Despite his wide-ranging and incisive engagement with Heidegger's thought across his career, Derrida seems to have written very little about Heidegger's Ereignis manuscripts, which, according to many commentators, constitute the place where Heidegger's thinking comes closest to Derridean deconstruction. Taking up Derrida's comments in Hospitality 1 on the figure of ‘selfhood’ in Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy, this essay argues that this dense but important moment of engagement with the Ereignis manuscripts reveals the extent to which Heidegger's thinking of selfhood, in (...) spite of its fundamentally relational character, remains thoroughly determined by ipseity, the philosopheme that links selfhood, possibility, and sovereignty within the metaphysics of presence. Beginning with a reconstruction of the link between power and selfhood in Derrida's thinking of ipseity and a close-reading of the key passage in Hospitality 1, the essay then turns to Heidegger's engagement with Hölderlin to show both the depth of Heidegger's commitment to a relational thinking of selfhood and the philosophical and rhetorical safeguards by which he ensures that the relations of difference that constitute the self continue to function in the name of the ipseity, understood as the very Ur-form of sovereign power. (shrink)

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, troth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, (...) are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

Nothing seems to follow strictly from 'X believes that p'. But if we reinterpret it to mean: 'X can consistently be described as consistently believing p'--which roughly renders, I think, Hintikka's notion of "defensibility"--we can get on with the subject, freed from the inhibitions of descriptive adequacy. But defensibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for truth: it tells us little, therefore, about the concept of belief on which it is based. It cannot, in particular, specify necessary conditions for the consistent (...) ascription of belief--as opposed to rational belief. If there are no such conditions, all belief ascriptions must be treated as atomic: which is implausible. If there are some, they must be settled on before an account of consistency can be complete. The reason is simple: it is that we have beliefs about our own beliefs. A set of first order beliefs is consistent if they can all be true together; but it is a lesson of Moore's paradox that consistency of second-order beliefs requires additional constraints. If someone both believes that p and that he does not believe that p, the propositions he believes might all be true together, yet he is inconsistent. And the characterization of second order consistency will remain incomplete, so long as nothing is said about the consistency of first order belief ascriptions. Suppose someone says and believes: "I am inconsistent: I believe both p and ~p." This is "indefensible": but is it insight, or nonsense? Breast-beating of this sort is guaranteed success: something he believes is bound to be false. But that remains diagnostically frustrating: is he inconsistent because what he said is true, or on the contrary because it is inconsistent? (shrink)

Aristotle's De Anima is the first systematic philosophical account of the soul, which serves to explain the functioning of all mortal living things. In his commentary, Ronald Polansky argues that the work is far more structured and systematic than previously supposed. He contends that Aristotle seeks a comprehensive understanding of the soul and its faculties. By closely tracing the unfolding of the many-layered argumentation and the way Aristotle fits his inquiry meticulously within his scheme of the sciences, Polansky answers (...) questions relating to the general definition of soul and the treatment of each of the soul's principal capacities: nutrition, sense perception, phantasia, intellect, and locomotion. The commentary sheds light on every section of the De Anima and the work as a unit. It offers a challenge to earlier and current interpretations of the relevance and meaning of Aristotle's highly influential treatise. (shrink)

Ainslie’s Picoeconomics presents an ingenious theory, based on a remarkably simple basic law about the rate of discounting the value of future prospects, which explains a vast number of psychological phenomena. Hyperbolic discount rates result in changes in the ranking of interests as they get closer in time. Thus quasi-homuncular “interests” situated at different times compete within the person. In this paper I first defend the generality of scope of Ainslie’s model, which ranges over several personal and subpersonal levels of (...) psychological analysis. I raise a problem which results from the temporal relativity of assessments of value, and affects the possibility of objective values. Finally, I offer one example of a form of time-related irrationality on which Ainslie’s scheme does not seem to have a grip, namely one which relates not to a situation’s relative position in time, but to its temporal (‘progressive’ or ‘perfect’) temporal aspect. (shrink)

