There has been a heated debate within psychotherapeutic counseling of the role that can be afforded to spirituality within the counseling setting. If one single factor can be accorded primacy, then it might be reckoned the late Carl Rogers turned to spirituality in the last decade of his life. The following examines this debate in relation to the supposed, and, it might be argued, demonstrated, ineffable nature of alterity in relation to intersubjectivity in general. Many of the protagonists in this (...) debate have highlighted the inadequacy of discursive language in conveying the essential moment of connectedness in Rogerian therapy between two individuals. This gap, perceived or real, has been filled by rendering the relationship between therapist and client as spiritual. It is argued that this move has already been rehearsed in at least two classical texts, G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment. Both authors at quite crucial junctures in these texts turn to spirituality within the context of a very specific self—other relation. There is very little discernible difference between these described relationships, in either substance or form, and those described by Rogers and others as being their most successful therapeutic encounters. All of them can be regarded as a therapeutic relationship between two specific individuals that derives benefits for both irreducible to, and irreplaceable by, the psycho-social benefits of wider group membership. (shrink)

Of all the memorable, and influential, passages of the Phänomenologie des Geistes none are more famous or enjoyed greater attention than those sections devoted to the master-slave dialectic. It would seem almost inconceivable then that anything would be left to say concerning Hegel's martial struggle, the sheer number of illustrious scholars who have commented on this text bearing ample testimony to the probable redundancy of further comment. However, in actual fact, this is not the case. Indeed, it is probable that (...) Hegel is addressing and utilising not a theory of recognition but rather two quite distinct concepts of recognition. The appropriate passages are of course the master-slave section itself and the rather oblique references to the »confession« of one consciousness to another at the end of chapter six. Commentators have generally been in agreement that the master-slave section marks the beginning of Hegel's theory of recognition; that is, that the continuation of the treatment of recognition in chapter six marks a further development of the concept formulated in chapter four - a further development seemingly promised by Hegel himself - »With this, we already have before us the notion of spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what spirit is«. However the preceding is interpreted, the reader is surely right to recognize that something has been »won«, the triumphalist language being repeated in the following »[it is] in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present«. However, this triumph may have been misunderstood. The theory of recognition referred to in the master-slave dialectic may have been a »turning-point«, a new beginning, but it was a new beginning that was soon realised to be a dead-end. The following will attempt to demonstrate that there is a quite radical discontinuity at the heart of the concept of recognition itself, a discontinuity that can be traced to its origins in the Fichtean system itself. For the master-slave dialectic is »Fichte's wake« - it is at once a celebration and a mourning for the first concept of recognition, the unworkability of which heralded a truly new beginning. That is, the concept of recognition outlined in the Einige Vorlesungen uber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten. The second concept of recognition, that of the Grundlage des Naturrechts cannot be reckoned a further development or emendation of the first concept, its quite peculiar status, and philosophical importance as a »spiritual concept«, precluding any such treatment. The latter concept may mark the birth of Hegelian or speculative idealism itself. It is the contention of the following that understanding this quite radical discontinuity will fashion a better understanding of the connection between transcendental and speculative philosophy, the point of transition or sublation. (shrink)

Of all the memorable, and influential, passages of the Phänomenologie des Geistes none are more famous or enjoyed greater attention than those sections devoted to the master-slave dialectic. It would seem almost inconceivable then that anything would be left to say concerning Hegel's martial struggle, the sheer number of illustrious scholars who have commented on this text bearing ample testimony to the probable redundancy of further comment. However, in actual fact, this is not the case. Indeed, it is probable that (...) Hegel is addressing and utilising not a theory of recognition but rather two quite distinct concepts of recognition. The appropriate passages are of course the master-slave section itself and the rather oblique references to the »confession« of one consciousness to another at the end of chapter six. Commentators have generally been in agreement that the master-slave section marks the beginning of Hegel's theory of recognition; that is, that the continuation of the treatment of recognition in chapter six marks a further development of the concept formulated in chapter four - a further development seemingly promised by Hegel himself - »With this, we already have before us the notion of spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what spirit is«. However the preceding is interpreted, the reader is surely right to recognize that something has been »won«, the triumphalist language being repeated in the following »[it is] in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present«. However, this triumph may have been misunderstood. The theory of recognition referred to in the master-slave dialectic may have been a »turning-point«, a new beginning, but it was a new beginning that was soon realised to be a dead-end. The following will attempt to demonstrate that there is a quite radical discontinuity at the heart of the concept of recognition itself, a discontinuity that can be traced to its origins in the Fichtean system itself. For the master-slave dialectic is »Fichte's wake« - it is at once a celebration and a mourning for the first concept of recognition, the unworkability of which heralded a truly new beginning. That is, the concept of recognition outlined in the Einige Vorlesungen uber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten. The second concept of recognition, that of the Grundlage des Naturrechts cannot be reckoned a further development or emendation of the first concept, its quite peculiar status, and philosophical importance as a »spiritual concept«, precluding any such treatment. The latter concept may mark the birth of Hegelian or speculative idealism itself. It is the contention of the following that understanding this quite radical discontinuity will fashion a better understanding of the connection between transcendental and speculative philosophy, the point of transition or sublation. (shrink)

