Strategic games require reasoning about other people’s and one’s own beliefs or intentions. Although they have clear commonalities with psychological tests of theory of mind, they are not clearly related to theory of mind tests for children between 9 and 10 years of age “Flobbe et al. J Logic Language Inform 17:417–442 ”. We studied children’s individual differences in how they played a strategic game by analyzing the strategies that they applied in a zero, first, and second-order reasoning task. For (...) the zero-order task, we found two subgroups with different accuracy levels. For the first-order task, subgroups of children applied different suboptimal strategies or an optimal strategy. For the second-order task only suboptimal strategies were present. Strategy use for all tasks was related to age. The 5- and 6-year old children were additionally tested on theory of mind understanding and executive functioning. Strategy-use in these children was related to working memory, but not to theory of mind after correction for age, verbal ability and general IQ. (shrink)

Strategic games require reasoning about other people’s and one’s own beliefs or intentions. Although they have clear commonalities with psychological tests of theory of mind, they are not clearly related to theory of mind tests for children between 9 and 10 years of age “Flobbe et al. J Logic Language Inform 17(4):417–442 (2008)”. We studied children’s (5–12 years of age) individual differences in how they played a strategic game by analyzing the strategies that they applied in a zero, first, and (...) second-order reasoning task. For the zero-order task, we found two subgroups with different accuracy levels. For the first-order task, subgroups of children applied different suboptimal strategies or an optimal strategy. For the second-order task only suboptimal strategies were present. Strategy use for all tasks was related to age. The 5- and 6-year old children were additionally tested on theory of mind understanding and executive functioning. Strategy-use in these children was related to working memory, but not to theory of mind after correction for age, verbal ability and general IQ. (shrink)

As of October 23, 2020, almost 42 million cases of COVID-19 have been reported globally. Although many different treatments have been applied in infected...

In this paper Peirce's notion of sign is studied to try to characterize the artistic sign as representation. Then, some considerations about the work of art as a sign are developed involving three elements: experience, expression and interpretation. Finally it is concluded that beauty requires for Peirce a peculiar balance, the imaginative conjunction of the sensible and the reasonable in an artistic sign; it requires moreover the expression of something that transcends the sensible; it requires, as a sign, an interpretation (...) which is not exact and which implies growth. It requires, finally, love, because an artist will only reach beauty guided by agape updating and harmonizing possibilities through abduction, that is, creating new signs that give form to what does not have it; the artist only reaches beauty when he loves what he does and when he can express himself freely. -/- En este artículo se estudia, en primer lugar, la noción de signo de Peirce para tratar de caracterizar después el signo artístico como representación. Se desarrollan enseguida algunas consideraciones sobre la obra de arte como signo que como tal conlleva tres elementos: experiencia, expresión e interpretación. Finalmente se concluye que la belleza requiere para Peirce un peculiar equilibrio, la conjunción imaginativa de lo sensible y lo razonable en un signo artístico; requiere además la expresión de algo que trasciende lo sensible; requiere, en tanto signo, de una interpretación que no es exacta y que implica crecimiento. Requiere, por último, amor, pues el artista solo alcanzará lo bello cuando sea guiado por el ágape y a través de la abducción vaya actualizando y armonizando posibilidades, creando nuevos signos que den forma a lo que no la tiene, cuando ame lo que hace y se exprese libremente. (shrink)

La mercantilización se define como «la transformación de los bienes, servicios, ideas y personas en objetos de comercio estandarizados». Este artículo presenta una visión de la mercantilización como un proceso que se aplica no sólo a la naturaleza sino también a los bienes, al trabajo, al propio cuerpo, las experiencias y las relaciones. El artículo reflexiona sobre papel clave de la tecnociencia.El camino hacia la reconciliación —con la naturaleza, con el otro y con nosotros mismos— pasa por reconocer y apreciar (...) lo que en ellos es único e irremplazable. El artículo concluye con algunas ideas iniciales sobre cómo la tecnología puede utilizarse como una herramienta. Dar marcha atrás en el proceso de mercantilización es esencial si deseamos establecer una economía sostenible y una sociedad más humana. (shrink)

El programa de investigación Naturaleza Humana 2.0, dirigido por la Profesora Camino Cañón, fue un proyecto de la Cátedra Ciencia, Tecnología y Religión, Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingeniería de la Universidad Comillas, Madrid. Concluyó con un Simposio del que parte de sus ponencias y comunicaciones son publicados en este número extraordinario de PENSAMIENTO, en la serie Ciencia, Filosofía y Religión, volumen VIII. Sara Lumbreras, Antonio Sánchez-Orantos y Clara Fernández Díaz-Rincón, presentan aquí una recapitulación de los contenidos de esta Conferencia, (...) que presentamos como una Crónica, que permitirá entender el sentido de algunos de los artículos anteriores. Con esta crónica concluimos. (shrink)

This article approaches certain dynamics, tensions and gaps that emerge in the concept of innovation and entrepreneurship when examining forms of creation, production, collaboration and competition in the real time visual/video intervention of videojockeys (VJs).

