Aspiracija za jedinstvenim upravljanjem svetom je stara koliko i sam svet. Ona u suštini proizlazi iz naše percepcije sveta kao jednog, bez obzira na sve razlike koje se u njemu takođe vide. U naše vreme ova percepcija je pojačana utiskom o sve većoj međuzavisnosti delova sveta, kao i osećajem da su razlike, ma koliko bile velike, sve manje važne u odnosu na ono što je isto ili bar slično u različitim delovima sveta. Ovaj osećaj jedinstva je još više pojačan percepcijom (...) potrebe, ili nužde, da se o važnim stvarima u svetu odlučuje i upravlja na jedinstven način, bez kolizija koje bi proces odlučivanja učinile neefikasnim ili nemogućim. Ali jedinstvo sveta bi trebalo da u sebi sadrži ideju ravnopravnosti, i neke načelne jednakosti. Međutim, uvidom u način na koji se ovaj proces unifikacije sveta stvarno odvija vidimo mnoge probleme. Neki od njih su za očekivati – problemi reprezentacije i pristanka na svetsku vlast koja bi bila odraz jedinstvene zakonodavne volje čovečanstva. Takva volja možda uopšte ne može da se konstituiše. Umesto nje imamo volju za hegemonijom koju prati ideja nejednakosti i manihejske podele sveta na naš i tuđi deo, kao i razne vrste pokušaja ukidanja onog uslova koji svakom zakonodavstvu daje njegov legitimet – a to je sloboda. Suočavamo se sa idejom da je, kao uslov mira i demokratije (šta god da to znači, ili što će značiti u bližoj i daljoj budućnosti) potrebno uspostaviti krutu nejednakost i rigidnu kontrolu svih različitosti u jednom zamrznutom stanju podele na povlašćene i obezvlašćene, na „dobre“ i „loše“ momke, kao da se svet sastoji od „momaka“. Ključni deo ove sheme je pretpostavka o univerzalnoj samerljivosti svega što život čini vrednim. Ta pretpostavka uniformiše i simplifikuje, smanjuje, svet, negirajući relevanciju i stvarnost razlikama koji sada predstavljaju stvarnost sveta. Zakoni više ne pretpostavljaju postojanje zakonodavne volje. U toj situaciji proizvodnja ogromne količine iluzorne sreće više liči na podmićivanje svetskog lumpenproletarijata, sa rizikom da celokupno čovečanstvo postane totalno ravnodušno prema svakoj posebnosti i svakoj vrlini, sasvim primereno svojoj novoj lumpenproleterskoj prirodi. (shrink)

[Lifeworld, Metaphysics and the Ethics of Nature in Habermas. ].

1. Svet -- 2. Preizkušanje meja izrekljivega.

V zborniku Gemeinsamkeit auf getrennten Wegen s podnaslovom Die slowenischen Doktoranden der Grazer Philosophischen Fakultät im Zeitraum 1876–1918 und die Gründung der Universität in Ljubljana so zbrani prispevki o slovenskih doktorskih kandidatih Filozofske fakultete Univerze Karla in Franca v Gradcu v zadnjem obdobju obstoja donavske monarhije. Prispevki so plod raziskav v okviru projekta Zgodovina disertacij slovenskih kandidatov v Avstroogrski monarhiji, kjer so bili predhodno obravnavani že slovenski doktorandi Karlove univerze v Pragi in Univerze na Dunaju.

This review highlights how the author expresses his ideas about Confucian Sentimental Representation as an Approach to Confucian Democracy in East Asia, especially South Korea. In addition, the author takes some ideas from western democratic philosophy which are in harmony with the basic teachings of Confucianism.

