators and scientists, the proliferation of training opportunities in science communication at the national level, the perceived increase of interest and participation of marine scientists in public communication in the past years, and the consolidation of science communicators as part of the scientific community offer positive prospects for the future of outreach of marine sciences in Portugal. (shrink)

Richard Rudner famously argues that the communication of scientific advice to policy makers involves ethical value judgments. His argument has, however, been rightly criticized. This article revives Rudner’s conclusion, by strengthening both his lines of argument: we generalize his initial assumption regarding the form in which scientists must communicate their results and complete his ‘backup’ argument by appealing to the difference between private and public decisions. Our conclusion that science advisors must, for deep-seated pragmatic reasons, make value judgments is (...) further bolstered by reflections on how the scientific contribution to policy is far less straightforward than the Rudner-style model suggests. (shrink)

The “Open Air Laboratories” (OPAL) is a large, England-wide environmental public engagement (PE) project based on the “citizen science” model. It is designed to involve people of all backgrounds and abilities in the production of environmental science and in the process to educate and raise awareness and enthusiasm about nature and its importance. This article draws on a series of interviews with scientists and science communicators involved in the project to explore their motivations and aims for the project and what (...) they see as the goals of public engagement generally. We find a varied and nuanced array of motivations and aims that interviewees cite for taking part in the project, pointing toward a reevaluation of traditional ways of understanding the value of public engagement, policy relevance, and dialogue within public engagement. Especially relevant in relation to thinking about the policy relevance of PE is our conclusion that there are many different ways of thinking about the value of PE, characterized in this article as “the neglected middle.”. (shrink)

Despite a widespread impression that the public is woefully ignorant of science and cares little for the subject, U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) surveys show the majority are very interested and understand that they are not well informed about science. The data are consistent with the author’s view that the popularity of pseudoscience does not indicate a rejection of science. If this is so, opportunities for scientists to communicate with the public promise a more rewarding result than is commonly believed (...) among scientists. In fact, the increasing visibility of science in the mass media correlates with a slow, steady improvement in public understanding of science in recent years. (shrink)

The concept of “critical science literacy” advanced by Susanna Priest is significant to how citizens approach scientific knowledge, but the concept is also relevant to undergraduate students majoring in the sciences, who are not necessarily becoming “critically literate” in their own disciplines. That is, future scientists are not learning how arguments are structured, meaning is made, and facts are agreed upon—specifically through communicative practices—both within and outside of the scientific community. This gap in the curriculum can be addressed through collaborative (...) efforts between rhetoricians and sociologists of science. Drawing from three major disciplinary traditions—writing studies, the rhetoric of science, and science communication—this article posits that a pedagogical intervention is necessary to improve science communication with nonexpert publics. A science writing and communication course that is grounded in the rhetoric of science and that also has sociological, philosophical, and historical components can provide science students with a critical awareness of how their discipline operates in society and teach them how to become more responsible and effective communicators. (shrink)

Scientific Testimony concerns the roles of scientific testimony in science and society. The book develops a positive alternative to a tradition famously expressed by the slogan of the Royal Society Nullius in verba ("Take nobody's word for it"). This book argues that intra-scientific testimony—i.e., testimony between collaborating scientists—is not in conflict with the spirit of science or an add-on to scientific practice. On the contrary, intra-scientific testimony is a vital part of science. This is illustrated by articulating epistemic norms of (...) intra-scientific testimony and arguing that they are vital to scientific methodology on a par with other scientific norms governing scientific observation and data analysis. -/- The book also provides an account of public scientific testimony—i.e., scientific testimony to the lay population. This is done by integrating philosophical resources with empirical research on the science of science communication. For example, various misconceptions about science and folk epistemological biases are diagnosed as factors that contribute to science skepticism. This diagnosis provides the basis for developing novel norms for science communication that are sensitive to the psychological and social obstacles to laypersons' uptake of it. Finally, the volume discusses how public scientific testimony is best embedded in society and argues that it is critical for societies that pursue the ideals of deliberative democracy. Scientific Testimony draws on philosophy of science, social epistemology, and empirical research to provide a wide-ranging account of the roles of scientific testimony within scientific practice and within the wider society. (shrink)