Los modelos epistemológicos tradicionales clasifican el conocimiento en disciplinas separadas con objetos de estudio distintos y técnicas específicas, incluso proponiendo esquemas jerárquicos. Según pensadores como John Holland o Teilhard de Chardin, el avance de la ciencia implica una convergencia entre sus disciplinas. Esta convergencia puede estudiarse de maneras distintas, como el impacto de diferentes autores fuera de su equipo o la manera en la que colaboran. Aunque estos estudios están generando ideas interesantes, no son capaces de mostrar la convergencia de (...) los distintos temas que se tratan en un cuerpo de trabajos. Este artículo intenta estudiar esta pregunta desde un punto de vista cuantitativo, buscando evidencias que apoyen la idea de convergencia en el contenido de las ciencias en sí mismas. Empleamos Latent Dirichlet Analysis, una técnica que analiza textos y estima las contribuciones relativas de los temas que los generan. Aplicamos esta técnica al corpus de artículos publicados por el Instituto de Santa Fe, que describe trabajos relacionados con las Ciencias de la Complejidad entre 1989 y 2015. Analizamos la cercanía entre las diferentes áreas, la aparición y desaparición de temas de investigación y, en general, la posible convergencia entre disciplinas. Combinando la estructura obtenida de la historia de las publicaciones de SFI con técnicas de inferencia de jerarquía y clustering, reconstruimos la perspectiva de una comunidad científica dinámica que experimenta tendencias, temas recurrentes y cambios en la cercanía de las diferentes disciplinas. Nuestros resultados muestran que hay evidencias de convergencia y que la aplicación de métodos cuantitativos puede proporcionar nuevos elementos de comprensión que ayuden a los investigadores a estructurar una literatura científica cada vez más amplia y compleja, así como a identificar áreas potenciales para nuevas colaboraciones. (shrink)

Las Tecnologías de la Comunicación y la Información han cambiado drásticamente la manera en la que accedemos al conocimiento y procesamos datos, cómo aprendemos y trabajamos y nuestra manera de relacionarnos con otros seres humanos. El interés creciente que despiertan las consecuencias del uso de las TCIs se ha manifestado en múltiples estudios aislados que analizan estos fenómenos desde puntos de vista diferentes. Este artículo tiene como objetivo proporcionar una perspectiva unificadora de estos trabajos, reflexionando sobre las consecuencias que el (...) uso de las TCI está teniendo en nuestras habilidades intelectuales y en cómo nos percibimos a nosotros mismos como seres humanos. (shrink)

Uno de los componentes más importantes del proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje de los estudios de Arquitectura Técnica es la realización de un proyecto final que aglutina todos los conocimientos y competencias desarrollados en las diferentes disciplinas que configuran el Plan de Estudios. El objetivo de esta propuesta es visualizar la evolución del proceso de enseñanza y aprendizaje en el Proyecto Fin de Grado en los estudios de Arquitectura Técnica e Ingeniería de Edificación de la Universidad de Burgos, mostrando las diferentes adaptaciones (...) de los contenidos y la tipología elegida para su desarrollo. (shrink)

Más allá del análisis filológico e histórico de fuentes como el Kojiki y el Nihongi, se puede abordar el estudio de la mitología japonesa desde la antropología y la etnología. Es por ello que, para obtener una visión más completa de figuras mitológicas como Izanami e Izanagi, una aproximación a su presencia en algunos matsuri y danzas kagura puede ser de interés. En este trabajo se expone una relación y descripción tanto de los materiales audiovisuales como de los resultados obtenidos (...) en el trabajo de campo realizado el 5 de mayo de 2018 en el santuario Tamashiki (Kazo, Saitama), en la celebración del shunki taisai (festival de primavera), entre cuyos kagura se representaba el pasaje mítico del matrimonio entre Izanami e Izanagi, bajo el título de Izanagi Izanami no tsuremai. (shrink)

Mediante un análisis histórico y documental, se indaga en las posibles percepciones e influencias que en la vida de Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz pudo haber tenido su exposición a los incipientes movimientos sociales y culturales de la época del virreinato en la Nueva España. A lo largo de su obra, la poeta novohispana se refiere a España y a la Nueva España. De la primera, recoge la tradición literaria y la transforma, dedica poemas a los representantes de la (...) monarquía y reconoce su propia herencia española; de la segunda, recoge la lengua nahua, el español mexicano y el eco de otras lenguas. (shrink)

Se analizan las políticas medio ambientales e indígenas durante el período 1990- 2010 de gobiernos de la Concertación, los tratados internacionales sobre el medio ambiente que inciden en el uso de recursos naturales en territorios huilliche. Se concluye que la política pública medioambiental, por su naturaleza reactiva, en el contexto de los mercados globales, se ha visto sobrepasada por la hegemonía del poder de las transnacionales que invierten en los commodities forestal, minero, agropecuario, amparadas por una legislación ambiental débil y (...) un discurso político obsecuente. (shrink)

Uno de los principales retos del transhumanismo lo encontramos en su antropología. Nos encontramos ante un reduccionismo en el que el cuerpo aparece despojado de su dignidad y el espíritu no existe. El ejemplo que más me llama la atención de esto es el de la endogénesis: no se valora el hecho de que el ser humano sea gestado dentro del vientre de otro ser humano; para ellos sería preferible tener una máquina que pudiese hacer la misma misión, en lugar (...) de que el embarazo sea un acto de amor que tiene impacto en toda la vida de la persona. Creo que este es el mayor obstáculo en el que nos encontraremos al valorar el transhumanismo, y es especialmente importante: la persona es un edificio de múltiples dimensiones inextricablemente ligadas. Es necesario reconocer la dignidad de nuestro cuerpo, que va más allá de ser sustrato material de nuestra consciencia. El cuerpo forma parte de nuestra naturaleza, en la que cuerpo, emoción, pensamiento y espíritu son dimensiones que están íntimamente ligadas. No podemos renunciar a nuestro cuerpo. Además, me gustaría proponer que dentro del cuerpo existen portales ante la trascendencia. no es lo mismo ser que parecer. Muchos defienden que pronto tendremos robots que estarán dotados de consciencia. Que podrán pasar el test de Turing. Además, la Inteligencia Artificial permite generar mensajes de manera sintética. En algunos casos, estos mensajes son relativamente simples, pero en otros casos, como los chatbots, resultan muy interesantes. Algunos autores estiman que, dentro de poco, estos chatbots podrían llegar a pasar el test de Turing. Una vez tengamos máquinas que pasen el test de Turing, ¿podremos decir que son conscientes? ¿Es lo mismo una máquina que pase el Test de Turing que una máquina consciente? Para algunos, la respuesta es «es indiferente». Yo digo que no, que no es lo mismo. (shrink)

