U radu iznosimo shvaćanje da je novoplatonizam u Michelangelovom kiparstvu prisutan na dublji način nego li to shvaćaju oni koji u Michelangelovoj umjetnosti iznalaze tek simboličku ilustraciju određenog novoplatoničkog učenja. Novoplatonizam u Michelangelovoj skulpturi ne vidimo kao simboliku koja upućuje na određenu novoplatoničku teoriju. U tom bismo slučaju o novoplatonizmu u umjetnosti govorili kao o onome izvanjskom s obzirom na bit umjetničkog djela, budući da se samo nastajanje i jestvo umjetničkog djela ne temelji u postupku teorijskog razmatranja, već u (...) rukotvorenju. Polazimo od shvaćanja da je novoplatonizam s Michelangelom ostvaren izravno iz umjetničkog tvorenja u samom unutarnjem obliku umjetničkog djela.In the paper we propose attitude that Neoplatonism in Michelangelo’s sculpture is present in a deeper way than it is understood by those who in Michelangelo’s art find merely simbolic illustration of specific Neoplatonic learning. In Michelangelo’s sculpture we do not see Neoplatonism as a symbolism that is indicating a specific Neoplatonic theory. In that case we would be talking about Neoplatonism in the art as the external considering the proper essence of the work of art, since the proper emergence and beingness of the work of art is not founded in the act of theoretical consideration, but in handicrafting. Our starting point is the understanding that Neoplatonism with Michelangelo realizes itself directly out of artistic formation in the proper internal form of the work of art. (shrink)
U članku se, prije svega, tvrdi da većina odgojne prakse u liberalno-demokratskom društvu službeno teži promicanju, kako ga nazivam, ‘ideala demokratskog karaktera’ za građane budućnosti. On utjelovljuje deweyjevsko uvjerenje da demokracija nije samo oblik političke zajednice nego i način življenja u kojem se pojedinci mogu razvijati u socijalno pravednim okolnostima. Zahtjevna priroda tog ideala se može činiti problematičnom, no nastojat ću pokazati da tomu nije slučaj. Ono što jest problem je omjer u kojem aktualna teorija i praksa odgoja odudara (...) od ideala, bez obzira na službene prigovore tom idealu. Deweyjevski uvidi u poveznice između oblika odgoja i oblika društva ukazuju da suvremena izdaja ili napuštanje ideala demokratskog karaktera iziskuje radikalnu kritiku stanja u kojem razmatranja suvremene kapitalističke ekonomije podrivaju široko prihvaćene težnje za dobrim životom i odgojem koji pridonosi ostvarenju tih težnji. (shrink)
Raspravu o pluralizmu u području filozofije autor otvara razlikovanjem institucionalne i supstancionalne razine filozofskog pluralizma. Dok se institucionalni pluralizam odnosi na vanjske uvjete i okolnosti mišljenja i obilježava otvorenost i neutralnost filozofskih institucija, supstancionalni pluralizam izražava odnos prema istini kao imanentnom cilju svakog mišljenja. U tom odnosu pluralizam gubi svaki smisao, jer se istina može pluralizirati samo u svojim aspektima, pa se, sukladno tome, i supstancijalni pluralizam može odraziti kao pluralizam perspektiva . Pluriperspektivizam se, u razlici prema relativističkom perspektivizmu, (...) pobliže određuje kao integrativni perspektivizam, odnosno kao interaktivno povezivanje perspektiva u metodološkom obrascu stvaranja orijentacijskog znanja. Paradigma orijentacijskog znanja, koja se artikulira u protuteži prema monoperspektivizmu novovjeke znanosti, postaje tako duhovnim obilježjem nove epohe. U članku se ekspliciraju kategorijalna razlikovanja "objektne i smisaone istine" , te s druge strane "uporabnog i orijentacijskog znanja" , kako bi se prijelom svjetskopovijesnih epoha mogao izraziti ne samo sredstvima teorije istine nego istodobno obrazložiti i na epistemološkoj razini.Die Diskussion über den Pluralismus im Bereich der Philosophie eröffnet der Autor mit der Unter-scheidung zwischen einer institutionalen und einer substantiellen Ebene innerhalb des philosophischenPluralismus. Während sich der institutionale Pluralismus auf die äußeren Bedingungenund Umstände des Denkens bezieht sowie die Offenheit und Neutralität philosophischer Institutionencharakterisiert, bringt der substantielle Pluralismus den Bezug zur Wahrheit als das immanenteZiel allen Denkens zum Ausdruck. In diesem Bezug verliert der Pluralismus jeglichen Sinn,da die Wahrheit