These two small works are a good supplement to Rescher’s recent trilogy. Whereas the systems-theoretic approach is employed in Methodological Pragmatism in dealing with the problem of the legitimation of claims to factual knowledge or cognitive rationality, Dialectics deals with the argumentation aspect of thesis-introduction rather than the logical aspect of thesis-derivation. Although some key notions such as the idea of burden of proof and presumption have been stated in the former work, what is offered here is a systematic discussion (...) of a disputational model of inquiry. The principal aims are "to exhibit the sociocommunal roots of the foundations of rationality, to provide an instrument for the critique of scepticism implicit in the cognitive solipsism of the Cartesian approach, and to illuminate the communal and controversy-oriented aspects of rational argumentation and inquiry—scientific inquiry in particular." Again, Rescher limits his discussion to "the probative mechanism in the factual domain." This book, if it were not for its price, should be a good supplement to a course in "informal" logic which focuses on argumentation rather than on mere evaluation of arguments. Plausible Reasoning provides the mechanism for evaluation of plausibility claims as distinct from probabilistic ones. The basic differences between these two types of claims are clearly discussed. "Plausibility is essentially a classificatory concept which ranks theses in terms of the standing and solidity of their cognitive basis. Plausibility grades theses by an external or extrinsic standard of the hierarchical nature of their supporting bases. It classifies propositions by the status of the evidential sources or validating principles that vouch for them. Probability weighs alternatives and evaluates theses by this relative contentual weight of the supporting considerations."—A.S.C. (shrink)

"One basic and underlying assumption of this investigation will be that there is a distinct continuity and development in Berkeley's thought which can be traced through all of his reflective analyses of the problem of perception." The essay argues for Berkeley's theory of perception as a "prototype of the phenomenalists." It argues also for Berkeley's incorporation of elements from the representative theory of perception. Of special interest is the treatment of Berkeley's doctrine of "suggestion" and its connection with the role (...) of imagination in the perception of physical objects. The linguistic aspect of Berkeley's work is minimized. Berkeley's theory of notions receives only a passing reference. The last third of the book is a clear and useful discussion of Berkeley and contemporary phenomenalism. It is suggested, though not shown, that Berkeley has affinity with contemporary phenomenology of perception.--A. S. C. (shrink)

An able and clear defense of Bradley's principal theses and the underlying conception of metaphysical enterprise. "This is a book about a metaphysician, about metaphysics, and, most importantly, it attempts to develop elements of a metaphysical position long the lines of what is called Absolute Idealism." The Introduction takes up the Verificationists [[sic]] argument and two recent accounts of metaphysics. Part I devotes ten Chapters to the elucidation and defense of Bradley's conception of reality. It culminates in examining three alternative (...) accounts of "Real". Part II considers "the major philosophical theories of the self in order to defend Bradley's Theory of the self within his metaphysical scheme."--A. S. C. (shrink)

This is a critical edition of the work published in 1681, two years after Hobbes' death. The dialogue contains mature reflections of Hobbes on the doctrine of sovereignty. It deals with the relation between law and reason, sovereign power, crimes, heresies and punishments. The editor's introduction sets forth arguments for regarding the text as a complete work, contrary to the views of L. Stephen, Tönnies, and Robertson. A critical analysis of the argument in the dialogue is also provided indicating the (...) relation of the dialogue to Hobbes' political philosophy. The dialogue is interesting in portraying the more "liberal" side of Hobbes. It is an invaluable aid to the study of Hobbes.--A. S. C. (shrink)

The author addresses the question of how to use value-learning processes to integrate corporate social responsibility (CSR) in organizations as an interesting challenge in (higher) education. Two strategies have been proposed for the issue of CSR: a compliance strategy and a cultural change strategy (Karssing, 2001). This article focuses on the ethical and philosophical presuppositions of these different approaches. The incorporation of CSR in organizations cannot be accomplished by means of a compliance strategy only. Rather, it needs to be supplemented (...) by a strategy aimed at stimulating a transformation process on the corporate culture level. The perspective of change through dialogue is proposed as a means of innovating the curriculum and the primary processes of student education. This organizational change perspective is demonstrated by describing how (ethical) reflective aspects are integrated in the curriculum of the Free University of Amsterdam. An additional case study on organizational value learning is presented to illustrate the thesis that CSR presupposes that university is an adequate context where life-long learning begins. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive and appreciative account of Dewey’s philosophy of value. It succeeds in rectifying certain current misconceptions of Dewey’s aims and contributions to moral philosophy, and in clearly presenting a coherent theory of value. Gouinlock begins his account by laying stress upon Dewey’s Experience and Nature as a key to Dewey’s thought. Chapter 1 is devoted to this task. It is held that "Dewey develops and articulates an inclusive philosophy by characterizing such things as art, science, and value (...) with a common set of concepts denoting the generic traits of experience." There is also a discussion of Dewey’s philosophic method and the uses and abuses of experience. Chapter 2 deals with man and nature and Dewey’s critical response to bifurcation between mind and body, and the relation between individual and society. Chapter 3 begins with Nature and Value. Here one finds a good discussion of ends-in-view and values. A great stress is laid on Dewey’s use of metaphysical concepts in value analysis, in particular the needed stress on the inclusive unity of means and end. (shrink)

