Results for 'Satisficing'

171 found
Order:
  1. Willpower Satisficing.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):251-265.
    Satisficing Consequentialism is often rejected as hopeless. Perhaps its greatest problem is that it risks condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as "good enough". I propose a radical new willpower-based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further demonstrate how, by drawing on the resources of an independent theory of blameworthiness, we may obtain a principled specification (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  2. Divine Satisficing and the Ethics of the Problem of Evil.Chris Tucker - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (1):32-56.
    This paper accomplishes three goals. First, it reveals that God’s ethics has a radical satisficing structure: God can choose a good enough suboptimal option even if there is a best option and no countervailing considerations. Second, it resolves the long-standing worry that there is no account of the good enough that is both principled and demanding enough to be good enough. Third, it vindicates the key ethical assumption in the problem of evil without relying on the contested assumption that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3.  44
    A Satisficing Theory of Epistemic Justification.Raimund Pils - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):450-467.
    There is now a significant body of literature on consequentialist ethics that propose satisficing instead of maximizing accounts. Even though epistemology recently witnessed a widespread discussion of teleological and consequentialist theories, a satisficing account is surprisingly not developed yet. The aim of this paper is to do just that. The rough idea is that epistemic rules are justified if and only if they satisfice the epistemic good, i.e., reach some threshold of epistemic value (which varies with practical context), (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Against satisficing consequentialism.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (2):97-108.
    The move to satisficing has been thought to help consequentialists avoid the problem of demandingness. But this is a mistake. In this article I formulate several versions of satisficing consequentialism. I show that every version is unacceptable, because every version permits agents to bring about a submaximal outcome in order to prevent a better outcome from obtaining. Some satisficers try to avoid this problem by incorporating a notion of personal sacrifice into the view. I show that these attempts (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  5. Maximizing, Satisficing and the Normative Distinction Between Means and Ends.Robert Bass - manuscript
    Decision theory, understood as providing a normative account of rationality in action, is often thought to be an adequate formalization of instrumental reasoning. As a model, there is much to be said for it. However, if decision theory is to adequately account for correct instrumental reasoning, then the axiomatic conditions by which it links preference to action must be normative for choice. That is, a choice must be rationally defective unless it proceeds from a preference set that satisfies the axiomatic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion).Chris Tucker - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):127-143.
    In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a significant liability. I argue, however, that the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  7. Satisficing.John Turri - 2013 - In J. E. Crimmins & D. C. Long (eds.), Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism. Bloomsbury Academic.
  8.  48
    Solving Satisficing Consequentialism.Daniel McKay - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):149-157.
    Satisficing consequentialism is often used as a way of solving the demandingness objection, but many forms of satisficing consequentialism fail to do so. Further, those that do are vulnerable to the objections Ben Bradley outlined in Against Satisficing Consequentialism. In this paper, I present a new type of satisficing consequentialism which resolves the demandingness objection, is in-line with common intuitions about moral responsibility, and avoids Bradley's criticisms.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason.Michael Byron (ed.) - 2004 - New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    How do we think about what we plan to do? One dominant answer is that we select the best possible option available. However, a growing number of philosophers would offer a different answer: since we are not equipped to maximize we often choose the next best alternative, one that is no more than satisfactory. This strategy choice is called satisficing. This collection of essays explores both these accounts of practical reason, examining the consequences for adopting one or the other (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  10. Satisficing and optimality.Michael Byron - 1998 - Ethics 109 (1):67-93.
    It is common, though perhaps not correct, to think that practical rationality is strictly instrumental.1 The functions of instrumental reason include finding suitable means to our determinate ends, helping to determine our indeterminate ends, and implementing our principles in appropriate actions. One reason that might be given for adopting instrumentalism with respect to rationality might be that our best scientific evidence offers little support for the idea that our brains have powers to detect good and bad as such in persons, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  11.  83
    Satisficing Consequentialism Still Doesn't Satisfy.Joe Slater - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (1):108-117.