nur in ihren Aspekten pluralisiert werden kann, sodass demgemäß der substantiellePluralismus nur als ein Pluralismus von Perspektiven vertretbar ist. ImUnterschied zum relativistischen Perspektivismus wird der Pluriperspektivismus als ein integrativerPerspektivismus bestimmt bzw. als ein interaktives Verknüpfen von Perspektiven nach einem metho-dologischen Verfahren zur Erzeugung von Orientierungswissen. Das Paradigma des Orientierungs-wissens, das sich als Gegengewicht zum Monoperspektivismus der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft artikuliert,wird so zum geistigen Merkmal der neuen Epoche. Der Verfasser expliziert die kategorialeUnterscheidung zwischen »Objekt- und Sinnwahrheit« einerseits und zwischen»Verfügungs- und Orientierungswissen« andererseits, welche die weltgeschichtlicheEpochenwende nicht nur mit den Mitteln der Wahrheitstheorie zum Ausdruck bringen, sondernsie zugleich auch auf epistemologischer Ebene begründen soll. (shrink)
Od svih suvremenika Praxisa, koji je nesumnjivo najsnažnija pojava u novijoj povijesti filozofije i kulture na ovim prostorima, Blaženku Despot treba smatrati onom izuzetnom osobnošću koja, ni formalno niti konceptualno, ne pripada tom krugu, iako s njime dijeli problematsku suštinu prijepora kojim se svi oni u to doba intenzivno bave. Ona, kao i Praxis , oštro i bespoštedno kritizira »socijalističku zbilju«, ali pritom ide dalje, propitujući i promišljajući odnos misaonih, idejnih izvora na koje se »realizacija socijalističke zbilje« poziva, kao i (...) kvalitetu, domet i istinitost same realizacije. Tako su u žarište njezinih preokupacija postavljeni misaoni korpus Hegela i Marxa, njihove razlike i istovjetnosti, granice i nepotpunosti u odnosu na povijesnu zakrivljenost našeg vremena. Poduzimajući filozofsku analizu tzv. društvenih pojava ona poduzima suočavanje »socijalističke stvarnosti« s idejama njezinih marksističkih uzora. Stoga poduzima »ponovno čitanje Hegela«, koje znači i ponovno čitanje Marxa, naročito na onim mjestima na kojima ih je »socijalistička stvarnost«, kao i cjelokupna povijest, potpuno demantirala, a to je područje humanističkog dometa emancipacije žena. Otvarajući među prvima u nas upravo ovo teorijsko-filozofsko polje, Blaženka Despot slijedi svjetske trendove teorije i filozofije feminizma, u čemu je ostavila ne samo neizbrisivi trag doprinosu produbljavanja filozofije slobode nego je u nas postavila temelje feminističke filozofije.Blaženka Despot should be regarded as an extraordinary person among all Praxis’s contemporaries, because she was concerned with the same themes, although she did not belong to the group, neither formally nor conceptually. She, like the philosophers closely associated with Praxis , harshly and without pity criticizes the so called “socialist reality”, but goes on even further to examine and rethink the conceptual foundations on which it is based, as well as its quality, range and truthfulness of the whole project. Therefore, Hegel and Marx lie in the very centre of her interest – the differences and similarities between them, and their limitations and insufficiencies regarding the historical context of our times. Putting effort into the philosophical analysis of social phenomena , she puts “socialist reality” and the ideas of its Marxist role-models side by side. Thus, she “re-reads Hegel”, and thereby also unavoidably Marx, in the context completely neglected by both “socialist reality” and the entire history of ideas – in the context of humanistic emancipation of women. Opening that theoretic-philosophical field of investigation, Blaženka Despot follows the world trends in theory, including also dealing with the philosophy of feminism, where she left an indelible mark concerning her efforts to deepen the “philosophy of freedom” and to establish feminist philosophy in Croatia. (shrink)