The paper deals with von Mises’ metaphysics and argues that his methodological dualism concerns only his epistemology. The framework of Mises´s ontology is materialistic monism. Although Mises strongly criticizes materialism, his critique does not concern metaphysical ontological materialism as long as it does not try to eliminate the specific method of the social sciences. In this sense Mises’ metaphysics is fully naturalistic – it does not include any “spiritual” agents and postulates a world consisting exclusively of elementary physical particles. The (...) study illustrates this point on Mises’ determinism and his rejection of the free will as well as on his Darwinian account of the evolution of human mind. The specific method of the social sciences which makes use of the category of finality serves merely as an efficient heuristics and is based on a pragmatic view of science. It allows us to describe the irreducible complexity of social phenomena that cannot (at least not yet) be grasped by the physicalist vocabulary alone. Thus the argument of complexity is seen as a cornerstone of Misesian methodological dualism. (shrink)

By examining the idea found in the works of several contemporary philosophers that the multiplicity of worlds is no longer merely possible – as it was for Leibniz – but actually determines our experience of reality, the article proposes an understanding of worlds as transcendental structures that frame the ontological multiplicity. The article argues that such a proliferation of actual worlds implies that the concept of world should be seen today as a category that belongs to the order of fiction, (...) making the world-building devices of literature relevant for understanding the contemporary experience of reality. The first part examines the conceptions of multiple worlds of Leibniz, Deleuze, and Badiou through the structural differences and similarities between possible and fictional worlds. While Deleuze actualises possible worlds, Badiou actualises fictional worlds. The second part explores worlds as political fictions, revisiting Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism via Rancière’s definition of politics as a conflict of worlds. Rancière’s formulation of political dissensus in fictional and narrative terms sheds a new light on Kant’s description of cosmopolitanism as a perspective that presents history as a novelistic narrative. (shrink)

Sefer ha-Roḳeaḥ -- Sefer Eldad ha-Dani -- Sibuv Rabi Petaḥyah -- Sefer Har Adonai.

Článek srovnává pojetí člověka jako bytosti, situované v celkové souvislosti a vyznačující se otevřeností a sebetranscendencí, v myšlení Jana Patočky a Karla Rahnera, a to se zvláštním zřetelem na interpretaci postavy bohočlověka u obou autorů. Srovnává a dává do souvislosti Patočkův pojem "světa" a pojem "tajemství" u Karla Rahnera, jejich pojetí dějinnosti i radikálního ohrožení člověka. Konečně se zabývá interpretací postavy bohočlověka, kterou můžeme u obou autorů chápat jako klíčovou pro lidskou existenci, a zároveň si můžeme všimnout, že odlišné interpretace (...) tohoto motivu u obou autorů jsou si vnitřně překvapivě blízké. (shrink)

The essay discusses a significant shift in conceptualizing the notion of representation found in Alain Badiou’s ontology and Jacques Rancière’s aesthetics. From Heidegger to Deleuze, the artwork was able to express an ontological truth about the world on the condition that it does not represent it. Badiou’s ‘subtractive’ approach to ontology and Rancière’s redefinition of the modern aesthetic break with representation, however, suggest that there is nothing to express beyond the veil of representation. Instead, representation can only be counteracted by (...) the occurrence of surplus representations that subvert the principles of the dominant regime of representation. The essay provides an understanding of this shift by reversing the Leibnizian conceptual metaphor Adorno used to describe the modern artwork. Unlike ‘windowless monads’, whose seclusion from the world enables them to convey an ontological truth, artworks as ‘monadless windows’ reframe the parameters of what is perceived as reality. (shrink)

The article examines the transformations of the philosophical concept of world as it appears in the cosmopolitan tradition of political thought and its relation to the problem of the border. It focuses particularly on how world is understood as either lost or multiplied in the contexts of modernity, globalisation, and migration. The article discusses postcolonial conceptions of cosmopolitics and the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt to show how the universal ideal of the world is replaced by singular constructions of worlds (...) in terms of the experience of migrants and refugees or the phenomenological horizon of political action. I conclude by suggesting that Jacques Rancière’s understanding of politics as a conflict of worlds can take us beyond the traps of both cosmopolitan universalism and the phenomenological singularity of being-in-the-world. (shrink)

