Converse contended that the ideological disorganization, attitudi‐nal inconsistency, and limited information of American voters make them a politically disengaged mass, not a responsible electorate. I illustrate the shortcomings of Converse's line of reasoning by showing that he misread his two most prominent examples of the electoral consequences of his theory: voting on the Vietnam War in the 1968 New Hampshire primary, and public opinion about the 1948 Taft‐Hartley Act. In both cases, voters were better able to sort candidates and policies (...) than Converse reported, despite their lack of ideological sophistication or their knowledge of specific legislation. Converse's interpretive errors here stem from mistaken assumptions about information processing and recall, and from questionable normative standards about what constitute meaningful and competent political orientation. His criteria underestimate the public's ability to make responsible choices, and the effect of campaigns on the choosing process. (shrink)

This article examines the ways that new communications technologies change the organization of politics as well as the content of news. Changes in the media lead to changes in the mediators, the persons who choose and interpret the news for the public. When new mediators convey different news stories or offer different interpretations from the previous regime, they redistribute control of politics and culture.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 173 ducente un monde interamente unificato dall'azione divina. Ma, come egli stesso ritiene di avere mostrato nell'altro sue libro, Le probl~raede l'ttre chezAristote, questo fu soltanto l'ideale di Aristotele, mentre la sua filosofia effettiva ne rimase infinitamente Iontana. L'etica di Aristotele si pu6 definire allora un umanesimo tragieo: umanesimo, in quanto presuppons la fiducia nell'uomo, nella sua ricerca e nella sua azione; tragieo, in quanto si costituisce (...) proprio nella distanza che separa l'uomo da Die: Aristotele invita l'uomo a volere tutto il possibile, ma solo il possibile, e a lasciare il resto agli dei (pp. 174-177). Nell'appendice, dedicata al tema dell'amieizia in Aristotele, I'A. mostra come anche questa virtfl, analogamente alla prudenza, sia espressione dell'imperfezione dell'uomo, il quale, non potendo trovare la propria felicit~ nella contemplazione e nelI'amore dise stesso, come Die, la cerca nel riconoscimento e nell'amore degli altri (pp. 179-183). Nel complesso si deve ammettere che lo studio dell'A. ~ il tentative pifl interessante e pih moderno che sia state fatto per collegare logicamente l'etica di Aristotele con la sua metafisica, e si deve riconoscere che tale tentative, nonostante qualche affermazione discutibile, ~ perfettamente riuseito. Esso infatti conserva all'etica aristotelica quel carattere di problematicit~ e di asistematicit~ che ne costituisce la pifi genuina natura e che altri tentativi analoghi finiscone invece inevitabilmente col sopprimere. Ci6 che rende possibile la sua riuscita b la nuova interpretazione della metafisica aristotelica, che I'A. ha sviluppato nella sua opera precedente ed in base alla quale anche la metafisica, come l'etica, lungi dal presentarsi come una costruzione sistematica e rigidamente dimostrativa, rivela una natura essenzialmente problematica. L'unica riserva di fondo che ritengo di dover muovere a tale interpretazione, ~ quella a cui he avuto occasione di accennare recensendo Le probl~me de l'$tre chez Aristote (cf. "Giornale di Metafisica", XVIII, 1963, 266-271), e cio~ che la problematicit~ della metafisica aristoteliea non significa rinunzia ad affermare con certezza razionale la trascendenza di Die, ma anzi si risolve proprio in questa affermazione, la quale, lungi dall'essere uno scacco o un insuccesso, 6, al contrario, la pifi esaltante delle certezze. Analogamente la problematicit~ dell'etica arlstotelica non significa rinunzia all'affermazione di un valore supreme, ma riconoscimento della sua necessitY, anche se l'uomo non giunger~, mai ad attuarlo. Come nella metafisica il sapere dell'uomo si risolve in definitiva nslla continua ricerca del sapere, cio~ nella consapevolezza dell'esistenza di un sapere superiore a quello puramente umano, cosi nell'etica la perfezione dell'uomo si risolve nella stessa aspirazione alla perfezione, cio~ nell'ineessante sforzo di autoperfezionarsi. Tale precisazione, a mio avviso, ~ necessaria, per evitare chela metafisica di Aristotele venga interpretata come una forma di scetticismo e la sua etica come una forma di relativismo. ENRICO BERTI Perugia, Italy Consolation ]or the Tribulations o] Israel (Consola~am as Tribula~oens de Israel). By Samuel Usque. Translated from the Portuguese by Martin A. Cohen. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publications Society of America, 1965. Pp. xiii + 354. $6.00.) This work, the first in a new scholarly series of translations of texts, is a fascinating document. It was probably written in Italy around 1550 and was first published in Portuguese in Ferrara in 1553. Although it was not widely read at the time, it was republished around the end of the sixteenth century in the Netherlands. By now it is a Portuguese classic, and a unique document in Jewish intellectual history. Usque, whose biography is almost unknown except for clues found in the Consola~am, was apparently a Portuguese New Christian (a forced convert) who fled during the persecutions of Judaizers by the Inquisition in the 1530's. He wandered in Europe and the Levant, visited Palestine, and settled down in Italy, probably in the entourage of Samuel Abravanel (the brother of Leon Ebreo), Dona Gracia Nasi (the aunt and mother-in-law of the Duke of Naxos), and Hercules of Este, the Duke of Ferrara. His book, addressed "to the gentlemen of the Diapora of Portugal" is a pastoral and a dialogue, dealing with Israel's fate. Writing just 174 HISTORY OF... (shrink)

