Language and Ontology: Linguistic Relativism (Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis) vs. Universal Grammar Universal Ontology vs. Ontological Relativity Semiotics and Ontology: Annotated Bibliography of John Deely. First part: 1965-1998 Annotated Bibliography of John Deely. Second part: 1999-2010 The Rediscovery of John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas).

This paper identifies a new source of differences in religiosity: the type of future tense marking in language. We argue that the rewards and punishments that incentivize religious behaviour are more effective for speakers of languages without inflectional future tense. Consistent with this prediction, we show that speakers of languages without inflectional future tense are more likely to be religious and to take up the short-term costs associated with religiosity. What is likely to drive this behaviour, according to our results, (...) is the relatively greater appeal of the religious rewards to these individuals. Our analysis is based on within-country regressions comparing individuals with identical observable characteristics who speak a different language. (shrink)

Introduction -- 1. The settling of a language -- 2. The Whorf hypothesis -- 3. Relativism or a universal theory? -- 4. What does language have to do with logic and mathematics? -- 5. A test bed for grammatical theories -- 6. The Chomsky hierarchy in perpsective -- 7. Reflexivity and identity in language and cognition -- 8. The generalized logic hierarchy and its cognitive implications -- 9. The intensionalization of extensions.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Philosophical Tale.

Evidencia reciente ha revitalizado el interés en los llamados “efectos Whorf” en la percepción, dando lugar a nuevas explicaciones de sus alcances y mecanismos subyacentes. En este trabajo propongo que pueden distinguirse dos tipos de propuestas: autores como Lupyan (2012) explican estos efectos postulando mecanismos específicamente dedicados a producirlos, mientras que autores como Casasanto (2008) atribuyen tales efectos al funcionamiento de procesos generales, como los de aprendizaje asociativo. Luego, muestro cómo el enfoque grounded acerca de los conceptos en ciencias (...) cognitivas (e.g. Barsalou 1999, 2016) podría resultar pertinente para el estudio de los efectos Whorf en lingüística, antropología, filosofía y psicología cognitiva. En particular, defenderé que la evidencia ofrecida en favor de este enfoque favorece explicaciones de mecanismo general como la de Casasanto (2008), por encima de propuestas de mecanismo específico como la de Lupyan (2012). (shrink)

The Whorfian hypothesis has received support from recent findings in psychology, linguistics, and anthropology. This evidence has been interpreted as supporting the view that language modulates all stages of perception and cognition, in accordance with Whorf’s original proposal. In light of a much broader body of evidence on time perception, I propose to evaluate these findings with respect to their scope. When assessed collectively, the entire body of evidence on time perception shows that the Whorfian hypothesis has (...) a limited scope and that it does not affect early stages of time perception. In particular, all the available evidence shows that the scope of language modulation is limited in the case of time perception, and that the most important mechanisms for time perception are cognitive clocks and simultaneity windows, which we use to perceive the temporal properties of events. Language modulation has distorting effects, but only at later stages of processing or with respect to specific categorization tasks. The paper explains what is the role of these effects in the context of all the available evidence on time cognition and perception. (shrink)

This text is a translation of an article of B.L. Whorf “Language, mind and reality" (first published in 1941). The text was originally written for the journal Theosophist (India) during the last year of Whorf's life. The article contains a formulation of the principle of linguistic relativity that relates to the idea of that the world picture of a user of a language depends on the grammar of the language she is using. The article also contains a critique (...) of the Western science from Whorf's theosophist perspective. The paper was translated in Russian by Andrey A. Veretennikov. (shrink)