§1. The origins of recursion theory. In dedicating a book to Steve Kleene, I referred to him as the person who made recursion theory into a theory. Recursion theory was begun by Kleene's teacher at Princeton, Alonzo Church, who first defined the class of recursive functions; first maintained that this class was the class of computable functions ; and first used this fact to solve negatively some classical problems on the existence of algorithms. However, it was Kleene who, in his (...) thesis and in his subsequent attempts to convince himself of Church's Thesis, developed a general theory of the behavior of the recursive functions. He continued to develop this theory and extend it to new situations throughout his mathematical career. Indeed, all of the research which he did had a close relationship to recursive functions.Church's Thesis arose in an accidental way. In his investigations of a system of logic which he had invented, Church became interested in a class of functions which he called the λ-definable functions. Initially, Church knew that the successor function and the addition function were λ-definable, but not much else. During 1932, Kleene gradually showed1 that this class of functions was quite extensive; and these results became an important part of his thesis 1935a. (shrink)

This book is another work on the voluminous literature on the Private Language Argument. The author devotes his arguments solely to a refutation of "anti-private language thesis" as it appears in the articles of N. Malcolm, J. D. Carney, and Newton Garver. Two arguments of the thesis are considered without ascription to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. The first is the familiar "The Diary Keeper Argument" found in Wittgenstein : "The claim that the supposition that one could keep a record of a (...) particular kind of sensation having no publicly observable behavioral or circumstantial indicators is unintelligible". Smerud’s attack on this argument in part relies on Ayer’s paper "Can There Be a Private Language?" on the issue of recognition. For the issue on the criterion requirement, Smerud appealed to J. J. Thomson’s paper "Private Languages" as a basis for argument. No note is taken of the criticism of the relevance of verification principle to the issue in D. Locke’s Myself and Others. (shrink)

In an article in Philosophy R. G. Swinburne set out to argue that none of Hume's formal objections to the design argument ‘have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument’ . This, he maintained, is largely because Hume's criticisms ‘are bad criticisms of the argument in any form’ . The ensuing controversy between Swinburne and Olding 1 has focused upon the acceptable/unacceptable aspects of the dualism presupposed in Swinburne's defence of the design argument; upon whether any simplification (...) is achieved by reducing scientific explanation to agent explanation; and upon the problems which arise from taking a man's acting upon his body as the analogy for understanding a disembodied agent acting upon matter. In this article I shall refer to the Swinburne-Olding controversy when appropriate but my main concern is to return to Swinburne's original article and argue, seriatim , that Hume's individual criticisms of the design argument are for the most part a great deal more powerful than Swinburne allowed. I shall contend that cumulatively they destroy the design argument as any sort of rational foundation for theistic belief. But first I shall indicate briefly the character of the argument together with one or two of the distinctions and refinements in terms of which it has been found helpful to carry on the discussion in recent years. (shrink)

Originally published in 1981, this book provides a detailed account of the emergence of the children's rights movement, and analyses the concept of a right. It considers the justifications which may be sought when rights are claimed. Particular attention is given to the problem which arises when different rights are seen to be in conflict with each other or with other kinds of moral consideration. These arguments are then examined with regard to such special features of children as their incomplete (...) but developing rationality and their material dependence on adults. (shrink)

