Digital energy platforms play a central role in the transition toward a more sustainable energy system. This research explores the effect of digital energy platforms on public values. We developed and tested a novel public value framework, combining values already embedded in energy and digitalization regulations and emerging values that have become more relevant in recent debates. We analyzed value changes and potential value tensions. We found that sustainability is prioritized, security is broadened to include cybersecurity, and values relevant for (...) digital technologies, such as control over technology, have also become relevant for the energy system. This has resulted in three value tensions: preserving a well-functioning energy system, self-determination, and ensuring a level playing field and public control. A sustainable energy system requires governments to address these value changes, value tensions, and connected societal and political challenges related to the implementation of digital energy platforms. (shrink)

In order to be doing something intentionally, must one know that one is doing it? Some philosophers have answered yes. Our aim is to test a version of this knowledge thesis, what we call the Knowledge/Awareness Thesis, or KAT. KAT states that an agent is doing something intentionally only if he knows that he is doing it or is aware that he is doing it. Here, using vignettes featuring skilled action and vignettes featuring habitual action, we provide evidence that, in (...) various scenarios, a majority of non-specialists regard agents as intentionally doing things that the agents do not know they are doing and are not aware of doing. This puts pressure on proponents of KAT and leaves it to them to find a way these results can coexist with KAT. (shrink)

According to an influential view about directed expressive duties (e.g., duties to express gratitude to benefactors, remorse to victims, forgiveness to wrongdoers), these duties do not have rights as their correlates, because they are not demandable and enforceable. The chapter argues that this view is mistaken. Like other directed duties, directed expressive duties are demandable and enforceable. While this does not entail that these duties have rights as their correlates, it does create a strong presumption of this being the case. (...) This shifts the burden of proof from those who hold that expressive duties correlate with rights to those who deny it. (shrink)

This article contributes to recent work that has turned to Frantz Fanon for a socio-ecological approach to racism and colonization. Its intervention is to take up Fanon to critically reflect on the concept and use of “environmental racism,” one of the few approaches we have to hand to interrogate the place of race in discussions of the Anthropocene. It shows that a Fanonian approach to environmental racism integrates a socio-ecological perspective with decolonial political phenomenology. It uses this position as a (...) foundation to rethink environmental racism, reframing the problem in terms of racist environments. Environmental racism can then be understood as a symptom of a more fundamental problem with modes of experiencing and organizing the world. (shrink)

What is the right thing to do? -- "You have nothing to fear if you've done nothing wrong" -- Between culpable and blameless -- Are all mistakes equal? -- Report, disclose, protect, learn -- A just culture in your organization -- The criminalization of human error -- Is criminalization bad for safety? -- Without prosecutors, there would be no crime -- Three questions for your just culture -- Why do we blame?

This article traces the efforts of the National Council of Churches in Brazil to endorse the document ‘Christian witness in a multi-religious world’ and to implement its recommendations in the practice of churches in Brazil. The reception of the document is placed into the historical development of the ecumenical movement in Brazil since an important conference in 1962 in Recife, Brazil, and the impact the Second Vatican Council had in the Latin American country. The focus is then on how the (...) religious plurality in the country started to be perceived. Three examples follow showing how fundamentalist Christian groups oppose other religious expressions in the country and how the churches united in the council are challenged by the spirit of witnessing in respect to embrace pluralism. (shrink)

Rosa Menkman proposed that the concept of glitch should be considered a tipping point, a momentum, that can be seized, in which the power of subjectivity and the collaborative efforts of creators and the active spectators take centre stage. This article will discuss how in the last decades the glitch as noise and techne has shifted towards glitch as precarious aesthetics and how it has become associated with decolonial and feminist modes of critique. While the glitch is still seen as (...) a material, a techne, there is a resistant aesthetics of mutiny, a tactical revolt of the material that is confronting systemic standardization, bias and institutionalization. As presented in the exhibition VJ Um Amel, Beit Um Amel (2020), the technologically induced phenomena are analogous with the crises and states of emergency in various global infrastructures, systems and information channels. (shrink)