One of the most important discoveries of the last thirty years is the extent to which the pattern of anaphoric interpretations is determined by the geometry of syntactic structure. As our understanding of these phenomena has steadily grown, the theory of syntax has often been driven by discoveries in this domain, and it is no accident that Chomsky's Binding Theory was a centerpiece of the principles and parameters approach of the 1980s. However, what remained accidental in Chomsky's theory, and in (...) most of the theories that have followed it, is the apparently complementary distribution of forms that support anaphora for a given antecedent. This book argues not only that the complementary distribution in question is robust empirically, but that its existence is derived by a competitive theory of anaphora. It is demonstrated in detail that the competitive theory provides a far better explanation of anti-locality, anti-subject orientation and the range of apparently exceptional distributions that have been long been problematic for other approaches, such as Chomsky's Binding Theory and the influential predication-based theory of Reinhart and Reuland. (shrink)

It seems that when the term "coreference" is used, whether in linguistics or in philosophy, there is often presumed to be a consensus about what it is, or at least about what it is in the context where the term is introduced. I don't think the term deserves to have much use at all, insofar as it disguises more interesting linguistic and pragmatic relations between nominal forms in natural language. My preoccupation with these relations issues in part from some of (...) the central concerns and distinctions introduced in Evans (1980), an essay that has had wide and, in some cases, a very deep influence on how a variety of reference issues have been addressed in modern linguistics. As a linguist, my interest is in the way in which natural language shapes what we know and from that perspective, I want to understand how natural language sets boundary conditions on how linguistic forms can be used to achieve readings that pick out the same entity more than once. (shrink)

Ken Safir, Rutgers University Following a line of thought initiated by Kuno (1972), it has been suggested that the coconstrual of first person pronouns is a model for the coconstrual of a logophoric pronoun with its antecedent. This particular proposal has been extended to the forms of logophoricity that have been observed in some African languages (e.g., Ewe, as remarked in passing by Clements, 1975, and Amharic, as proposed by Schlenker, 2000).

Ken Safir, Rutgers University ABSTRACT: It is argued that the indexicality of first person pronouns is arises from a restriction on the pronouns themselves, as opposed to any operator that binds them. The nature of this restriction is an asyntactic constant function that picks out individuals to the context of utterance (following Kaplan, 1989)). Constant function pronouns do not require an antecedent, neither an operator nor an argument, although this does not prevent them from participating in bound readings if (...) an appropriate antecedent is introduced. The notion that agents of contexts and agents of propositional attitudes are versions of the same operator-variable relation is thus rejected, along with certain less fine-grained versions of the nature of de se interpretation. Consequently, indexical pronouns such as first person ones contrast with logophoric pronouns, which are necessarily operator-bound by perspectival operators introduced by propositional attitude verbs. Scope-sensitive properties of operator-binding and the perspectival interpretations that are imposed on logophoricity distinguish the latter from constant function phenomena, which are sensitive neither to scope, as it is usually treated, nor perspectival shifts. Constant function phenomena are also detectable as restrictions on third person forms, and two such examples are lightly explored: the English generic pronoun one and the proximate/obviative distinction in languages like Fox. (shrink)

This essay is a contribution to the discussion, now going on for many years, concerning what sorts of identity relations should be represented in the syntax and semantics of formal grammar and what properties those relations should have. In what follows, I will use the neutral cover term coconstrual to refer identity relations of one sort or another between nominals when no particular syntactic or semantic analysis is presupposed (among which are dependent identity, covaluation and coreference). The central claim made (...) here is (I), with its consequence in (Ia) and the far-from-innocent background assumption in (II). Most of my argumentation is designed to establish (Ia) to argue that it should be understood as the natural consequence of (I) and with respect to strict readings in ellipsis contexts. Although I will also argue for (II), I rely on Safir (2004b) for a more general defense of it. (shrink)

Broadly construed, anaphors are forms that must be anteceded in a discourse, and more narrowly, as syntacticians tend to use the term, anaphors are forms that must be anteceded within a bounded, syntactically defined domain. In this short note, I focus on the difference between these two notions of anaphor and some problems with approaches to anaphora that try to collapse them by linking all anaphors to their antecedents by syntactic operations. The latter approach permits syntactic operations to exceed the (...) bounds of sentence grammar and must still introduce familiar descriptive constraints to distinguish between anaphora in the general sense, on the one hand, and syntactic anaphors, on the other. The notion of syntactic anaphor most familiar to syntacticians is the class of forms that are susceptible to Principle A (1a) of Chomsky's (1981) Binding Theory.. (shrink)

