We discuss problematic theoretical and empirical issues and consider alternative explanations for Grodzinsky's hypotheses regarding receptive and expressive syntactic mechanisms in agrammatic aphasia. We also explore his claims pertaining to domain-specificity and neuroanatomical localization.

Noam Chomsky's ideas and work on the human language faculty and how language is acquired opened new territory on which a whole new framework in non‐native language acquisition was established: generative second language acquisition, or GenSLA. Investigating Chomsky's principles and parameters within the GenSLA framework has brought additional and convincing evidence for the essential validity of Chomsky's original insights. This chapter highlights Chomsky's lasting legacy embodied in the GenSLA framework. In addition to interpretation, poverty of the stimulus situations provide an (...) opportunity to test Universal Grammar (UG)‐based knowledge of graded distinctions beyond simple acceptability. The Subjacency Condition was probably the most studied principle of UG in the 1980s and 1990s. Structure dependence is directly demonstrated in languages with auxiliary verb movement to form questions. The Feature Reassembly Hypothesis brought grammatical features reflected in functional categories to the front of GenSLA research. (shrink)

Paraguayan Guarani does not overtly mark tense in its inflectional system. Prior accounts of languages without obligatory morphological tense have posited a phonologically covert lexical tense, or have introduced tense semantics via a rule, in the post-syntactic interpretative component. We offer a more radical approach: Paraguayan Guarani does not have tense at the level of lexical or logical semantics. We propose that evaluation time shift, a mechanism independently attested in the narrative present in languages with tense, is more widely used (...) in Paraguayan Guarani for encoding temporal meaning. The broader consequence of our proposal is that tense is not a linguistic universal. (shrink)

The natural interpretation of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents involves selecting from each of the disjuncts the worlds that come closest to the world of evaluation. It has been long noticed that capturing this interpretation poses a problem for a minimal change semantics for counterfactuals, because selecting the closest worlds from each disjunct requires accessing the denotation of the disjuncts from the denotation of the disjunctive antecedent, which the standard boolean analysis of or does not allow (Creary and Hill, Philosophy of (...) Science 43:341–344, 1975; Nute, Journal of Philosophy 72:773–778, 1975; Fine, Mind 84(335):451–458, 1975; Ellis et al. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6:335–357, 1977). This paper argues that the failure to capture the natural interpretation of disjunctive counterfactuals provides no reason to abandon a minimal change semantics. It shows that the natural interpretation of disjunctive counterfactuals is expected once we refine our assumptions about the semantics of or and the logical form of conditionals, and (i) we assume that disjunctions introduce propositional alternatives in the semantic derivation, in line with independently motivated proposals about the semantics of or (Aloni, 2003a; Simons, Natural Language Semantics 13:271–316, 2005; Alonso-Ovalle, Disjunction in Alternative Semantics. PhD thesis, 2006); and (ii) we treat conditionals as correlative constructions, as advocated in von Fintel (1994), Izvorski (Proceedings of NELS 26, 1996), Bhatt and Pancheva (2006), and Schlenker (2004). (shrink)