A critical survey of various positions on the nature, use, possession, and analysis of normative concepts. We frame our treatment around G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument, and the ways metaethicists have responded by departing from a Classical Theory of concepts. In addition to the Classical Theory, we discuss synthetic naturalism, noncognitivism (expressivist and inferentialist), prototype theory, network theory, and empirical linguistic approaches. Although written for a general philosophical audience, we attempt to provide a new perspective and highlight some underappreciated problems (...) about normative concepts. (shrink)

Upon doing something generous for someone with whom you are close, some kind of reciprocity may be appropriate. But it often seems wrong to actually request reciprocity. This chapter explores the wrongness in making these requests, and why they can nevertheless appear appropriate. After considering several explanations for the wrongness at issue (involving, e.g. distinguishing oughts from obligation, the suberogatory, imperfect duties, and gift-giving norms), a novel proposal is advanced. The requests are disrespectful; they express that their agent insufficiently trusts (...) the hearer to recognize their own reasons to reciprocate, and the close relationship between them morally requires this kind of trust. This proposal is articulated and situated in the recent discussion of the normativity of requests. The chapter concludes by explaining how these requests may appear appropriate. Agents in these relationships often have standing to make requests, though the standing is lacking in these particular cases. (shrink)

We work in the context of ω-stable theories. We obtain a natural, algebraic equivalent of ENI-NDOP and discuss recent joint proofs with Shelah that if an ω-stable theory has either ENI-DOP or is ENI-NDOP and is ENI-deep, then the set of models of T with universe ω is Borel complete.

Models are of central importance in many scientific contexts. The centrality of models such as inflationary models in cosmology, general-circulation models of the global climate, the double-helix model of DNA, evolutionary models in biology, agent-based models in the social sciences, and general-equilibrium models of markets in their respective domains is a case in point (the Other Internet Resources section at the end of this entry contains links to online resources that discuss these models). Scientists spend significant amounts of time building, (...) testing, comparing, and revising models, and much journal space is dedicated to interpreting and discussing the implications of models. In short, models are one of the principal instruments of modern science. (shrink)

Are words like ‘woman’ or ‘man’ sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological or non-biological features depending on context. I argue that a recent version of contextualism from Jennifer Saul that Esa Diaz-Leon develops doesn't exhibit the right kind of flexibility to capture our theoretical intuitions or moral and political (...) practices concerning our uses of these words. I then float the view that terms like 'woman' or 'man' are polysemous, arguing that it makes better sense of the significance of some forms of criticisms of mainstream gender ideology. (shrink)

We show that if T is a trivial uncountably categorical theory of Morley Rank 1 then T is model complete after naming constants for a model.

Fix a weakly minimal (i.e. superstable U-rank 1) structure M. Let M∗ be an expansion by constants for an elementary substructure, and let A be an arbitrary subset of the universe M. We show that all formulas in the expansion (M∗,A) are equivalent to bounded formulas, and so (M,A) is stable (or NIP) if and only if the M-induced structure AM on A is stable (or NIP). We then restrict to the case that M is a pure abelian group with (...) a weakly minimal theory, and AM is mutually algebraic (equivalently, weakly minimal with trivial forking). This setting encompasses most of the recent research on stable expansions of (Z,+). Using various characterizations of mutual algebraicity, we give new examples of stable structures of the form (M,A). Most notably, we show that if (G,+) is a weakly minimal additive subgroup of the algebraic numbers, A⊆G is enumerated by a homogeneous linear recurrence relation with algebraic coefficients, and no repeated root of the characteristic polynomial of A is a root of unity, then (G,+,B) is superstable for any B⊆A. (shrink)

It is often said that normative properties are “just too different” to reduce to other kinds of properties. This suggests that many philosophers find it difficult to believe reductive theses in ethics. I argue that the distinctiveness of the normative concepts we use in thinking about reductive theses offers a more promising explanation of this psychological phenomenon than the falsity of Reductive Realism. To identify the distinctiveness of normative concepts, I use resources from familiar Hybrid views of normative language and (...) thought to develop a Hybrid view of normative concepts. In addition to using this new Hybrid view to explain why reductive theses are difficult to believe, I show how to preserve several patterns of inference involving normative concepts that, intuitively, it is possible to make, and hence answer an important recent challenge to Hybrid views from Mark Schroeder. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the heading of the "Normativity Objection," that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in Parfit's non-reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. (...) We argue that the exclusively negative attention that the objection has received has been a mistake. On our reading, Parfit's Normativity Objection poses a serious threat to reductivism, as it exposes the uneasy relationship between our a priori knowledge of a range of distinctly normative truths and the typical package of semantic commitments that reductivists have embraced since the Kripkean revolution. (shrink)