El objetivo principal de este trabajo es dar a conocer en lengua castellana un texto del profesor Thomas Buchheim acerca de la «última prueba» de la existencia de Dios a partir del futurum exactum de su maestro, Robert Spaemann. Para ello se analiza en primer lugar el argumento del futurum exactum del «haber-sido». Seguidamente se exponen las objeciones contra el argumento presentado de esta forma. A continuación, la presentación del argumento a partir del futurum exactum de la verdad. Finalmente se (...) plantean los rasgos personales de la capacidad de verdad que dan pie a considerar la necesidad de una conciencia personal para poder hablar de verdad en sentido propio. (shrink)

En la historia del pensamiento político musulmán ŷihād e iŷtihād siempre van unidos. Pero es en el pensamiento combativo donde más se manifiesta esa unión de un modo transcendente. El objetivo del presente trabajo es plantear el aspecto transhistórico del iŷtihād y del ŷihād, y con ello, exponer de manifiesto el siempre fracasado proceso de emancipación histórica y teológica del proyecto ŷihadístico basado sobre la mistificación de lo sustancialmente humano.

Heidegger ist durch seinen eigenwilligen Sprachgebrauch einer der dunkelsten Denker unserer Zeit. Dies ist jedoch kein Zeichen von Willkür oder unbegründeter Sucht nach Ürsprünglichkeit, für ihn hängt die Sprache wesentlich mit seinem Philosophieren zusammen (1). Vor allem ist von Seiten der angloamerikanischen Sprachanalytiker an diesem Sprachgebrauch viel Kritik geübt, u.a. durch Carnap. Ausdrücke wie „das Nichtige nichtet” finden in den empirischen Situationen kein Echo, entziehen sich der Methode der Verifikation, erfüllen keine einzige Wahrheitsvoraussetzung und können keine Protokollsätze sein (2). Dennoch, (...) Heideggers Methode kann, vermöge der Art seiner Untersuchung, der Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins, nicht die der logischen Analyse sein ; sie ist die phänomenologische Methode, die für die Ontologie in ihren Fragen nach dem Sinn des Seins die angemessenste Methode ist (3). Heidegger meint, daß die Vorsokratiker in ihrer dichterischen Formgebung dem ursprünglichen Sinn des Seins äußerst nahegekommen sind. Seine Intention beschränkt sich nicht allein auf eine etymologische Analyse von Begriffen wie „physis”, „logos”, „aletheia” usw., wodurch er das Sein zu entbergen sucht, er will mit dieser Analyse auch und vor allem ein neues Fundament legen für unser heutiges Denken und unsere Einstellung dem Sein gegenüber (4). Um dies deutlich zu machen, wählen wir Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit dem Logosbegriff bei Heraklit im Fragment 50 (Diels), den er in Vorträge und Aufsätze III (Pfüfflingen 1967, S. 3-25) einer minuziösen Untersuchung unterzieht. Heidegger fragt sich, was die ursprüngliche Bedeutung von Logos ist, und er sucht zu beweisen, daß „legein” nicht ursprünglich „sprechen” bedeutet, sondern in dem deutschen „legen” (vorlegen, darlegen, überlegen) wiedergefunden wird, „legein” konnte sprechen bedeuten, weil sprechen besagt : „Beisammen-vor-uns-liegen-lassen”. Deshalb kann nach Heidegger die Sprache nicht als „Verlautbarung” oder „Bedeuten” gedeutet werden. Ausdruck und Bedeutung sind beide Phänomene der Sprache als das „Beisammen-voruns-liegen-lassen” des Unverborgenen in seiner Unverborgenheit. Das Sprechen muß nach Heidegger den Spielraum der Unverborgenheit, mit dem das Hören korrespondieren muß, offenlassen. Das Hören nach dem Logos ist ein „homologein”, dem Logos zugehörig. Ist man dem Logos zugehörig, so ist man in dem Sinne weise, daß man sich in das schickt (geschicklich), was dem Menschen zugewiesen ist : Heidegger widersetzt sich der herrschenden Interpretation