Vjekoslav Bajsić , koji je poput Karla Balića u mnogim bitnim postavkama svojega mišljenja i svoje »integralne skolastike« anticipirao temeljna nastojanja enciklike Fides et ratio, razvio je u svojim istraživanjima vrlo osebujno razumijevanje prirodne znanosti. U ovome se radu nastoji pokazati kako je Bajsić najsuvremenije prirodoznanstvene spoznaje pokušao učiniti ne samo religijski relevantnim, već jednako tako i samu religiju pokazati kao temeljni osmišljavajući moment prirodoznanstvenih istraživanja, bez kojega same prirodne znanosti uvijek iznova dospijevaju u »krizu smisla« vlastitoga postupanja. U (...) tom se smislu razmatra i Bajsićev pojam »hominizacije« znanosti, ali i same religije, tj. njegovo nastojanje da religija i znanost ponovno zadobiju svoje životno svjetovno utemeljenje i svoju značajnost za konkretan ljudski život, bez čega one postaju bezsvjetovnim i nadvremenskim datostima koje više nemaju mogućnost da konkretnoga čovjeka oslove u njegovom faktičnom životu.Vjekoslav Bajsić der wie sein Vorgänger Karlo Balić in vielen Ansätzen seines Denkens und in seiner sogenannten »integralen Scholastik« die Grundbemühungen der Enzyklika Fides et ratio antizipiert hat, entwickelte in seinen Forschungen ein eigentümliches Verständnis der Naturwissenschaft. In diesem Beitrag versucht man zu zeigen, wie Bajsić nicht nur die modernsten naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse religiös relevant gemacht hat, sondern zugleich die Religion selbst als das sinngebende Grundmoment der naturwissenschaftlichen Forschungen betrachtet, ohne das die Naturwissenschaften selbst in „Sinnkrise” des eigenen Verfahrens immer wieder gelangen. In diesem Sinne wird auch Bajsićs Begriff der „Hominisation” der Wissenschaft erörtert, zugleich aber der Religion selbst, d.h. seine Bemühung, die Religion und Wissenschaft ihre lebensweltliche Begründung und ihre Bedeutsamkeit für das konkrete menschliche Leben wieder zu erreichen, ohne die sie die weltlose und überzeitliche Gegebenheiten werden, die keine Möglichkeit mehr haben, den konkreten Menschen in seinem faktischen Leben in Anspruch zu nehmen. (shrink)
Pojam izvora od predsokratovaca preko Heideggera do postmoderne imao je različita značenja. Treba ga razlikovati od povijesnog izvora i bezdana. U filozofiji je pitanje izvora pitanje zasnivanja i autentičnosti. Kao što horizont nije samo ono buduće tako ni izvor nije nešto prošlo. Izvor i horizont zasnivamo sada i ovdje: oni pripadaju povijesnom biću, pa su u tom smislu i sami povijesni; pripadaju promjenjivom svijetu, u kome je jedino moguća njihova »vječnost«. Vječno se za nas izjednačava s pojmom vrijednosti, bilo (...) da je u pitanju nešto radi čega vrijedi živjeti ili je u pitanju nešto što označava naš svijet, pa je i takva »vječnost« u biti povijesna i zapravo zrcalo naše sadašnjosti. (shrink)
Namjera je ovog članka da se skicira portret Ante Pažanina kao filozofa, istraživača i autora, te kao profesora, prevoditelja i javnoga djelatnika, odnosno da se kaže nešto ne samo o njegovu djelu nego i o njegovu liku. U tom smislu, članak se više oslanja na reminiscencije na Pažaninovu predavačku djelatnost negoli na istraživanje njegova filozofskog opusa, iako se naglašavaju ključna uporišta njegove filozofije . Zaključuje se kako je glavna značajka Pažaninova djela – živi dijalog sa suvremenicima i misliteljima prohujalih (...) vremena, koji su zahvaljujući njegovu pristupu također postajali suvremenima – bila trajno prisutna i u njegovoj profesorskoj djelatnosti.The intention of this paper is to sketch a portrait of Ante Pažanin as a philosopher, researcher and author, as well as a professor, translator and public servant, i.e. to speak not only about his work but also his figure. In this sense, the paper relies more on reminiscences on Pažanin’s lecturing activities than on research of his philosophical works, although the key strongholds of his philosophy are emphasised. It is concluded that the main characteristic of Pažanin’s work – live dialogue with contemporary thinkers as well as those of the past times, who also became contemporary by virtue of his approach – was permanently present in his professorial activities. (shrink)
There are several recent and noteworthy studies on the testimonies and fragments of Melissos of Samos: Laks-Most, Brémond. Furthermore, one can learn a great deal about Melissos from the lectures and discussions undertaken in the framework of “Eleatica 2012”. When taken together, these studies enable us to fully appreciate Melissos’ original work in terms of its sources, its audacious arguments and its later criticisms. Melissos is here presented as a spokesman of the Eleatic school in an order that aims to (...) do justice to the ancient testimonies that relate and refute his arguments as well as to the verbatim fragments. For the sake of clarity, however, various secondary testimonies have been omitted. (shrink)
