This paper examines the role of the United Kingdom in the process of drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); and proceeds to discuss the impact the UDHR has had on UK law, politics and society.

Can we coherently conceive of an agent whose practical rationality is limited to merely instrumental reasoning? I argue that we cannot. Existing arguments to this effect have focused on what is required in order to have reasons to take means to our ends-or on what is required in order to be bound by the so-called ‘instrumental principle’. By contrast, I argue that consideration of the special kind of concept-use characteristic of instrumental reasoning reveals that a merely instrumentally rational agent would (...) not be so much as able to identify means to ends in the first place. I then elucidate this line of thought by testing it against three different conceptions of merely instrumentally rational agency found in the literature. I conclude by highlighting a risk associated with remaining agnostic concerning the possibility of merely instrumentally rational agents: namely, that we arrive at a false conception of our own capacity to identify means to ends as somehow isolated from our conceptions of the good. (shrink)

Human rights law proclaims that all persons are the same, and have the same rights. Yet this revolutionary claim, which has overturned political regimes and confounded conventions, has itself been criticised. The criticisms have often come from a non-legal disciplinary background - anthropology, philosophy, sociology or others. Sceptics, postmodernists, feminists, cultural relativists and multiculturalists argue that this universalist view is too simple, or even invidious and oppressive and should be rejected. This chapter explores the universalist pretensions of human rights, the (...) criticisms of this universalism, the legal modification of the simple universalist claim and finally discusses a proposal to resolve some of the tensions between these views. (shrink)

Constitutional adjudication straddles law and politics, legal and political theory. Referring to legal controversies in Canada (free expression), Ireland (sexual morality) and Italy (religion), this book examines how constitutional judgements rely upon unarticulated political commitments. This interaction between "law" and "morality" allows us to escape the dichotomy of natural law versus positivism in a time when judges increasingly act as moral guardians.

This article discusses the role of moral argument in the Constitutional case law of the Irish courts. It looks at the debate on the constitutional morality of sexuality in four major cases: a 1973 case protecting the right to use contraceptives; a 1984 case which upholds discrimination against gay men; a 1987 case limiting access to abortion information; and a 1992 case which finds a limited right to abortion in the Constitution. These cases show the role of the courts in (...) contributing to a debate on political morality, both proposing new visions of political morality, and elaborating on the requirements of the current one. (shrink)

This case note discusses the case of Baczkowski v. Poland in the European Court of Human Rights. The Court ruled that, where an elected mayor makes comments disapproving of homosexuality, and officials subsequently ban a Gay Pride march, then courts may be able to infer that the ban was discriminatory under Article 14 ECHR.

The European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") has a distinguished track record. Established under the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 ("ECHR"), it was the world's first international human rights court. It decides thousands of cases every year, and its opinions are cited world-wide. For most of its history, the Court's jurisprudence on equality was uninspiring, as it was based on a formal conception of equality. In recent years, however, the ECtHR has begun to give equality more substantive content.