    Satisficing consequentialism is an unpopular theory. Because it permits gratuitous sub-optimal behaviour, it strikes many as wildly implausible. It has been widely rejected as a tenable moral theory for more than twenty years. In this article, I rehearse the arguments behind this unpopularity, before examining an attempt to redeem satisficing. Richard Yetter Chappell has recently defended a form of ‘effort satisficing consequentialism’. By incorporating an ‘effort ceiling’ – a limit on the amount of willpower a situation requires (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. Satisficing and substantive values.Thomas Hurka - manuscript
    Satisficing theories, whether of rationality or morality, do not require agents to maximize the good. They demand only that agents bring about outcomes that are, in one or both of two senses, “good enough.” In the first sense, an outcome is good enough if it is above some absolute threshold of goodness; this yields a view that I will call absolute-level satisficing. In the second sense, an outcome is good enough if it is reasonably close to the best (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13.  47
    Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective.Wynn C. Stirling & Teppo Felin - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):279-308.
    Satisficing is a central concept in both individual and social multiagent decision making. In this paper we first extend the notion of satisficing by formally modeling the tradeoff between costs and decision failure. Second, we extend this notion of “neo”-satisficing into the context of social or multiagent decision making and interaction, and model the social conditioning of preferences in a satisficing framework.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. The plausibility of satisficing and the role of good in ordinary thought.Mark Van Roojen - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.
    Satisficing without thereby maximizing is rational provided that non-consequentialism is rational and provided that the preferred characterization of non-consequentialism is not one in which right action is justified in virtue of maximizing agent-relative value. Rather, the non-consequentialism which can serve to defend satisficing should be one in which the best characterization of certain reasons to act does not involve maximization of value of any sort, whether agent-relative or agent neutral. I argue there are reasons to prefer this sort (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. Why ethical satisficing makes sense and rational satisficing doesn't.James Dreier - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-154.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  16. Is Genuine Satisficing Rational?Edmund Henden - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):339-352.
    There have been different interpretations of satisficing rationality. A common view is that it is sometimes rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when one does not know that it is the best option. But there is available a more radical view of satisficing. On this view, it is rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when a better option is known to be available. In this paper I (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  17. Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded Rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):528-554.
    What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of morality: (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  18. Satisficing as a humanly rational strategy.David Schmidtz - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 30--59.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  19. Tough enough? Robust satisficing as a decision norm for long-term policy analysis.Andreas Mogensen & David Thorstad - manuscript
    This paper aims to open a dialogue between philosophers working in decision theory and operations researchers and engineers whose research addresses the topic of decision making under deep uncertainty. Specifically, we assess the recommendation to follow a norm of robust satisficing when making decisions under deep uncertainty in the context of decision analyses that rely on the tools of Robust Decision Making developed by Robert Lempert and colleagues at RAND. We discuss decision-theoretic and voting-theoretic motivations for robust satisficing, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. How to think about satisficing.Chris Tucker - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1365-1384.
    An agent submaximizes with motivation when she aims at the best but chooses a less good option because of a countervailing consideration. An agent satisfices when she rejects the better for the good enough, and does so because the mere good enough gets her what she really wants. Motivated submaximization and satisficing, so construed, are different ways of choosing a suboptimal option, but this difference is easily missed. Putative proponents of satisficing tend to argue only that motivated submaximization (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  21. Satisficing: The Rationality of Preferring What is Good Enough.Michael E. Weber - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    It is widely maintained that self-interested rationality is a matter of maximizing one's own good or well-being. Rationality more generally is also frequently characterized in maximizing terms: the rational thing to do in any decision context is whatever is best in terms of one's interests or will lead to the greatest preference-satisfaction, My dissertation consists of three independent papers that challenge this orthodoxy by lending support to "satisficing," the idea that it is rational to prefer what is good enough. (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Satisficing Consequentialism.Michael Slote & Philip Pettit - 1984 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 58 (1):139-176.
  23. Satisficing: Not good enough.Henry S. Richardson - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 106--130.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  24.  19
    Satisficing as an Account of Kuhnian Rationality.Rogier de Langhe - 2013 - Philosophy Study 3 (5).
    The lack of an account of rationality in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was a lacuna which Thomas Kuhn acutely felt. In this paper, I argue that Herbert Simon’s notion of “satisficing” provides a formally well-developed and empirically well-established theory of rationality that fits well with Kuhn’s general characterization of science. I start by considering two rival interpretations of the problem of Kuhnian rationality and introduce Simon’s notion of satisficing. In Section 3, I show how satisficing can (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  10
    Satisficing Consequentialism.Michael Slote & Philip Pettit - 1984 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 58 (1):139-176.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  26. In defense of a version of satisficing consequentialism.Jason Rogers - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (2):198-221.
