"One basic and underlying assumption of this investigation will be that there is a distinct continuity and development in Berkeley's thought which can be traced through (...) class='Hi'>all of his reflective analyses of the problem of perception." The essay argues for Berkeley's theory of perception as a "prototype of the phenomenalists." It argues also for Berkeley's incorporation of elements from the representative theory of perception. Of special interest is the treatment of Berkeley's doctrine of "suggestion" and its connection with the role of imagination in the perception of physical objects. The linguistic aspect of Berkeley's work is minimized. Berkeley's theory of notions receives only a passing reference. The last third of the book is a clear and useful discussion of Berkeley and contemporary phenomenalism. It is suggested, though not shown, that Berkeley has affinity with contemporary phenomenology of perception.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This is a critical edition of the work published in 1681, two years after Hobbes' death. The dialogue contains mature reflections of Hobbes on the doctrine of (...) sovereignty. It deals with the relation between law and reason, sovereign power, crimes, heresies and punishments. The editor's introduction sets forth arguments for regarding the text as a complete work, contrary to the views of L. Stephen, Tönnies, and Robertson. A critical analysis of the argument in the dialogue is also provided indicating the relation of the dialogue to Hobbes' political philosophy. The dialogue is interesting in portraying the more "liberal" side of Hobbes. It is an invaluable aid to the study of Hobbes.--A. S. C. (shrink)

An able and clear defense of Bradley's principal theses and the underlying conception of metaphysical enterprise. "This is a book about a metaphysician, about metaphysics, and, (...) class='Hi'>most importantly, it attempts to develop elements of a metaphysical position long the lines of what is called Absolute Idealism." The Introduction takes up the Verificationists [[sic]] argument and two recent accounts of metaphysics. Part I devotes ten Chapters to the elucidation and defense of Bradley's conception of reality. It culminates in examining three alternative accounts of "Real". Part II considers "the major philosophical theories of the self in order to defend Bradley's Theory of the self within his metaphysical scheme."--A. S. C. (shrink)

Originally published in 1981, this book provides a detailed account of the emergence of the children's rights movement, and analyses the concept of a right. It (...) class='Hi'>considers the justifications which may be sought when rights are claimed. Particular attention is given to the problem which arises when different rights are seen to be in conflict with each other or with other kinds of moral consideration. These arguments are then examined with regard to such special features of children as their incomplete but developing rationality and their material dependence on adults. (shrink)

A clearly written book that purports to analyze "the ends men pursue, and the ways in which these ends are ordered in some kind of system." The (...) driving force behind the analysis is the attempt to present ends, or at least some important ends, as complex entities having a discernible and significant structure, and then to present the priorities, preferences, and relationships that men impose on their ends as themselves constituting a complex, coherent structure, whose principles of ordering may be discerned and criticized. Part one deals with the structure and ordering of ends and reflects the influence of Kant and Rawls. Part two deals with rational ends and social structures, and part three with life and death as values. Of great practical interest are certain concepts such as life plan and budget risk in dealing with the problems of life and death. The book repays careful study.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This short history of Pembroke College, Cambridge appeared in 1936, during a particularly successful period for the college in terms of both academic and sporting achievements. Pembroke (...) was founded in 1347, when Edward III granted Marie de St Pol, widow of the Earl of Pembroke, a licence for the foundation of a new educational establishment in the young University of Cambridge. The college flourished, and from the mid-nineteenth century expanded greatly. The author of this book, which is still regarded as the 'official history of Pembroke College', was a leading authority on the college's history. However, he died before the manuscript could be completed, and the final part was written as a postscript by S. C. Roberts, a former Master of the college. The book has delightful illustrations and a thorough index of the influential scholars, former students and benefactors connected with the college over the centuries. (shrink)

The author addresses the question of how to use value-learning processes to integrate corporate social responsibility (CSR) in organizations as an interesting challenge in (higher) education. (...) class='Hi'>Two strategies have been proposed for the issue of CSR: a compliance strategy and a cultural change strategy (Karssing, 2001). This article focuses on the ethical and philosophical presuppositions of these different approaches. The incorporation of CSR in organizations cannot be accomplished by means of a compliance strategy only. Rather, it needs to be supplemented by a strategy aimed at stimulating a transformation process on the corporate culture level. The perspective of change through dialogue is proposed as a means of innovating the curriculum and the primary processes of student education. This organizational change perspective is demonstrated by describing how (ethical) reflective aspects are integrated in the curriculum of the Free University of Amsterdam. An additional case study on organizational value learning is presented to illustrate the thesis that CSR presupposes that university is an adequate context where life-long learning begins. (shrink)

This thought-provoking book examines exactly what people mean when they accuse others of being “moralistic”. Written by an international team of philosophers Analyses what the “vice” (...) class='Hi'>of moralism might be and contrasts this with a genuine concern for morality Contributors draw upon literary sources, philosophical theories and political theory Helps readers to appreciate the role that morality really plays in our judgements and decisions. (shrink)