von Fr. 50. Das „Eins-Alles” zielt nicht auf den Inhalt der Verkündigung des Logos, sondern vielmehr auf die Weise, in der der Logos anwesend ist, die Weise, in der er wirkt und wohl als das Eine, das alles ausschließt, das lichtende Sammeln, Zusammentragen, das Bergen aller Gegebenheiten in die Offenheit der Welt. Er birgt und entbirgt. Unverborgenheit und Verborgenheit sind Pole dieses einen Seinsereignisses. So bleiben die Gegensätze innerhalb des Lichtkreises der Unverborgenheit bestehen und aufeinander angewiesen. Heidegger identifiziert den Logos mit dem „Hen-Panta”, weil „ Hen-Panta” sagt, was der Logos ist, und der Logos sagt, wie „Hen-Panta” anwesend ist. Wenn der Mensch die Sprache des Logos spricht, sammelt er auch die Dinge, läßt er sie vor-sichliegen, bringt er die Anwesenheit der Dinge in ihrem Anwesen zur Sprache, läßt sie zu ihrem Recht kommen, dabei durch das ursprüngliche „Einen” des Logos geleitet, das „Hen-Panta” ist. Heidegger weist darauf hin, daß dies kein pantheistischer Gedankengang ist. Heraklit will, so meint er, vor dem Geheimnis dieser Worte stehenbleiben, um so das Geheimnis als Geheimnis zu erkennen. Er meint, daß der durch die Vorsokratiker geöffnete Weg durch die Denkentwicklung seit Plato verschleiert geblieben ist. Heidegger sieht in Fr. 50 von Heraklit den stammelnden Ausdruck des noch nicht in Subjekt und Objekt aufgeteilten Seins. In dem Wort Logos dachte Heraklit das Sein des Seienden. Dieses Licht verblaßte schnell. Für Heidegger liegt die große Bedeutung Heraklits in dessen Anregung, in Übereinstimmung mit der Logossprache zu sprechen und den Weg einzuschlagen, den er uns gezeigt hat durch ein uns Offenhalten für das entbergendverbergende Sein (5). Auf wirklich geniale Weise hat Heidegger der Logosphilosophie die Gewalt seines eigenen Denkens verliehen. Diese Auslegung lehrt uns mehr über seine eigene Philosophie, als über die Heraklits. Heidegger ist gefesselt durch das mystisch-prophetische Element in Heraklits Philosophieren. So wie Heraklit der Dolmetscher der Masse sein will, die dem Logos widerspricht, obwohl sie fortwährend darüber spricht, so fühlte Heidegger sich berufen ein Hermeneut zu sein, auf dem durch die Seinsvergessenheit verdunkelten Weg des denkens nach einem neuen (An) denken des Seins. Betroffen ist Heidegger durch die Idee der Einheit, die sich in dem Logos erschließt. Der Logos offenbart sich in der Welt durch Gegensätze, in denen die Einheit sich fortwährend erneuert. Das Denken Heideggers ist von Anfang an auf das Ans-Licht-bringen des (oft) vergessenen, verborgenen Zusammenhängens gerichtet, in dem alles was ist erscheint. Aus dieser Interpretation wird deutlich, wie wertvoll eine Konfrontation der eigenen Zeit mit der Vergangenheit sein kann, angesichts der Gratie, durch die die Geschichte der Philosophie aktuell bleibt (6). Unser großes Bedenken gegen diese Interpretation ist, daß Heidegger sich keine Rechenschaft über die textkritischen Schwierigkeiten dieses Textes gegeben hat. Es ist die Frage, ob wohl Logos im ursprünglichen Text gestanden hat. Wir haben versucht, dies aufzuzeigen. Gleichfalls ist es sehr bedenklich, daß Heidegger „legein” und „legen” etymologisch im Zusammenhang sieht, was deshalb nicht möglich ist, weil beide Wörter auf im Wesen verschiedene indoeuropäische Wurzeln zurückgehen. Unsere Schlußfolgerung ist, daß Heideggers Auslegung von Fr. 50 uns mehr über die Philosophie von Heidegger selbst, als über die Logosphilosophie von Heraklit lehrt. Es ist besonders zu bedauern, daß Heidegger, der sich gerne rühmt die Belange der Wissenschaftlichkeit zu vertreten, die für die Interpretation griechischer Texte unentbehrliche philologische Vorarbeit vernachlässigt hat. (shrink)

