13 found
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  1. Misremembering.Sarah K. Robins - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):432-447.
    The Archival and Constructive views of memory offer contrasting characterizations of remembering and its relation to memory errors. I evaluate the descriptive adequacy of each by offering a close analysis of one of the most prominent experimental techniques by which memory errors are elicited—the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. Explaining the DRM effect requires appreciating it as a distinct form of memory error, which I refer to as misremembering. Misremembering is a memory error that relies on successful retention of the targeted event. It (...)
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  2. Confabulation and constructive memory.Sarah K. Robins - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2135-2151.
    Confabulation is a symptom central to many psychiatric diagnoses and can be severely debilitating to those who exhibit the symptom. Theorists, scientists, and clinicians have an understandable interest in the nature of confabulation—pursuing ways to define, identify, treat, and perhaps even prevent this memory disorder. Appeals to confabulation as a clinical symptom rely on an account of memory’s function from which cases like the above can be contrasted. Accounting for confabulation is thus an important desideratum for any candidate theory of (...)
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  3.  74
    Stable Engrams and Neural Dynamics.Sarah K. Robins - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (5):1130-1139.
    The idea that remembering involves an engram, becoming stable and permanent via consolidation, has guided the neuroscience of memory since its inception. The shift to thinking of memory as continuo...
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  4.  96
    Memory and Optogenetic Intervention: Separating the Engram from the Ecphory.Sarah K. Robins - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (5):1078-1089.
    Optogenetics makes possible the control of neural activity with light. In this article, I explore how the development of this experimental tool has brought about methodological and theoretical advances in the neurobiological study of memory. I begin with Semon’s distinction between the engram and the ecphory, explaining how these concepts present a methodological challenge to investigating memory. Optogenetics provides a way to intervene into the engram without the ecphory that, in turn, opens up new means for testing theories of memory (...)
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  5. Introduction to the topical collection ‘locating representations in the brain: interdisciplinary perspectives’.Sarah K. Robins & Felipe De Brigard - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-18.
  6.  64
    Optogenetics and the mechanism of false memory.Sarah K. Robins - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1561-1583.
    Constructivists about memory argue that memory is a capacity for building representations of past events from a generalized information store. The view is motivated by the memory errors discovered in cognitive psychology. Little has been known about the neural mechanisms by which false memories are produced. Recently, using a method I call the Optogenetic False Memory Technique, neuroscientists have created false memories in mice. In this paper, I examine how Constructivism fares in light of O-FaMe results. My aims are two-fold. (...)
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  7.  62
    Contiguity and the causal theory of memory.Sarah K. Robins - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):1-19.
    In Memory: A Philosophical Study, Bernecker argues for an account of contiguity. This Contiguity View is meant to solve relearning and prompting, wayward causation problems plaguing the causal theory of memory. I argue that Bernecker’s Contiguity View fails in this task. Contiguity is too weak to prevent relearning and too strong to allow prompting. These failures illustrate a problem inherent in accounts of memory causation. Relearning and prompting are both causal relations, wayward only with respect to our interest in specifying (...)
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  8.  24
    Biological clocks: explaining with models of mechanisms.Sarah K. Robins & Carl F. Craver - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 41--67.
  9. From Phenomenology to Traces: Inferring Memory Mechanisms.Marta Caravà & Sarah K. Robins - 2023 - Constructivist Foundations 19 (1):70-72.
  10. No Nonsense Neuro-law.Sarah K. Robins & Carl F. Craver - 2010 - Neuroethics 4 (3):195-203.
    In Minds, Brains, and Norms , Pardo and Patterson deny that the activities of persons (knowledge, rule-following, interpretation) can be understood exclusively in terms of the brain, and thus conclude that neuroscience is irrelevant to the law, and to the conceptual and philosophical questions that arise in legal contexts. On their view, such appeals to neuroscience are an exercise in nonsense. We agree that understanding persons requires more than understanding brains, but we deny their pessimistic conclusion. Whether neuroscience can be (...)
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  11.  52
    Kinding memory: Commentary on Muhammad Ali Khalidi's Cognitive ontology.Sarah K. Robins - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (1):109-115.
    My commentary focuses on Khalidi's defense of episodic memory as a cognitive kind. His argument relies on merging two distinct accounts of episodic memory—the phenomenal and the etiological. I suggest that Khalidi's framework can be used to carve the contemporary memory literature differently. On this view, the phenomenal account supports constructive episodic simulation as a cognitive kind, the etiological account supports event memory as a cognitive kind, and episodic memory ceases to be. The question for Khalidi is, then, how to (...)
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  12. Memory Structure and Cognitive Maps.Sarah K. Robins, Sara Aronowitz & Arjen Stolk - forthcoming - In Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott Armstrong (eds.), Neuroscience & Philosophy. MIT Press.
    A common way to understand memory structures in the cognitive sciences is as a cognitive map​. Cognitive maps are representational systems organized by dimensions shared with physical space. The appeal to these maps begins literally: as an account of how spatial information is represented and used to inform spatial navigation. Invocations of cognitive maps, however, are often more ambitious; cognitive maps are meant to scale up and provide the basis for our more sophisticated memory capacities. The extension is not meant (...)
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  13.  68
    A Hybrid Theory of Event Memory.David H. Ménager, Dongkyu Choi & Sarah K. Robins - 2022 - Minds and Machines 32 (2):365-394.
    Amongst philosophers, there is ongoing debate about what successful event remembering requires. Causal theorists argue that it requires a causal connection to the past event. Simulation theorists argue, in contrast, that successful remembering requires only production by a reliable memory system. Both views must contend with the fact that people can remember past events they have experienced with varying degrees of accuracy. The debate between them thus concerns not only the account of successful remembering, but how each account explains the (...)
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