An able and clear defense of Bradley's principal theses and the underlying conception of metaphysical enterprise. "This is a book about a metaphysician, about metaphysics, and, most importantly, it attempts to develop elements of a metaphysical position long the lines of what is called Absolute Idealism." The Introduction takes up the Verificationists [[sic]] argument and two recent accounts of metaphysics. Part I devotes ten Chapters to the elucidation and defense of Bradley's conception of reality. It culminates in examining three alternative (...) accounts of "Real". Part II considers "the major philosophical theories of the self in order to defend Bradley's Theory of the self within his metaphysical scheme."--A. S. C. (shrink)

The aim "has been to provide the general reader with a reliable and trustworthy account of the life, teaching and influence of Confucius and to show how a man, comparatively insignificant and obscure in his own day, came to occupy a supreme place as the Great and Revered Teacher of the Chinese people." This aim is admirably fulfilled in this sympathetic study of the roots and history of Confucian civilization and its continuing revival of interest, both in the mainland and (...) in areas of Chinese Dispersion, in Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Part I gives a good account of the "unique and distinctive place given to Confucius, the founder of one of the world’s greatest systems of religion and philosophical thought." A persuasive case is offered for the defense of the religious dimension of Confucian thought, though its content is essentially ethical. Professor Smith has, in the main, succeeded in conveying the Confucian religious attitude. Part II devotes to a discussion of Confucian civilization from the triumph of Confucianism in the Han Dynasty, and its role until the founding of the Republic of China in 1911. It deals with the development of Neo-Confucian systems and the state cult. A great emphasis is placed on the process that led to the apex of the Confucian civilization in the Manchu Dynasty. The book concludes with an assessment of Confucius: "The great ideals of individual perfection and a harmonious social order which Confucius inculcated are as relevant in the modern world as they were nearly 2500 years ago.... He retains his place, and will still retain his place among the wise ones of the earth who sought after righteousness and found it a thing of great price. Confucius is China’s greatest gift to mankind." The book is a contribution to contemporary reassessment of Confucian thought.—A. S. C. (shrink)

These volumes provide a large introduction to the works of modern value theory from their beginnings in J. Bentham, F. Nietzsche, and H. Lotze to the more recent Anglo-American studies. Volume I is concerned with "the German-Language Group." Extensive discussion is devoted to the views of F. Brentano, A. Meinong, C. von Ehrenfels, J. C. Kreibig, E. Heyde, H. Rickert, H. Münsterberg, M. Scheler, K. Wiederhold, W. Stern, F. Wilken, M. Beck, and V. Krafts. It provides a good conspectus of (...) varieties of nineteenth century value theories. The author aims at an exposition rather than critical treatment of the various philosophers. Each chapter contains a useful bibliography. Of more contemporary interest is Volume II which deals with the Anglo-American Group. One finds here a detailed presentation of the theories of W. M. Urban, J. Dewey, B. Bosanquet, D. Prall, C. G. Shaw, R. B. Perry, D. H. Parkel, W. Stern, A. C. Garnett, J. N. Findlay, E. Brightman, B. E. Jessup, C. I. Lewis, R. Lepley, S. C. Pepper, Everett Hall, R. Hartman, and W. D. Lamont. Shorter discussions deal with works of A. L. Hillard, E. M. Adams, and K. Aschenbrenner. Liberal quotations from original sources are interspersed throughout the exposition. The clarification of issues is not always successful. The author does provide a good focus, however, for important passages from the works discussed. Regrettably, one finds an omission of the view of David Pole, the absence of a summary section on each theory discussed, and the absence of an index. Nevertheless, the students of value theory can find in this work a useful tool of research. The comprehensive scope provides a rich variety of contributions to the important field of value theory.—A.S.C. (shrink)

This book is an anthology of essays dealing with the problem of the justification of claims to factual knowledge of various sorts. All, except one excerpted from a book, were originally journal articles. Part one, contains essays by R. F. Holland, William Earle, and E. J. Furlong on the problem of memory. Part two, contains essays by A. J. Ayer, C. H. Whiteley, and H. H. Price. Part three contains essays by Ayer, R. J. Hirst, and C. H. Whiteley. A (...) general introduction precedes the essays. A useful bibliographical essay is also given.--A. S. C. (shrink)

