In this essay, I first argue that the Gray’s Elegy Argument—the dense passage in Bertrand Russell’s ‘On Denoting’—can be interpreted as a single, coherent argument against the notion that a definite description corresponds to what I call a multifaceted object—an object having multiple facets or sides. I then look into some manuscripts Russell wrote in 1904 and in 1905. I show that he had envisaged the notion of a multifaceted object and used it for two different purposes before he discovered (...) various objections to it, which he turned into the Gray’s Elegy Argument. (shrink)

In this article we compare Fine’s theory of arbitrary objects with the theory of variables that Russell formulated in his Principles of Mathematics. We argue that Russell’s early theory of variables can be seen as a prefiguration of Fine’s theory of arbitrary objects. The main difference between Russell’s theory and Fine’s account lies in their account of dependence relations between variables. Fine develops a stable view of dependence between arbitrary objects, whereas no such view is presented in Principles of Mathematics. (...) We then sketch how Russell developed the notion of dependence between arbitrary objects in some of his subsequent works. (shrink)

Organisms must adapt to environmental stresses to ensure their survival and prosperity. Different types of stresses, including thermal, mechanical, and hypoxic stresses, can alter the cellular state that accompanies changes in gene expression but not the cellular identity determined by a chromatin state that remains stable throughout life. Some tissues, such as adipose tissue, demonstrate remarkable plasticity and adaptability in response to environmental cues, enabling reversible cellular identity changes; however, the mechanisms underlying these changes are not well understood. We hypothesized (...) that positive and/or negative “Integrators” sense environmental cues and coordinate the epigenetic and transcriptional pathways required for changes in cellular identity. Adverse environmental factors such as pollution disrupt the coordinated control contributing to disease development. Further research based on this hypothesis will reveal how organisms adapt to fluctuating environmental conditions, such as temperature, extracellular matrix stiffness, oxygen, cytokines, and hormonal cues by changing their cellular identities. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper is an attempt to explain why Russell abandoned the ontology of propositions, mind-independent complex entities that are possible objects of judgements. I argue that he did so not because of any decisive argument but because he found it better to endorse the existential account of truth, according to which a judgement is true if and only if there exists a corresponding fact. In order to endorse this account, he had examined various theories of judgement before he adopted the (...) multiple-relation theory of judgement, the most feasible way he then had of espousing it. I also attempt to explain why he preferred the existential account of truth. (shrink)