    In this paper, I develop, motivate and offer a qualified defense of a version of satisficing consequentialism (SC). I develop the view primarily in light of objections to other versions of SC recently posed by Ben Bradley. I motivate the view by showing that it (1) accommodates the intuitions apparently supporting those objections, (2) is supported by certain ‘common sense’ moral intuitions about specific cases, and (3) captures the central ideas expressed by satisficing consequentialists in the recent literature. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  27.  82
    Satisficing and Virtue.Christine Swanton - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):33-48.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  28.  86
    Satisficing revisited.Michael A. Goodrich, Wynn C. Stirling & Erwin R. Boer - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (1):79-109.
    In the debate between simple inference heuristics and complex decision mechanisms, we take a position squarely in the middle. A decision making process that extends to both naturalistic and novel settings should extend beyond the confines of this debate; both simple heuristics and complex mechanisms are cognitive skills adapted to and appropriate for some circumstances but not for others. Rather than ask `Which skill is better?'' it is often more important to ask `When is a skill justified?'' The selection and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. Tough enough? Robust satisficing as a decision norm for long-term policy analysis.Andreas L. Mogensen & David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-26.
    This paper aims to open a dialogue between philosophers working in decision theory and operations researchers and engineers working on decision-making under deep uncertainty. Specifically, we assess the recommendation to follow a norm of robust satisficing when making decisions under deep uncertainty in the context of decision analyses that rely on the tools of Robust Decision-Making developed by Robert Lempert and colleagues at RAND. We discuss two challenges for robust satisficing: whether the norm might derive its plausibility from (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Acting and Satisficing.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2015 - In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency. Cambridge University Press. pp. 31-51.
  31. Maximising, Satisficing and Context.C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan - 2010 - Noûs 44 (3):451-468.
  32.  98
    Revealed preference and satisficing behavior.Robert van Rooij - 2011 - Synthese 179 (S1):1 - 12.
    A much discussed topic in the theory of choice is how a preference order among options can be derived from the assumption that the notion of ' choice' is primitive. Assuming a choice function that selects elements from each finite set of options, Arrow (Económica 26: 121-127,1959) already showed how we can generate a weak ordering by putting constraints on the behavior of such a function such that it reflects utility maximization. Arrow proposed that rational agents can be modeled by (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33.  86
    Resting content: Sensible satisficing?Patricia Greenspan - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):305 - 317.
    Suppose I am now making plans for next summer’s vacation. I can spend a week in Rome or on the Riviera, but not both. Either choice would be excellent, but after weighing various pros and cons, I decide that for my purposes Rome would be better. If I am rational, then, I must choose Rome. It is an assumption of standard decision theory that rationality requires maximizing: trying to get the maximum amount of whatever form of value we are after (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34.  7
    Review - Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason.Alexandra Couto - 2006 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 10 (5).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Two kinds of satisficing.Thomas Hurka - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (1):107 - 111.
    Michael Slote has defended a moral view that he calls "satisficing consequentialism." Less demanding than maximizing consequentialism, it requires only that agents bring about consequences that are "good enough." I argue that Slote's characterization of satisficing is ambiguous. His idea of consequences' being "good enough" admits of two interpretations, with different implications in (some) particular cases. One interpretation I call "absolute-level" satisficing, the other "comparative" satisficing. Once distinguished, these versions of satisficing appear in a very (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  36. Being Rational Enough: Maximizing, Satisficing, and Degrees of Rationality.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):111-127.
    ABSTRACT Against the maximizing conception of practical rationality, Michael Slote has argued that rationality does not always require choosing what is most rational. Instead, it can sometimes be rational to do something that is less-than-fully rational. In this paper, I will argue that maximizers have a ready response to Slote’s position. Roy Sorensen has argued that ‘rational’ is an absolute term, suggesting that it is not possible to be rational without being completely rational. Sorensen’s view is confirmed by the fact (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37.  18
    Έπιείχεια and Satisficing.Michael S. Macrakis - 1985 - Ancient Philosophy 5 (1):53-57.
  38.  1
    Έπιείχεια and Satisficing.Michael S. Macrakis - 1985 - Ancient Philosophy 5 (1):53-57.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  1
    Έπιείχεια and Satisficing.Michael S. Macrakis - 1985 - Ancient Philosophy 5 (1):53-57.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  22
    Satisficing as an alternative to optimality and suboptimality in perceptual decision making.Antonio Mastrogiorgio & Enrico Petracca - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  12
    Maximieren, Satisficing, Handlungsanleitung und “ Sollen impliziert Können ". Antworten auf die Kommentare von Annette Dufner, Jörg Löschke, Dorothee Bleisch und Konstantin Weber.Vuko Andrić - 2021 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 75 (4):595-598.