Este artículo reconstruye y problematiza el debate sobre la relación entre humanitarismo y uso de la fuerza. Para ello analiza los giros históricos en la familia humanitaria y la consolidación del nuevo humanitarismo político. A continuación, se revisa la convergencia entre las agendas del nuevo humanitarismo y el proyecto de un orden internacional liberal intervencionista en cuyo núcleo se sitúa un discurso transformador, maximalista y utópico de los derechos humanos. Luego, se recogen algunas perspectivas críticas de ese humanismo militar de (...) la posguerra fría, prestando especial atención a los estudios críticos del humanitarismo y a los análisis pospositivistas de la política internacional. Finalmente, se presentan algunos argumentos en favor de quienes consideran que el humanitarismo debe recuperar el mayor grado de neutralidad e independencia posible, alejándose del intervencionismo militar y de los proyectos de transformación a gran escala del sistema internacional. El texto plantea una revisión crítica de la literatura especializada sobre el humanitarismo contemporáneo, cuya naturaleza es esencialmente interdisciplinar, combinando los fundamentos teóricos y metodológicos provenientes de la antropología, el derecho, la filosofía, las relaciones internacionales, y las reflexiones provenientes de los trabajadores humanitarios sobre el terreno. (shrink)

Levinas' Heidegger-Kritik, der in seinem Totalité et Infini zweifellos grundlegende Bedeutung zukommt, stürzt zunächst in Verwirrung : der Begriff der Totalität, in dem nach Levinas Heideggers ontologisches Denken befangen bleibt, scheint nur ein solcher für das Sein des Seienden als solchen und im Ganzen zu sein, Levinas' Idee eines diese Totalität transzendierenden „Unendlichen” aber eher Heideggers Gedanken des Seins selbst nahezukommen ; der Unterschied zwischen Totalität und Unendlichem, den Levinas begründet, scheint fast ein Gleiches zu bedeuten wie die „ontologische Differenz” (...) bei Heidegger, hinwiederum aber bleibt für Levinas das Sein offenbar die bloße Totalität des Seienden, indessen es ein Seiendes par excellence, nämlich der Andere ist, das unendlich die Totalität übersteigt, auf die alle Ontologie das Sein des Seienden reduziert. Aber die reduktiven Tendenzen in Heideggers ontologischem Denken, auf die Levinas kritisch hinweist, sind in der Tat unverkennbar ; sie finden ihren schärfsten Ausdruck in Heideggers ausdrücklicher Zurückweisung der Ethik als einer eigenständigen philosophischen Aufgabe. Die zur Debatte stehenden Positionen lassen sich klären im Rückgang auf Husserl : dessen Denken scheint zwiegespalten zwischen der Reduktionsforderung, die hervorgeht aus dem Verlangen nach einem absolut Gegebenen als „adäquat” Gegebenem, und dem Festhalten an der Gegebenheit auch von solchem, was nie adäquat gegeben sein kann, als einer „originären”. Vielleicht trifft es zu, daß Heidegger bei all seiner Kritik am Begriff der Wahrheit als Adäquation doch aufs entschiedenste Husserls Tendenz zum Rückgang auf adäquate Gegebenheit, also die Tendenz der Reduktion vertieft hat, indessen Levinas -nach dem Vorgange von Merleau-Ponty -strenger auf dem eigenen Rechtsgrund des inadäquat Gegebenen als eines Ursprünglichen besteht. Hier geht es vor allem um die „Gegebenheit” des Anderen, die nach Levinas in primärer und originärer Weise ein moralisches Verhalten fordert -auch und gerade schon da, wo es sich „zunächst” um die „bloße Erkenntnis” des Anderen handelt. So ist es schließlich Levinas' Idee, daß überhaupt die Ethik die philosophische Funktion der notwendigen Selbstkritik aller Philosophie hat, in der diese ihre Geschlossenheit durch das Ausbleiben des Anderen unendlich in Frage zu stellen aufgefordert ist. Mag Levinas' Heidegger-Kritik in gewissem Sinne selbst sich auf einen Gedanken gründen, der Heideggers Idee der ontologischen Differenz verwandt ist, mögen ohne den Blick auf diese Idee die Streitfragen undeutlich bleiben, die jene Kritik aufwirft, es sind doch Fragen, die in ein Dunkel eindringen, das der „ontologischen” Aufhellung sich bislang entzogen hat. (shrink)

There is an increased controversy surrounding Westerners' use of ayahuasca. One issue of importance is psychological resiliency of users and lack of screening by ayahuasca tourism groups in the Amazon. Given the powerful effects of ayahuasca coupled with lack of cultural support, Western users are at increased risk for psychological distress. Many Westerners who experience psychological distress following ayahuasca ceremonies report concurrently profound spiritual experiences. Because of this, it may be helpful to consider these episodes "spiritual emergencies," or crises resulting (...) from intense and transformative spiritual experiences. Although the author warns readers to avoid romantic comparisons of Western ayahuasca users to shamans, ethnographic data on indigenous shamanic initiates along with theory on liminality may be of some use to understand difficult experiences that accompany ayahuasca use. Given that psychotherapy is culturally sanctioned, therapists trained in treating spiritual crises can help Western ayahuasca users make meaning of their distress. Three case studies are offered as examples of individuals working through various sorts of crises following ayahuasca ceremonies. (shrink)

We hypothesize that juvenile baboons are less efficient foragers than adult baboons owing to their small size, lower level of knowledge and skill, and/or lesser ability to maintain access to resources. We predict that as resources are more difficult to extract, juvenile baboons will demonstrate lower efficiency than adults will because of their lower levels of experience. In addition, we hypothesize that juvenile baboons will be more likely to allocate foraging time to easier-to-extract resources owing to their greater efficiency in (...) acquiring those resources.We use feeding efficiency and time allocation data collected on a wild, free-ranging, non-provisioned population of chacma baboons (Papio hamadryas ursinus) in the Moremi Wildlife Reserve, Okavango Delta, Botswana to test these hypotheses. The major findings of this study are:1. Juvenile baboons are significantly less efficient foragers than adult baboons primarily for difficult-to-extract resources.We propose that this age-dependent variation in efficiency is due to differences in memory and other cognitive functions related to locating food resources, as is indicated by the greater amount of time juvenile baboons spend searching for food. There is no evidence that smaller body size or competitive disruption influences the differences in return rates found between adult and juvenile baboons in this study.2. An individual baboon’s feeding efficiency for a given resource can be used to predict the duration of its foraging bouts for that resource.These results contribute both to our understanding of the ontogeny of behavioral development in nonhuman primates, especially regarding foraging ability, and to current debate within the field of human behavioral ecology regarding the evolution of the juvenile period in primates and humans. (shrink)

Despite the enormous progress made in the advancement of health technologies over the last century, infectious diseases continue to cause significant morbidity and mortality in developing countries. Neglected diseases are a subset of infectious diseases that lack treatments that are effective, simple to use, or affordable. Neglected diseases primarily affect populations in poor countries that do not constitute a lucrative market sector, thus failing to provide incentives for the pharmaceutical industry to conduct R&D for these diseases. Of the treatments that (...) do exist for neglected diseases, most are completely out-dated, with poor side-effect profiles, cumbersome logistics of administration, and inadequate efficacy. Historically, the impetus for a majority of neglected disease research was driven by early 20th-century colonialism, and in the post-colonial era, these diseases have been virtually ignored. Of the 1556 New Chemical Entities brought to market during the 30-year period from 1975 to 2004, only 20 — less than 0.02% — were for neglected diseases. (shrink)

Desde Patterson, Estados Unidos, Génova, Italia, Buenos Aires, Argentina o Santiago de Chile, desafiando hasta cientos de miles de kilómetros de distancia, más de medio millón de mujeres tejen porfiadamente, cotidianamente, lazos de amor y cuidado con sus hijos e hijas en Perú. El hilo con que hilvanan estas nuevas formas de ser y hacer familias, transformando el mundo y transformándose, es el cable telefónico. Un nuevo cordón umbilical por el que van y vienen los afectos y cuidados, los enoj..