Suvremene bioetičke rasprave reaktualizirale su pitanje smjene epoha. Bioetika je nastala upravo kao moralna i civilizacijska reakcija u novostvorenoj povijesnoj situaciji. U tom kontekstu, potrebno je analizirati, s jedne strane, promišljanje prijeloma epoha i predviđanje »novog srednjovjekovlja« u djelu ruskog filozofa N. A. Berdjajeva te, s druge strane, pojavu bioetike. Hoćemo li zaista zakoračiti u novu epohu, kakva će ona biti te što ćemo i u kojem obliku prenijeti iz sadašnje epohe – najviše ovisi o tome kakvog će duha biti (...) čovjek. Stanje čovjekova duha možemo iščitati iz čovjekova odnosa prema tehnici, odnosno s obzirom na snažnu interaktivnu ulogu tehnike u našem životu. Kako je pitanje odnosa čovjeka i stroja jedno od ključnih bioetičkih pitanja, problem tehnike nužno je analizirati iz perspektive Berdjajevljeva odnosa čovjeka i stroja, ali i u sklopu Heideggerova promišljanja biti tehnike. Jednako kao i Berdjajev, Heidegger smatra da ne treba poricati tehniku, već tražiti izmjenu uloge tehnike i podlaganje čovjekovu duhu na kojem leži zadatak dokučiti ono spasonosno. Duh današnjeg čovjeka duh je bogolikog čovjeka koji, uz pomoć uznapredovalog stroja, izaziva prirodu , ali taj isti stroj, koji njemu služi kao sredstvo, toliko je uznapredovao da je sada u mogućnosti izazivati njega. U tom je kontekstu nužno okrenuti se bioetici. Upravo je bioetika sa svojom pluriperspektivnom metodologijom zaslužna za pokušaj okupljanja različitih sustava vrijednosti kako bi se zajedno usmjerio sadašnji sustav vrijednosti i zaštitio budući, ali i budućnost uopće. No, hoće li bioetika ostati samo na razini rijetkog pozitivnog primjera u nizu negativnih znakova dolaska nove epohe ili ćemo ozbiljno shvatiti princip odgovornosti što nas dovodi na prag bioetičke epohe te hoće li promjena duha sadašnjeg čovjeka, prema kojem nas vodi bioetičko promišljanje, doista dovesti do podvrgavanja tehnike čovjekovom duhu – ostaju otvorena pitanja.The problem of the turn of epochs is debated once more nowadays. Contemporary discussions on bioethics once again pose this very question. Bioethics as such was created as a moral and civilisational response to the new historical situation. In that context one needs to analyze, on the one hand, both the problem of the turn of epochs and the prediction of the new Middle Ages proposed by Russian philosopher N. A. Berdyayev and, on the other hand, the emergence of bioethics which raised the question of the turn of epochs for the second time. Will we really reach the new epoch, what will it look like, what and in which form shall we transmit from the present epoch? These questions ultimately depend on the state of the human spirit which can be deciphered from man’s relation to technology, taking into account the strong interactive role which technology plays in our daily lives. Bearing in mind that the relation between the man and the machine is one of the crucial bioethical issues, this question of technology should be analyzed from Berdyayev’s relation between the man and the machine, but also within Heidegger’s analysis of the essence of technology. Similarly to Berdyayev, Heidegger states that technology must not be contradicted or denied, but rather, changed in a way to serve the human spirit – which is entrusted with the task of understanding the saving elements. The spirit of the modern man is the spirit of the divine-like creature . It is the spirit of a man who, with the help of a developed machine can challenge nature , but this same machine, which serves him as a means, has evolved to the point that it can challenge the man. In this context it seems essential to turn to bioethics. It is precisely bioethics which, thanks to its pluri-perspective methodology, takes credit for covering different systems of values to direct the present system in the right way and protect the future system and the future in general. However, the questions remain whether bioethics will stay the only positive example among the multitude of negative signs and predictions, whether it will lead us to a new, yet unknown, epoch and whether we will take seriously the principle of responsibility which leads us to the threshold of the bioethical epoch and whether the change in the spirit of the present-day man, triggered by the bioethical thinking, can change technology to make it subordinate to the human spirit. (shrink)