The fourth publication of the monograph series of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, this lengthy letter of Leibniz on Chinese philosophy is an important contribution to East-West philosophical dialogue, for it depicts a sympathetic yet critical assessment of Chinese philosophy on the basis of translations and secondary sources available to Leibniz. Leibniz’s interest, as the translators point out, was not merely ecumenical, but an expression of high regard for the intrinsic contributions of Chinese thought. In spite of mistakes (...) in chronology, authorship, and interpretation of key notions of Chinese philosophy, Leibniz’s letter is important in the use of philosophical argumentation in the rebuttal of the historical and theological arguments given by Antonio Caballero a Santa Maria and Nicholas Longobardi who opposed the accommodationist position of Matteo Ricci. Leibniz’s letter cannot be regarded as a good guide to Chinese philosophy. But it has a place in the history of East-West philosophy in exemplifying the commendable attitude that combines serious appreciation and critical assessment. The translators have provided an excellent introductory guide to this Discourse. The explanatory notes and comments are quite helpful to the readers. An appendix on "Variant Readings of the Text" and a good bibliography are also provided.—A.S.C. (shrink)

A welcome reprint of an important work of Hutcheson with an excellent philosophical and scholarly study of the issues between Hutcheson and the rationalist Gilbert Burnet in respect to the former's contributions to metaethics. The study, modestly entitled "Editor's Introduction" is a philosophical contribution to the study of the Moral Sense Theory which argues forcibly for the plausibility of Hutcheson's epistemology of morals as a form of non-cognitivism that recognizes the proper role of reason. Peach adopts a defeasibility interpretation of (...) Hutcheson's Moral Theory. Unlike the principle of Benevolence, which is a moral principle, "the principle of approval is primarily descriptive and psychological." It is maintained that the vindication of Hutcheson's theory appeals to "the concept of a way of life in which the satisfaction of examined desires is maximized, to the concept of the kind of person, all things considered, one wants to be." Professor Peach's challenging interpretation is worthy of careful study. The appendix reprints the correspondence between Gilbert Burnet and Francis Hutcheson.--A. S. C. (shrink)

An account and development of Arthur Murphy's Theory of Practical Reason and its application to contemporary moral problems. Chapter II gives a schematic account of Murphy's theory of normative discourse. Chapter III contrasts this theory with other theories and approaches. The author justly remarks that "Murphy's intent has been primarily to restore proper balance among considerations that play a role in practical discourse and to steer clear of the pitfalls which would impair or diminish the effectiveness of reason in human (...) actions." Chapter IV deals with "the contemporary erosion of practical reason and critique of existentialistic [[sic]] ethics." Chapter V contains an interesting discussion of Murphy's conception of developing and dynamic self as responsible agent. It gives recognition to the moral self as basic condition that underlies the activity of practical justification. The final chapter undertakes practical applications of the theory expounded. The monograph is a good exposition and defense of Murphy's important contribution to contemporary moral philosophy.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This is an excellent compilation of essays honoring the seventieth birthday of Joseph Needham. Sivin’s preface plausibly argues for the thesis that, "since the theoretical and practical approaches seem in traditional societies everywhere to have formed a unity with the social, political, and spiritual aspects of life, the reader can enrich his understanding of the latter to the extent that he is aware of the former". The essays belong to two complementary parts. The first four essays by Derek J. de (...) Solla Price, S. Nakayama, A. C. Graham, and Mitukuni Yosida furnish valuable critical aids and perspectives on Needham’s monumental work, Science and Civilization in China. The first three essays contain matters of philosophical interest. The remaining five essays display a variety of representative approaches to Chinese science in the areas of astronomy, Mohist optics, elixir plants, medicine and anesthesia in China and Japan. (shrink)

Dr Ian Ramsey has made considerable use of the word ‘disclosure’ in what he has to say about religion and in his attempts to give an account of the meaning of religious language. He sometimes speaks of ‘discernment’ or ‘insight’ but ‘disclosure’ is the word he normally favours. In what follows I shall ask: what a disclosure is, to what extent Dr Ramsey's use of the notion leads to confusions, and what questions have to be faced in order to resolve (...) these confusions. (shrink)