This essay explores the place of coconstrual relations, such as antecedent-anaphor relations, in a theory of grammar informed by minimalist architecture. It has been argued that the logical space created by minimalist theorizing should favor an account of coconstrual derived from the tree-building operations of narrow syntax (Agree, feature theory, Merge and its subcase, Remerge), dispensing with rules or conditions that evaluate constructed trees. On such an account, it is argued, the explanatory power of narrow syntax is enhanced and the (...) role of the interpretive component can be circumscribed. However, if coconstrual cannot be reduced to the derivational relations of narrow syntax, then we must be prepared to reevaluate the role of syntax-sensitive interpretive rules, balancing the need for such rules against any complication of narrow syntax mechanisms just to account for coconstrual. It will be argued that dependent identity relations, the form of coconstrual that is sensitive to syntactic configurations, must be interpreted from the output of narrow syntax and are not expressed within narrow syntax at all. This result unburdens narrow syntax of a class of relations that bring theoretical and empirical complications, while providing a more elegant account of coconstrual in a broader conception of the interpretive interface. (shrink)

In recent years, certain analytic proposals have been appealed to that are incompatible with fundamental principles of structure−building that appear attractive. One such principle is Extension (Chomsky,1995), which ensures that what counts as the top of the tree at a given point in a derivation restricts the class of possible operations that can apply at that point. Another principle I will show to be desirable is Insularity, which bans on interarboreal movement.

Extension embodies an intuition that appears worth preserving, namely, the notion that at any point in a derivation, what counts as the top of the tree at that moment restricts the class of possible operations that can apply. This principle, if a version of it is correct, propels an aggressively derivational view of syntax. However, Chomsky's proposal is too restrictive to permit a wide range of syntactic analyses that appear to be worth preserving, all of which violate Extension by merging (...) constituents near the top of the tree. After some 'fixes' of Extension are rejected, including interarboreal movement, I then propose to revise Extension as Exxtension. The essential idea of Exxtension is to loosen, yet make precise and restrictive, the definition of what counts as (near) the top of the tree. The new definition, to be introduced after some structural assumptions have been established, has interesting consequences for the role of thematic selection and modification once it has been enhanced by the Selection Principle, also to be introduced below. Then all of the analyses discussed that are worth preserving will be shown to be viable within the Exxtension approach, except one, for which a different sort of analysis will be sketched. (shrink)

Utrecht, and at the École des Hautes Études in Paris in 2002. It is a partial description of a book ms. presently in preparation that will have the same title. The ms. will also explore the interpretation of 'generic person', 'impersonal agency' and 'arbitrary person'.

As a generative linguist and syntactician, I share the general outlook established since the 1950's that the goal of syntactic research into the nature of the language faculty is to understand the nature of syntax as it is determined by Universal Grammar. My particular research foci have been, and continue to be, on the contribution of syntactic form to semantic interpretation, on the one hand, and on the nature of the linguistic typology made available by the innate language faculty.

In this essay I will explore the syntactic expression of the notion ‘clause’ by focusing on some syntactic and semantic properties of bare infinitive (BI) complements to perception verbs in English. I shall argue briefly that perception BI complements must be clausal, and then turn in more detail to the issue of what sort of clause the BI complement must be. It will be established that the categorical nature of the perception BI complement as IP or VP is contingent on (...) selectional properties of the perception verb, properties which may be contextually influenced by modality and negation. More specifically, an interpretative distinction between ‘vision’ and ‘non-vision’see first suggested by Napoli (1988) will be shown, contrary to her proposal, to provide the key to the contrast in the selection of clausal types. The IP/VP distinction will be shown to correlate with the viability of interpretations for the BI clause that are ‘temporally independent’ of the matrix clause. Given the IP/VP distinction, it will be demonstrated further that the peculiarly limited distribution of the expletive formativethere in BI complements may be predicted from independently motivated syntactic principles that determine clausal structure. (shrink)