This study is about the interaction of scientific expertise and local knowledge in the context of a contested issue: the quality and quantity of safe drinking water available to some residents in one Canadian community. The authors articulate the boundary work in which scientific and technological expertise and discourse are played out against local knowledge and water needs to prevent the construction of a water main extension that would provide a group of residents with the same water that others in (...) the community already access. The authors draw on an extensive database constructed during a three-year ethnographic study of one community; the data base includes the transcript of a public meeting, newspaper clippings, interviews, and communications between residents and town council. The authors show not only that scientists and residents differ in their assessment of water quality and quantity but also that there is a penchant for undercutting residents in their attempts to make themselves heard in the political process. (shrink)

When scientists or science reporters communicate research results to the public, this often involves ethical and epistemic risks. One such risk arises when scientific claims cause cognitive or behavioural changes in the audience that contribute to the self-fulfilment of these claims. I argue that the ethical and epistemic problems that such self-fulfilment effects may pose are much broader and more common than hitherto appreciated. Moreover, these problems are often due to a specific psychological phenomenon that has been neglected in the (...) research on science communication: many people tend to conform to ‘descriptive norms’, that is, norms capturing (perceptions of) what others commonly do, think, or feel. Because of this tendency, science communication may frequently produce significant social harm. I contend that scientists have a responsibility to assess the risk of this potential harm and consider adopting strategies to mitigate it. I introduce one such strategy and argue that its implementation is independently well motivated by the fact that it helps improve scientific accuracy. (shrink)

There are two senses of ‘what scientists know’: An individual sense (the separate opinions of individual scientists) and a collective sense (the state of the discipline). The latter is what matters for policy and planning, but it is not something that can be directly observed or reported. A function can be defined to map individual judgments onto an aggregate judgment. I argue that such a function cannot effectively capture community opinion, especially in cases that matter to us.

[This is an edited and improved version of "You Are Not Your Brain: Against 'Teaching to the Brain'" previously published in *Review of Higher Education and Self-Learning* 5(15), Summer 2012.] Since educators are always looking for ways to improve their practice, and since empirical science is now accepted in our worldview as the final arbiter of truth, it is no surprise they have been lured toward cognitive neuroscience in hopes that discovering how the brain learns will provide a nutshell explanation (...) for student learning in general. I argue that identifying the person with the brain is scientism (not science), that the brain is not the person, and that it is the person who learns. In fact the brain only responds to the learning of embodied experience within the extra-neural network of intersubjective communications. Learning is a dynamic, cultural activity, not a neural program. Brain-based learning is unnecessary for educators and may be dangerous in that a culturally narrow ontology is taken for granted, thus restricting our creativity and imagination, and narrowing the human community. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The contribution of amateur scientists to the International Geophysical Year (IGY) was substantial, especially in the arena of spotting artificial satellites. This article examines how Fred L. Whipple and his colleagues recruited satellite spotters for Moonwatch, a program for amateur scientists initiated by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) in 1956. At the same time, however, the administrators with responsibility for the IGY program closely monitored and managed—sometimes even contested—amateur participation. IGY programs like Moonwatch provided valuable scientific information and gave (...) amateurs opportunities to contribute actively to the research of professional scientists. Moonwatch, which operated until 1975, eventually became the public face of a vast satellite‐tracking network that expanded the SAO’s global reach and helped further Whipple’s professional goals. Understanding amateurs’ interactions with the professional science community enables us better to understand the IGY as a phenomenon that enlisted broad participation and transcended traditional boundaries between professional and amateur scientists. (shrink)