Unlike its predecessors, this systematic survey of the law of Athens is based on explicit discussion of how the subject might be studies, incorporating topics such as (...) the democratic political system and social structure. Technical and legal terms are explained in a comprehensive glossary. (shrink)

In an article in Philosophy R. G. Swinburne set out to argue that none of Hume's formal objections to the design argument ‘have any validity against (...) class='Hi'>a carefully articulated version of the argument’ . This, he maintained, is largely because Hume's criticisms ‘are bad criticisms of the argument in any form’ . The ensuing controversy between Swinburne and Olding 1 has focused upon the acceptable/unacceptable aspects of the dualism presupposed in Swinburne's defence of the design argument; upon whether any simplification is achieved by reducing scientific explanation to agent explanation; and upon the problems which arise from taking a man's acting upon his body as the analogy for understanding a disembodied agent acting upon matter. In this article I shall refer to the Swinburne-Olding controversy when appropriate but my main concern is to return to Swinburne's original article and argue, seriatim , that Hume's individual criticisms of the design argument are for the most part a great deal more powerful than Swinburne allowed. I shall contend that cumulatively they destroy the design argument as any sort of rational foundation for theistic belief. But first I shall indicate briefly the character of the argument together with one or two of the distinctions and refinements in terms of which it has been found helpful to carry on the discussion in recent years. (shrink)

A lucidly written and original contribution to the study of the concept of expression. "The aim has been to construct an analysis from the examination of typical (...) forms of human expressions and from the logical implications of our description of such expressions." An interesting theory emerges from such an analysis in Chapters I and II. The theory is "extended to language in Chapter III and to art in Chapters IV and V." Chapter I deals with behavior and expression and plausibly argues for the thesis that intentionality is characteristic of expressible states of the person and that these expressions are "noncontingently connected with behavioral patterns associated with them." Chapter II takes up the topic of inference. It begins with the distinction between "Ø-expression" and "expression of Ø." The former is claimed to be a "description of certain observable features of a situation;" and the latter is an "inference warranting expression, relating some intentional state of a person to particular aspects of his observable behavior." It is argued that the nature of warrantable inference is non-causal, but "one which moves from a part of a conceptual complex to another part, or to the whole of it." Chapter III contains a good discussion of the distinction between belief and opinion, expressive and performative uses of language. The chapter concludes with the statement that "linguistic expression, like its behavioral counterpart, preserves an inferential connection with intentional states of the person." The last two chapters deal with art as expression. The appendix contains quotations from prominent expression theorists. A useful bibliography is also provided.--A. S. C. (shrink)

An account and development of Arthur Murphy's Theory of Practical Reason and its application to contemporary moral problems. Chapter II gives a schematic account of Murphy's (...) class='Hi'> theory of normative discourse. Chapter III contrasts this theory with other theories and approaches. The author justly remarks that "Murphy's intent has been primarily to restore proper balance among considerations that play a role in practical discourse and to steer clear of the pitfalls which would impair or diminish the effectiveness of reason in human actions." Chapter IV deals with "the contemporary erosion of practical reason and critique of existentialistic [[sic]] ethics." Chapter V contains an interesting discussion of Murphy's conception of developing and dynamic self as responsible agent. It gives recognition to the moral self as basic condition that underlies the activity of practical justification. The final chapter undertakes practical applications of the theory expounded. The monograph is a good exposition and defense of Murphy's important contribution to contemporary moral philosophy.--A. S. C. (shrink)

To a cognitive psychologist discourse comprehension poses a number of interesting problems both in terms of mental representation and mental operations. In this paper we suggest that (...) certain of these problems can be brought into clear focus by employing a procedural approach to discourse description. In line with this approach a general framework for the mental representation of discourse is discussed in which distinctions between different types of memory partitions are proposed. It is argued that one needs to distinguish both between focussed representations available in immediate working memory and nonfocussed representations available in long-term memory and also between representations arising from the asserted information in the discourse and those arising from what is presupposed by it. In the second half of the paper a particular problem of anaphoric reference is discussed within the context of this framework. A general memory search procedure is outlined which contains three parameters for determining the search operation. We then attempt to describe certain anaphoric expressions such as personal pronouns and full definite noun phrases in terms of the execution of this search procedure, where distinctions arise from the parameter specification derived from the expressions.The cognitive psychology of discourse is concerned with the nature of the mental processes entailed in understanding what is written or spoken, and the problem of how these processes might be realised in the mind of the understander given the psychological constraints of limited attention and memory which we know to obtain. One very attractive line of attack is to view the many and various aspects of a discourse as having an instructional component, in the sense that the reader or listener is being instructed to assemble representations of the elements of discourse in a particular way. An example of this is to be found in a treatment of topic marking within the topic/comment distinction (Halliday, 1976): topic identification may be hought of as an instruction to implement a procedure in which the topic content is construed as an address in memory to which new (comment) information is to be affixed (e.g. Broadbent, 1973; Haviland & Clark, 1974).While any attempt at producing a process-model for comprehensioninevitably makes use of such a procedural view, it is also sensible to consider a text as having a content, which is more directly interpret-able as a set of statements. In the present paper, we shall first consider the question of text content. This immediately raises the problem of how to treat anaphoric reference, which is one of the key contributors to text cohesion. Finally, we shall attempt to illustrate how the instructional or procedural aspect of discourse interacts with the content aspect by reference to a specific problem of anaphoric reference. (shrink)