    Aus Platzgründen kann ich die originellen und scharfsinnigen Kommentare von Annette Dufner, Jörg Löschke, Dorothee Bleisch und Konstantin Weber nicht vollständig würdigen. Ich beschränke mich auf einige zentrale Aussagen und Überlegungen.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Slote's Satisficing Consequentialism.Tim Mulgan - 1993 - Ratio 6 (2):121 - 134.
    The article discusses Michael Slote's Satisficing Consequentialism, which is the view that moral agents are not required to maximise the good, but merely to produce a sufficient amount of good. It is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism is not an acceptable alternative to Maximising Consequentialism. In particular, it is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism cannot be less demanding in practice than Maximising Consequentialism without also endorsing a wide range of clearly unacceptable actions. It is then argued that Slote's inability (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  43. Rethinking Demandingness: Why Satisficing Consequentialism and Scalar Consequentialism are not Less Demanding than Maximizing Consequentialism.Spencer Case - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-8.
    What does it mean to object to a moral theory, such as maximizing consequentialism, on the grounds that it is too demanding? It is apparently to say that its requirements are implausibly stringent. This suggests an obvious response: Modify the theory so that its requirements are no longer as stringent. A consequentialist may do this either by placing the requirement threshold below maximization – thereby arriving at satisficing consequentialism – or, more radically, by dispensing with deontological notions such as (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  32
    Satisficing rationality: In praise of folly. [REVIEW]Grant Brown - 1992 - Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (2):261-269.
    From a psychological point of view, human wants and desires form a multitiered structure. If values are related in any way to human affectivity or desire - and this is something most maximizing theorists would certainly not dispute - then we are forced to recognize that human values also form a multi-tiered structure. Failure to appreciate this connection leads maximization theorists seriously astray, both in their interpretation of human behavior and in their postulates of rationality. Optimizing involves satisficing, not (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45.  32
    Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason - Edited by Michael Byron.William J. Fitzpatrick - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (3):281-283.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  20
    Moral Satisficing: moralisches Verhalten als „Bounded Rationality“.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2016 - In Julian Nida-Rümelin (ed.), Moral, Wissenschaft und Wahrheit. De Gruyter. pp. 223-262.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  64
    Toward A Positive Theory of Social Entrepreneurship. On Maximizing Versus Satisficing Value Capture.Alejandro Agafonow - 2014 - Journal of Business Ethics 125 (4):1-5.
    In a recent issue of the Journal of Business Ethics, Filipe M. Santos posits that social entrepreneurs maximize not on value capture, but on value creation, only satisficing on value capture to fuel operations, reinvesting in growth, whatever the specific combination of institutional means is deemed appropriate. No doubt the analytical framework of value creation and value capture casts new light on the phenomenon of social entrepreneurship, but we think Santos is asking too much by advocating a shift in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48.  7
    Explaining satisficing through risk aversion.Yudistira Permana - 2020 - Theory and Decision 89 (4):503-525.
    This paper extends the analysis of the data from the experiment of Hey et al. : 337–353, 2017), which was designed to test Proposition 2 of the theory of Manski : 155–173, 2017). I focus on how the subjects select the aspiration levels when they choose to satisfice, and try to find a better explanation for that story than that of Manski. I assume that the subjects are expected utility agents and that they think of the payoffs as having a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  9
    Satisficing inference and the perks of ignorance.Daniel G. Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer - 1996 - In Garrison W. Cottrell (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 137--141.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  11
    Heuristics and Satisficing.Robert C. Richardson - 2017 - In William Bechtel & George Graham (eds.), A Companion to Cognitive Science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 566–575.
    Bounded rationality is a fundamental feature of cognition. We make choices between alternatives in light of our goals, relying on incomplete information and limited resources. As a consequence, PROBLEM SOLVING cannot be exhaustive: we cannot explore all the possibilities which confront us, and search must be constrained in ways that facilitate search efficiency even at the expense of search effectiveness. If we think of problem solving as a search through the space of possibilities as it was conceptualized by Allen Newell (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 171