Arrivé à un stade de ma vie qui m'engage à prendre du recul, je voudrais témoigner dans ce livre d'un certain sentiment de spiritualité, qui a émergé de mes recherches pour comprendre l'ordre caché des choses et le sens secret de la nature. Ce sentiment est né d'un émerveillement et d'une révélation sur la simplicité des codes naturels qui conduisent au jaillissement, dans l'espace et dans le temps, de formes d'une extrême diversité et d'une grande beauté. Une morphogenèse qui a (...) passionné des penseurs comme Pythagore, Benoît Mandelbrot ou Alan Turing, et qui se poursuit par le travail et l'oeuvre des hommes. Ce travail est désormais mis en cause par les extensions du corps et du cerveau humains que représentent l'intelligence artificielle et les robots... Aujourd'hui, il devient plus difficile de prédire les évolutions exponentielles auxquelles nous sommes confrontés dans les domaines scientifique, technologique, économique et politique. Mon message vise à alerter les prospectivistes, les politiques, les économistes, les scientifiques, non seulement sur la vitesse de ces évolutions, mais surtout sur les interdépendances émergentes entre intelligence artificielle, robotique, travail humain et modifications de l'" ADN " d'Internet. Mal comprises, ces évolutions peuvent engendrer des mouvements tels que le transhumanisme. Mieux intégrées à nos réflexions, elles peuvent en revanche mener à une nouvelle étape de l'évolution de l'humanité... (shrink)

Jonathan Quong | : Alan Patten presents his account of minority rights as broadly continuous with Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources. This paper challenges this claim. I argue that, contra Patten, Dworkin’s theory does not provide a basis to offer accommodations or minority rights, as a matter of justice, to some citizens who find themselves at a relative disadvantage in pursuing their plans of life after voluntarily changing their cultural or religious commitments. | : Alan Patten considère (...) que sa théorie des droits des minorités s’inscrit en continuité avec celle de l’égalité des ressources chez Donald Dworkin. Cet article interroge cette affirmation. Je soutiens que, contrairement à ce que pense Patten, la théorie de Dworkin ne fournit pas de base en vue d’accommodations ou des droits de la minorité, en ce qui a trait à la justice, à des citoyens relativement désavantagés par la poursuite de leur plan de vie après avoir volontairement changé de culture ou d’engagements religieux. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ : Les attitudes de se sont généralement considérées comme constituant une classe particulière d’attitudes de re . Cet article propose une analyse différente, qui s’appuie sur la notion d’attitude de objecto et qui évite un engagement ontologique envers le sujet. La proposition élabore l’idée de Hintikka d’une logique épistémique dite de seconde génération, qui introduit un marqueur syntaxique permettant d’exprimer des relations d’indépendance entre certaines constantes logiques. De cette sémantique résulte une conception du Moi, dénotation de «je», comme un (...) objet simplement intentionnel. ABSTRACT: De se attitudes are generally regarded as being a proper part of de re attitudes. In this paper an alternative analysis that avoids ontological commitment to the self is proposed, based on the notion of de objecto attitudes. This proposal develops an idea from Hintikka’s second generation epistemic logic, which introduces a syntactic marker expressing independence relations between certain logical constants. According to this semantic account, the Self, as the denotation of ‘I’, is conceived of as a mere intentional object. (shrink)

This study aims to investigate the relationship between job burnout and employee performance in the feed industry during the ASF outbreak. Further, the researchers employed a descriptive-correlational research design in order to analyze the acquired data and produce pertinent findings. Thus, the researchers gathered data from one hundred two (102) feed industry employees. The Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) and Individual Work Performance Questionnaire (IWPQ) were employed to ascertain the extent of job burnout experienced by the respondents and evaluate employee performance, (...) respectively. Based on the statistical analysis, there is a significant relationship between job burnout and employee performance. Moreover, the study's findings were thoroughly analyzed and discussed. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ : Les attitudes de se sont généralement considérées comme constituant une classe particulière d’attitudes de re. Cet article propose une analyse différente, qui s’appuie sur la notion d’attitude de objecto et qui évite un engagement ontologique envers le sujet. La proposition élabore l’idée de Hintikka d’une logique épistémique dite de seconde génération, qui introduit un marqueur syntaxique permettant d’exprimer des relations d’indépendance entre certaines constantes logiques. De cette sémantique résulte une conception du Moi, dénotation de «je», comme un objet (...) simplement intentionnel. ABSTRACT: De se attitudes are generally regarded as being a proper part of de re attitudes. In this paper an alternative analysis that avoids ontological commitment to the self is proposed, based on the notion of de objecto attitudes. This proposal develops an idea from Hintikka’s second generation epistemic logic, which introduces a syntactic marker expressing independence relations between certain logical constants. According to this semantic account, the Self, as the denotation of ‘I’, is conceived of as a mere intentional object. (shrink)