Jacques Ellul, by far the most significant author in the serious discussions on the interface between religion and technology, is apparently not known to the science‐and‐religion field. The reason is the imprecise use of the terminology. In scientific formulation the relationship can be summarized as technology /religion:: science/theology. The first pair are robust three‐dimensional templates of most human experience; the second pair are linear, abstract concerns of a minority of citizens. In the parallel community—now well developed throughout academia—of science, technology, (...) and society, where the technology/religion matters have been discussed more than the science/religion pair, John Caiazza's point that “techno‐secularism is the real problem” has been front and center for some decades. Among the theologians most aware of this, Raimundo Panikkar, Langdon Gilkey, and Huston Smith, Smith is the one who has taken the case much further than Caiazza, recognizing the danger of the real theological challenge from the religion of scientism and actively working against it. I write from a unique background among those involved in this debate—that of being deeply embedded simultaneously both in the modern science and technology establishment and in the reform of the religious enterprise for fifty years. I make the case that matters are worse than even Smith posits. He shows that scientism as a fundamentalist modern secularism serves the exact function of the theology behind the practiced religion of America and the West, that is, technology. An unexpected ray of hope has appeared in the sudden emergence of whole‐person healing (also known as complementary and alternative medicine), which is used regularly by well over half the population. This reintroduction of the spiritual dimension into this key technology of health will certainly be a major turning point. (shrink)

Scientism in medical education distracts educators from focusing on the content of learning; it focuses attention instead on individual achievement and validity in its measurement. I analyze the specific form that scientism takes in medicine and in medical education. The competencies movement attempts to challenge old “scientistic” views of the role of physicians, but in the end it has invited medical educators to focus on validity in the measurement of individual performance for attitudes and skills that medicine resists conceptualizing as (...) objective. Academic medicine should focus its efforts instead on quality and relevance of care. The social accountability movement proposes to shift the focus of academic medicine to the goal of high quality and relevant care in the context of community service and partnership with the institutions that together with medicine create and cope with health and with health deficits. I make the case for this agenda through a discussion of the linked histories of the opioid prescribing crisis and the professionalism movement. (shrink)

Climate change has become one of the most pressing problems that can threaten the existence and development of humans around the globe. Almost all climate scientists have agreed that climate change is happening and is caused mainly by greenhouse gas emissions induced by anthropogenic activities. However, some groups still deny this fact or do not believe that climate change results from human activities. This essay discusses the causes, significance, and skeptical arguments of climate change denialism, as well as the roles (...) of scientists and science communication in addressing the issues. Through this essay, we call for the active participation of scientists in science communication activities with the public, the opening of new science communication sectors specified for climate change, and more attention to social sciences and humanities in addressing climate change issues. (shrink)

_Purpose__._ This article aims at outlining the socio-communicative prerequisites for the influence of personality on the acquisition of rigorous scientific knowledge. _Theoretical__ basis__._ The communicative foundations of an individual’s activity in general and the functioning of his consciousness in particular were laid by the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, primarily due to his introduction of the concepts of "intersubjectivity" and "lifeworld". From these positions, attempts were made to understand the discussion of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn regarding the role of the (...) individual in science, in particular, the concept of a "normal scientist" as a participant in the lifeworld of scientists who support special intersubjective norms of reproduction of this lifeworld through scientific communication. The concept of "communicative mind", correlated with the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas, best expresses the rational and argumentative principles of achieving consensus in science. _Originality__._ Social anthropology reveals the constitutive significance of teamwork in science as a way of achieving rigorous scientific knowledge. Social phenomenology concretizes this by emphasizing the need for constant improvement of the rules of this communication. The verification of scientific knowledge by facts is strictly determined by the observance of community-recognized scientific tools for achieving such verification, in particular, the conventional agreement within a certain community of scientists regarding the language of science, which is used to describe verification, falsification, and other procedures for organizing scientific knowledge into a system. _Conclusions._ Verification of the obtained scientific knowledge critically depends on the formulation, dissemination and observance of certain institutional rules of scientific communication. This applies, in particular, to the conventionally recognized rules for the verification of scientific knowledge by empirical facts: it is not an isolated scientist who should identify, verify, organize and evaluate empirical facts, but a community of scientists who conduct scientific research in an organized manner. Team scientific work is a special case of collective action, which is characterized by a high level of reflection and application of critical thinking on a communicative basis. In particular, the legitimation of acquired scientific knowledge occurs in the process of scientific research due to the observance of procedural rules and careful work with empirical facts. (shrink)