The article explores Adorno’s understanding of fetishism and melancholy as immanent to the artwork’s autonomous structure. In order to understand the relation between them, the Freudian understanding of fetishism and melancholy has to be considered along with the more explicit reference to the Marxist concept of commodity fetishism. Analysing the implications of Adorno’s claim that commodity fetishism is at the origin of artistic autonomy, the article shows how it should be understood not only as a materialist demystification but also as (...) a reaffirmation of art’s apparent self-sufficiency and its capacity to resist the commodification of society. Nevertheless—the article claims—thas this is only possible if art’s fetishism is dialectically opposed to its melancholy, through which art establishes a relation to the heterogeneous element of the lost object produced by its autonomous form. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify the aesthetical, ontological, and political grounds upon which certain modern philosophers (above all Heidegger and Deleuze) denounce the metaphor as an alternative device for producing meaning through language. It comes to the conclusion that the critique of metaphor is based on the critique of analogy as defined by the laws of representation, which should be replaced by a more direct expression of immanence or being. On the basis of other philosophical assumptions from various traditions and (...) the insights of literary theory, it proposes an alternative model of the metaphor that is no longer founded on analogy and demonstrates its philosophical implications. (shrink)

The affective turn in photography theory takes as its point of departure Roland Barthes’s move from semiology to affective phenomenology in Camera Lucida. This article, however, considers the way affective phenomenology is itself grounded in the semiological structure of photography. It looks at how, before Camera Lucida was even written, Thierry de Duve had already discussed the affective implications of Barthes’s understanding of photography’s indexical nature. The article then proceeds to rethink the structural affectivity of photography beyond Barthes’s and de (...) Duve’s emphasis on a direct relation between indexicality and loss. Reconsidering photography through Jacques Rancière’s conception of the aesthetic regime of art, the article rather puts emphasis on the indeterminacy of photography, which results from the way the camera captures and isolates a spatio-temporal fragment. Shifting the focus from indexicality to indeterminacy sheds a different light on the loss implied by the structure of photography, parallel to how Freud understood the difference between mourning and melancholy. (shrink)

By the end of 18th century, when one of the well-known political documents, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, was enacted, it hasn’t been that difficult to find the answer to the question about “what” of the human rights, though then we acceded to the grounds of a basically different morals. One way or another, human rights were derived from reason, meaning from the ability which should be able to write “The Pure Reason Gospel”. A (...) century and a half later, in 1948, such question not only had certain shortcomings, but in just a few years of practicing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights it became clear that searching for “what” of human rights opens numerous and profound dissidences every day. Therefore a strategic shift was suggested: to proclaim the question about “what” to be prevalent and commit ourselves to the “how” of human rights. Instead of positive assignment , we suggest a negative assignment: What kind of thinking can negatively affect the “how” of human rights? In this enclosure, we need to show how postmodernism brought onto-theological thinking which acts like lenses that give us wrong perspective on human rights and therefore represents one of the biggest contemporary threats for human rights. (shrink)

A peculiar trait unites Roland Barthes and Susan Sontag’s famous accounts of photography: both emphasize the anti-Proustian character of the medium. Two versions of the same assertion are presented in Camera Lucida and On Photography, namely that the nature of photography prevents it from being able to provide the experience needed to regain what was lost in time. Curiously enough, in Raoul Ruiz’s film adaptation, Marcel Proust’s Time Regained, photographs are used by the director to set the world of the (...) novel into motion. Does the opening scene, which shows the writer browsing through photographs of the people he used to know, merely present Proust’s documented habit of collecting photographs of the... (shrink)