It is a rather remarkable fact that in most discussions of Aquinas’s ethics, Q. 21 of the De Veritate which deals with Aquinas’s notion of Good, is almost entirely overlooked. For example D. J. O’Connor’s book Aquinas and Natural Law refers only once to the De Veritate and that is not a reference to Q. 21. Even the massive work of Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, in the entire third section which deals with Aquinas’s moral theory has (...) only six references to the De Veritate and again none are to Q. 21. H. J. McCloskey in Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics, provides what he considers two definitive repudiations of Aquinas’s theory but there is no mention or reference to the De Veritate. There may be a reason for this. Thomists like Gilson may not be attuned to or interested in answering the specific problems which contemporary ethical theorists address themselves to, while ethical theorists like O’Connor seem to depend upon traditional Thomistic accounts to locate the pertinent passages in Aquinas’s ethical writings, accounts which follow the order of one or other of the Summas. Be that as it may, some of the most illuminating sections of Aquinas dealing with ethical-theoretical issues are to be found in Question 21 of the De Veritate, for in this question is found a definition of the good as well as explanations of this definition. Consider the following passages where Aquinas lists what seem to be necessary conditions for calling something good. (shrink)

El hombre crea su moral tomando en cuenta las aportaciones más íntimas de su espíritu. Así como la historia de la humanidad presenta una serie gradual y emocional de conquistas espirituales, así también la moral se ha logrado a través de la historia, pero siempre sobre el fundamento de la esencia humana, pues no cabe duda de que la jerarquía de los valores depende de cada ser humano. Ella orienta toda su conducta y señala sus grandes metas. El espíritu religioso (...) coloca, en primer término, a los valores de la religión, el moralista a los éticos, el pragmático a los útiles; el estético a las bellas artes, dando preferencia cada una a su valor favorito. (shrink)

Despite the fact that common sense taxes emotions with irrationality, philosophers have, by and large, celebrated their functionality. They are credited with motivating, steadying, shaping or harmonizing our dispositions to act, and with policing norms of social behaviour. It's time to restore emotion's bad rep. To this end, I shall argue that we should expect that some of the “norms” enforced by emotions will be unevenly distributed among the members of our species, and may be dysfunctional at the individual, social, (...) moral, or even species levels. I”ll adduce three considerations in support of that pessimistic view: The fallacy of adaptive fixation, the moral randomness of group selection, and the lack of fit between “natural norms” set up by evolution and those moral and social norms we would like philosophy to justify. (shrink)

Puente Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641), Iberian Jesuit and author of one of the earliest comprehensive Baroque philosophy courses, entered the debate on the modality “moral” or “morally” in the sense of a qualifier of evidence, certainty, being, and necessity or impossibility in the first half of the seventeenth century. This paper presents his analysis of the different forms (or levels) of evidence and necessity or impossibility in 1630s, where “moral” represents the weakest degree of these properties. First, it covers (...) the notion of moral evidence in the sense of a wise decision that is in accordance with the consensus of either the majority of mankind or of the learned community, as introduced in Disputationes de Deo. Second, it covers the notions of moral necessity and impossibility, introduced in De Deo homine in terms of a strong inclination, and developed in Hurtado’s later theological texts. Third, Hurtado introduced the notion “morally” in his De actibus humanis in frequentist terms. (shrink)

Fondations pieuses en mouvement: De la transformation du statut de propriété des biens waqf-s à Jérusalem, 1858–1917. By Musa Sroor. Damascus: Institut Français du Proche Orient, 2010. Pp. 461, maps. €30.