There are many examples of persons who appear to be grateful to other people's benefactors. In at least some of these examples, such third-party gratitude also seems fitting. However, these observations conflict with a widespread assumption in the philosophical literature about gratitude: that only beneficiaries can be fittingly grateful to benefactors. In this article, I argue that third-party gratitude exists and can be fitting, and that the assumption is therefore mistaken. More specifically, I defend two claims: (i) that there exists (...) a kind of gratitude to benefactors that is experienced by third parties in their capacities as moral agents (‘moral gratitude’); and (ii) that what makes this kind of gratitude fitting is the fact that, in benefitting the beneficiaries, the benefactors are responding to values that we, as moral agents, each have reason to care about and to want to see promoted. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that valid consent is a necessary condition for permissible sexual activity. Since non-human animals, children, and individuals who are severely cognitively disabled, heavily intoxicated or unconscious, lack the cognitive capacity to give valid consent, this condition explains why it is impermissible to have sex with them. However, contrary to common intuitions, the same condition seems to render it impermissible to have sex with robots, for they too are incapable of consenting to sex due to insufficient cognitive (...) capacitation. This paper explores whether the intuition that non-consensual sex with robots is permissible can be vindicated, whilst preserving valid consent as a general requirement for permissible sexual activity. I develop and evaluate four possible ways to argue that there is a morally significant difference between robots on the one hand, and insufficiently cognitively capacitated humans and non-human animals on the other hand, to substantiate and justify the intuition that it is permissible to have non-consensual sex with the former but not with the latter. (shrink)

In “Other-Sacrificing Options”, Benjamin Lange argues that, when distributing benefits and burdens, we may discount the interests of the people to whom we stand in morally negative relationships relative to the interests of other people. Lange’s case for negative partiality proceeds in two steps. First, he presents a hypothetical example that commonly elicits intuitions favourable to negative partiality. Second, he invokes symmetry considerations to reason from permissible positive partiality towards intimates to permissible negative partiality towards adversaries. In this paper, I (...) argue that neither the intuition elicited by Lange’s example nor the invoked symmetry considerations support a permission for negative partiality. This does not mean that negative partiality is unjustified. It means only that the justification, if there is one, must take a different form. I end by suggesting an alternative justification of negative partiality, one that mirrors gratitude-based justifications of positive partiality rather than justifications based on intimacy. (shrink)

In the book, I provide an account of what it is for an agent to have an ability. According to the Success View, abilities are all about success across possible situations. In developing and applying the view, the book elucidates the relation between abilities on the one hand and possibility, counterfactuals, and dispositions on the other; it sheds light on the distinction between general and specific abilities; it offers an understanding of degrees of abilities; it explains which role intentions and (...) performances play for the having of an ability, how abilities relate to success and failure, and gives an outlook at how the view might be applied to the free will debate and time travel. (shrink)

In this article some of the presuppositions that underly the current ideas about decision making capacity, autonomy and independence are critically examined. The focus is on chronic disorders, especially on chronic physical disorders. First, it is argued that the concepts of decision making competence and autonomy, as they are usually applied to the problem of legal (in)competence in the mentally ill, need to be modified and adapted to the situation of the chronically (physically) ill. Second, it is argued that autonomy (...) and dependence must not be considered as two mutually exclusive categories. It is suggested that decision making may take on the form of a more or less conscious decision not to be involved in making all kinds of explicit and deliberate decisions. Elaborating on Agich's distinction between ideal and actual autonomy, the concept of Socratic autonomy is introduced. (shrink)

Sentences containing pronouns and indefinite noun phrases can be said toexpress open propositions, propositions which display gaps to be filled.This paper addresses the question what is the linguistic content ofthese expressions, what information they can be said to provide to ahearer, and in what sense the information of a speaker can be said tosupport their utterance. We present and motivate first order notions ofcontent, update and support. The three notions are each defined in acompositional fashion and brought together within a (...) single and coherentframework. (shrink)