Richard Popkin opened an early paper with the observation "No figure in the history of European philosophy has had a more direct and enduring influence on American thought than George Berkeley."2 Popkin's case for Berkeley's "enduring" influence well into classical pragmatism is compelling.3 But in what follows I will be concerned with his more "direct" influence on the Connecticut philosopher and theologian Samuel Johnson —not to be confused with the English stone-kicking confuter of Berkeley—during Berkeley's brief, abortive (...) Rhode Island sojourn of 1729–31. Johnson studied classics and history at the nascent Yale College, until, "accidentally lighting on Lord Bacon's Instauratio Magna or Advancement of... (shrink)

The Irish writer and Nobel Prize winner, Samuel Beckett, assembled for himself a history of western philosophy during the 1930s, just at the point at which his first novel, Murphy, was coming together. The 'Philosophy Notes', together with related notes taken at that time about St. Augustine, thereafter provided Beckett with a store of knowledge, but also with phrases and images, which he took up in the major work that won him international and enduring fame, from the dramas Waiting (...) for Godot and Endgame, through to the late prose works Worstward Ho and Stirrings Still. This edition presents, for the first time, Beckett's full 'Philosophy Notes', which constitute his most extensive unpublished text. The Notes display Beckett's own interests and emphases within the history of western philosophy, from the pre-Socratic Greeks onwards, together with more familiar figures in the study of his work, such as Descartes, Leibnitz, and Geulincx. Here we see Beckett's original thoughts on all of these figures for the first time. The Notes also, tellingly and often comically, display Beckett's impatience with many aspects of philosophy, such as its anthropological or anthropomorphic bias, or the idealism of the Enlightenment and Kant. The Edition contains an extensive Introduction, outlining the origin of Beckett's Notes, his major sources and approach to them, the historical context for his view of philosophy, and the significance of Beckett's 'Philosophy Notes' within his mature writings. The many footnotes then suggest ways in which particular aspects of the philosophy narrated here by Beckett suggest fresh insights into those later writings-the images, but also the creative impulses, behind some of his most famous texts. This Edition, further, raises larger questions about, and perspectives upon, the relation between philosophy and literature in the twentieth century and beyond."--Back cover. (shrink)

In a recent book and an article, Carl Craver construes the relations between different levels of a mechanism, which he also refers to as constitutive relations, in terms of mutual manipulability (MM). Interpreted metaphysically, MM implies that inter-level relations are symmetrical. MM thus violates one of the main desiderata of scientific explanation, namely explanatory asymmetry. Parts of Craver’s writings suggest a metaphysical interpretation of MM, and Craver explicitly commits to constitutive relationships being symmetrical. The paper furthermore explores the option of (...) interpreting MM epistemologically, as a means for individuating mechanisms. It is argued that MM then is redundant. MM should therefore better be abandoned. (shrink)

I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account what grounds facts of the form a=b. In particular, I defend the claim that indiscernibility grounds identity. This is typically rejected because it is viciously circular; plausible assumptions about the logic of ground entail that the fact that a=b partially grounds itself. The theory I defend is immune to this circularity.