When the COVID-19 surge hit New York City hospitals, the Division of Medical Ethics at Weill Cornell Medical College, and our affiliated ethics consultation services, faced waves of ethical issues sweeping forward with intensity and urgency. In this article, we describe our experience over an eight-week period (16 March through 10 May 2020), and describe three types of services: clinical ethics consultation (CEC); service practice communications/interventions (SPCI); and organizational ethics advisement (OEA). We tell this narrative through the prism of time, (...) describing the evolution of ethical issues and trends as the pandemic unfolded. We delineate three phases: anticipation and preparation, crisis management, and reflection and adjustment. The first phase focused predominantly on ways to address impending resource shortages and to plan for remote ethics consultation, and CECs focused on code status discussions with surrogates. The second phase was characterized by the dramatic convergence of a rapid increase in the number of critically ill patients, a growing scarcity of resources, and the reassignment/ redeployment of staff outside their specialty areas. The third phase was characterized by the recognition that while the worst of the crisis was waning, its medium- and long-term consequences continued to pose immense challenges. We note that there were times during the crisis that serving in the role of clinical ethics consultant created a sense of dis-ease as novel as the coronavirus itself. In retrospect we learned that our activities far exceeded the familiar terrain of clinical ethics consultation and extended into other spheres of organizational life in novel ways that were unanticipated before this pandemic. To that end, we defined and categorized a middle level of ethics consultation, which we have termed service practice communication intervention (SPCI). This is an underappreciated dimension of the work that ethics consult services are capable of in times of crisis. We believe that the pandemic has revealed the many enduring ways that ethics consultation services can more robustly contribute to the ethical life of their institutions moving forward. (shrink)

The epistemological delimitation between philosophy and theology was one of the most interesting problems discussed in the Thirteenth Century. Discussions around the object of theology prove this. Among the authors in the first half of the two hundreds, Roberto Grosseteste shows a particular interest because he represents one of the last exponents of the monastic tradition, but already open to new problems. His -well founded- intuition of the incommensability of the philosophical and theological language takes him to postulate the «credibilia» (...) as a proper kind of theological propositions, in opposition with the scibilia of philosophy. The first credibilia enunciated in the text revealed is the creation of nothingness, the importance of which lies in its contradiction with the Aristotelian physics a model of rational knowledge. Grosseteste assumes in this case the need of a rational process demonstrating its «credibility» defined in terms of«probability». (shrink)

Étant donné la priorité d’intérêt que ce volume entend donner aux textes écrits par Rosenzweig en 1917, alors qu’il se trouvait sur le front des Balkans, j’ai choisi de me pencher sur les tout premiers paragraphes du texte intitulé « Globus. Études sur la théorie de l’espace dans l’histoire universelle », et de mettre ces lignes en regard de ce que Rosenzweig développe dans L’Étoile de la Rédemption. C’est donc d’une lecture suivie de l’introduction de « Globus » dont je (...) partirai. Le texte s’... (shrink)

[Ronald de Sousa] Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; (...) belief-like states, by contrast, are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton ] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

This is a Big Book from one of Canada's preeminent philosophers. It aims at nothing less than to define what characterizes modernity, and then to tell us what is wrong with it. Like many a Big Book, it is predictably full of interesting things, and equally predictably disappointing, not to say feeble, in some of the central theses for which it argues. But then what more, in philosophy, can we really expect? It's what we tell our students: you don't have (...) to be right, and you don't have to make me agree with you, but you do have to produce interesting arguments and show that you have thought seriously about the issues. (shrink)

The treatise was in origin a polemic against the Erasistrateans in Rome whom Galen found to be in opposition to his own views. It is of interest not only for Galen's views on venesection but also for the fragments of the writings of Erastistratus contained in it. The text has not yet appeared in a modern critical edition. The Kühn edition of 1826 is the most recent, but Kühn did not go beyond the work of the Renaissance editors in dealing (...) with the numerous corruptions of the text. The emendations proposed below are occasioned by the want of a satisfactory reading anywhere in the tradition. (shrink)

In the following comments, I will raise no major objection to Furtak’s main line of argument. My questions are essentially requests for clarification. They focus on three key expressions: first, the “unified” character of emotional agitation and intentionality; second, the unique “mode of cognition” claimed for emotions; and third, the “emotional a priori.”.