It is argued that most anaphors have semantic content and that the semantic content of a given anaphoric atom plays an active role in determining both its distribution and the interpretation of the sentences in which it is employed. It is first demonstrated that semantic distinctions between semantically relational anaphoric atoms predict differences between their distributions. It is then argued that all of the semantically relational anaphoric atoms respect Principle A, while semantically contentless anaphors often do not.

The primary goal of this paper is to distinguish binding from reflexivity in domains where they appear to overlap. In so doing I will argue that Principles A and B of the Binding Theory are symmetric in the domains to which they apply. This symmetry derives from a deeper unity that permits us to dispense with Principles A and B and replace them with interpretive principles that distinguish reflexivity and binding.

This is an essay about language, thought, and culture in general, and about Ancient Greek and Classical Chinese in particular. It is about the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which says that language influences the mind, and applies this hypothesis to Greek and Chinese. It is also an essay in comparative philosophy as well as a contribution to the history of ideas. From the language side, I rely on the nineteenth-century German linguist Wilhelm von Humboldt, and from the culture side (...) on the contemporary French sinologist François Jullien. Combining their ideas, I give substance to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and explain some of Jullien's claims about the historical and political developments of Chinese culture. The central .. (shrink)

According to the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, a language influences the mind of its user. This is more or less trivial, but the problems are in the details. It is difficult to make precise what those influences are, be it in general philosophical or in particular empirical-cultural terms. I will give an account of what I take to be basic aesthetic and grammatical features of the Chinese language compared with what we find in Western languages such as Latin or (...) greek. Then I will indicate what I take to be cultural differences and discuss whether these might be the result of differences in language structure. (shrink)

Research Ethics, Volume 18, Issue 1, Page 64-83, January 2022. Automated, wearable cameras can benefit health-related research by capturing accurate and objective information about individuals’ daily experiences. However, wearable cameras present unique privacy- and confidentiality-related risks due to the possibility of the images capturing identifying or sensitive information from participants and third parties. Although best practice guidelines for ethical research with wearable cameras have been published, limited information exists on the risks of studies using wearable cameras. The aim of this (...) literature review was to survey risks related to using wearable cameras, and precautions taken to reduce those risks, as reported in empirical research. Forty-five publications, comprising 36 independent studies, were reviewed, and findings revealed that participants’ primary concerns with using wearable cameras included physical inconvenience and discomfort in certain situations. None of the studies reviewed reported any serious adverse events. Although it is possible that reported findings do not include all risks experienced by participants in research with wearable cameras, our findings suggest a low level of risk to participants. However, it is important that investigators adopt recommended precautions, which can promote autonomy and reduce risks, including participant discomfort. (shrink)

Examining the sapir-Whorf hypothesis, The author addresses the questions whether language affects perception and whether grammatical categories affect conceptual categories. He argues that advocates of linguistic relativity have attributed to language an unjustified degree of causal efficacy and that linguistic idealism is contradicted by the results of experimental psychology. Then, Considering the claimed correlation between grammatical and conceptual categories, He argues that grammar has no metaphysics and does not influence thought. The author concludes that language in use embodies (...) a point of view only in the weak sense that relations and distinctions implicit in necessary concepts constitute a philosophical theory about reality. (staff). (shrink)

According to a thesis I call the linguistic assumption, the structure of language is a guide to the fundamental nature of reality. It is deployed in the metaphysical debate over the nature of time. In that debate, it is more radical than the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, and should be rejected. A weak interpretation of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis makes the empirical claim that speakers of different languages experience, perceive, or think about aspects of the world differently. I survey (...) recent experimental evidence that supports this hypothesis which, I argue, gives us further reason to reject the linguistic assumption. (shrink)

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis asserts that people who organize their experience with the help of different languages can have different pictures of the world.

