This paper explores the position that moral enhancement interventions could be medically indicated in cases where they provide a remedy for a lack of empathy, when such a deficit is considered pathological. In order to argue this claim, the question as to whether a deficit of empathy could be considered to be pathological is examined, taking into account the difficulty of defining illness and disorder generally, and especially in the case of mental health. Following this, Psychopathy and a fictionalised mental (...) disorder are explored with a view to consider moral enhancement techniques as possible treatments for both conditions. At this juncture, having asserted and defended the position that moral enhancement interventions could, under certain circumstances, be considered medically indicated, this paper then goes on to briefly explore some of the consequences of this assertion. First, it is acknowledged that this broadening of diagnostic criteria in light of new interventions could fall foul of claims of medicalisation. It is then briefly noted that considering moral enhancement technologies to be akin to therapies in certain circumstances could lead to ethical and legal consequences and questions, such as those regarding regulation, access, and even consent. (shrink)

Concerns that people would be disinclined to voluntarily undergo moral enhancement have led to suggestions that an incentivised programme should be introduced to encourage participation. This paper argues that, while such measures do not necessarily result in coercion or undue inducement (issues with which one may typically associate the use of incentives in general), the use of incentives for this purpose may present a taboo tradeoff. This is due to empirical research suggesting that those characteristics likely to be affected by (...) moral enhancement are often perceived as fundamental to the self; therefore, any attempt to put a price on such traits would likely be deemed morally unacceptable by those who hold this view. A better approach to address the possible lack of participation may be to instead invest in alternative marketing strategies and remove incentives altogether. (shrink)

It seems, at first glance, that a Kantian ethics approach to moral enhancement would tend towards the position that there could be no place for emotional modulation in any understanding of the endeavour, owing to the typically understood view that Kantian ethics does not allow any role for emotion in morality as a whole. It seems then that any account of moral bioenhancement which places emotion at its centre would therefore be rejected. This article argues, however, that this assumption is (...) incorrect. Given later writings by Kant on the role of sympathy, and taking into account other concerns in Kantian ethics, it may in fact be the case that Kantian ethics would allow for an account of moral bioenhancement through emotional modulation, and that in some cases such an intervention might even be considered to be a duty. (shrink)

s for the Second Workshop on Implementing Machine Ethics.

In 1781, British Envoy Sir William Hamilton wrote to Joseph Banks of an astonishing discovery in rural Abruzzo. The inhabitants of Isernia offered wax phalluses as votives to Catholic shrines during the annual Fête of St. Cosmo and Damiano. The waxen vows were evidence that the cult of Priapus persisted in the modern world, and their appearance produced thauma or wonder in antiquarian circles. Moving from Hamilton’s letter to Richard Payne Knight’s A Discourse on the Worship of Priapus (1786), this (...) essay draws from recent scholarship on the phenomenology of thauma to recast this well-known episode of the ex-voti as an eighteenth-century attempt to reconcile archaic Greek and modern modes of perception. Using archaic texts to ascribe new meaning to phallic emblems, Knight created an interpretative framework through which moderns might draw closer to the ancient world. (shrink)

In the current post-GDPR landscape, privacy notices have become ever more prevalent on our phones and online. However, these notices are not well suited to their purpose of helping users make informed decisions. I suggest that instead of utilizing notice to elicit informed consent, we could repurpose privacy notices to create the space for more meaningful, value-centered user decisions. Value-centered privacy decisions, or those that accurately reflect who we are and what we value, encapsulate the intuitive role of personal values (...) in data privacy decisions. To explore how we could design for such decisions, I utilize Suzy Killmister’s Four-Dimensional Theory of Autonomy (4DT) to operationalize value-centered privacy decisions. I then utilize 4DT to help design a system—called a value-centered privacy assistant (VcPA)—that could help create the space for value-centered data privacy decisions using privacy notices. Using this 4DT lens, I further assess the degree that an existing technology, personalized privacy assistants (PPAs), use notices in a manner that allows for value-centered decision-making. I lastly utilize insights from the PPA assessment to inform the design of a VcPA, concluding that a VcPA could utilize notices to assist users in value-centered app selection and in other data privacy decisions. (shrink)