Die Frage nach der Seinsweise der realen Welt gehört zu den zentralen und am meisten umstrittenen Themen der europäischen Philosophie. Weder die Argumente des Idealismus noch die des Realismus haben das Problem gelöst. Auch die Frage nach dem Wesen und dem Schicksal des Menschen und seiner Stellung in der Welt ist nicht ablösbar von der Grundfrage nach dem Wesen der Natur und der Existenzweise der realen Welt. Eine kritische Prüfung der Problemsituation ergibt, daß die seit mehr als zweihundert Jahren herrschende (...) Neigung, das Problem der Existenz der Welt erkenntnistheoretisch aufzufassen, eine Verschiebung und Verfälschung des eigentlichen Problems mit sich gebracht hat, das kein erkenntnistheoretisches, sondern im Kern ein echt metaphysisches ist. Seine Lösung kann deshalb nur durch eine ontologische Untersuchung vorbereitet werden. Das ist das Ziel von Roman Ingardens »Streit um die Existenz der Welt«. (shrink)

Many prominent ethicists, including Shelly Kagan, John Rawls, and Thomas Scanlon, accept a kind of epistemic modesty thesis concerning our capacity to carry out the project of ethical theorizing. But it is a thesis that has received surprisingly little explicit and focused attention, despite its widespread acceptance. After explaining why the thesis is true, I argue that it has several implications in metaethics, including, especially, implications that should lead us to rethink our understanding of Reductive Realism. In particular, the thesis (...) of epistemic modesty in ethics implies a kind of epistemic modesty about the metaphysical nature of ethics, if Reductive Realism about the metaphysical nature of ethics is true, and it implies that normative concepts are indispensable to practical deliberation in a way that answers an influential objection to Reductive Realism from Jonathan Dancy, David Enoch, William FitzPatrick, and Derek Parfit. (shrink)

We define a new topology on the space of strong types of a given theory and use it to state an omitting types theorem for countably saturated models of the theory. As an application we show that if T is a small, stable theory of finite weight such that every elementary extension of the countably saturated model is ω-saturated then every weakly saturated model is ω-saturated.

Ethicists struggle to take reductive views seriously. They also have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures. Understanding why provides further evidence for a kind of hybrid view of normative concept use.

Models and theories are of central importance in science, and scientists spend substantial amounts of time building, testing, comparing and revising models and theories. It is therefore not surprising that the nature of scientific models and theories has been a widely debated topic within the philosophy of science for many years. The product of two decades of research, in this book Roman Frigg provides an accessible yet critical introduction to the debates about models and theories within analytical philosophy of (...) science since the 1920s. Models and Theories is the first book to address the topic from a philosophical perspective, making it essential reading for advanced undergraduates, researchers, and professional philosophers working in philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of technology. It will also be of interest to philosophically minded readers working in physics, computer sciences and STEM fields more broadly. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to present and analyze philosophical conceptions concerning mathematics and logic as formulated by Polish logicians, mathematicians and philosophers in the 1920s and 1930s. It was a remarkable period in the history of Polish science, in particular in the history of Polish logic and mathematics. Therefore, it is justified to ask whether and to what extent the development of logic and mathematics was accompanied by a philosophical reflection. We try to answer those questions by analyzing (...) both works of Polish logicians and mathematicians who have a philosophical temperament as well as their research practice. Works and philosophical views of the following Polish scientists will be analyzed: Wacław Sierpiński, Zygmunt Janiszewski, Stefan Mazurkiewicz, Stefan Banach Hugo Steinhaus, Eustachy Żylińsk and Leon Chwistek, Jan Łukasiewicz, Zygmunt Zawirski, Stanisław Leśniewski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Alfred Tarski, Andrzej Mostowski and Henryk Mehlberg, Jan Sleszyński, Stanisław Zaremba and Witold Wilkosz. To indicate the background of scientists being active in the 1920s and 1930s we consider in Chapter 1 some predecessors, in particular: Jan Śniadecki, Józef Maria Hoene-Wroński, Samuel Dickstein and Edward Stamm. (shrink)