Recent advances in immunology have provided a foundation of knowledge to understand many of the intricacies involved in manipulating the human response to fight parasitic infections, and a great deal has been learned from malaria vaccine efforts regarding strategies for developing parasite vaccines. There has been some encouraging progress in the development of a Chagas vaccine in animal models. A prize fund for Chagas could be instrumental in ensuring that these efforts are translated into products that benefit patients.

On 22 July, 2011, we were confronted with the horror of the actions of Anders Behring Breivik. The instant reaction, as we have seen with similar incidents in the past—such as the Oklahoma City bombings—was to attempt to explain the incident. Whether the reasons given were true or not were irrelevant: the fact that there was a reason was better than if there were none. We should not dismiss those that continue to cling on to the initial claims of a (...) wider Jihadist plot behind the actions of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols as Islamophobes (or merely lacking common sense): for, it is often easier to rely on reason—no matter how fictional—than not to have anything to cling on at all. In many ways, it is even better if the reason is fictional: for, if grounded in a certain fact, or reality, it can then go away. However, if it is in the realm of the imaginary, it is then always already metaphorical: thus, can be applied to any and every situation. And it is this, if we echo Friedrich Nietzsche, that gives us our “metaphysical comfort”; that we can know what is going on. This is why conspiracy theories are so popular: underlying them is the logic that someone—no matter how implausible—is in control of the situation. One would rather believe that all acts of terror stemmed from Osama bin Laden (and the narrative worked even better when he was in a ‘cave in Afghanistan’) than if they were the actions, and decisions, of singular individuals. For, if there is a head organizing everything, it can be cut off; there is no controlling a mass of singularities. As Jean Baudrillard continues to teach us, the term ‘mass’ is not a concept. It is a leitmotif of political demagogy, a soft, sticky, lumpen-analytical notion. A good sociology would attempt to surpass it with ‘more subtle’ categories: socio-professional ones, categories of class, cultural status, etc. This is wrong: it is by prowling around these soft and acritical notions (like ‘mana’ once was) that one can go further than intelligent critical sociology. Besides, it will be noticed retrospectively that the concepts ‘class’, ‘social relations’, ‘power’, ‘status’, ‘institution’, and ‘social’ itself—all these too-explicit concepts which are the glory of the legitimate sciences—but also only ever been muddled notions themselves, but notions upon which agreement has nevertheless been reached for mysterious ends: those of preserving a certain code of analysis. To want to specify the term ‘mass’ is a mistake—it is to provide meaning for that which has none.1 And it is this lack of meaning—this nothingness of not only the mass, but our inability to know in general—that truly scares us. For, if we are never able to legitimately make a generalizing statement, this suggests that we can never actually posit beyond a singular, situational, moment. Hence, we can never claim to know anyone: at best, we can only catch momentary glimpses. It is for this very reason that the insanity plea Breivik’s lawyer will attempt is the one that horrifies us the most. For, if Breivik is insane, this foregrounds our inability to understand, know. And as Aristotle has taught us, it is more important that something is plausible than if something were probable—in this context, we would rather have Breivik as a calculating mass murderer than someone who was completely out of his mind. This is especially ironic in the light of the fact that none of us would say that we have any similarity with Breivik. If that were so, the declaration that he was mad should be no more than a logical consequence. However, we also want Breivik to be accountable for his actions. And in order for that to be so, we need him to be of sound mind. But if that were true, we can then no longer distinguish ourselves from him. And it is precisely this that scares us. For, we are horrified not when there are abnormalities to our way of life. There are usually two different reactions to this—either oppose and destroy it; or subsume it under the dominant logic. We see this most clearly in reactions to immigration: there are either calls for immigrants to ‘pack up and leave’ or pseudo-liberal notions of ‘we are all alike’. Both of which are merely version of “all men are brothers”—the brutal translation of which is that you are my brother if you live the same way as me; otherwise not only are you not my brother, you are also potentially not part of mankind (you might as well be, to echo Giorgio Agamben, bare life ). This is played out in our age of what is commonly termed post-political bio-politics —an instance of horribly awkward theoretical jargon that Slavoj Žižek channeling Agamben unpacks rather elegantly: “ post-politics is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead, focus[es] on expert management and administration, while bio-politics designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primary goal.”2 Žižek continues: Post-political bio-politics also has two aspects which cannot but appear to belong to two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to ‘bare life,’ to Homo sacer , that so-called sacred being who is the object of expert caretaking knowledge, but is excluded, like prisoners at Guantanamo or Holocaust victims, from all rights; and that of respect for the vulnerable Other brought to an extreme through an attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences the self as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential harassments [….] What these two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher causes, the notion that the ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. That is why there is no contradiction between the respect for the vulnerable Other and […] the extreme expression of treating individuals as Homini sacer .3 This is why the ones that are harshest towards new immigrants are the recently naturalized citizens of any country. For, if there is no longer any “ideological struggle” and all life is reduced to mere automaton-living, there is the realization that we are all the same—not in a tree-hugging hippie sense—but that the immigrant is the same as us precisely because we are all immigrants. And since all nations, and by extension peoples in a nation (especially those who believe in the notion of nationality, and national identity), have to find some manner, no matter from where or what it is, to distinguish themselves from those around them, the other (in spite, and especially in the light, of its absence) is the most crucial aspect of the discourse of nationality. More precisely, in the interests of what Baudrillard calls “preserving a certain code of analysis” (nationality in this case), what has to be maintained is the absolute otherness of the other. Very rarely is Boris Johnson right: “it is not enough to say he is mad. Anders Breivik is patently mad.”4 However, much like Breivik in his manifesto, he should have stopped whilst he was ahead. By attempting to diagnose Breivik—“the fundamental reasons for their callous behavior lie deep in their own sense of rejection and alienation. It is the ideology that gives them the ostensible cause … that gives them an excuse to dramatize the resentment … and to kill.”