Debates about new technologies, such as crop and food genetic modification, raise pressing questions about the ways ‘experts’ and ‘ nonexperts’ communicate. These debates are dynamic, characterized by many voices contesting numerous storylines. The discoursal features, including language choices and communication strategies, of the GM debate are in some ways taken for granted and in others actively manipulated by participants. Although there are many voices, some have more influence than others. This study makes use of 50 hours of in-depth (...) interviews with GM scientists, nonexperts, and other stakeholders in the GM debate to examine this phenomenon. We uncover rhetorical devices used by scientists to characterize and ultimately undermine participation by non-experts in areas including rationality, knowledge, understanding and objectivity. Scientists engage with ‘the public’ from their own linguistic and social domain, without reflexive confirmation of their own status as part of the public and the citizenry. This raises a number of interesting ironies and contradictions, which are explored in the article. As such, it provides valuable insights into an increasingly important type of discourse. (shrink)

Debates about new technologies, such as crop and food genetic modification, raise pressing questions about the ways ‘experts’ and ‘ nonexperts’ communicate. These debates are dynamic, characterized by many voices contesting numerous storylines. The discoursal features, including language choices and communication strategies, of the GM debate are in some ways taken for granted and in others actively manipulated by participants. Although there are many voices, some have more influence than others. This study makes use of 50 hours of in-depth (...) interviews with GM scientists, nonexperts, and other stakeholders in the GM debate to examine this phenomenon. We uncover rhetorical devices used by scientists to characterize and ultimately undermine participation by non-experts in areas including rationality, knowledge, understanding and objectivity. Scientists engage with ‘the public’ from their own linguistic and social domain, without reflexive confirmation of their own status as part of the public and the citizenry. This raises a number of interesting ironies and contradictions, which are explored in the article. As such, it provides valuable insights into an increasingly important type of discourse. (shrink)

My concern is with the possible implications of research in developmental psychology for understanding the workings of modern science. I agree both with Gopnik's general naturalistic orientation and with her more specific claims about scientists as cognitive agents. Neither the formal structure of propositions nor the social structure of scientific communities provides sufficient resources for the understanding we seek. So I agree that the empirical study of human cognition is not only relevant, but necessary, for understanding how science works.

Increasingly, epistemologists are becoming interested in social structures and their effect on epistemic enterprises, but little attention has been paid to the proper distribution of experimental results among scientists. This paper will analyze a model first suggested by two economists, which nicely captures one type of learning situation faced by scientists. The results of a computer simulation study of this model provide two interesting conclusions. First, in some contexts, a community of scientists is, as a whole, more reliable when its (...) members are less aware of their colleagues' experimental results. Second, there is a robust tradeoff between the reliability of a community and the speed with which it reaches a correct conclusion. ‡The author would like to thank Brian Skyrms, Kyle Stanford, Jeffrey Barrett, Bruce Glymour, and the participants in the Social Dynamics Seminar at University of California–Irvine for their helpful comments. Generous financial support was provided by the School of Social Science and Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences at UCI. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Baker Hall 135, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Historians of science have often presented the inter-war period as a time when British scientific communities radically questioned existing scholarship on ‘race’. The ascendancy of genetics, and the perceived need to challenge Nazi ‘racial’ theory have been highlighted as pivotal issues in shaping this British revision of ‘racial’ ideas. This article offers a detailed analysis of British scientific thinking in the inter-war period. It questions whether historians have exaggerated or oversimplified the prevalence of anti-‘racial’ reform. It uses a wide range (...) of scientific writings to consider issues of continuity and change in ‘racial’ thinking in mainstream British scientific communities. The article probes the relationship between science and politics, focusing on the extent to which ideological factors affected both the scientific agenda and conclusions as regards ‘racial’ issues. Far from dismissing the idea that events in the inter-war period triggered changes in the way in which British scientists dealt with ‘race’, the article argues that the seeds of the post-Second World War international scientific rejection of ‘race’ were sown in inter-war Britain amid considerable ambivalence and discord.We must remember that the investigator, whether a biologist, an economist, or a sociologist, is himself a part of history, and that if he ever forgets he is a part of history he will deceive his audience and deceive himself.J. B. S. Haldane, Heredity and Politics, 1938. (shrink)

Since the 1970s, researchers have focused on visual joint attention as a way to observe and operationalize joint attention. I will argue that this methodological choice has neglected other modalities and as a consequence might be missing important elements in the account of the development of JA and the evolutionary history of JA. I argue that by including other modes of interaction, such as touch, we open the possibility of finding that non-human primates and younger human infants engage in basic (...) forms of JA. Moreover, I argue that touch, as a proximal mode of perception, is the ontogenetic precursor of social communication. (shrink)

