Jan WoleĔski Kazimierz Twardowski and the Development of Philosophy of Science in Poland Kazimierz Twardowski studied with Brentano and followed his style of doing philosophy, in particular, the thesis that the method of philosophy is ...
This accessible and engaging text explores the relationship between philosophy, science and physical geography. It addresses an imbalance that exists in opinion, teaching and to a lesser extent research, between a philosophically enriched human geography and a perceived philosophically ignorant physical geography. Science, Philosophy and Physical Geography , challenges the myth that there is a single self-evident scientific method, that can and is applied in a straightforward manner by physical geographers. It demonstrates the variety of alternative philosophical perspectives. (...) Furthermore it emphasizes the difference that the real world geographical context and the geographer make to the study of environmental phenomenon. This includes a consideration of the dynamic relationship between human and physical geography. Finally, it demonstrates the relevance of philosophy for both an understanding of published material and for the design and implementation of studies in physical geography. Key themes such as global warming, species and evolution and fluvial geomorphology are used to provide illustrations of key concepts in each chapter. Further reading is provided at the end of each chapter. (shrink)
This paper analyzes the interaction between science, philosophy and politics (including ideology) in the early work of J. B. S. Haldane (from 1922 to 1937). This period is particularly important, not only because it is the period of Haldane's most significant biological work (both in biochemistry and genetics), but also because it is during this period that his philosophical and political views underwent their most significant transformation. His philosophical stance first changed from a radical organicism to a position far (...) more compatible with mechanical materialism. The primary intellectual influence that was responsible for this shift was that of F. G. Hopkins. Later, Haldane came to accept Marxism and its official metaphysics, dialectical materialism, a move that let him accept the materialist conception of the world while still maintaining a resolute distance from mechanism. Throughout all these changes, what is most obvious is the influence of science on Haldane's philosophical views. An influence in the opposite direction is far less apparent. (shrink)
This volume explores the potential of employing a relational paradigm for the purposes of interdisciplinary exchange. Bringing together scholars from the social sciences, philosophy and theology, it seeks to bridge the gap between subject areas by focusing on real phenomena.Although these phenomena are studied by different disciplines, the editors demonstrate that it is also possible to study them from a common relational perspective that connects the different languages, theories and perspectives which characterize each discipline, by going beyond their differences to (...) the core of reality itself. As an experimental collection that highlights the potential that exists for cross-disciplinary work, this volume will appeal to scholars across a range of field concerned with critical realist approaches to research, collaborative work across subjects and the manner in which disciplines can offer one another new insights. (shrink)
This Volume Is Being Published By The Project Of History Of Indian Science Philosophy And Culture. The Main Idea Underlying This Project Is To Study The Interconnection Between Philosophy, Science And Technology As Elements Of The Culture Of India. The Hallmark Of The Project Is Its Interdisciplinarity.
This groundbreaking volume casts light on the long shadow of naturalistic monism in modern thought and culture. When monism's philosophical proposition - the unity of all matter and thought in a single, universal substance - fused with scientific empiricism and Darwinism in the mid-nineteenth century, it led to the formation of a powerful worldview articulated in the work of figures such as Ernst Haeckel. The compelling essays collected here, written by leading international scholars, investigate the articulation of monism in (...) class='Hi'>science, philosophy, and religion and its impact on a range of social movements, from socialism and early feminism to imperialism and eugenics. The result is a broad and comprehensive chronological, disciplinary, and geographic map of a century of monism, as well as a bellwether for innovative new directions in the interdisciplinary study of science, religion, philosophy, and culture. (shrink)
From Lucretius throwing a spear beyond the boundary of the universe to Einstein racing against a beam of light, thought experiments stand as a fascinating challenge to the necessity of data in the empirical sciences. Are these experiments, conducted uniquely in our imagination, simply rhetorical devices or communication tools or are they an essential part of scientific practice? This volume surveys the current state of the debate and explores new avenues of research into the epistemology of thought experiments.
This is an introductory essay to the symposium on Michael Friedman’s The Dynamics of Reason. It provides a summary description of the symposium and its rationale; an introduction to Michael Friedman’s views on the a priori and what it refers to as ‘developmental Kantianism’; a summary of the content of each of the four contributed papers in the symposium; and a philosophical analysis of the symposium as a whole in relation with developmental Kantianism.