—Johnson falls into the same trap that he accuses others of: “to try to advance any other explanation for their actions … is simply to play their self-important game.” More crucially, and this is the point that Johnson completely misses, attempting to rationalize Breivik’s actions—to rehabilitate reason—is a desperate attempt at maintaining his otherness. In fact, we’ll end up going one step further, insist on Breivik’s sanity, put him on the stand, and hope that he will display such a difference from all of us that we can rest safe that we are unlike him and his kind. That, in itself, is a dangerous game to play. One should not forget that the turning point in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is in the central part of her novel where she lets the monster speak. At that moment, the monster moves from an ‘it’ to a fully subjectivized person; with his own stories, historicities, emotions, and so on. In Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Frankenstein , this is the moment where “the ultimate criminal is thus allowed to present himself as the ultimate victim. The monstrous murderer reveals himself to be a deeply hurt and desperate individual, yearning for company and love.”5 But, in the case of Breivik, this goes beyond just a risk of us feeling for him: for, no right-minded person should ever deny another the opportunity to put forth her or his own case. The problem lies with us trying to deny the madness of Breivik’s act by putting him back under reason. The problem is in our inability to differentiate the act from the person; the singular from the universal.6 In our desperation to preserve the notion that we are rational beings incapable of becoming monsters, we’ve had to deny the meaninglessness—in the strict sense of it lying outside of reason—of Breivik’ act; we’ve had to “provide meaning where there is none.” For, if this act were a moment of madness—a moment that comes from elsewhere—we cannot say that it will not descend upon us one day. If Breivik’s actions were that of a sane person, one who is in control of his being, his self, we can then locate the otherness in his being. More importantly, this would allow us to distinguish ourselves from that said being. Breivik’s sanity is the only thing that allows us to say that ‘this act of terror is borne out of one with an ultra-right ideology’; and ‘since I am not of that ideology, I would never do such a thing’. By doing that, we attempt to protect ourselves by claiming that people who share Breivik’s ideology are foreign to us, other to us. However, if Breivik’s act was a moment of insanity, his otherness is no longer locatable: and the notion of ‘us and them’ shifts from a geographical, physical, religious, or cultural notion, to one in the realm of ideas. And this is what truly scares us. For, if what is foreign is not phenomenological, then it cannot be seen, detected, sensed. Anders Behring Breivik, Timothy McVeigh, and Terry Nichols, terrify us not merely for the fact that they were white in a white society, but more pertinently that their skin color did not matter: we would not be able to spot them even if they were blue, even if they were right next to us, even if we had known them all our lives. Even as we are grappling with holding Breivik accountable by declaring him of sound mind, what truly terrifies us is that deep down we know that Breivik’s act is a moment of madness; beyond all comprehensibility. And this means that we would not be able to spot the idea; even if it were in our heads at this very moment. We have gone to lengths to rehabilitate Breivik, McVeigh, Nichols, and such perpetrators of massive incomprehensible violence, in order to preserve our difference from them. What we have really been trying to deny is the fact that everyone, at any given moment, could have a moment of madness. And this is the true radicality of Mary Shelley: in allowing us to momentarily enter the head of the monster, she shows us not just the fact that he is like any one of us, but that any one of us could, in the right (or wrong) circumstance, be like him. Perhaps here, there is a lesson to be learned from Wes Craven’s A Nightmare on Elm Street . The most dangerous thing that one could do on Elm Street was to mention Freddy’s name—once you had knowledge of him, you were open to the possibility of a visit during your dreams. This suggests that Freddy is a combination of externalities (after all, when you die, he survives) and your self (if you have never heard of him, he cannot come for you). In this sense, Freddy would be the manifestation par excellence of what Avital Ronell calls a “killer text”—it is one’s relationality with the text (and the ideas, notions, in the said text) that opens oneself to it, to the lessons of the text, to being changed, affected, even to the dangers of the text. After all, one should never forget Plato’s warning that ideas can corrupt, can be perilous. To compound matters, as Ronell reminds us, “the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimilation, or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading.”7 Thus, in attempting to differentiate ourselves from Breivik by concocting some reason(s) why we are not like him, we have done nothing but read him, open a connection to him. *** Bang bang, he shot me down Bang bang, I hit the ground Bang bang, that awful sound Bang bang, my baby shot me down. “Bang Bang (My Baby Shot Me Down)” Sonny Bono, 1966. This is the part that we all know and remember. Whilst never quite remembering that this is a song that is not so much about violence, love, but about remembering. For, after the bridge comes the accusatory stanza: “Now he's gone, I don't know why/ And till this day, sometimes I cry/ He didn't even say goodbye/ He didn't take the time to lie.” Bang Bang is a game that the two lovers used to play; and all she has now is the memory of the game to remember him by. And the only reason she has to recall this game is: he never provided her a reason for his leaving, his death. Not that she will, can, ever get that satisfactory answer. This is precisely the game we are playing with Anders Behring Breivik. Even though he has left a 1500 page manifesto, even though we will allow him to use the court-room as his platform, we will continue screaming at him “tell me why …” For, what we want him to say is that we are not like him: what we really want him to do is, “take the time to lie …” Perhaps here, we should allow the echo of the infans to resound in baby . As Christopher Fynsk reminds us, the infans is one that is pre-language, pre-knowing, pre-understanding: it is the very finitude, and exteriority, of relationality itself.8 And thus, it is a position of openness to the fullness of possibility—and nothing else. This would be, in Ronell’s terms, a “connection to the other” that knows nothing other than the fact that it is a connection. The true horror of 22 July, 2011, is the fact that it is not Anders Behring Breivik who is mad, but the act itself that is. And this is precisely why only “my baby” that could have “shot me down.” For, it is an act that is from beyond, a sheer act of madness that—as Plato warns us—is whispered into our ears (and can so easily be mistaken for inspiration, and even wisdom), an act that can both seize, and cease, us at the same time. And what can this utter openness to an other, the other, be but a moment of love, a true ‘falling in love’. At the moment of whispering, nothing can be known as we are babies as our baby shoots us down …. Hence, all attempts at analyzing this event (including this one) are not only futile, but border on the farcical. The real tragedy is that we forget that all of us have the possibility of becoming Breivik. NOTES Jean Baudrillard. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities . Trans. Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton, & Andrew Berardini. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007. p. 37. Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p. 34 Ibid: 35-36. Boris Johnson. “ Anders Breivik: There is nothing to study in the mind of Norway’s mass killer .” The Telegraph . (25 July, 2011): Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p.39. What is killing us is the notion that Breivik’s act is beyond reason, beyond knowing, outside understanding itself. This is why Boris Johnson’s plea was for us to ignore Breivik as a madman. But to do so, Johnson conflates the notion of the act and the person; the singular and the universal. This is exactly the same gesture as insisting on his sanity: the ‘madman’ is merely the absolute other, one that we are not. Avital Ronell. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989: 380. Christopher Fynsk. Infant Figures: The Death of the Infans and Other Scenes of Origin . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.  . (shrink)

