Over the past decade or so within this journal, there have been critical debates concerning the role of mindfulness within education, the influence of neoliberalism on education in general and well-being interventions specifically, and the relevance of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger for critiquing modernity including the nature and purpose afforded education. In this article, we propose that these debates are sufficiently interrelated to develop a more unified argument. We will show how a Heideggerian perspective is conceptually rich, in both (...) its heritage, as it draws upon both East-Asian wisdom and western thinking, and its engagement, as it confronts the implications of what Heidegger called a ‘technical-era’, for offering such a unified critique. The focus of this critique is on instrumental forms of mindfulness (mindfulness ‘in’ education), which when framed by neoliberalism has rather narrow goals concerning individual well-being and performance. In contrast, more critical and integral forms of mindfulness (mindfulness ‘as’ education) offer the potential for more holistic and authentic learning. Throughout the article, we discuss how Heideggerian philosophy offers a number of useful concepts (e.g., enframing, Dasein, authenticity, meditative thinking), which are able to both critique the instrumentalisation of approaches like mindfulness by neoliberalism and speak to more holistic education oriented toward more authentic being in the world. (shrink)

Although the implementation of mindfulness-based interventions in educational contexts appear to have demonstrated some benefits for students and teachers in research studies conducted over the last two decades, there are also those who criticize MBI’s for their instrumental focus. Exploring this debate, this article offers a case for the implementation of a more holistic and integral approach to mindfulness in educational settings. It will draw upon the philosophical legacy of Martin Heidegger and other critical theorists, who contest the dominant framing (...) of neoliberalism and encourage engagement with more systemic perspectives. During this exploration, we examine two polemics: whether mindfulness should be implemented technically or holistically and, whether the focus should be individual and/or collective. The article concludes that although mindfulness may be an efficient ‘self-technology’ to improve certain aspects of individual well-being, it is necessary to challenge this perspective as it promotes a type of ‘iatrogenic effect’. Specifically, it is argued that systemic failure is reframed as individual fallibility via a simplistic focus on well-being that may contradictorily foster appeasement to exploitative conditions. As an alternative, we offer a more integrative version, drawing in particular on the work of Ken Wilber, which proposes systemic as well as individual transformation. (shrink)

RESUMO: Tradução dos passos 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B da Epitome de Etica Estoica, do filósofo estoico e doxógrafo alexandrino Ário Dídimo. Não há traduções em língua moderna das obras completas de Ário Dídimo. Assim, para esta tradução, usamos a fixação da exposição sobre a ética estoica presente em Estobeu, realizada por Pomeroy. A seção que traduzimos versa sobre o conceito estoico de excelência, explicando o que ela é, quais as virtudes que dela participam, e como. Por antítese, Ário Dídimo também elucida o (...) conceito estoico de vício, o que ele é e qual a sua taxonomia. ABSTRACT: Translation of 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B of the Epitome of Stoic Ethics by the Stoic philosopher and Alexandrian doxographer Arius Didymus. There are no translations of Arius Didymus' complete works into modern languages. Thus for this translation we utilized Pomeroy's fixation of the exposition of Stoic ethics found in Stobaeus' Florilegium. Parts 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B deal with the Stoic concept of excellence, explaining what excellence is, what virtues participate in it, and how. Arius Didymus also explains the Stoic concept of vice, what it is, and its taxonomy. (shrink)