Krajem 18. stoljeća, kad je donesen jedan od najpoznatijih političkih dokumenata, Deklaracija o pravima čovjeka i građanina, nije bilo teško pronaći odgovor na pitanje o onome »što« ljudskih prava, premda se time stupilo na tlo jednog u temelju drugačijega morala. Na ovaj ili onaj način ljudska prava su se izvodila iz uma, što znači iz jedne moći koja bi trebala napisati »Evanđelje čistoga uma«. Stoljeće i pol kasnije, 1948. godine, jedno takvo pitanje ne samo da je bilo manjkavo, nego je (...) u samo nekoliko godina djelovanja Opće deklaracije o ljudskim pravima postalo jasno da traganje za onim »što« ljudskih prava svaki dan iznosi na vidjelo sve brojnije i dublje nesuglasice. Stoga je predložen jedan strateški pomak: proglasimo pitanje o onom »što« prevladanim i posvetimo se onome »kako« ljudskih prava. Umjesto pozitivne zadaće predlažemo negativnu zadaću: Koje mišljenje može naštetiti onome »kako« ljudskih prava? U ovom se prilogu treba pokazati kako se kroz postmodernu uvuklo onto-teološko mišljenje koje djeluje kao leća koja iskrivljuje pogled na ljudska prava i time predstavlja jednu od najvećih suvremenih prijetnji za ljudska prava. (shrink)

À la fin du XVIIIe siècle, à l’époque où fut voté l’un des documents politiques les plus célèbresla Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, il n’était pas difficile de répondre à la question du « quoi » des droits de l’homme, même si cela revenait à entrer dans une sphère morale fondamentalement différente. D’une manière ou d’une autre, les droits de l’homme avaient leur origine dans la raison, c’est-à-dire dans un pouvoir qui devrait écrire l’ « Evangile de (...) la raison pure ». Un siècle et demi plus tard, en 1948, une telle question non seulement ne suffisait plus, mais il était devenu clair, déjà à peine quelques années après l’entrée en vigueur de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, que ce « quoi » des droits de l’homme mettait chaque jour en lumière des divergences de plus en plus profondes. C’est pourquoi nous proposons une avancée stratégique : décidons que la question du « quoi » est dépassée et consacrons-nous à la question du « comment » des droits de l’homme. À la place du problème positif – Quelle pensée peut répondre à la question du « quoi » des droits de l’homme ? -, nous proposons un problème négatif : Quelle pensée peut nuire au « comment » des droits de l’homme ? Cette contribution doit démontrer qu’une pensée onto-théologique s’est introduite dans le post-modernisme, agissant comme une lentille qui déforme le regard porté sur les droits de l’homme et qui représente pour ceux-ci l’une des plus importantes menaces contemporaines. (shrink)

Am Ende des 18. Jh., als eines der berühmtesten politischen Dokumente, Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte, verabschiedet wurde, war die Antwort auf die Frage nach dem „Was” der Menschenrechte nicht schwer zu finden, obwohl damit Neuland einer grundsätzlich anderen politischen Moral betreten wurde. Auf diese oder andere Weise wurden die Menschenrechte aus der Vernunft abgeleitet, d. h. aus einem Vermögen, welches ein „Evangelium der reinen Vernunft” schreiben sollte. Eineinhalb Jahrhunderte später, im Jahr 1948, war eine solche Antwort nicht nur (...) hindernisreich, sondern es ist in den einigen mageren Jahren des Wirkens der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte klar geworden, dass das Suchen nach dem „Was” der Menschenrechte jeden Tag mehrere und tiefere Unstimmigkeiten zum Vorschein bringt. Deswegen wird eine strategische Verschiebung vorgeschlagen: Erklären wir die Frage nach dem „Was” als überholt und widmen wir uns dem „Wie” der Menschenrechte. Anstatt der positiven Aufgabe, welches Denken auf das „Was” der Menschenrechte antworten kann, schlagen wir eine negative Aufgabe vor: Welches Denken kann dem „Wie” der Menschenrechte schaden? In diesem Beitrag soll gezeigt werden, dass sich durch die Postmoderne das onto-theo-logische Denken eingeschlichen hat, das als eine Linse wirkt, die den Blick auf die Menschenrechte verzerrt und dadurch eine der größten zeitgenössischen Gefahren für die Menschenrechte mit sich bringt. (shrink)