Why do some parents refuse to vaccinate their children? Why do some people keep guns at home, despite scientific evidence of risk to their family members? And why do people use antibiotics for illnesses they cannot possibly alleviate? When it comes to health, many people insist that science is wrong, that the evidence is incomplete, and that unidentified hazards lurk everywhere. In Denying to the Grave, Gorman and Gorman, a father-daughter team, explore the psychology of health science denial. Using several (...) examples of such denial as test cases, they propose six key principles that may lead individuals to reject "accepted" health-related wisdom: the charismatic leader; fear of complexity; confirmation bias and the internet; fear of corporate and government conspiracies; causality and filling the ignorance gap; and the nature of risk prediction. The authors argue that the health sciences are especially vulnerable to our innate resistance to integrate new concepts with pre-existing beliefs. This psychological difficulty of incorporating new information is on the cutting edge of neuroscience research, as scientists continue to identify brain responses to new information that reveal deep-seated, innate discomfort with changing our minds. Denying to the Grave explores risk theory and how people make decisions about what is best for them and their loved ones, in an effort to better understand how people think when faced with significant health decisions. This book points the way to a new and important understanding of how science should be conveyed to the public in order to save lives with existing knowledge and technology. (shrink)

Researchers have argued that bilingual speakers experience less emotion in their second language. However, some studies have failed to find differences in emotionality between first and second lang...

The effective provision of psychotherapy services to individuals with intellectual disability requires consideration of ethical issues related to clinical competence, access to services, obligations to multiple parties, guardianship, and appropriate assessment practices. This article provides an overview of major ethical considerations with guidance for clarifying and resolving common ethical concerns. Psychologists are encouraged to expand access to psychotherapy services for this population while maintaining awareness of potential modifications, training needs, and boundaries of professional competence. The authors provide recommendations and resources (...) for effective and ethical treatment of psychotherapy clients with intellectual disabilities. (shrink)

"Here is a unique and penetrating postmodernist invitation to reread Pascal's Pensées. With a full control on two centuries of Pascalian hermeneutics, Sara Melzer leads her readers into a passionate quest far beyond the worn-out search for a paleontological reconstruction of the Pensées's hypothetical final form. She rightly and deeply understands Pascal's writing--écriture--as the complex story of the "Fall of Truth into language." Such a perspective gives to Pascal's fragments a rejuvenated life, a newness, a dramatic and powerful voice (...) for our own culture. In brief, a welcome breeze of fresh air in the Pascalian world!" --Edouard Morot-Sir, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill "By approaching Pascal's Pensées from the point of view of contemporary critical theory, Melzer sheds new light on this well-known work. Her argument is clear, lucid, and cogent. She has a firm grasp of the major issues at stake in debates among literary critics. I think this is an important work that will be of interest not only to Pascal specialists but also to people who work in the general area of literary theory.... One of the genuine strengths of the book is the author's ability to discern the theological implications of issues that preoccupy literary theorists. This is particularly important at a time when students of theology and religion are becoming more and more interested in literary theory. They will find this analysis of Pascal very suggestive." --Mark Taylor, Williams College. (shrink)