This book, originally published in 1987, considers how the science of linguistics creates its own objects of study. It argues that language is the one essential tool in the ¿social construction of reality¿ ¿ the way in which our environment as we perceive and respond to it is actually created by the cultural constructs we bring to bear on it ¿ and that it is also the means by which this reality, once constructed, is preserved and transmitted from person to (...) person and from generation to generation. Hence it is entirely appropriate to refer to the linguistic construction of reality. (shrink)

In this chapter, I critically examine two of the main approaches to colour categorization in cognitive science: the perceptual salience theory and linguistic relativism. I then turn to reviewing several decades of psychological research on colour categorical perception (CP). A careful assessment of relevant findings suggests that most of the experimental effects that have been understood in terms of CP actually fall on the cognition side of the perception-cognition divide: they are effects of colour language, for example, on memory or (...) decision-making. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a modern theory of linguistic iconicity, comparing it with similar, though more primitive ideas expounded in Plato's Cratylus. In the Cratylus two views on natural language compete: Hermogenes favours absolute arbitrariness of names, Cratylus defends the naturalness — iconicity — of names. In the end, both these extreme views are rejected, the main conclusion being that one should not base philosophy on the study of words. The ancient controversy shows up again as a clash between (...) Saussurean and Peircean thinking, though extreme views are avoided. Onomatopoeia and Plato's articulatory mimicry are instances of imagic iconicity, now recognized by everybody. Less known but more interesting for grammar is diagrammatic iconicity. A diagram is „a systematic arrangement of signs, none of which necessarily resembles its referent, but whose relationships to each other mirror the relationships of their referents” . A well-known example is word-order reflecting temporal sequence . The most interesting area of diagrammatic iconicity is to be found in the opposition between marked and unmarked structures in natural language. For example, the plural is marked as opposed to the singular. The iconicity lies in the fact that the unmarked form of the singular corresponds to an unmarked meaning, while the marked form of the plural matches a marked meaning, i.e. the more form, the more meaning. Unmarked meaning is then viewed not in objectivist but in experiential terms: ‘unmarked’ is related to ‘prototypical‘. Prototypical linguistic structures are seen to go back to biological, psychological and cultural properties of the prototypical speaker . A number of examples of this kind of iconicity are discussed. On the biological level, so-called freezes exist, whereby unmarked sounds precede marked counterparts . On the biologicalpsychological level, this is paralleled by lexical coordinations . In morphological categories, one finds pairs like singular-plural, definite-indefinite, animate-inanimate, masculine-feminine, present-past, positive-negative, locativetemporal. As to semantic-syntactic structures, direct perception and direct causation are unmarked in relation to the indirect counterparts. On the cultural level, politeness structures are adduced. We conclude that both Plato and Wittgenstein II rejected iconicity too radically : languages are more motivated, less arbitrary, than is commonly thought. Our view qualifies the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis as well. Other consequences concern feminism, Montaguegrammar, the place of intensions in a reference-theory of names and philosophy as a ‘critique of language’. (shrink)

Everett's main claim is that language is a “cultural tool“, created by hominids for communication and social cohesion. I examine the meaning of the expression “cultural tool“ in terms of the influence of language on culture (i.e. the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis) or of the influence of culture on language (Everett's hypothesis). I show that these hypotheses are not well-supported by evidence and that language and languages, rather than being “cultural tools“ as wholes are rather collections of tools used (...) in different language games, some cultural or social, some cognitive. I conclude that the coincidence between language and culture is due to the fact that both originate from human nature. (shrink)