The history of the idea of biological progress shows that it is not a selfexplanatory category, so a clear definition is required. Biological progress exists if: “more progressive” is defined as “more complex” – in that case evolution is synonymous with progress, i.e. development from simple to complex, from homogeneous to heterogeneous; we perceive the expression “more progressive” as more successful in relation to the environment, in these terms some groups in the history of life were more progressive because/so that (...) they survived, while others were retrogressive or less progressive because/so that they died out; on the other hand, within their ecological niches, certain forms of life are perfectly adapted to their environment as long as it is stable ; we take the span or reach of a potential adaptation of populations as a measure . However, there is no active, innovative problem solving in relation to the environment either with plants or animals – only the variability mechanism / selection is in place, automatism, instinct. In the light of the above-mentioned biological criteria, man is the most complex living creature by his constitution , he is the least dependent on the environment and can be innovative in relation to the environment. Man is the only living creature capable of establishing an active relationship with the environment through his special tool – culture. Considering the level of organization and quantity of information, the mammal genome is more progressive than the bacterium genome, while the human genome comprises most information which makes man the most progressive living thing. We can talk about biological progress if we define progressiveness as advancement toward complexity of organisation, but sometimes thesimplification of structure enables survival. It seems that we can talk about progressivenessin biology only if we accept the anthropic principle – that is why only cultural progress is possible. Information is the link between biological and cultural-anthropological successfulness . Biological information is a “complete” piece of information to an animal . To a human being, it is only a condicio sine qua non for the reality of human spirit which receives, keeps and generates information. Progress can be measured according to the capability ofestablishing an active and innovative relationship with the environment, but only within some sort of anthropocentric outlook which is a criterion of value. It is not possible to talk about progressiveness of life if man is not the measure of all things.Povijest ideje biološkog napretka pokazuje kako to nije samorazumljiva kategorija, pa se traži jasna definicija. Biološki progres postoji ukoliko: “naprednije” definiramo kao “složenije” – evolucija je tada sinonim napretka, tj. prelaženja iz jednostavnijeg u složenije, iz homogenog u heterogeno; “naprednije” shvatimo kao “uspješnije” s obzirom na okoliš; u tom smislu neke skupine u povijesti života bile su naprednije jer/pa su opstale, dok su druge bile nazadnije ili manje napredne pa/jer su izumrle; s druge strane unutar svojih ekoloških niša pojedini oblici života savršeno su prilagođeni svojem okolišu dokle god je on stabilan ; kao mjerilo uzmemo raspon ili širinu moguće prilagodbe populacija jer tada postoje razlike; ipak ni u biljaka ni u životinja tu nema aktivnog inovatorskog rješavanja problema okoliša, nego djeluje samo mehanizam varijabilnost/selekcija, automatizam, nagon. U svjetlu gore navedenih bioloških mjerila čovjek je svojim ustrojstvom najsloženije biće , najmanje je ovisan u odnosu na okolinu, može se novativno nositi spram okoline. Čovjek je jedini kadar za pravi aktivni odnos prema svom okolišu putem specifičnog oruđa kulture. S obzirom na stupanj organizacije i količinu informacija, genom sisavca je napredniji od genoma bakterije, a genom čovjeka raspolažes najviše informacija, pa je on po tome najprogresivnije biće u prirodi. O biološkom progresu možemo govoriti ako progresivnost definiramo kao porast složenosti organizacije, no ponekad