Many take Kantian ethics to founder when it comes to our duties to animals. In this paper, I advocate a novel approach to this problem. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I canvass various passages from Kant in order to set up the problem. In the second, I introduce a novel approach to this problem. In the third, I defend my approach from various objections. By way of preview: I advocate rejecting the premise that nonhuman animals (...) are nonrational. (shrink)

Because moral understanding involves a distinctly first-personal grasp of moral matters, there is a temptation to think of its value primarily in terms of achievements that reflect well on its possessor: the moral worth of one's action or the virtue of one's character. These explanations, I argue, do not do full justice to the importance of moral understanding in our moral lives. Of equal importance is the value of moral understanding in our relations with other moral agents. In particular, I (...) argue that an understanding of moral matters is of central importance within relations of solidarity. In addition to highlighting an overlooked aspect of moral understanding's value, this view also has important implications for what solidarity requires of those who stand in that relationship. (shrink)

Frege's picture of attitude states and attitude reports requires a notion of content that is shareable between agents, yet more fine-grained than reference. Kripke challenged this picture by giving a case on which the expressions that resist substitution in an attitude report share a candidate notion of fine-grained content. A consensus view developed which accepted Kripke's general moral and replaced the Fregean picture with an account of attitude reporting on which states are distinguished in conversation by their (private) representational properties. (...) I begin in support of the consensus by showing how a sort of de facto coordination on mental symbols is possible, even for unsophisticated agents. But I go on to argue that whenever conditions are ripe for de facto coordination on symbols, there is an inter-subjective relation that supports a fine-grained notion of content resistant to Kripke's challenge. The consensus view corresponds to a Kripke-resistant strain of the Fregean picture. (shrink)

This Element, written for researchers and students in philosophy and the behavioral sciences, reviews and critically assesses extant work on number concepts in developmental psychology and cognitive science. It has four main aims. First, it characterizes the core commitments of mainstream number cognition research, including the commitment to representationalism, the hypothesis that there exist certain number-specific cognitive systems, and the key milestones in the development of number cognition. Second, it provides a taxonomy of influential views within mainstream number cognition research, (...) along with the central challenges these views face. Third, it identifies and critically assesses a series of core philosophical assumptions often adopted by number cognition researchers. Finally, the Element articulates and defends a novel version of pluralism about number concepts. (shrink)

This dissertation is an experiment: what happens if we treat proper names as anaphoric expressions on a par with pronouns? The first thing to notice is that a name's 'antecedent' can occur in a discourse prior to the one containing the name. An individual may be introduced and tagged with a name in one context, and then retrieved using the name in a later context. To allow for discourse crossing anaphora, in addition to the usual cross-sentential anaphora, a revision of (...) discourse semantics is in order. Essentially, we must countenance discourse referents that span contexts, and think of contexts, not as islands, but as nodes connected to each other by the discourse referents they share. Discourse semantics gives rise to a new notion of content determined by discourse reference rather than pure reference. In a space of contexts structured by shared discourse referents, discourse content becomes transmissable. For a piece of content may be sent from one context to another whenever the discourse referents bundled up in the content are held in common by the two contexts. The final step is to treat the cognitive state of an agent as just another kind of context, and so a potential recipient of discourse content. Discourse content is more fine-grained than traditional 'singular' content, and so is a better fit for our pretheoretic intuitions about communication and attitude reporting. This is illustrated by applying the theory to Frege's puzzle, a puzzle of Loar's about communication, Kripke's puzzle about belief, Geach's intentional identity and new breed of 'mixed' de re-de dicto sentence. (shrink)

Fragmentalism allows incompatible facts to constitute reality in an absolute manner, provided that they fail to obtain together. In recent years, the view has been extensively discussed, with a focus on its formalisation in model-theoretic terms. This paper focuses on three formalisations: Lipman’s approach, the subvaluationist interpretation, and a novel view that has been so far overlooked. The aim of the paper is to explore the application of these formalisations to the alethic modal case. This logical exploration will allow us (...) to study (i) cases of metaphysical incompatibility between modal facts and (ii) cases of modal dialetheias. In turn, this will enrich our understanding of the role of impossibility in the fragmentalist framework. (shrink)