Analytic reductivism in metaethics has long been out of philosophical vogue. In Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normativity (2014), Stephen Finlay tries to resuscitate it by developing an analytic metaethical reductive naturalistic semantics for ‘good.’ He argues that an end-relational semantics is the simplest account that can explain all of the data concerning the term, and hence the most plausible theory of it. I argue that there are several assumptions that a reductive naturalist would need to make about contextual (...) parameter completion to derive reductive naturalism from an end-relational semantics—assumptions that nonnaturalists might forcefully resist. I also argue for the claim that an end-relational semantics could provide surprising resources for nonnaturalists to address semantic worries about their views—the upshot of which paints the way for a new and sophisticated nonnaturalism about the semantics of moral discourse. Nonnaturalists have long suspected that they need not worry about semantics and this paper lends support to that suspicion. (shrink)

Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the pool rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity” – it’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normatively” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning “authoritative (...) normativity”: (1) that motivation for it originates in a parochial conception of “normative flavours”; (2) that arguments against alternative ways of explaining e.g., morality’s importance are overblown; and (3) that there are strong reasons against theorizing in terms of “authoritative normativity”. The overarching aim is not to show that “authoritative normativity” is incoherent or entirely unmotivated. Rather, it is to discuss some of “authoritative normativity’s” deeper commitments to correct the impression that is it largely benign or that it is entailed by familiar and popular “metanormative” positions. Authoritative normativity, it seems to us, is a solution in search of a problem. (shrink)

This is the second of three parts of an introduction to the philosophy of climate science. In this second part about modelling climate change, the topics of climate modelling, confirmation of climate models, the limits of climate projections, uncertainty and finally model ensembles will be discussed.

Metaethical non-analytical naturalism consists in the metaphysical thesis that normative properties are identical with or reducible to natural properties and the epistemological thesis that we cannot come to a complete understanding of the nature of normative properties via conceptual analysis alone. In On What Matters, Derek Parfit (2011) argues that non-analytical naturalism is either false or incoherent. In § 1, I show that his argument for this claim is unsuccessful, by showing that it rests on a tacit assumption about the (...) nature of normative thought that non-analytical naturalists need not accept. In § 2, I show that escaping Parfit’s argument in this way is no ad hoc maneuver; as I demonstrate, the idea that non-analytical naturalists can exploit to escape Parfit’s argument is a familiar one. (shrink)

This is the first of three parts of an introduction to the philosophy of climate science. In this first part about observing climate change, the topics of definitions of climate and climate change, data sets and data models, detection of climate change, and attribution of climate change will be discussed.

Determinism and chance seem to be irreconcilable opposites: either something is chancy or it is deterministic but not both. Yet there are processes which appear to square the circle by being chancy and deterministic at once, and the appearance is backed by well-confirmed scientific theories such as statistical mechanics which also seem to provide us with chances for deterministic processes. Is this possible, and if so how? In this essay I discuss this question for probabilities as they occur in the (...) empirical sciences, setting aside metaphysical questions in connection with free will, divine intervention and determinism in history. (shrink)

Why do systems prepared in a non-equilibrium state approach, and eventually reach, equilibrium? An important contemporary version of the Boltzmannian approach to statistical mechanics answers this question by an appeal to the notion of typicality. The problem with this approach is that it comes in different versions, which are, however, not recognised as such, much less clearly distinguished, and we often find different arguments pursued side by side. The aim of this paper is to disentangle different versions of typicality-based explanations (...) of thermodynamic behaviour and evaluate their respective success. My conclusion will be that the boldest version fails for technical reasons, while more prudent versions leave unanswered essential questions. (shrink)

We show that if a countable structure M in a finite relational language is not cellular, then there is an age-preserving $N \supseteq M$ such that $2^{\aleph _0}$ many structures are bi-embeddable with N. The proof proceeds by a case division based on mutual algebraicity.

We prove two results intended to streamline proofs about cellularity that pass through mutual algebraicity. First, we show that a countable structure M is cellular if and only if M is \-categorical and mutually algebraic. Second, if a countable structure M in a finite relational language is mutually algebraic non-cellular, we show it admits an elementary extension adding infinitely many infinite MA-connected components. Towards these results, we introduce MA-presentations of a mutually algebraic structure, in which every atomic formula is mutually (...) algebraic. This allows for an improved quantifier elimination and a decomposition of the structure into independent pieces. We also show this decomposition is largely independent of the MA-presentation chosen. (shrink)