A clearly written book that purports to analyze "the ends men pursue, and the ways in which these ends are ordered in some kind of system." The driving force behind the analysis is the attempt to present ends, or at least some important ends, as complex entities having a discernible and significant structure, and then to present the priorities, preferences, and relationships that men impose on their ends as themselves constituting a complex, coherent structure, whose principles of ordering may be (...) discerned and criticized. Part one deals with the structure and ordering of ends and reflects the influence of Kant and Rawls. Part two deals with rational ends and social structures, and part three with life and death as values. Of great practical interest are certain concepts such as life plan and budget risk in dealing with the problems of life and death. The book repays careful study.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This book is an excellent collection of papers which partly spring from, and partly bear on the Study Group on the Unity of Knowledge held in various universities, October, 1967-March, 1970. The papers all bear on the problem of reduction. In "Unity of Physical Law and Levels of Description," Ilya Prigogine argues that organized structures need physical laws of organization, not of entropy only, to explain their genesis and operation." The editor’s paper, "Reducibility: Another Side Issue," argues, following Polanyi, that (...) living things as machines already transcend physics, since they demand both chemical and engineering principles for their explanation." "How is Mechanism Conceivable?" points out that ordinary ways of talking about and explaining behavior, i.e., as involving intention and purpose, differs in logic from mechanistic explanation. But this difference in logic of the two languages is "never an obstacle to the reduction of one theory to another, indeed, there is always such a noncongruence of the conceptual mesh." Anthony J. P. Kenny’s "The Homunculus Fallacy" argues against "the reckless application of human-being predicates to insufficiently human-like objects." In "Behavior, Belief, and Emotion," A. C. MacIntyre argues for the thesis that "there is no necessary connection between at least some emotions and particular forms of behavior." In "The Critique of Artificial Reason," H. Dreyfus criticizes both the empirical and a priori arguments for optimism underlying the work in artificial intelligence. It displays the underlying philosophical assumption inherent in Western philosophical tradition since Plato. The last two papers concern Polanyi’s theory of knowledge. In "Tacit Knowledge and the Concept of Mind," W. T. Scott shows how Ryle’s "Concept of Mind can be significantly extended by considering certain features of the philosophical position that Michael Polanyi has developed around the concept of tacit knowing." R. S. Cohen’s "Tacit, Social and Hopeful" discusses the difficulties in Polanyi’s epistemology and the merits of the logical reconstruction work in science. Only the papers by Dreyfus and Scott have been previously published. Throughout the collection, the editor has provided useful introductory remarks focusing upon the unifying themes in the collection.—A. S. C. (shrink)

This is a challenging and original work on the concept of justification and its application to ethical statements. The book divides into two parts. The first part is devoted to a systematic treatment of the nature of justification. It begins with a critical rejection of the deductive model. Wellman presents plausible arguments for the existence of non-deductive evidences in ethics and shows how ethical theories can be tested by "thought-experiment" as analogous to the confirmation of scientific theories by laboratory trials. (...) An interesting kind of inference termed "conductive reasoning" is described. It is argued that this third form of reasoning can be validly used in justifying ethical conclusions. Distinctive of conductive reasoning is its non-formal and inconclusive feature. Its validity is alleged to lie in its dependence upon the content of the argument. But by and large there is no way to judge the validity of these basic ethical arguments but by thinking them through and feeling their logical force." Wellman goes on to develop a challenge-response model for understanding the nature of justification. Justification is "to be understood essentially as a process of responding to challenges made." However, Wellman makes no attempt to consider the role of moral concepts in determining the validity of conductive reasoning and its role in the justification of ethical statements. Part II considers the dimensions of ethical justification in terms of the model of challenge and response. Seven species of challenge are described: truth, truth-value, meaningfulness, validity, validity-value, competence, and knowability. On the whole the book contains challenging views and material for the epistemology of ethics.--A. S. C. (shrink)

A collection of eight essays, this book is not intended as a comprehensive anthology like K. T. Fann’s Symposium on Austin. G. J. Warnock’s foreword indicates an attempt to rectify the apparent misunderstandings of Austin and his intentions. With the exception of the essays by D. F. Pears and John R. Searle, all are written especially for the volume. Three of the works, those by Sir Isaiah Berlin, George Pitcher, and G. J. Warnock, present an informative account of Austin’s activities (...) at Oxford. Professor Berlin’s "Austin and the Early Beginning of Oxford Philosophy" offers a valuable personal account of Austin’s early years as "a very clear, acute, and original intellect." In the "Thursday meetings", Austin’s main purpose seemed to Berlin "then, and afterwards, to be the establishing of particular truths with a view to generalizing from them, or eliciting principles at a later stage." Pitcher’s "Austin: A Personal Memoir" gives an account of Austin’s stay and influence at Harvard in 1955. Warnock’s "Saturday Mornings" recollects Austin’s activities in the 1950’s. (shrink)

