Agnes Heller's Theory of Morals was to be composed of three parts: General Ethics, Moral Philosophy, and a Theory of Proper Behaviour. The first two were born; the third, however, before it was written, was rebaptized by the author who could not resist her inner compulsion to do so. It bears the title Ethics of Personality. This author does not conceal his one-sided preference for this last part of Heller's Theory of Morals which has only one imperative: `Be yourself! Follow (...) your own destiny!'. At the same time he raises the question whether an ethics of personality does not contradict so much a general ethics (that simply describes the functioning of the moral) but a moral philosophy that tries to prescribe how people should behave. The author concludes that the only possibility of ethics in our age is an ethics of personality. (shrink)

The author, as the leader of the team that translated Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit into Hungarian, tells the story of the translation. The members of this team were anything else but experts in Heidegger. Belonging to the so-called “democratic opposition” at the beginning of the ‘80s, they asked the author, a dissent himself, to hold for them a private seminar on modern phenomenology. It is here where they read Husserl, Scheler, and wanted to read Heidegger as well. Their German, however, (...) was not good enough to understand Being and Time in the original. That’s why they decided to translate it into Hungarian. In a few years the translation was ready – three years ago, in 2001, it was even published its second, revised edition. In the second part of this short essay, the author deals with those Heideggerian words that have proven to present the most serious difficulties at that time, and explains the nature of their difficulties in some cases: Sein, Seiendes, Dasein, Da, Bewandtnis, Zuhanden, Vorhanden, das Man, Befindlichkeit, Angst, Eigentlichkeit, Unheimlichkeit, Platz, Ort. (shrink)

Le judaïsme se définit par une modalité particulière d’amour de Dieu : Israël, peuple élu, existe en vertu d’une alliance unique avec Dieu, formée sur la base d’un amour que l’on devrait dire mutuel plus que réciproque. Ce n’est pas, en effet, que l’amour d’Israël réponde à celui de Dieu, ou que Dieu récompense l’amour de ses fidèles d’une affection en retour : ces deux amours s’originent l’un en l’autre, ils ont chacun pour raison et pour fin l’existence de l’autre. (...) Ils coexistent et s’interpellent : telle est le propre de cette élection.Georges Vajda se propose ici d’explorer la construction de ce concept d’amour de Dieu dans les textes et la théologie juive : analysant la lettre de la Bible, du Midrash et du Talmud, il l’articule aux développements théoriques des grands penseurs du judaïsme que furent Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Tibbon, Bahya, Halévi, Ibn’Ezra et Moïse Maïmonide.On découvre ainsi un amour du fidèle pour Dieu nécessairement articulé à la crainte qu’il inspire, crainte révérentielle car liée à l’exigence d’une pleine et juste obéissance. Le phénomène religieux propre au judaïsme se définit dès lors comme « l’engagement total à l’égard du dieu créateur de l’univers, donateur de la Loi et rédempteur d’Israël » : l’histoire du peuple juif devient celle d’un amour tourmenté, singulier et unique.Par cette synthèse au style clair et accessible, George Vajda nous offre les clés d’une question située au coeur de la théologie juive : l’amour de Dieu est-il une dette ou une attente? (shrink)

The author, as the leader of the team that translated Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit into Hungarian, tells the story of the translation. The members of this team were anything else but experts in Heidegger. Belonging to the so-called “democratic opposition” at the beginning of the ‘80s, they asked the author, a dissent himself, to hold for them a private seminar on modern phenomenology. It is here where they read Husserl, Scheler, and wanted to read Heidegger as well. Their German, however, (...) was not good enough to understand Being and Time in the original. That’s why they decided to translate it into Hungarian. In a few years the translation was ready – three years ago, in 2001, it was even published its second, revised edition. In the second part of this short essay, the author deals with those Heideggerian words that have proven to present the most serious difficulties at that time, and explains the nature of their difficulties in some cases: Sein, Seiendes, Dasein, Da, Bewandtnis, Zuhanden, Vorhanden, das Man, Befindlichkeit, Angst, Eigentlichkeit, Unheimlichkeit, Platz, Ort. (shrink)

In this paper I try to underline both the positive and negative circumstances in which I began translating Heidegger's "Sein und Zeit" in Greek. In 1971 I started, as a young student of philosophy, to study and translate this book, although I misunderstood it and considered it as a paradigm of "existentiell", not existential philosophy. I benefited essentially from both the English and the French translations and I've also received great help from my Greek mentor, E. N. Platis. I published (...) my translation in two volumes, one in 1978 and the other in 1985 and the critics have been very positive. At the beginning, I gave extended explanations about the translation problems and my solutions in a paper published in 1974. In the following years, I wrote articles about the Heideggerian concepts, in order to facilitate a better understanding of his philosophy.. (shrink)

Die Arbeit durchleuchtet die metaphysische Grundlegung der landlaufigen Literaturwissenschaft hermeneutisch-ontologisch, um eine phanomenologisch schlussige Neuorientierung der Literaturtheorie terminologisch und anhand konkreter Interpretationen eminenter Literatur (Kafka, Rilke, Musil) auch exegetisch zu ermoglichen. Dabei stellt sie neben der subtilen Kritik von Strukturalismus, Dekonstruktion und Rezeptionsasthetik Querverbindungen zwischen der Heideggerschen Fundamentalontologie und dem Bachtinschen Dialogizitatsprinzip her. Die kritische Analyse gewinnt erst durch eine subtile Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles und dem literaturtheoretischen Denken der vorklassischen Zeit ihre rechten Dimensionen und drangt auf eine begriffsgeschichtlich fundierte Rezeptionsontologie.".

