Engaging with phenomenology, moral philosophy, politics and psychology, and authored by an international team of leading scholars in the field, this volume explores the ethical and social significance of a variety of human emotions.

Engaging with phenomenology, moral philosophy, politics and psychology, and authored by an international team of leading scholars in the field, this volume explores the ethical and social significance of a variety of human emotions.

The dominant view on grieving processes throughout the twentieth century was based on the idea that grief ’s purpose is to loosen and finally sever the bonds with the deceased in order to set oneself free (free to enter new relationships). An expanded view, which aims at a more complete and more complex understanding of grief, corrected the former approach by arguing in favor of continuing bonds. The expanded view certainly fits better the meaning of attachment relations in human life. (...) So-called disenfranchised grief nonetheless reveals additional normative constraints in terms of (culturally varying) social control mechanisms taking effect with regard to expressions of grief. The present paper argues that duly considering the complex and ambiguous nature of grief, as well as its transformative power, requires challenging the standard view of disenfranchised grief. I propose an expanded view that is based on the idea that proponents of the standard view have failed to inquire into the equivocal meaning of a common conversation about “coping with grief ” (getting over it vs. getting along with it). Arguing in favor of an expanded account of disenfranchised grief by following the second reading (“getting along with grief ”) then requires acknowledging the inseparability of grief ’s existential depth and social implications. With a view to this inseparability, it is argued that coping with grief is a public (or even political) affair instead of a merely private experience. (shrink)

Thomas Metzinger's self-model theory offers a framework for naturalizing subjective experiences, e.g. first-person perspective. These phenomena are explained by referring to representational contents which are said to be interrelated at diverse levels of consciousness and correlated with brain activities. The paper begins with a consideration on naturalism and anti-naturalism in order to roughly sketch the background of Metzinger's claim that his theory renders philosophical speculations on the mind unnecessary. In particular, Husserl's phenomenological conception of consciousness is refuted as uncritical and (...) inadequate. It is demonstrated that this critique is misguided. The main deficiencies of Metzinger's theory are elucidated by referring to the conception of phenomenal transparency which is compared to a phenomenological idea of transparency. The critical horizon is then enlarged by focusing on some implications of representationalism, including reification of consciousness, brain-Cartesianism and exclusion of the social dimension. Finally meta-theoretical reflections on the naturalism debate are taken up. (shrink)

Thomas Metzinger’s self-model theory offers a frame¬work for naturalizing subjective experiences, e.g. first-person perspective. These phenomena are explained by referring to representational contents which are said to be interrelated at diverse levels of consciousness and correlated with brain activities. The paper begins with a consideration on naturalism and anti-naturalism in order to roughly sketch the background of Metzinger’s claim that his theory renders philosophical speculations on the mind unnecessary . In particular, Husserl’s phenomenological conception of consciousness is refuted as uncritical (...) and inadequate. It will be demonstrated that this critique is misguided. . The main deficiencies of Metzinger’s theory will be elucidated by referring to the conception of phenomenal transparency which will be compared to a phenomenological idea of transparency . Then we shall enlarge our critical horizon by focusing on some implications of representationalism, including reification of consciousness, brain-Cartesianism, and exclusion of the social dimension . Finally, we shall take up our meta-theoretical reflections on the naturalism debate. (shrink)

First, we argue that Dummett, in his accusing Husserl of psychologism, does not pay sufficient attention to the phenomenological framework of Husserl's philosophy. This framework must be taken into account for understanding why Husserl is not a psychologist in the theory of meaning. Second, it is shown that the thoughts required by Evans' theory of understanding indexical utterances are not to be identified with mental events as understood by psychologism. We then emphasize what Husserl's and Evans' explanation of the mind (...) share, and finally argue that Dummett's anti-psychologism is based on a psychologistic view of consciousness which is not questioned by Dummett. (shrink)

Michael Pauen defends the compatibility of freedom and determinism by way of strengthening the principle of authorship and interpreting the principle of alternative possibilities in terms of determinism. Authorship is said to be incompatible with indeterminism because the latter is unable to grasp the connection between the mental content of an agent and her action in a non-fortuitous way. Apart from authorship, there is a second minimal criterion which, according to our common sense view of freedom, must be met, namely (...) autonomy. Authorship requires absence of pure chance,autonomy requires absence of compulsion. In course of specifying his idea of self-determination, the author examines current arguments against compatibilism. The paper sets in with a terse introduction which nicely formulates the issue and, among other things, rightly stresses that every theory of self-determination depends on some idea of the self which has to be made explicit. (shrink)

Teorija samo-modela Thomasa Metzingera nudi okvir naturaliziranja subjektivnih iskustava, to jest perspektive prve osobe. Ovi se fenomeni objašnjavaju referiranjem na reprezentacijske sadržaje za koje se kaže da su međuodnošajni na različitim razinama svijesti i suodnošajni s moždanim aktivnostima. Članak počinje razmatranjem o naturalizmu i anti-naturalizmu u svrhu grubog skiciranja pozadine Metzingerove tvrdnje da njegova teorija drži filozofijske spekulacije o umu ne-nužnima . Posebice, Husserlova se fenomenološka koncepcija svijesti odbacuje kao nekritička i neprimjerena. Pokazat će se da je ta kritika pogrešno (...) usmjerena . Glavni nedostaci Metzingerove teorije osvijetlit će se referiranjem na koncepciju fenomenalne transparencije koja će se usporediti s fenomenološkom idejom transparencije . Tada ćemo povećati naš kritički horizont fokusirajući se na neke implikacije reprezentacionalizma, uključujući reifikaciju svijesti, mozgovni kartezijanizam, te isključivanje socijalne dimenzije . Konačno, primijenit ćemo naše meta-teorijske refleksije na raspravu o naturalizmu. (shrink)

Ist die Verbindung von Konventionalismus und Letztbegründung in sich widersprüchhch? Diese Frage ist zu entscheiden, indem Dinglers Sonderstellung in der Konventionalismus-Debatte auf der Grundlage einer Analyse des Begriffsapparates und des Begründungsanspruches seiner Fundamentalwissenschaft aufgeklärt wird. Von zentraler Bedeutung ist hiebei der Exhaustionismus, mit dem Dingler das Schlüsselproblem seiner Wissenschaftslehre - das Verhältnis von Theorie und Empirie - löst und zu einer differenzierten Bestimmung der Theorieabhängigkeit der Erfahrung gelangt. Das Gesamtbild von Dinglers Denken ist von der Einsicht in die Unmöglichkeit einer (...) theoretischen Letztbegründung geprägt. Dieser Einsicht verdankt sich die eigentümliche Verbindung von Konventionalismus, operativistischem Apriorismus und Willensmetaphysik, die aus der Überschreitung des Systems der reinen Synthese in die vorwissenschaftliche Lebenssphäre resultiert. Was „praktischer Absolutismus" bedeutet und was diese Konzeption leistet, wird ausgehend von Dinglers Bestimmung des Begriffs des reinen Willens ausgeführt. (shrink)