pojednostavljenje građe omogućava preživljavanje. Čini se da o progresivnosti u biologiji možemo govoriti samo usvajajući princip antropičnosti, zato je u svijetu moguć samo kulturni progres. Posjedovanje informacije je veza između biološke i kulturno-antropološke uspješnosti . Posjedovanje biologijske informacije za životinju je “potpuna informacija” , dok je za Čovjeka samo condicio sine qua non za zbiljnost ljudskog duha koji dobiva, posjeduje i stvara informaciju. Progres je moguće mjeriti prema sposobnosti aktivnog i inovativnog odnosa spram okoliša jedino u nekoj vrsti antropocentričnog obzora koji u središtu ima mjerilo vrijednosti. Nemoguće je govoriti o progresivnosti života ako svemu nije mjera sam čovjek. (shrink)
U ovome radu zagovaram stajalište koje uključni pozitivisti dijele s Ronaldom Dworkinom. Prema tezi o uključenosti morala , logički je moguće da pravni sustav uključuje moralne kriterije pravnosti . Do ovoga trenutka rasprava je uvijek imala oblik napada na koherentnost TUM-a, pri čemu su branitelji TUM-a samo pokušavali osporiti napadajući argument. Ja u prilog TUM-u iznosim pozitivan argument, koji započinjem objašnjenjem logike dokazivanja mogućnosnih tvrdnji kao što je to TUM. Pritome na samom početku vrijedi istaknuti da se logika dokazivanja (...) mogućnosnih tvrdnji umnogome razlikuje od logike dokazivanja kontingentnih deskriptivnih tvrdnji ili nužnih tvrdnji. Zbog toga će ovdje biti potrebno dati neka pojašnjenja važnih obilježja semantike modalne logike. Nakon prikladne razrade strukturnog okvira, argument u prilog TUM-a bit će zasnovan na iznenađujuće jednostavnom mislenom eksperimentu. Zapravo, argument pronalazi svoje nadahnuće u Razovom argumentu u prilog mogućnosti postojanja pravnog sustava koji se ne temelji na prisilnoj mašineriji izvršavanja prava; prema njemu, društvo anđela i dalje bi imalo sustav prava, iako u tom sustavu ne bi postojala prisilna mašinerija. Moj argument sadržavat će dvije teorijski važne značajke koje sadrži i Razov snažno jednostavan, ali u konačnici neuspješan argument. (shrink)
There are many questions we can ask about time, but perhaps the most fundamental is whether there are metaphysically interesting differences between past, present and future events. An eternalist believes in a block universe: past, present and future events are all on an equal footing. A gradualist believes in a growing block: he agrees with the eternalist about the past and the present but not about the future. A presentist believes that what is present has a special status. My first (...) claim is that the familiar ways of articulating these views result in there being no substantive disagreement at all between the three parties. I then show that if we accept the controversial truthmaking principle, we can articulate a substantive disagreement. Finally, I apply this way of formulating the debate to related questions such as the open future and determinism, showing that these do not always line up in quite the way one would expect. (shrink)
This article develops an unconventional perspective on the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill in at least four areas. First, it is shown that both authors conceived of utility as irreducibly multi-dimensional, and that Bentham in particular was very much aware of the ambiguity that multi-dimensionality imposes upon optimal choice under the greatest happiness principle. Secondly, I argue that any attribution of intrinsic worth to any form of human behaviour violates the first principles of Bentham's and Mill's utilitarianism, and that this (...) renders both authors immune to the claim by G. E. Moore that they committed a ‘naturalistic fallacy’. Thirdly, in light of these contentions, I find no flaw in Mill's ‘proof of utility’. Fourthly, I use the notion of intrapersonal utility weights to provide an interpretation of Mill's qualitative hedonism that is entirely consistent with his value monism. (shrink)
What if thought freed itself from common sense and decided to think only at the extreme point of its singularity? What if it mischievously practiced the bias of paradox, instead of complacently accepting its citizenship in the doxa? What if it thought difference differentially, instead of searching out the common elements underlying difference?1.