Although there are many different philosophical hares that could be started by the use of the term ‘historical fact’ I am interested in pursuing one that is (...) related to the historian's attitude to testimony. By way of preliminary, however, I should say something about my use of the word ‘fact’. A contrast that sets off my use best is probably that between fact and theory. This distinction is at once methodological and epistemological in that it concerns the structure of inquiry as well as the structure of secure belief. As far as inquiry is concerned it is plausible to suppose that an investigation begins with a problem or a puzzle, the delineation of which requires certain data in the form of propositions that are known to be true, or are taken for granted or commonly agreed upon as sufficiently secure to provide a grounding for the inquiry. It is to cover such data that I am using the word ‘fact’ and hence it will not refer to just any true proposition. Theories however stand as the outcome of inquiry and involve generality and inference and classification in a way that facts do not. It is interesting that the term ‘datum’ came into use in English at the same time that the word ‘fact’, which had meant ‘a deed or action’, acquired the sort of meaning that interests me here. (shrink)

The question I wish to explore is this: Does idealism conflict with common sense? Unfortunately, the answer I give may seem like a rather banal one: It (...) depends. What do we mean by ‘idealism’ and ‘common sense?’ I distinguish three main varieties of idealism: absolute idealism, Berkeleyan idealism, and dualistic idealism. After clarifying what is meant by common sense, I consider whether our three idealisms run afoul of it. The first does, but the latter two don’t. I conclude that while Moore’s famous common sense critique is sound against external world skepticism, against Berkeleyan idealism and dualist idealism it is unavailing. (shrink)

Mealey's etiological distinction between primary and secondary sociopathy blurs the delineation between individual and group differences. She uses physiological evidence to support her claim of genetic (...) class='Hi'>influences, neglecting variability within social classes, frequency of delinquent behavior in upper and middle classes (measured by self-report), and discontinuity of criminal behavior across the life span. Finally, Mealey's proposals for differential intervention fall short of a future agenda, which should tailor to individual needs, not social classes. (shrink)

That the legacy of Berkeley's philosophy has been a largely sceptical one is perhaps rather surprising. For he himself took it as one of his objectives (...) class='Hi'>to undermine scepticism. He roundly denied that there were ‘any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down’. Yet Hume was to write of Berkeley that ‘most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, Bayle not excepted’. And it has become something of a commonplace to say that Berkeley's philosophy is sceptical in direction, if not in intention. He is represented as a half-hearted sceptic, applying radical empiricist principles in his treatment of matter but baulking at their implications when he came to consider spirits. Hume is credited with being the more thoroughgoing of the two. Berkeley had denied the substantiality of extended things. Hume felt obliged, by parity of reasoning, to deny the substantiality of the self. On his account of the mind there is ‘properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different’. It is commonly supposed that Berkeley, in maintaining the quite contrary view that we know ourselves to be simple, undivided beings, showed a lack of rigour or consistency. (shrink)

These two small works are a good supplement to Rescher’s recent trilogy. Whereas the systems-theoretic approach is employed in Methodological Pragmatism in dealing with the problem (...) class='Hi'> of the legitimation of claims to factual knowledge or cognitive rationality, Dialectics deals with the argumentation aspect of thesis-introduction rather than the logical aspect of thesis-derivation. Although some key notions such as the idea of burden of proof and presumption have been stated in the former work, what is offered here is a systematic discussion of a disputational model of inquiry. The principal aims are "to exhibit the sociocommunal roots of the foundations of rationality, to provide an instrument for the critique of scepticism implicit in the cognitive solipsism of the Cartesian approach, and to illuminate the communal and controversy-oriented aspects of rational argumentation and inquiry—scientific inquiry in particular." Again, Rescher limits his discussion to "the probative mechanism in the factual domain." This book, if it were not for its price, should be a good supplement to a course in "informal" logic which focuses on argumentation rather than on mere evaluation of arguments. Plausible Reasoning provides the mechanism for evaluation of plausibility claims as distinct from probabilistic ones. The basic differences between these two types of claims are clearly discussed. "Plausibility is essentially a classificatory concept which ranks theses in terms of the standing and solidity of their cognitive basis. Plausibility grades theses by an external or extrinsic standard of the hierarchical nature of their supporting bases. It classifies propositions by the status of the evidential sources or validating principles that vouch for them. Probability weighs alternatives and evaluates theses by this relative contentual weight of the supporting considerations."—A.S.C. (shrink)