I outline a pragmatic view of scientists' use of observation which draws attention to non-discursive, instrumental and social contexts of observation, in order to explain scientists' agreement about the appearance and significance of new phenomena. I argue that: observation is embedded in a network of activities, techniques, and interests; that experimentalists make construals of new phenomena which enable them communicate exploratory techniques and their outcomes, and that empirical enquiry consists of communicative, exploratory and predictive strategies whose interdependence ensures that, notwithstanding (...) the constructedness of representations and the empirical underdetermination of theories, observations contain information about the natural world. (shrink)

It has become increasingly clear that social learning and culture occur much more broadly, and in a wider variety of animal communities, than initially believed. Recent research has expanded the list to include insects, fishes, elephants, and cetaceans. Such diversity allows scientists to expand the scope of potential research questions, which can help form a more complete understanding of animal culture than any single species can provide on its own. It is crucial to understand how culture and social learning present (...) in different communities, as well as what influences community structure and culture may have on one another, so that the results across these different studies may most effectively inform one another. This review presents an overview of social learning in species across a spectrum of community structures, providing the necessary infrastructure to allow a comparison of studies that will help move the field of animal culture forward. (shrink)

In this article, I consider whether there are values intrinsic to development theory and practice that are dubious in light of a characteristically African ethic. In particular, I focus on what a certain philosophical interpretation of the sub-Saharan value of communion entails for appraising development, drawing two major conclusions. One is that a majority of the criticisms that have been made of development by those sympathetic to African values are weak; I argue that, given the value of communion, development should (...) not be rejected because it is essentially, say, overly materialistic and scientistic, or insufficiently spiritual and local. The second conclusion, however, is that three criticisms of development are strong from the perspective of Afro-communalism and are particularly powerful when set in that context. I argue that development theory and practice are characteristically anthropocentric, individualist and technocratic, and that a reading of the sub-Saharan value of communion provides a unitary foundation for rejecting these features and for grounding an alternative, more relational approach to social progress and to what justice demands from the West in relation to Africa. (shrink)

In June 2005, Italy held a referendum on repealing the law on medically assisted fertilization , which limits access to artificial reproduction to infertile couples, and prohibits the donation of gametes, the cryopreservation of embryos, preimplantation genetic diagnosis , and research on human embryos. The referendum was invalidated, and the law remained unchanged. The Italian political e bioethical debate on assisted reproduction was manipulated by the Catholic Church, which distorted scientific data and issues at stake with the help of Catholic (...) politicians and bioethicists. What happened in Italy shows that some perverse socio-cultural e political mechanisms are spreading the absurd and anti-historical view that scientific and technological advancements are threatening democracy and personal freedom. Scientists should not only contrast the political attempts at limiting freedom of scientific research, but also tell politicians, humanists and citizens that the invention of Western science with its view of scientific community as an “open society”, contributed and still contributes, through scientific education, to the construction and maintaining of the moral and political values underlying Western democracies. (shrink)

Codes of ethics currently offer no guidance to scientists acting in capacity of expert. Yet communicating their expertise is one of the most important activities of scientists. Here I argue that expert communication has a specifically ethical dimension, and that experts must face a fundamental trade-off between "actionability" and "transparency" when communicating. Some recommendations for expert communication are suggested.

ArgumentThe argument of this paper is to situate The Interpretation of Dreams within an historical context. It is, therefore, impossible to believe Freud entirely when he staged himself in his letters to Fliess as a mere discoverer. In reality Freud also felt he belonged to a learned community of dream specialists, whom I call “dreaming scientists” and “scientific dreamers.” Instead of speaking, as Ellenberger does, in terms of influence, I will be offering as an example a portrait of Freud as (...) a reader of two French authors, Maury, and indirectly, Hervey de Saint-Denys. I will analyze how Freud staged himself as replacing Maury and dreaming sometimes like Hervey de Saint-Denys. My premise in this work is that we must forget Freud, in order to adventure into a learned dream culture peculiar to the nineteenth century. Only afterwards can we come back to Freud and place him in this context as a creative heir. (shrink)