It is argued that a second-order belief to the effect that I now have some particular propositional attitude is always true (Incorrigibility). This is not because we possess an infallible cognitive faculty of introspection, but because that x believes that he himself now has attitude A to proposition P entails that x has A to P. Incorrigibility applies only to second-order beliefs and not to mere linguistic avowals of attitudes. This view combines a necessary asymmetry between 1st and 3rd person (...) ascriptions with Objectivism about the propositional attitudes. The epistemic justification of second-order beliefs is shown to be a further question. (shrink)
In this article the author discusses aspects of the existence of New Atheism. It states that the idea of New Atheism was started by anti-religious books such as "The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason," by W. W. Norton, "Breaking the Spell," by Daniel C. Dennett, and "The God Delusion," by Richard Dawkins. Furthermore, it says that there is no New Atheism, and all that Norton, Dennett, and Dawkins have done was repackage arguments against religion that (...) already existed. (shrink)
This is the first of two papers addressing Browning’s “Designation, Characterization, and Theory in Dewey’s Logic” (2002) where he distinguishes a series of pre-theoretical and theoretical stages for developing a theory of logic. The second of these two papers will recommend a modified version of this scheme of stages of inquiry into inquiry. The present paper recounts Browning’s original version of these stages and the ramifications of not clearly distinguishing them. I respond to Browning’s claim that in Burke 1994 I (...) made two such mistakes of not properly distinguishing theoretical and pre-theoretical stages of inquiry into inquiry. (shrink)
In Pragmatism, James promised his readers a theory of truth. However, many of his readers (even those sympathetic with other parts of James’s work) have concluded that James’s “theory” was little more than a tangle of mistakes. In this chapter, I offer an interpretation and defence of James’s theory of truth. I emphasize James’s truth pluralism.
The term “anthropocene,” emerging around the time of Derrida's death, implies a shift in reference that his late production does not address or anticipate—and thus, if it is to be taken seriously as a ghost term, it poses today a question of a selective translation effect as regards “deconstruction.” This essay finds in Derrida's “last” interview and the “war with myself” that it avows a cipher and entry point for this broader question. Given official “deconstructions” withdrawn, conservative, and fallow state (...) today, as a minor academic camp dedicated to Derridean theology, the essay asks whether the arrival of the term is not a catalyst for the re-organization of deconstructive memes. It examines not only Derrida's systematic avoidance in his writing of eco-catastrophism, but how that occlusion parallels others—specifically, a certain “materiality” that lies outside binaries and, more surprisingly, cinema. In examining this “war” between the two Derridas the essay speculates on whether the anthropocene moves us beyond the sort of soft Derrideanism that, since his death, has paralyzed the franchise and fulfilled his prediction of his work's disappearance. (shrink)
Automation can bring the risk of technological unemployment, as employees are replaced by machines that can carry out the same or similar work at a fraction of the cost. Some believe that the appropriate response is to tax automation. In this paper, I explore the justifiability of view, maintaining that we can embrace automation so long as we compensate those employees whose livelihoods are destroyed by this process by creating new opportunities for employment. My contribution in this paper is important (...) not only because I develop a theoretical framework that we can use to resolve this urgent policy dispute—a dispute that has been discussed extensively by labour economists, tax lawyers, and policymakers, but largely neglected by political philosophers—but also because my analysis sheds lights on a wider range of controversies relating to the moral and political importance of unemployment. (shrink)
The key role that animals play in our aesthetic appreciation of the natural world has only gradually been highlighted in discussions in environmental aesthetics. In this article I make use of the phenomenological notion of 'perceptual sense' as developed by Merleau-Ponty to argue that open-ended expressive-responsive movement is the primary aesthetic ground for our appreciation of animals. It is through their movement that the array of qualities we admire in animals are manifest qua animal qualities. Against functionalist and formalist accounts, (...) I defend and develop an account of expressive-responsive movement as the primary perceptual sense of animals. I go on to suggest that the primacy of movement in the aesthetic appreciation of animals is also the primary sense of animal 'wildness', and that a key part of the rewilding paradigm should be the development of such appreciation. (shrink)
Douven (in press) observes that Schurz's meta-inductive justification of induction cannot explain the great empirical success of induction, and offers an explanation based on computer simulations of the social and evolutionary development of our inductive practices. In this paper, I argue that Douven's account does not address the explanatory question that Schurz's argument leaves open, and that the assumption of the environment's induction-friendliness that is inherent to Douven's simulations is not justified by Schurz's argument.