English summary: Am I free? Is this not the most fundamental question for all humans? For Spinoza, for us to be free, we must first free ourselves from the illusion of freedom; between determinism and free will is true freedom. Through Spinozas philosophy of desire and reason, the idea of living with our desires without being a slave to them allows us to come closer to answering the question of whether or not we are free. French description: Suis-je libre? N'est-ce (...) pas la question la plus fondamentale que se pose l'etre humain? Car de la reponse que chacun se donne depend la maniere de vivre et de penser. Or, il y a pour Spinoza un risque majeur: tomber dans l'illusion de la liberte. C'est le pire prejuge, la plus dangereuse erreur; se croire libre alors qu'on ne l'est pas. Pour etre veritablement libre, nous dit Spinoza, il faut avant tout se liberer de l'illusion de la liberte! Il n'y a pas ici de paradoxe mais une exigence de la pensee: entre le determinisme et le libre arbitre, il y a la vraie liberte. Ainsi la liberte est un combat contre le pessimisme du je n'y peux rien et l'optimisme du je fais ce que je veux. Si la liberte est une realite fondamentale de la nature humaine, elle est aussi une exigence permanente. Suis-je libre? C'est la question qu'il faut se poser tout au long de sa vie. Pour cette tache difficile mais passionnante, Spinoza est a mon sens indispensable. Des ma decouverte de la philosophie, j'ai voulu comprendre de quelle maniere Spinoza, le philosophe du desir et de la raison, nous parlait de liberte. La liberte individuelle d'abord: comment vivre avec ses desirs sans en etre esclave mais sans y renoncer? La connaissance nous aide et la necessite ne s'oppose plus a la liberte. La liberte politique ensuite: comment vivre en societe avec sa personnalite mais en harmonie avec les autres? La raison nous aide et la paix ne s'oppose plus a la liberte. Dans les deux cas la liberte est possible sans aucune aide, sans aucun ideal, sans aucune reference transcendante, a partir de la seule Terre et de la vie reelle de l'homme. Dans ma vie personnelle comme dans mon engagement collectif, les idees de Spinoza m'ont toujours guide, eclaire, libere. Elles me conduisent encore. Je dois d'ailleurs remercier Andre Comte-Sponville et Marcel Conche qui m'ont grandement aide a m'orienter sur ce chemin, des ma jeunesse. La liberte est une lutte infinie, nous dit Spinoza, la plus belle des luttes. J.F. Robredo. (shrink)

Ira Brevis furor, said the Latins: anger is a brief bout of madness. There is a long tradition that views all emotions as threats to rationality. The crime passionnel belongs to that tradition: in law it is a kind of “brief-insanity defence.” We still say that “passion blinds us;” and in common parlance to be philosophical about life's trials is to be decently unemotional about them. Indeed many philosophers have espoused this view, demanding that Reason conquer Passion. Others — from (...) Hume to the Emotivists — have appeared to reverse this hierarchy.” But those philosophers who refuse to join in the general denigration of emotion as irrational usually share the presupposition that the role of rationality is limited to the calculation of means. In so far as emotions are concerned with the determination of ends, they remain, on this view, beyond the pale of rationality. Modern decision theorists have worked out schemes to assess the rationality of desires, as well as actions, against the background of beliefs and other desires.1 But these schemes leave no room at all for emotions, except, by implication, as disrupters of the rational process. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta desarrollar una deducción del concepto de sumo bien kantiano: esto es, intenta demostrar, de acuerdo con la interpretación de Dieter Henrich acerca de la deducción, que el sumo bien es un fin a la vez que un deber. Apelo a los rasgos de la razón práctica que constituyen la legitimidad de los hechos, la premisa que cualquier deducción debe tener. De acuerdo con Kant, el sumo bien consiste en la felicidad, la virtud y sus relaciones de proporcionalidad (...) y causalidad, tal que la felicidad es proporcional a, y causada por, la virtud. Sostengo, utilizando las nociones kantianas aceptadas, que Kant tiene razones convincentes para concluir que el sumo bien es, de hecho, un fin a la vez que un deber. Si esto es correcto, entonces este argumento ofrece la deducción prometida en mi título. This paper attempts a deduction of Kant's concept of the highest good: that is, it attempts to prove, in accordance with Dieter Henrich's interpretation of the notion of deduction, that the highest good is an end that is also a duty. It does this by appealing to features of practical reason that make up the legitimating facts that serve as the premises that any deduction must possess. According to Kant, the highest good consists of happiness, virtue, and relations of proportionality and causationbetween happiness and virtue, such that happiness is proportional to and caused by virtue. I argue, by drawing on accepted Kantian notions, that Kant had compelling reasons for concluding that the highest good is in fact an end that is also a duty. If correct, then this argument provides the deduction promised in my title. (shrink)