When physicist Alan Sokal recently submitted an article to the postmodernist journal Social Text, the periodical's editors were happy to publish it--for here was a respected scientist offering support for the journal's view that science is a subjective, socially constructed discipline. But as Sokal himself soon revealed in Lingua Franca magazine, the essay was a spectacular hoax--filled with scientific gibberish anyone with a basic knowledge of physics should have caught--and the academic world suddenly awoke to the vast gap that (...) has opened between the scientific community and their mould-be critics. But the truth is that not only postmodern critics but Americans in general have a weak grasp on scientific principles and facts. In Connected Knowledge, physicist Alan Cromer offers a way to bridge the chasm, with a lively, lucid account of scientific thinking and a provocative new agenda for American education. Science, Cromer argues, is anything but common sense: It requires a particular habit of mind that does not come naturally. For example, something as simple as buoyancy can only be explained through Archimedes' principle--that a body in a fluid is subject to an upward force equal to the weight of fluid it displaces--yet few scientists could arrive at this ancient concept by trial and error. School children, however, are often given a ball and a tank of water, and asked to explain buoyancy any way they can. Today's de emphasis on teaching pupils necessary facts and principles, he argues, "far from empowering them, makes them slaves of their own subjective opinions." This movement in education, known as Constructivism, has close ties to postmodern critics (such as the editors of Social Text) who question the objectivity of science, and with it the existence of an objective reality. Cromer offers a ringing defense of the knowability of the world, both as an objective reality and as a finite landscape of discovery. The advance of scientific knowledge, he argues, is not unlike the mapping of the continents; at this point, we have found them all. He shows how the advent of quantum mechanics, rather than making knowledge less certain, actually offers a more precise understanding of the behavior of atoms and electrons. Turning from philosophy to education, he argues that instead of allowing students to flounder, however creatively, schools should follow a progressive curriculum that returns theoretical knowledge to the classroom. Connected Knowledge, however, goes much farther. As a discipline that insists upon connecting theory with measurable reality, physical science offers a new direction for reforming the social sciences. Cromer also shows how some of the hottest issues in public policy--including the debates over special education and group variations in I.Q., can be resolved through clear, hard headed thinking. For example, he argues for use of the G.E.D. as a national educational standard, with a new "politics of intelligence" to guide the distribution of school resources. Always forthright and articulate, Alan Cromer offers a startling new vision for integrating science, philosophy, and education. (shrink)
It has been urged that philosophers in the contemporary world should be able to engage with domains of practice and not just with each other. If that is the case, in what sense philosophy can become an ‘applied’ discipline, and with what consequences both for philosophy and for practice? As a preliminary I will rehearse some of the reasons why philosophical investigation is socially commendable. I will then show how philosophy in so called knowledge societies should interact with science (...) and the contexts where science is used. A suitably formulated idea of interdisciplinarity will suggest the necessary epistemic conditions to achieve this interaction. I will use two illustrations from the specific field of the philosophy of science to point out the kinds of readjustments required by philosophical analysis not so much to apply but to ‘engage’ with practice. (shrink)
This book provides instances of what the technology and semantic field of music have contributed to the development of epistemology, logic and the early modern sciences of developmental biology, continuum mechanics anatomy and physiological psychology, as well as what some other domains have given back to the philosophy and theory of music.