The following article is intended as a contribution to a reorientation of approaches to the treatment of the historical development of the concept of subjectivity. It argues for a fundamental continuity between German Idealist philosophy and Jungian psychoanalysis on certain fundamental aspects of selfhood. These continuities might seriously question certain key assumptions about the nature of 'modernity', notably as a period marked by exaggerated claims on self-identity and reflexivity. It is suggested that such claims are largely the result of the (...) Hegelian interpretation of the early Fichtean system, an interpretation that utilizes only one aspect of the intellectual resources made available by the early system of J. G. Fichte. Such an appropriation might be sub sumed under the rubric of 'Geist'. This article attempts to retrieve the other aspects of Fichte's system - the concepts of drive and primordial images; the emphasis on the 'subject' as a self-diremptive energy-flow; the aspect that points to Schopenhauer and beyond. (shrink)

The recent turn to discursive psychology has prompted an increasing interest in the work of Michel Foucault, particularly with relation to debates on the possibility and nature of ‘discourse analysis’. This variant of discourse analysis has generally emphasized the utility of Foucauldian insights in critiquing existent psychological practices as a manifestation of the proliferation of disciplinary forms in Western society. This utility may have been dramatically over-stated. Key concepts such as discursive practices and power are inextricably linked to theoretical frameworks (...) that radically resist any ad hoc importation into critical practice. Furthermore, they may be antithetical to the kind of reflexive critique promulgated by critical psychology itself. However, the later Foucault’s partial retreat from the disciplinary containment of subjectivity only promises to trap critical psychology in the agency/structure hiatus that has so bedevilled 20th-century sociological theory. Foucauldian critical psychology may be a dead end. (shrink)

Commentators on Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism have tended to view that work within the context of world-historical social processes and change. Recently, more literary forms of analyses have come to the fore emphasizing Weber’s indebtedness to the philosophical/literary efforts of Nietzsche and Goethe, among others. The following offers the preliminary observation that the concept of ‘drive’ understood as a mode of psychological operation and process considerably complicates any possible interpretation of the essay itself. Weber’s refusal (...) to specify the exact nature and extent of the psychological Antriebe underlying his rational actor may make a decisive interpretation of the text impossible. Nevertheless, there may be good reason for supposing that Weber’s usage of the terms ‘drive’ and ‘maxim’ is indicative of a Fichtean synthesis of anthropological impulses and the operations of the rational intellect via his reading of Hugo Münsterberg. (shrink)

Frederick Neuhouser has attempted the impossible - a book about “the early Fichte” without mentioning, or engaging with, the third principle of the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794-95. Neuhouser offers no satisfactory explanation of this surprising omission - the third principle is by far the most important structural moment of “the early Fichte.” Neuhouser hints that he is not prepared to discuss the absolute positing of quantifiability, and the systematic implications thereof, because “there is some doubt about the extent (...) of Fichte’s commitment to this project in the later versions of the Wissenschaftslehre,” and, the aims of such systematic derivation “are almost certainly incapable of being carried out”. These reasons are quite baffling even within the parameters Neuhouser sets for his book. Yes, there is doubt whether Fichte remained committed to the type of systematic deduction elucidated in the Wissenschaftslehre after 1800. However, Neuhouser’s book is about the Fichte of 1790-99, and if he regards the system of 1797-99 as a further development of the systematic structuration of the Wissenschaftslehre, then evidence should have been supplied vis-à-vis a proper outline of the system of the Wissenschaftslehre. It must also be said that if one regards the Fichtean project of deducing the principles of theoretical reason from one principle as not worthy of serious comment then the motivation for writing a book on the early Fichte is not readily apparent. (shrink)