Recently, the term «fake news» has become ubiquitous in political and public discourse and the media. Despite its omnipresence, however, it is anything but clear what fake news is. An adequate and comprehensive definition of fake news is called for. We take steps towards this goal by providing a systematic account of fake news that makes the phenomenon tangible, rehabilitates the use of the term, and helps us to set fake news apart from related phenomena. (You can email us for (...) a penultimate draft of this paper.). (shrink)

In the imagery debate, a key question concerns the inherent spatial nature of mental images. What do we mean by spatial representation? We explore a new idea that suggests that motion is instrumental in the coding of visual space. How is the imagery debate informed by the representation of space being determined by visual motion?

This paper explores the prospects for dispositional accounts of abilities. According to so-called new dispositionalists, an agent has the ability to Φ iff they have a disposition to Φ when trying to Φ. We show that the new dispositionalism is beset by some problems that also beset its predecessor, the conditional analysis of abilities, and bring up some further problems. We then turn to a different approach, which links abilities not to motivational states but to the notion of success, and (...) consider ways of implementing that approach. Our results suggest that there are principled disanalogies between abilities and disposition which prevent any dispositional account of abilities from succeeding. (shrink)

Most psychological studies investigating the balance between stability and flexibility in decision making use specific restrictions in their scenarios. These restrictions are likely to affect decision process, and it is unclear which of the findings can be transferred to more naturalistic decision contexts that call for a balance between stability and flexibility. Therefore, the present study used a scenario that is inspired by the problem structure found in a particular domain: Adapt/Exchange decisions in modular chemical plants. In this setting, we (...) investigated whether participants engage in a thorough comparison of options and whether they perseverate on their previous choices when decision sequences increasingly favour one or the other option. The results suggest that instead of comparing options, participants used a satisficing strategy, checking whether Adapt was good enough and only computing an Exchange solution when it was not. Sequence effects were found, but their direction was opposite to the choice perseveration predicted from the literature: In sequences initially favouring Adapt, participants started exploring the Exchange option early on, while in sequences initially demanding Exchange, they preferred Adapt as soon as it became possible. The results raise questions about the application of psychological theories to complex decisions between qualitatively different options. (shrink)

This Discussion Note calls for attention to the cultural practices of Neural Engineering as part of the life sciences as practices and technologies of manufacturing life. Through focusing on Disability, Ableism, and especially Technoableism within the field, I point out instances of onto-epistemological violence, which influence the likelihood of survival of disabled people individually and as a group. By drawing on Crip Technoscience, a method assemblage is introduced that allows to address these issues in an intersectional-kyriarchal understanding of interlocking systems (...) of privilege and oppression through generative critique and productive collaborative work. Criptical Neural Engineering is dedicated to disability justice and disability gain. It centers disabled people as epistemic activists and demands response-ability and accountability from non-disabled people, specifically engineers that want to build adaptive technologies with disabled people. (shrink)

For a few decades, patients with Parkinson's disease have been treated with intracerebral transplantations of fetal mesencephalic tissue. The results of open trials have been variable. Double blind, placebo-controlled studies have recently been started in order to further investigate the efficacy of this new medical technique. In this paper we challenge the need for sham surgery in neurotransplantation research on PD patients. Considerations regarding the research subjects' informed consent, therapeutic misconception, the integrity of the human body, and the assessment of (...) risks and benefits argue against sham surgery for patients with PD. Moreover, there is an alternative, less harmful mode of research that can provide the same or comparable scientific evidence. A plea is made for intrapatient research based on quantitative measurements of the patient's pre- and post-operative condition combined with similar research on a reference group of patients who have received the standard treatment. (shrink)