This is the first volume in the Vienna Circle collection. The editorial committee plans to publish a series of about thirty volumes between 1973 and 1980. This gigantic task should render immense service to both historians and contemporary philosophers. The basic aim is to present in English anthologies of "the most important work of single members, which should contain besides a detailed essay on the man a complete bibliography of his work." The present large anthology of the writings of Neurath (...) presents a valuable collection of memories, in lieu of a biographical essay, revealing Neurath’s manysided interests and activities. Of more strictly philosophical interest are the short essays that deal with the history of optics, the problem of pleasure maximum, the scientific conception of the world; and a long selection from the book Empirical Sociology: The Scientific Content of History and Political Economy. (shrink)

This book formulates and defends a form of idealism that shows the influences of Kant, Leibniz, Peirce, and Anglo-American neo-Hegelians. The general position is characterized as conceptual idealism. "It maintains that the concepts we standardly employ in constituting our view of reality—even extramental, material reality-involves an essential reference to minds and their capabilities." Conceptual idealism is distinct from the causal version; it is essentially concerned with the deployment of our present conceptual framework. "A concept is mind-involving in the present, conceptualistic (...) sense if its full and adequate explication—not just on the side of its semantical meaning-content, but also on that of its applicability-conditions—cannot be carried out without reference to those functions which, like thinking, imagining, assuming, etc., are characteristic capabilities of mind.". (shrink)

These essays "develop in a more ample and emphatic form the pragmatic perspective of the idealistic position" defended in previous books. The basic question deals with validating the criterion employed in the practice of determining factual truth. The pragmatic thesis is defended along the criterial rather than propositional line. Criterial pragmatism asserts "that a proposition is to be accepted if it conforms to an epistemologically warranted criterion, and that a criterion is warranted if its adoption as a principle of propositional (...) acceptance is maximally success-promoting." It is concerned with validating methodology rather than establishing substantive theses or validating specific criteria for factual knowledge. "Since the rational espousal of a factual truth must be governed by some appropriate criterion of acceptance, and any such criterion is in effect methodological, it follows that in the factual domain practical reason is basic to the theoretical.". (shrink)

An excellent collection of lectures. The collection consists of the following: Carl C. Hempel, "On the Structure of Scientific Theories"; W. V. Quine, "Stimulus and Meaning"; Stuart Hampshire, "Aesthetic as the Middle Ground"; H. D. Aiken, "On the Concept of a Moral Principle"; J. O. Urmson, "Utilitarianism"; John Wild, "Is There an Existential A Priori?"; Aron Gurwitsch, "The Husserlian Conception of the Intentionality of Consciousness"; Quentin Lauer, "The Phenomenon of Reason"; and Walter Kaufmann, "The Riddle of Oedipus: Tragedy and Philosophy." (...) These essays represent original contributions to philosophy of science, ethics, and phenomenology and existentialism.--A. S. C. (shrink)

For scholars of American philosophy, this anthology of essays on S. C. Pepper's works on metaphysics, aesthetics, and value theory is especially a welcome one. Also included is a reprint of a little known but valuable essay by Pepper entitled "Metaphor in Philosophy," which originally appeared in volume 3 of Phillip S. Wiener's Dictionary of the History of Ideas. In this essay, Pepper discusses his root metaphor theory in relation to Bacon and Kant, and some contemporary uses of the notion (...) of paradigm, e.g., Wittgenstein and Kuhn. Lewis E. Hahn's "The Stephen C. Pepper Papers, 1903-1972" gives an informative account of six book-length unpublished manuscripts in the Pepper Archives at the Southern Illinois University. The rest of the essays concentrate on the various aspects of Pepper's works. A few deal with aesthetic theory and its application to critical practice. Of philosophical interests are papers by Elmer H. Duncan, David B. Richardson, Robert J. Yanal, Robert L. Armstrong, and Brian Caraher, and a short essay by Charles Hartshorne and a response by Joseph H. Monast. Duncan gives a just but critical account of the neglect of Pepper's Sources of Value, and a highly appreciative appraisal of Pepper's World Hypotheses. Caraher's careful essay on the conflicting root metaphors in Frege's theory of meaning offers interesting application of Pepper's conception of formism and contextualism to problems in Frege's philosophy. A variety of problems such as the root metaphor theory, descriptive definition and aesthetic experience are discussed. Efron's long introductory essay entitled "Pepper's Continuing Value" serves its purpose well in terms of indicating Pepper's influence in non-philosophical disciplines and the problems that arise in Pepper's value theory. What is missed is a sustained critical examination of Pepper's root metaphor theory, characterization of the various world hypotheses including Pepper's own selectivism, and its relation to ethical theory. The anthology however is useful in indicating the scope of Pepper's influence and the need to examine his contributions with reference to contemporary philosophical problems.--A.S.C. (shrink)