There are a host of data privacy decisions we must make every day – and it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for us to make meaningful decisions about all of them. In this thesis, I define, conceptualize, interrogate, and design for value-centered privacy decision making – that is, decisions that are focused on who we are and what we value – as a means of respecting and promoting user autonomy. To achieve this, this work utilizes philosophical theory to understand (...) value-centered privacy decisions and translates this theory into a system that promotes such decisions. In summary, this work has two major contributions. Firstly, I conceptualize and define value-centered privacy decision-making using a value-centered theory of autonomy. I explore how we can create the space for value-centered privacy decisions by applying the Four-Dimensional Theory of Self Governance (4DT). I first conceptualize privacy decisions in terms of these four dimensions – self-definition, self-realization, self-unification, and self-constitution – and explore existing data privacy challenges through this lens. In particular, I conceptualize notice fatigue in terms self-realization, self-unification, and self-constitution; a lack of relevant privacy controls in terms of self-realization and self-unification; and nudges in terms of self-realization and self-unification. I then present and discuss results from a mixed-methods investigation into how values are involved in privacy decisions – in particular, app choice. We found that they were related in a highly individualized, context specific manner, observing different values that were more relevant based on the app in question. This suggests that the value-privacy relationship is largely informed by individual preferences and understandings of values. However, the values of Use, Control, and Community were quite prevalent, with Use and Control in particular spanning contexts and individual participants. They were also frequently perceived as in conflict with each other. This suggests that these three values are the most relevant to consider when designing for value-centered privacy decisions. The participants’ experiences can also be explained using 4DT, providing empirical support for our conceptualization of value centered privacy. However, the study results also provide insights into how existing systems – such as surveillance capitalism and the attention economy – frustrate value centered privacy decisions. Secondly, I use the 4DT-based understanding of value-centered privacy decisions to establish the usability and effectiveness of the value-centered approach, designing a privacy assistant to help users make app choices that are in more accordance with their personal values. To inform the design of a smartphone assistant that creates this space for users, I examine an existing technology – personalized privacy assistants (PPAs) – using the 4DT lens. Using insights from this examination, I propose a value-centered, smartphone privacy assistant (VcPA) to help users make more value-centered decisions at one privacy decision point: smartphone app choices. This VcPA consists of three features: selective notices, exploratory notices, and a “suggest alternative apps” feature. I then present the results from testing a prototype VcPA system with users, serving as a proof-of concept that a value-centered privacy assistant, designed using privacy preferences and values, could help users when making privacy decisions such as choosing apps. In particular, we found that the VcPA prototype helped users download value-consistent apps, with the “suggest alternatives” feature especially well-received. We also identified places where the VcPA could be improved – for example, profiles could be improved by being made more customizable; VcPA notices could be made easier to understand; and the “suggest alternatives” feature could be more streamlined. This thesis lays the groundwork for future researchers to design systems that promote value-centered privacy decisions. To guide this future work, I lastly present prospective research avenues to advance the value-centered approach to data privacy decision-making. In particular, I discuss limitations of the studies in this work, including engagement with a wider range of demographic groups; touch upon how the identified VcPA improvements, such as improved VcPA profiles, might be accomplished; briefly explore the possibility of applying the value-centered understanding to other privacy contexts; and consider how both system-wide regulation and individual autonomy enhancing interventions, such as the VcPA, can empower us to shape a technological future based on our values. (shrink)

Synthetic biology has generated extensive discussion about a wide range of risks and potential benefits, the intrinsic value of the technology, and the soci­etal distribution of its risks and benefits. However, be­fore these questions can be resolved, it is important to first ask a critical question: Is synthetic biology different enough from the technologies that came before it that it raises new questions or concerns? By putting synthetic biology into context, we gain a better understanding of the issues, both old (...) and new, that it raises. We can then consider practical governance questions, including ways to improve current practices. (shrink)