Forced choices between rescuing imperilled persons are subject to a presumption of equality. Unless we can point to a morally relevant difference between these persons' imperilments, each should get an equal chance of rescue. Sometimes, this presumption is overturned. For example, when one imperilled person has wrongfully caused the forced choice, most think that this person (rather than an innocent person) should bear the harm. The converse scenario, in which a forced choice resulted from the supererogatory action of one of (...) the imperilled people, has received little attention in distributive ethics. I argue that, sometimes, we need not offer equal chances in these cases either. When the supererogatory act places the initially imperilled person under a reciprocal duty to bear risks for the supererogatory agent's sake in the forced choice, we may fulfil this duty for them if they are unable to do it themselves, by favouring the supererogatory agent. (shrink)

Medicine does not usually consider the human body from an aesthetic point of view. This article explores the notion of the lived body as aesthetic object in anthropological medicine, concentrating on the views of Buytendijk and Straus on human uprightness and gracefulness. It is argued that their insights constitute a counter-balance to the way the human body is predominantly approached in medicine and medical ethics. In particular, (1) the relationship between anthropological, aesthetic and ethical norms, (2) the possible danger of (...) a naturalistic fallacy, (3) the implications for the care of disabled people and (4) the intrinsic aesthetic quality of the human body are dealt with. (shrink)

This paper shows why defining „fake news“ is worthwhile and what a suitable definition of “fake news” might look like. We begin by introducing our definition of “fake news” (§2) and employ it to set fake news apart from related phenomena that are often conflated with it (§3). We then extract seven potential dimensions of the concept of fake news from the literature (§4) and compare the most representative definitions that have been proposed so far along those dimensions (§5). In (...) particular, we discuss the definitions by Rini, Gelfert, Dentith, Mukerji, and Zimmermann & Kohring, show up their merits and debits and put them in relation to ours. Although we take our definition as the starting point and argue for it on the side-lines, our primary aims are (i) to enable a systematic evaluation of prevalent definitions with respect to their extensional scope, practical utility, and conceptual transparency, (ii) to demonstrate that there is more widespread agreement than one would think on the outset, and (iii) to show (in §6) that defining “fake news” is not only far from futile, but of vital importance to confront the epistemic threats posed by fake news. (shrink)

2019 marked the 50th anniversary of Harry Frankfurt’s seminal paper ‘Moral responsibility without alternate possibilities’. The paper set an avalanche of research on the role of alternative possibilities for freedom and responsibility in motion which has not abated to this day. A good 50 years later, the debate over Frankfurt’s central argument and its implications is still very much alive. [...].

Beschouwingen vanuit een orthodox perspectief aan de hand van Bijbelse verhalen over of oude opvattingen inzake geloof en God nog zinvol zijn in een geseculariseerde wereld.

Challenges to visual prediction as an organizing concept come from three main sources: (1) from observations arising from the results of experiments employing unpredictable motion, (2) from the assertions that motor processes compensate for all neural delays, and (3) from multiple interpretations specific to the flash-lag effect. One clarification that has emerged is that visual prediction is a process that either complements or reflects non-visual (e.g., motor) prediction.

Visual percepts are called veridical when a “real” object can be identified as their cause, and illusions otherwise. The perceived position and color of a flashed object may be called veridical or illusory depending on which viewpoint one adopts. Since “reality” is assumed to be fixed (independent of viewpoint) in the definition of veridicality (or illusion), this suggests that “perceived” position and color are not properties of “real” objects.

Warum gibt es Fake News? Und warum verbreiten sie sich so erfolgreich? Weil der Mensch nicht so rational ist, wie er gerne denkt. Denn Fake News gibt es schon, solange es Nachrichten gibt. Neu ist nur ihr Ausmaß. Und das hat mit der Funktionslogik sozialer Netzwerke zu tun. Inhalte werden geteilt, weil man zu einer Gruppe gehören möchte, oder weil sie zu dem passen, was man ohnehin schon glaubt. Die Autoren des Bandes bieten eine umfassende Analyse der Erfolgsgeschichte von Fake (...) News sowie Lösungsmöglichkeiten an, wie wir ihrem Einfluss wieder entkommen können. (shrink)

