The purpose of this paper is first to explain a general notion of transcendental deductions, of which the Kantian are special cases; next to show, and to illustrate by examples from Kant’s work, that no transcendental deduction can be successful; and thirdly to put one of Kant’s achievements in its proper light by substituting for his spurious distinction between metaphysical exposition and transcendental deduction, a revised notion of metaphysical exposition and of the philosophical tasks arising out of it.

The main purpose of this essay is to examine Brentano's rejection of Kant's theory of a priori concepts and synthetic a priori judgments. The essay begins by recalling the views of Descartes and Locke about the acquisition of knowledge, since Brentano regards them as on the whole correct or, at least, as pointing in the right direction and since he regards Kant's epistemology as obscurantist and reactionary (Section 1). There follows a brief characterization of Brentano's conception of knowledge as based (...) on self-evident inner perception and analytic propositions, i.e. propositions which are true ex terminis (Section 2). Next some aspects of Kant's epistemology are compared with corresponding features of Brentano's doctrine (Section 3). In the light of this comparison the validity of Brentano's criticisms is examined (Section 4). In conclusion an independent view of the function of concepts and of their relation to perception is briefly outlined and contrasted with the views of Kant and Brentano (Section 5). (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Der Inklusionsbegriff hat sich in den letzten Jahren gesellschaftlich etabliert. Inklusion tritt dabei vor allem auf als Forderung. Die Sportwissenschaft und hier insbesondere die Sportpädagogik haben den fordernden Inklusionsbegriff insgesamt eher ungebrochen übernommen. Inklusion versteht man hier vor allem als gesellschaftlichen Auftrag und ist mit dessen Umsetzung befasst. Lange vor dieser Konjunktur hat die soziologische Systemtheorie einen Inklusionsbegriff eingeführt, der dem normativen Verständnis diametral gegenübersteht. Verstanden als Relevanzmarkierung von Menschen für Kommunikation, ist Inklusion systemtheoretisch ein Faktum moderner Gesellschaften. Im (...) sportwissenschaftlich-sportpädagogischen Inklusionsdiskurs spielt die Systemtheorie der Inklusion bislang so gut wie keine Rolle. Der Beitrag setzt hier an. Ziel folgender Überlegungen ist es, dem gesellschaftlich und in der Sportwissenschaft vorherrschenden normativen Begriffsverständnis von Inklusion eine systemtheoretische Gebrauchsform gegenüber zu stellen. Für sportwissenschaftliche und sportpädagogische Inklusionsforschung bietet die Systemtheorie der Inklusion ein bislang kaum genutztes Analyse- und Reflexionspotenzial. (shrink)

In this article the author proposes "to state the problem (of explanatory propositions) by defining and discussing the requirements for a satisfactory account of the laws of nature, In a somewhat narrow sense of the term which does not include probability statements and statistical propositions; next to examine two mutually exclusive theories and their common assumptions; finally to suggest and try to justify a solution to the problem." (staff).

Since the question of the relations between philosophy and science is never very far from the minds of philosophers of science, an occasional attempt at answering it seems permissible and may even be useful. The paper is divided into three parts. First, philosophical and scientific theories are compared by reference to commonsense thought. Secondly, some of the reasonable and unreasonable constraints will bediscussed which philosophical theories may impose upon scientific ones, and scientific theories upon philosophical ones. In the third part (...) I try to indicate briefly the relevance of these comparisons to some special problems in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Originally published in 1966. This volume analyzes the general structure of scientific theories, their relation to experience and to non-scientific thought. Part One is concerned with the logic underlying empirical discourse before its subjection to the various constraints, imposed by the logico-mathematical framework of scientific theories upon their content. Part Two is devoted to an examination of this framework and, in particular, to showing that the deductive organization of a field of experience is by that very act a modification of (...) empirical discourse and an idealization of its subject matter. Part Three analyzes the concordance between theories and experience and the relevance of science to moral and religious beliefs. (shrink)