My essay is based on the lecture I presented at the Conference “The German-Speaking Intellectual and Cultural Emigration to the United States and United Kingdom. 1933–1945”. I decided to publish it in honour of my friend Marek Siemek, because I think this theme is very actual, especially in light of the current crisis in Europe connected with the problems of fugitives and refugees. Ernst Bloch and Stefan Zweig, both Jews, reacted in opposite ways to their forced fate of being on (...) the run from persecution and murder. They felt like strangers in their exile. Ernst Bloch, a stranger to English and other languages, wrote his Principle of Hope in his mother tongue. Stefan Zweig, a brilliant translator, felt himself “imprisoned in a language, which he could not use”: Europe was his homeland. Tired “of all ideas in the future” he committed suicide far away from home. Ernst Bloch came back to Germany after the Second World War—first to the German Democratic Republic, and then, in 1961 to the Federal Republic of Germany. He continued his lifework against resignation and despair in keeping with what he outlined in his Principle of Hope: with his “real utopia” social model, and existence “without expropriation and alienation in real democracy,” where “there arises in the world something which shines into the childhood of all and in which no one has yet been: homeland.”. (shrink)

A la fin de la periode talmudique, la pensee juive a pour matiere la revelation biblique, ainsi que toute la loi orale qui la complete et l'interprete. Cette interpretation a ses methodes propres qui, rigoureuses dans leur genre, ne sont point celles qu'a produites la pensee grecque et codifiees le genie systematique d'un Aristote. La vaste litterature dite rabbinique, consignee dans les recueils un peu chaotiques connus sous le nom de Talmud et Midrash, a cree, en se constituant, une structure (...) mentale specifique. Ainsi, le choc qu'eprouva la pensee du type purement talmudique lorsqu'elle se heurta serieusement a la pensee grecque, meme deja orientalisee, aboutit a creer un type mixte, dont une histoire de la pensee juive au Moyen Age devait exprimer toute la complexite. Contraint par les circonstances hsitoriques de cotoyer la civilisation musulmane, le judaisme allait progressivement se laisser infiltrer par certains elements de provenance platonicienne et aristotelicienne. La pensee juive se voit alors exprimee par des personnalites composites, dont l'aspect judeo-talmudique est aussi inseparable de l'aspect greco-rationaliste que la matiere de la forme dans l'ancienne metaphysique. (shrink)

After reviewing various formulations of the problems of universals and individuation, this essay considers the dialectic that informs the relationship between the two. This dialectic involves a distinction between a realist theory of universals that satisfies the requirements of science but fails to account for the non-instantiability of individuals and a nominalist theory of universals that fails to satisfy the requirements of science but accounts for the non-instantiability of individuals. Inadequacies found in one view tend to motivate movement to the (...) other view. But, like a pendulum swing, this movement inevitably involves facing what motivated the original view. This dialectic is illustrated by a consideration of the views of five medieval authors: Boethius, Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. (shrink)

In this paper we propose an Ontology of Commercial Exchange (OCE) based on Basic Formal Ontology. OCE is designed for re-use in the Industrial Ontologies Foundry (IOF) and in other ontologies addressing different aspects of human social behavior involving purchasing, selling, marketing, and so forth. We first evaluate some of the design patterns used in the Financial Industry Business Ontology (FIBO) and Product Types Ontology (PTO). We then propose terms and definitions that we believe will improve the representation of contractual (...) obligations, sales processes, and their associated documents. A commercial exchange, for instance, involves mutual agreement to reciprocate actions, such as transferring money, performing a service, or transferring goods. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt wrote the following to Karl Jaspers in 1931: “What this all really adds up to—fate, being exposed, what life means—I can’t really say in abstract. Perhaps all I can try to do is illustrate it with examples. And that is precisely why I want to write a biography. In this case interpretation has to take the path of repetition.” This description seems to me to be characteristic of her whole lifework: always illustrate everything with examples, and only use (...) abstract language as a kind of repetition; this is her attitude whether she writes on totalitarianism, on revolution, on anti-semitism, or on assimilation. I have the feeling that in speaking about her view on assimilation, I should avoid quoting her assertions. The only adequate procedure would be to narrate her own stories, the life-story of Rahel Varnhagen, the stories of the first chapter of The Origins of Totalitarianism; and in the first place to recapitulate her polemics. Since it is surely impossible to do this here, I cannot help but sometimes quote her assertions in abstract, her interpretations; but you must know: her stories always leave room for interpretations which are different and more sophisticated than her sometimes very categorical statements. (shrink)

I myself and Marek Siemek could never accept the philosophical standpoint of the other, nevertheless we agreed with each other in a very important respect. For both of us philosophy was always a vital questioning, and not a kind of neutral science about the world. To Marek Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was the starting point, to me Martin Heidegger, later Frierich Nietzsche; Marek wanted to create a new unified explanation of our world, I have denied to possibility of such a (...) unified explanation.To make my attitude comprehensible, I gave in this paper a kind of report on the conference at which in different talks the crisis of our world was discussed. The standpoints of the early György Lukács, that of Edmund Husserl, and Heidegger, and that of Carl Schmidt were interpreting. All of them wanted to give a kind of solution to our existential crisis. To me the name of Nietzsche was lacking; I think namely that only Niettzsche was the philosopher at the beginning of our crisis of modernity, who could see: the “last man” who killed God, cannot do anything else as to accept his existential crisis. There is no solution. (shrink)