Scientists, as human beings, sometimes make mistakes. The aim of this case study was to examine the misreferencing practice of scientists. Citations of two documents about the neuroimaging of a dead salmon were collected. A total of 173 references were extracted from Google Scholar and analyzed by both qualitative and quantitative methods. The findings reveal a reference error rate of 93.1%, involving 419 authors. Sociological and bibliometric data about the authors were collected and revealed that referencing errors can be committed (...) by all types of researchers. Further, a major referencing error was discovered in 22.5% of the citing documents, involving 121 authors, that is, the citation of a poster as if it were an article published in a prestigious journal. This major error was committed by the more prolific and recognized researchers. The higher the first author’s number of citations, number of publications or h-index, the more major reference errors (citing a ‘ghost’ paper) were committed. Nevertheless, the ScienceDirect database bears some responsibility, as it indexed abstracts of the Organization for Human Brain Mapping meeting as journal articles that had never been published in the prestigious NeuroImage journal. Finally, this case study raises epistemological concerns about research and its dissemination. (shrink)

Prior research suggests that voluntary environmental governance mechanisms operate to enhance a firm’s environmental legitimacy as opposed to being a driver of proactive environmental performance activities. To understand how these mechanisms contribute to the firm’s environmental legitimacy, we investigate whether environmental corporate governance characteristics are associated with voluntary environmental disclosure. We examine an increasingly important attribute of a firm’s disclosure setting, namely the disclosure of greenhouse gas (GHG) information. GHG information represents proprietary non-financial information about the firm’s exposure to environmental (...) concerns and is related to the firm’s operations and future profitability. Thus, we expect governance participants would view such information as a potentially important strategic device for managing stakeholders’ demands for information concerning environmental risks. We find that the presence of an environmental committee and a Chief Sustainability Officer (CSO) is positively associated with the likelihood of GHG disclosure and that CSOs are associated with disclosure transparency. Further analysis reveals that the likelihood of disclosure is associated with committee size, number of committee meetings, expertise of committee members and CSO, and overlap between the environmental committee and audit committee. Only expertise of the environmental committee members and the CSO are associated with GHG disclosure transparency, while larger committees tend to be associated with lower transparency. Our results are particularly important to those with interests in evaluating the potential role that corporate governance mechanisms play in responding to stakeholder concerns about environmental risks. Directors and officers who are considering appointment to similar governance positions, may wish to consider what attributes would make such governance positions more influential. (shrink)

According to the New Dispositionalist’s response to the Frankfurt Cases, Jones can do otherwise because Black merely masks (or finks), but does not deprive Jones of the relevant ability. This reasoning stands in the tradition of a line of thought according to which an informed view of the truth conditions of ability attributions allows for a compatibilist stance. The promise is that once we understand how abilities work, it turns out that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with determinism, (...) or with Black standing ready to intervene, or indeed both, as the New Dispositionalists hold. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. Understanding how abilities work gives us no reason to think that the ability to do otherwise relevant for free will is compatible with either Black’s presence or determinism. (shrink)

Welche Beschränkungen sollten sich Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler bei der Entscheidung auferlegen, wen sie als Vortragende zu universitären Veranstaltungen einladen? Und von welchen Überlegungen sollten sie sich dabei leiten lassen? Gibt es Personen, die für einen Auftritt an der Universität schlechthin ungeeignet sind? Wenn ja, aufgrund welcher Eigenschaften oder aus welchen anderen Gründen? Wir argumentieren zunächst, dass jüngere Kontroversen über die Einladung politisch exponierter Sprecher zu akademischen Veranstaltungen den Blick auf diese universitätspolitischen Fragen eher verstellt haben, insoweit sie als Streit um (...) die Rede- und um die Wissenschaftsfreiheit geführt wurden (1.). Im Anschluss erörtern wir die radikal liberale Auffassung, nach der sich Einladungsverbote überhaupt nicht begründen lassen (2.). Häufiger wird heute vertreten, dass es durchaus kategorische Ausschlussgründe gebe: Einige Debattenteilnehmerinnen ziehen die rote Linie dort, wo bestimmte politischen Positionen vertreten werden, insbesondere solche, in denen Rassismus oder andere Arten gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit zum Ausdruck kommen (3.). Andere ziehen die rote Linie dort, wo zu erwarten ist, dass der Inhalt eines Vortrags Zuhörende psychisch stark belastet (4.). Wir werden in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Auffassungen eine tugendbezogene Antwort auf die Titelfrage vorschlagen (5.). Sie läuft darauf hinaus, dass man sich für eine Einladung an die Universität nicht durch bestimmte Meinungen oder durch bestimmte Wirkungen disqualifiziert, sondern durch einen Mangel an intellektueller Redlichkeit. (shrink)