Liberalism generally holds that legitimate political power is limited and is to be impartially exercised, only for the public good. Liberals accordingly assign political priority to maintaining certain basic liberties and equality of opportunities; they advocate an essential role for markets in economic activity, and they recognize government's crucial role in correcting market breakdowns and providing public goods. Classical liberalism and what I call “the high liberal tradition” are two main branches of liberalism. Classical liberalism evolved from the works of (...) Adam Smith and the classical utilitarian economists; its major 20th century representatives include Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. The high liberal tradition developed from John Stuart Mill's works, and its major philosophical representatives in the 20th century are John Dewey and, later, John Rawls. This paper discusses the main distinguishing features of the classical and the high liberal traditions and their respective positions regarding capitalism as an economic and social system. Classical liberals, unlike high liberals, regard economic liberties and rights of private property in productive resources to be nearly as important as basic liberties. They conceive of equality of opportunity in more formal terms, and regard capitalist markets and the price system as essential not only to the allocation of production resources, but also as the fundamental criterion for the just distribution of income, wealth, and economic powers. High liberals, by contrast, regard the economic liberties as subordinate to the exercise of personal and civic liberties. They are prepared to regulate and restrict economic liberties to achieve greater equality of opportunities, reduce inequalities of economic powers, and promote a broader conception of the public good. And while high liberals endorse markets and the price system as essential to allocation of productive resources, they do not regard markets as the fundamental criterion for assessing just distributions of income, wealth, and economic powers and positions of responsibility. The paper concludes with some reflections upon the essential role that dissimilar conceptions of persons and society play in grounding the different positions on economic justice that classical and high liberals advocate. (shrink)

The allocation of scarce health care resources such as flu treatment or organs for transplant presents stark problems of distributive justice. Persad, Wertheimer, and Emanuel have recently proposed a novel system for such allocation. Their “complete lives system” incorporates several principles, including ones that prescribe saving the most lives, preserving the most life-years, and giving priority to persons between 15 and 40 years old. This paper argues that the system lacks adequate moral foundations. Persad and colleagues' defense of giving priority (...) to those between 15 and 40 leaves them open to the charge that they discriminate unfairly against children. Second, the paper contends that the complete lives system fails to provide meaningful practical guidance in central cases, since it contains no method for balancing its principles when they conflict. Finally, the paper proposes a new method for balancing principles of saving the most lives and maximizing life-years. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine global public reason as a method of justifying a global state. Ultimately, I conclude that global public reason fails to justify a global state. This is the case, because global public reason faces an unwinnable dilemma. The global public reason theorist must endorse either a hypothetical theory of consent or an actual theory of consent; if she endorses a theory of hypothetical consent, then she fails to justify her principles; and if she endorses a theory (...) of actual consent, her theory will lead to a highly unstable political system. On either side of the dilemma, global public reason faces untenable implications. Although similar criticisms have been advanced against domestic public reason, my argument is not repeating points made before me. My argument is new, in that it raises these objections specifically against global public reason, and in that it shows how, due to increased diversity of belief in the global arena, these problems are more pressing for global public reason than they are for domestic public reason. (shrink)

Richard Henry Popkin - Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 537-539 Book Review Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism Luciano Floridi. Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xv + 150. Cloth, $54.00. This is a most important book for those who wish to understand how skepticism became a vital part of philosophy (...) from the Renaissance onward. For at least the last decade, the author has been working as a historical detective to find out what was known about ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism and the writings of Sextus Empiricus during the Middle Ages and what happened when Greek manuscripts of the texts became available in Europe. Floridi's information enables us to gain a more accurate picture of how, when, and where Greek skepticism reached Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; who had access to manuscripts; who translated the Greek texts into Latin; and who read them, thereby correcting the usual picture that I and other scholars have presented. Floridi reveals that there was a lingering knowledge of Pyrrhonian skepticism in philosophical handbooks that were used during the Middle Ages. But it is only in the.. (shrink)

John Rawls says: “The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system.” Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realized the requirements of his principles of justice. This article discusses Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. I explain why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles: it is mainly because of the connection he perceived between capitalism and utilitarianism.

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction A Global Distribution Principle? Problems with Globalizing the Difference Principle Conclusion Notes.

