Non-recent (historic) childhood sexual abuse is an important issue to research, though often regarded as taboo and frequently met with caution, avoidance or even opposition from research ethics committees. Sensitive research, such as that which asks victim-survivors to recount experiences of abuse or harm, has the propensity to be emotionally challenging for both the participant and the researcher. However, most research suggests that any distress experienced is usually momentary and not of any clinical significance. Moreover, this type of research offers (...) a platform for voices which have often been silenced, and many participants report the cathartic effect of recounting their experiences in a safe, non-judgemental space. With regard to the course of such research, lines of inquiry which ask adult participants to discuss their experiences of childhood sexual abuse may result in a first-time disclosure of that abuse by the victim-survivor to the researcher. Guidance about how researchers should respond to first-time disclosure is lacking. In this article, we discuss our response to one research ethics committee which had suggested that for a qualitative study for which we were seeking ethical approval (investigating experiences of pregnancy and childbirth having previously survived childhood sexual abuse), any disclosure of non-recent (historic) childhood sexual abuse which had not been previously reported would result in the researcher being obliged to report it to relevant authorities. We assess this to be inconsistent with both law and professional guidance in the United Kingdom; and provide information and recommendations for researchers and research ethics committees to consider. (shrink)

This article will explore a pregnant woman's experience of relationship with the fetus, using a clinical case study in which abortion would have been clinically indicated because of severe fetal abnormality. Emphasizing the pregnant woman's actual experience in this case study helps to highlight inadequacies in how the debate about abortion is usually conducted.

Jeff Nisker describes his personal experience of a diagnosis of advanced prostate cancer and the kindnesses he received from friendly doctors. He claims that this narrative account supports the promotion of Prostate Specific Antigen screening for asymptomatic men and impugns statisticians, mistakenly thinking that their opposition to PSA screening derives from concerns about financial cost. The account inadvertently demonstrates the danger of over-reliance on a single ethical tool for critical analysis. In the first part of this response, we describe the (...) statistical evidence. The most reliable Cochrane meta-analyses have not shown that PSA screening saves lives overall. Moreover, the high false positive rate of PSA screening leads to overinvestigation which results in unnecessary anxiety and increased cases of unnecessary sepsis, urinary incontinence and sexual dysfunction. Then we describe how narrative ethics alone is an insufficient tool to make claims about policies, such as PSA screening, which have hidden harms. Although Nisker’s story-telling is compelling and evokes emotions, narrative ethics of this sort have an inherent bias against people who would be harmed by the counterfactual. Particular care must be taken to look for and consider those untellable stories. Ethicists who only consider narratives which are readily at hand risk harming those who are voiceless or protected by the status quo. PSA screening is the wrong tool to reduce prostate cancer deaths and narrative ethics is the wrong tool to appraise this policy. It is vital that the correct theoretical tools are applied to the medical and ethical questions under scrutiny. (shrink)