Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, in Dialectic of Enlightenment [Dialektik der Aufklärung, first published in 1944], argue that Donatien-Alphonse-François, the Marquis de Sade (1740–1814), and Friedrich Nietzsche have brought the Enlightenment project of grounding morality in reason to an end. For Adorno and Horkheimer, Sade has revealed philosophy’s moral impotency, in particular “the impossibility of deriving from reason any fundamental argument against murder [...].”1 Marcel Hénaff, Susan Neiman, and Annie Le Brun have similarly suggested that Sade has (...) demonstrated that morality is no more philosophically justified than immorality.2 There is no doubt that there is much discussion of moral philosophy in Sade’s surviving works. But are these extraordinary claims of Sade’s sceptical powers justified? To answer this question, this paper sets out to identify the moral and meta- ethical claims made in Sade’s works, and to assess his arguments for those claims. (shrink)

The literary oeuvre of Marquis de Sade (1740–1814) has attracted a great deal of interest over the past 200 years, not only from writers, but also from numerous leading philosophers. Among them is Georges Bataille, who particularly emphasizes the apathetic character of the Sadean libertines, meaning that they feel nothing at all. More specifically, the French philosopher focuses on their apathetic enjoyment that goes hand in hand with the abuse of victims. The goal of this article is (...) to clarify that peculiar pleasure by comparing it, among other things, with stoicism and mysticism. It will be shown that in the Sadean universe not moral transgression is central, but rather the transgression of a metaphysical boundary, i.e. the boundary between the human and non-human. (shrink)