Do we love someone for their virtue, their beauty, or their moral or other qualities? Are love's characteristic desires altruistic or selfish? Are there duties of love? What do the sciences tell us about love? In this Very Short Introduction, Ronald de Sousa explores the different kinds of love, from affections to romantic love.

Chez les enseignants-chercheurs, la faible proportion des temps-cadres institutionnels, la grande diversité des types d’activités et la porosité des frontières entre travail et hors travail imprègnent leurs pratiques professionnelles d’une grande labilité, d’une forte individualisation et de formes d’autonomie dans la construction de leur emploi du temps. Cette fluidité des temps dans l’organisation de leur travail s’accompagne pourtant chez les EC de toute une rhétorique du débordement et de la pression temporelle. Ce « je suis débordé » est mis ici (...) en relation avec le nécessaire travail de co-construction de leurs articulations temporelles. Dans ce travail invisible de configuration et d’arbitrage entre activités, l’article repère quatre foyers de tensions potentielles. Le premier réside dans l’intrication d'activités professionnelles et/ou non professionnelles de natures et de temporalités multiples. Le deuxième se situe dans la discontinuité d’activités, en contradiction avec des projections personnelles harmonisatrices. Le troisième concerne l’imbrication d’échelles de temporalités multiples et parfois concurrentes. Un dernier foyer de tensions est ouvert par les évolutions des logiques institutionnelles qui génèrent un décalage entre des représentations personnelles du métier d'EC et la progression d'injonctions de productivité, de rentabilité et d'immédiateté. L’article s’attarde ensuite sur les tactiques mobilisées par les EC pour tenter d’au moins prévenir l’actualisation de ces tensions en pressions temporelles : redécoupage des frontières entre activités, mise en place de divers micro-rituels de stabilisation du flux temporel, travail de recatégorisation des activités, temporisation, détournement ou cantonnement des temps contraints.Enfin l'article revient sur quelques enjeux ou prolongements possibles de l'idée que le rapport aux temps des EC peut être considéré moins comme un temps-cadre que comme un temps-activité. (shrink)

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, truth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

En varios pasajes de su Comentario a la Física S. Tomás polemiza con Averroes a propósito del tipo y valor de algunas argumentaciones de Aristóteles. Se aprecia uma divergencia acerca de las condiciones epistemológicas para considerar “apodíctica” uma demostración, y también sobre el valor de las argumentaciones probables. Se sugiere que la búsqueda de la intentio Aristotelis pudo estar condicionada en cada caso por la propia visión tanto de la hermenéutica histórica como de la metodologia.

Since the late thirteenth century, the counterfactual Filioque debate, i.e., the question whether the Son and the Holy Spirit were distinct persons in the Trinity if the Holy Spirit only proceeded from the Father and not also from the Son, was an interesting context for developing the methodology of extreme thought experiments and the logic of conditionals with impossible antecedents and paradoxes of implication. In the mid-1620s, Puente Hurtado de Mendoza introduced a strongly critical approach towards the scientific merits (...) of positing certain types of impossible scenarios while joining this traditional debate in his Tractatus de Trinitate. He argued that the counterfactual Filioque problem is a needless detour and either shifts to unreliable discussions of properties of fictional entities or is outright trivial for logical reasons. The present article offers a modern edition of the ninth disputation of Hurtado’s Tractatus de Trinitate and analyses logical and methodological aspects of Hurtado’s position in the counterfactual Filioque debate. (shrink)