Richard Henry Popkin - Founding Editor's Note - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 417-419 Founding Editor's Note HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO THE JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. As I sat down to write this I realized that a bit more than half of my life has involved affairs of the Journal. So I'd like to reflect a little on what its development and success might represent. Back in the 1950s there (...) were very few programs at the American Philosophical Association relating to the history of philosophy and only occasionally would the then-existing journals accept papers on the subject. In most philosophy departments people interested in the history of philosophy were marginalized. They had to prove their bona fides by doing philosophy, not writing about the dead white males who wrote philosophy in the past. People who cared about the exact wording of classical philosophical texts were regarded as museum keepers, not philosophers. It was in the '50s that my own career as a historian of philosophy really took off with a series of.. (shrink)

In his discussion of the duty of benevolence in §27 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that agents have no obligation to promote their own happiness, for ‘this happens unavoidably’ (MS, AA 6:451). In this paper I argue that Kant should not have said this. I argue that Kant should have conceded that agents do have an obligation to promote their own happiness.

Can an agent's intelligence level be negative? We extend the Legg-Hutter agent-environment framework to include punishments and argue for an affirmative answer to that question. We show that if the background encodings and Universal Turing Machine (UTM) admit certain Kolmogorov complexity symmetries, then the resulting Legg-Hutter intelligence measure is symmetric about the origin. In particular, this implies reward-ignoring agents have Legg-Hutter intelligence 0 according to such UTMs.

In Improvisation, Samuel Wells defines improvisation in the theater as "a practice through which actors seek to develop trust in themselves and one another in order that they may conduct unscripted dramas without fear." Sounds a lot like life, doesn't it? Building trust, overcoming fear, conducting relationships, and making choices--all without a script. Wells establishes theatrical improvisation as a model for Christian ethics, a matter of "faithfully improvising on the Christian tradition." He views the Bible not as a "script" (...) but as a "training school" that shapes the habits and practices of the Christian community. Drawing on scriptural narratives and church history, Wells explains six practices that characterize both improvisation and Christian ethics. His model of improvisation reinforces the goal of Christian ethics--to teach Christians to "embody their faith in the practices of discipleship all the time."--Publisher description. (shrink)

How did one of the greatest Jewish thinkers of the 20th century grapple with the founding of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—one of the most significant political conflicts of his time? Samuel Hayim Brody traces the development of Martin Buber's thinking and its implications for the Jewish religion, for the problems posed by Zionism, and for the Zionist-Arab conflict. Beginning in turbulent Weimar Germany, Brody shows how Buber's debates about Biblical meanings had concrete political consequences for anarchists, socialists, Zionists, (...) Nazis, British, and Palestinians alike. Brody further reveals how Buber's passionate commitment to the rule of God absent an intermediary came into conflict in the face of a Zionist movement in danger of repeating ancient mistakes. Brody argues that Buber's support for Israel stemmed from a radically rich and complex understanding of the nature of the Jewish mission on earth that arose from an anarchist reading of the Bible. (shrink)

In this article, I provide an interpretation of Heidegger’s critique of Hegel. Hegel’s ability to provide a presuppositionless metaphysics is often taken to be the core strength of his Logic. In his critique of Hegel, Heidegger attempts to show that Hegel in fact smuggles in a decisive presupposition concerning being. Building on the recent work of Robert Pippin, I argue that we can understand this critique by situating it in terms of their common understanding of problems of first principles. Once (...) we do, we can fully appreciate a point that Pippin misses, that Heidegger develops his methodology and concept of ground in order to avoid the problems that he locates in Hegel. The upshots of my interpretation are that it (1) allows us to appreciate the systematicity and radicality of Heidegger’s mature ontology, and (2) forces those sympathetic to Hegel to reevaluate Hegel’s ability to provide a presuppositionless metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Kant gives a philosophically plausible derivation of the general duty of benevolence and that this derivation can be used to show how to derive other general duties of commission with the universalizability tests. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I explain Kant’s notion of a general duty. In the second, I introduce the universalizability tests. In the third, I examine and argue against an account in the secondary literature of how (...) to derive general duties from these tests. In the fourth, I look at Kant’s derivation of the duty of benevolence in the Metaphysics of Morals, and I suggest how this reasoning can be extended to other duties. (shrink)

When Kuhn first published his _Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ he was accused of promoting an “irrationalist” account of science. Although it has since been argued that this charge is unfair in one aspect or another, the early criticism still exerts an influence on our understanding of Kuhn. In particular, normal science is often characterized as dogmatic and uncritical, even by commentators sympathetic to Kuhn. I argue not only that there is no textual evidence for this view but also that normal (...) science is much better understood as being based on _epistemically justified_ commitment to a paradigm and as _pragmatic_ in its handling of anomalies. I also argue that normal science is an example of what I call Kuhn’s program of _revisionary rational reconstruction_. (shrink)