This interesting and original essay deals with the sense in which the self is a problem, i.e. the sense in which the self poses a problem. The central thesis is carefully argued: "that if there is a problem of the self, its solution is that self is a problem." Central to the thesis is the distinction between persons and selves. The concept of a person is in Heideggerian terms "ontic" in the sense that it does not arise from any theoretical (...) concern. The concept of self is an "ontological" one. Chapter one argues for the assumption that "persons can be generally inconsistent" and for the distinction between computers and persons. In Chapter two, "the self" is defined as "the locus of the inconsistency." The remaining essays deal with the problems of identity, immortality, consciousness and the pivotal role of the self in philosophical controversy. The book is clearly written and its thesis is carefully supported by arguments. It is an original contribution to the philosophy of mind.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This new addition to the series New Studies in Practical Philosophy edited by W. D. Hudson is a study of deontic moral judgment, in particular of moral concepts which embody standards for the assessment of claims to right or wrong actions. Three main theses are quite clearly stated. The first thesis concerns the distinctive character of the moral point of view which is irreducible to either logical or factual considerations. The second thesis is that moral judgments claim interpersonal validity in (...) the sense that the speaker makes the implicit claim that every reflective agent who considers the judgment "ought to agree" with the judgment as a correct one. The third thesis pertains to the moral disagreement. It is maintained that moral disagreements are "in principle" decidable, not by way of deductive subsumption under the criteria governing the uses of moral concepts, but by a method of inquiry analogous to that of scientific inquiry involving the use of hypothesis. The author acknowledges his debt to Arthur Prior, J. Kovesi, and M. Polanyi. The book is good in raising questions on the relation between moral inquiry and scientific inquiry, the significance of the open texture of moral terms and its relation to ethical argumentation, and the problem of reconciling differences of moral beliefs in the setting of their connection with nonmoral beliefs.—A. S. C. (shrink)

A lucidly written and original contribution to the study of the concept of expression. "The aim has been to construct an analysis from the examination of typical forms of human expressions and from the logical implications of our description of such expressions." An interesting theory emerges from such an analysis in Chapters I and II. The theory is "extended to language in Chapter III and to art in Chapters IV and V." Chapter I deals with behavior and expression and plausibly (...) argues for the thesis that intentionality is characteristic of expressible states of the person and that these expressions are "noncontingently connected with behavioral patterns associated with them." Chapter II takes up the topic of inference. It begins with the distinction between "Ø-expression" and "expression of Ø." The former is claimed to be a "description of certain observable features of a situation;" and the latter is an "inference warranting expression, relating some intentional state of a person to particular aspects of his observable behavior." It is argued that the nature of warrantable inference is non-causal, but "one which moves from a part of a conceptual complex to another part, or to the whole of it." Chapter III contains a good discussion of the distinction between belief and opinion, expressive and performative uses of language. The chapter concludes with the statement that "linguistic expression, like its behavioral counterpart, preserves an inferential connection with intentional states of the person." The last two chapters deal with art as expression. The appendix contains quotations from prominent expression theorists. A useful bibliography is also provided.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This anthology consists of a wealth of selections from pre-Confucian literature to Han Fei Tzu’s legalistic writings. Ample space is given to pre-Confucian classes to display the background of Confucius and Chinese philosophical thought. The selections are made from the point of view of a political philosopher. Major thinkers are well represented. Each selection is preceded by a brief general introduction. The editor succeeds well in presenting the spectrum and rich variety of classical Chinese philosophy. Explanatory notes are on the (...) whole quite helpful to students, so also is the bibliography for further readings. For the students of Chinese philosophy, however, this anthology is no substitute for W. T. Chan’s Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. For students of political thought this anthology could increase its value had the editor written a longer introduction dealing with the intimate connection of Chinese ethics and politics and the underlying conception of man in relation to the cosmos.—A.S.C. (shrink)

C. A. Campbell has for many years defended vigorously, and often persuasively, the following libertarian claims: that the libertarian concept of freedom of choice is meaningful; that the libertarian variety of freedom of choice is necessary for moral responsibility; and that the libertarian variety of freedom of choice is a reality. This paper will be concerned with Campbell's effort of will argument for the last claim.