Roman Ingardens Werk über das Kausalproblem führt entscheidend über den Problemstand hinaus, wie er von John Stuart Mill und seinen Nachfolgern gekennzeichnet und seither kaum mehr verändert worden war. Anknüpfend an deren Analyse von Bedingungszusammenhängen unternimmt Ingarden es, die Bereiche und Verteilungen ursächlicher Beziehungen im Sinne relativ isolierter Systeme innerhalb des einen Weltzusammenhanges zu interpretieren. Es gelingt ihm mittels einer formalen Analyse, verschiedene Typen möglicher kausaler Beziehungen zu unterscheiden und insbesondere das Determinismusproblem aus der leidigen Alternative "Zufall oder Notwendigkeit" (...) herauszuführen. (shrink)

We introduce the notions of a mutually algebraic structures and theories and prove many equivalents. A theory $T$ is mutually algebraic if and only if it is weakly minimal and trivial if and only if no model $M$ of $T$ has an expansion $(M,A)$ by a unary predicate with the finite cover property. We show that every structure has a maximal mutually algebraic reduct, and give a strong structure theorem for the class of elementary extensions of a fixed mutually algebraic (...) structure. (shrink)

On one way of talking about a traditional metaethical topic, realists accept that some items appear on the list of what exists in the moral or more broadly normative domain of inquiry. They then divide over whether those items are like what science and experience suggest that all other items on the list of what exists across all domains are like – naturalistic and secular. Reductive naturalists answer this further question affirmatively. Why don’t nonnaturalists? I explore the answer that it’s (...) because normative entities are “just too different” in the sense that they are countably different things. However, I argue that this answer rests on the subtle presupposition that the normative domain doesn’t also contain uncountable entities of the sort that analytic metaphysicians call “stuff”. Taking intuitions of difference seriously points the way to a novel form of metaethical reductive naturalism. The key is to identify the stuff that matters. (shrink)

In this paper, we study VC-minimal theories and explore related concepts. We first define the notion of convex orderablity and show that this lies strictly between VC-minimality and dp-minimality. To do this we prove a general result about set systems with independence dimension ≤ 1. Next, we define the notion of weak VC-minimality, show it lies strictly between VC-minimality and dependence, and show that all unstable weakly VC-minimal theories interpret an infinite linear order. Finally, we define the notion full VC-minimality, (...) show that this lies strictly between weak o-minimality and VC-minimality, and show that theories that are fully VC-minimal have low VC-density. (shrink)

We define an easily verifiable notion of an atomic formula having uniformly bounded arrays in a structure M. We prove that if T is a complete L-theory, then T is mutually algebraic if and only if there is some model M of T for which every atomic formula has uniformly bounded arrays. Moreover, an incomplete theory T is mutually algebraic if and only if every atomic formula has uniformly bounded arrays in every model M of T.

The present collection takes stock of posthumanism and its theoretical development and impact in the field of Anglophone literary and cultural studies, with a particular focus on its role in education and the practice of teaching English. Posthumanism informs work in environmental or ecological criticism, climate change research, or human-animal studies - and poses an educational challenge since it also affects curricular and pedagogic theory and practice. Moreover, humanist idea(l)s of subject formation and individually acquired competences have a direct bearing (...) on conceptions of education. This is why the volume interrogates the potentials and pitfalls of posthumanist pedagogies and its connections with digitization, multiliteracies, non-European and non-anthropocentric thinking, and the role of literature pedagogy more generally, presenting case studies of teaching the posthuman from primary to tertiary levels. (shrink)

Transformácia politického systému -- Aktuálne problémy a riešenia -- Alternatívy súčasného kapitalizmu -- Cynizmus ako princíp -- Appendix o školstve.

Der thematisch scharf umgrenzte Sammelband ist von grundlegender Bedeutung füuuml;r die Ästhetik der Gegenwart und vervollstäauml;ndigt Ingardens großen Entwurf einer philosophisch begründeten Theorie des Kunstwerks. Im Mittelpunkt der Eröouml;rterungen stehen das ästhetische Erlebnis, das Form-Inhalt-Problem im literarischen Kunstwerk und vor allem der Fragenkomplex des ästhetischen Wertes.