The basis of perception is the processing and categorization of perceptual stimuli from the environment. Much progress has been made in the science of perceptual categorization. Yet there is still no consensus on how the brain generates sensory individuals, from sensory input and perceptual categories in memory. This chapter argues that perceptual categorization is highly variable across perceivers due to their use of different perceptual strategies for solving perceptual problems they encounter, and that the perceptual system structurally adjusts to the (...) strategies that are most successful. Despite this variability, the different sensory individuals that result when different perceivers rely on different strategies nonetheless correspond to actual external world objects/features. This view is called 'perceptual pluralism'. (shrink)

This study investigated whether and how a person's varied series of lexical categories corresponding to different discriminatory characteristics of the same colors affect his or her perception of colors. In three experiments, Chinese participants were primed to categorize four graduated colors—specifically dark green, light green, light blue, and dark blue—into green and blue; light color and dark color; and dark green, light green, light blue, and dark blue. The participants were then required to complete a visual search task. Reaction times (...) in the visual search task indicated that different lateralized categorical perceptions of color corresponded to the various priming situations. These results suggest that all of the lexical categories corresponding to different discriminatory characteristics of the same colors can influence people's perceptions of colors and that color perceptions can be influenced differently by distinct types of lexical categories depending on the context. (shrink)

The 2016 much acclaimed American sci-fi movie Arrival is based on the so-called “Sapir-Whorf” hypothesis, a linguistic theory set forth in the first half of the 20th century, according to which one’s native language dictates the way in which one perceives reality. By taking into account the latest in human knowledge, this paper tries to provide arguments as to why such a claim works wonderfully in fiction, but not in science.

A variety of commentators have explored the similarities between pragmatism and Thomas Reid’s Philosophy of Common Sense. Peirce himself claims his version of pragmatism either (loosely) is, or entails, a Critical Common-sensism, a blend of what is best in Kant and Reid. In this paper I argue for a neglected aspect of the relation between Peirce and Reid, and of each to common sense: linguistics. First, I summarize Peirce’s account of what distinguishes his common-sensism from Reid’s. Second, I argue for (...) the importance of appeals to linguistic universals by Reid as both a source for identifying common sense beliefs, and a basis for justifying them. While Peirce is occasionally tempted by such appeals, overall he is critical of appeals to language, especially as most Western philosophers have been familiar with a small set of (Indo-)European languages; say, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, and Latin. This leads to the third section, which concerns Peirce’s familiarity with major nineteenth century linguists, and his contention that the ‘peculiarity’ of Western European languages has impeded the development of logic and philosophy. In particular, I look at unpublished manuscripts where Peirce summarizes his own study of non-European languages, ranging from Arabic, to Ngarrindjeri, to Xhosa. Peirce was only an amateur linguist, and also aware of the challenges of doing cross-cultural linguistics through comparative grammar; e.g., the temptation to force unfamiliar languages onto the “Procrustean Bed of Aryan grammar” (CP 2.211). Nonetheless, this study left him suspicious of any claims of linguistic universals, and supported his anti-psychologism. That is, not only should logic and philosophy not be based upon psychology (at least as a special science), they should also be independent of linguistics. However, Peirce also advances something like the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, that language determines, or at least conditions, thought. The question now becomes what is the nature of a philosophy of common sense, even a critical one, without a common language, or possibly no commonalities across languages? (shrink)

Having remarked that "competing and mutually contradictory philosophies may be formulated in different languages," Landesman concludes that "the generalization that the speaking of a given language by a given philosopher is either a necessary or sufficient condition for the formulation of his explicit philosophy would seem to be false." I do not believe that the conclusion follows. Elsewhere, I have tried to show that what I call the "strong interpretation" of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis can be assimilated to the (...) notion of "untranslatability" in such a way that it becomes equivalent to the denial of the position held by Roman Jakobson that "All cognitive experience and its classification is conveyable in any existing language." To deny Jakobson's thesis is equivalent to the assertion that there is at least one language for which there is at least one other language such that the first cannot translate the second. Letting "Txy" stand for "x translates y," and "Lx" for "x is a language," Jakobson's thesis goes over in symbols as. (shrink)