In 1996, Alan Sokal, a Professor of Physics at New York University, wrote a paper for the cultural-studies journal Social Text, entitled: 'Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity'. It was reviewed, accepted and published. Sokal immediately confessed that the whole article was a hoax - a cunningly worded paper designed to expose and parody the style of extreme postmodernist criticism of science. The story became front-page news around the world and triggered fierce and wide-ranging controversy. (...) -/- Sokal is one of the most powerful voices in the continuing debate about the status of evidence-based knowledge. In Beyond the Hoax he turns his attention to a new set of targets - pseudo-science, religion, and misinformation in public life. 'Whether my targets are the postmodernists of the left, the fundamentalists of the right, or the muddle-headed of all political and apolitical stripes, the bottom line is that clear thinking, combined with a respect for evidence, are of the utmost importance to the survival of the human race in the twenty-first century.' The book also includes a hugely illuminating annotated text of the Hoax itself, and a reflection on the furore it provoked. (shrink)
Auguste Comte's doctrine of positivism was both a philosophy of science and a political philosophy designed to organize a new, secular, stable society based on positive or scientific, ideas, rather than the theological dogmas and metaphysical speculations associated with the ancien regime. This volume offers the most comprehensive English-language overview of Auguste Comte's philosophy, the relation of his work to the sciences of his day, and the extensive, continuing impact of his thinking on philosophy and especially secular political movements (...) in Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Contributors consider Comte's reasons for establishing a Religion of Humanity as well as his views on domestic life and the arts in his positivist utopia. The volume further details Comte's attempt to apply his "positive method," first to social science and then to politics and morality, thereby defending the continuity of his career while also critically examining the limits of his approach. (shrink)
These papers were first presented at a symposium held under the auspices of the A. P. A. Western Conference. The general theme involves the role of science and philosophy in teaching, more specifically, the role of human reason and its ability and/or inability to plumb the depths of physics, psychology, mathematics and to convey any results in an intelligible way. Anton offers an essay on the teaching of philosophy in a general science-culture background. Carl C. Lindegren evaluates the (...) role of philosophy in the teaching of sciences. Alden L. Fisher relates philosophy to psychology. Hippocrates G. Apostle views the teaching of mathematics in a philosophical atmosphere, and William Earle distinguishes philosophy from science as "king of the humanities" rather than merely "a handmaiden of science."—J. J. R. (shrink)
Do the social sciences employ the same methods as the natural sciences? If not, can they do so? And should they do so, given their aims? These central questions of the philosophy of social science presuppose an accurate identification of the methods of natural science. For much of the twentieth century this presupposition was supplied by the logical positivist philosophy of physical science. The adoption of methods from natural science by many social scientists raised another central (...) question: why had these methods so apparently successful in natural science been apparently far less successful when self‐consciously adapted to the research agendas of the several social sciences? Alternative answers to this last question reflect competing philosophies of social science. On one view, the social sciences have not progressed because social scientists have not yet applied the methods of natural science well enough. Another answer has it that the positivists got the methods of natural science wrong, and that social scientists aping wrong methods have produced sterility in their disciplines. Still another response to this question argues that the social sciences are using the right methods and are succeeding, but that the difficulties they face are so daunting that rapid progress is not to be expected. Finally, a fourth answer which has attracted many philosophers of social science has it that social science has made much progress, but that its progress must be measured by different standards from those applied in natural science. This view reflects the belief that social science ought not to employ the methods of natural science, and that many of its problems stem precisely from the employment of an inappropriate method, reflecting profound philosophical confusion. These differing philosophies of social science must be assessed along the dimensions outlined below. (shrink)
The optimum science benefits to routine life have insufficiently been proved. Science progress is not merely reflected in machinery and technological breakthroughs. Subordinate impacts of science and scientists on global interactions are an evidence for the major deficiencies and futility of the many current science designations. A primary objective is to describe postmodern global interrelations of science mentoring policies and life quality. Also, global programs are proposed that will aid in the timely achievement of optimal (...) real-life science goals. The global wholeness of science pictures should be visible, acknowledged, and educated. The wholeness of science, no matter how exposed or sophisticated, should never change. Definitive paths should be developed to bestow science with sufficiently empowered authorities to lead and optimize economics, politics, and international relations. Mentoring rather than teaching of science will be a main frontier for quality lives. Postmodern mentors will be cognizant of the science entirety. Mentors will create and designate definitive shapes from discoveries and findings that will grant human life with ongoing peace and ultimate satisfaction. (shrink)
La transformation du mode de production des connaissances scientifiques va de pair avec une évolution significative des attentes de la société vis-à-vis des sciences, et soulève pour le philosophe de nouvelles questions : qu’est-ce qui est vraiment nouveau dans le régime actuel de production des connaissances ? Quel rôle et quelle responsabilité pour le chercheur face à la demande croissante d’expertise scientifique ? Quelle attitude avoir face à des avancées technologiques touchant à la nature même de l’Homme ? Le citoyen (...) doit-il être davantage impliqué dans le choix des grandes priorités de la recherche ? Cet ouvrage offre une sélection variée et accessible de travaux actuels en philosophie des sciences explorant les facettes multiples des relations entre science et société. (shrink)