Between the zone of certainty beyond all doubt and the zone of incomprehensible uncertainty, the sources of which are nothing but chance, we need to use solid results from a vast interdisciplinarity. We wish to give here a sense of the factors in play and the state of the debate and advance in the territory of how interdisciplinarity may help to solve problems which are common in many areas of knowledge. Chaos and complexity certainly put limits on what we can (...) know. High complexity, asymmetry and/or non-linearity are universal types of imprecision. Can hazard have purpose and direction?The idea is that the more effort we put into project design to cover as many details and possible consequences as possible we can grasp in our in-depth analysis aiming to create the project (in art or science or society), the greater the chances that the random occurrence of the unpredictable event will settle on the project's purpose and direction and not on contrary to them. There is no vicious circle here. This kind of method can explain many good results already obtained in such circumstances. Simplicity, beauty, rationalistic optimism, are features of unshakeable scientific results We may call this feature of scientific theory or art _uniqueness. _Uniqueness is strongly correlated with _essentialization. _Science is working in that sense: to simplify a phenomenon to its essence in order to study it easily without losing anything important in the analysis. That is _essentialization. _Why and how complex systems move to the edge of chaos? And what do they do to stay there? They are in constant struggle to create or keep order in complexity. That is the pattern of self-organization, the specific feature of human nature. That is why our action is meant to build resilience to deal better with unpredictable events and prevent the emergence of a critical threshold. Uncertainty, indeterminacy, randomness, and contradictions appear, not as non-essential substances of debate to be eliminated by explanation, but as everlasting ingredients of our conception of reality. There are compelling reasons to believe that it is impossible to make accurate, nontrivial predictions concerning human behavior. Logic and reason are and remain priority, but unpredictability forces us to imagination and creative thinking. Indeed we are confronted with a new human landscape. The anomalies become the new normal. (shrink)

We give an example of a countable theory $T$ such that for every cardinal $\lambda \geq \aleph_2$ there is a fully indiscernible set $A$ of power $\lambda$ such that the principal types are dense over $A$, yet there is no atomic model of $T$ over $A$. In particular, $T$ is a theory of size $\lambda$ where the principal types are dense, yet $T$ has no atomic model.

In this paper we prove three theorems about first-order theories that are categorical in a higher power. The first theorem asserts that such a theory either is totally categorical or there exist prime and minimal models over arbitrary base sets. The second theorem shows that such theories have a natural notion of dimension that determines the models of the theory up to isomorphism. From this we conclude that $I(T, \aleph_\alpha) = \aleph_0 +|\alpha|$ where ℵ α = the number of formulas (...) modulo T-equivalence provided that T is not totally categorical. The third theorem gives a new characterization of these theories. (shrink)

We prove that if M is any model of a trivial, weakly minimal theory, then the elementary diagram T(M) eliminates quantifiers down to Boolean combinations of certain existential formulas.

In his highly engaging book, Speech and Morality, Terence Cuneo advances a transcendental argument for moral realism from the fact that we speak. After summarizing the major moves in the book, I argue that its master argument is not as friendly to non-naturalist versions of moral realism as Cuneo advertises and relies on a diet of insufficient types of speech acts. I also argue that expressivists have compelling replies to each of Cuneo's objections individually, but taken together, Cuneo's objections provide (...) the resources for issuing a new and interesting challenge to expressivists. (shrink)

We reconsider the Nagelian theory of reduction and argue that, contrary to a widely held view, it is the right analysis of intertheoretic reduction. The alleged difficulties of the theory either vanish upon closer inspection or turn out to be substantive philosophical questions rather than knock-down arguments.

A class K of structures is controlled if for all cardinals λ, the relation of L∞,λ-equivalence partitions K into a set of equivalence classes . We prove that no pseudo-elementary class with the independence property is controlled. By contrast, there is a pseudo-elementary class with the strict order property that is controlled 69–88).

When asked which of our concepts are normative concepts, metaethicists would be quick to list such concepts as GOOD, OUGHT, and REASON. When asked why such concepts belong on the list, metaethicists would be much slower to respond. Matti Eklund is a notable exception. In his recent book, Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund argues by elimination for “the Normative Role view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of having a “normative role” or being “used normatively”. One view that Eklund aims (...) to eliminate is “the Metaphysical view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of referring to normative properties. In addition to arguing that Eklund’s objection looks doubtful by its own lights, we argue that there are several plausible versions of the Metaphysical view that Eklund doesn’t eliminate, defending various claims about normative concepts and their relationships to deliberation, competence, reference, and possession along the way. (shrink)

There’s a long but relatively neglected tradition of attempting to explain why many researchers working on the nature of phenomenal consciousness think that it’s hard to explain.1 David Chalmers argues that this “meta-problem of consciousness” merits more attention than it has received. He also argues against several existing explanations of why we find consciousness hard to explain. Like Chalmers, we agree that the meta-problem is worthy of more attention. Contra Chalmers, however, we argue that there’s an existing explanation that is (...) more promising than his objections suggest. We argue that researchers find phenomenal consciousness hard to explain because phenomenal concepts are complex demonstratives that encode the impossibility of explaining consciousness as one of their application conditions. (shrink)