Periodic attacks of uncertain origin, where the clinical presentationresembles epilepsy but there is no evidence of a somatic disease, arecalled Pseudo-Epilepsy or Pseudo-Epileptic Attack Disorder (PEAD). PEADmay be called a `non-disease', i.e. a disorder on the fringes ofestablished disease patterns, because it lacks a rationalpathophysiological explanation. The first aim of this article is tocriticize the idea, common in medical science, that diseases are realentities which exist separately from the patient, waiting to bediscovered by the doctor. We argue that doctor and (...) patient construct adisease, and that the construction of the disease PEAD includes manynormative evaluations. The second aim is to provide insight into thesuffering of patients with PEAD. We focus on three aspects of thepatient, identity, autonomy and responsibility. We present somecharacteristic descriptions of (pseudo-)epileptic attacks by FjodorDostoevsky, Gustave Flaubert and Thomas Mann. We argue that diagnosingPEAD reduces a meaningful life event into an insignificant, thoughintriguing, medical phenomenon, and that the patient will not benefitfrom being diagnosed as having PEAD. (shrink)

Hawthorne toys with the view that ascriptions of free will are context-sensitive. But the way he formulates the view makes freedom contextualism look like a non-starter. I step into the breach for freedom contextualism. My aim is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that freedom contextualism can be motivated on the basis of our ordinary practice of freedom attribution is not ad hoc. The view explains data which cannot be accounted for by an ambiguity hypothesis. On the other hand, (...) I suggest a more plausible freedom contextualist analysis, which emerges naturally once we pair the assumption that freedom requires that the agent could have acted otherwise with a plausible semantics of "can" statements. I'll dub the resulting view Alternate Possibilities Contextualism, or APC, for short. In contrast to Hawthorne's view, APC is well-motivated in its own right, does not beg the question against the incompatibilist and delivers a context parameter which allows for a wide range of context shifts. I conclude that, far from being a non-starter, freedom contextualism sets an agenda worth pursuing. (shrink)

The creation of a specialized executive position that oversees sustainability activities represents a distinct shift in the structure of top management teams and their approach for addressing sustainability concerns. However, little is known about these management team members, namely the corporate sustainability officers or CSOs. We examine CSO appointments and their association with subsequent sustainability performance. Our results indicate that the creation of a CSO position may represent more of a symbolic versus substantive governance mechanism. Further tests suggest that CSO (...) expertise and the firm’s existing sustainability performance affect the association between the CSO and post-appointment sustainability performance. We find no association between CSO appointments and subsequent sustainability performance for firms that were already poor performers, while firms possessing relatively higher levels of prior sustainability performance appointing a CSO begin to experience significant improvements to performance after 3 years. We further find that CSOs with prior sustainability expertise are associated with increases in sustainability performance in firms that were already strong performers, but not in firms with poor sustainability performance. Non-expert CSOs, on the other hand, are associated with initial decreases in performance for poor performing firms, whereas better performing firms hiring non-expert CSOs are able to rely on other sustainability attributes of the firm and benefit from improvements in performance in the long term. We discuss the potential importance of these positions as it relates to symbolic versus substantive governance mechanisms through the lens of top management team literature streams. (shrink)