Rochelle E. Cox [5]Rochelle Cox [3]
  1. ‘Faultless’ ignorance: Strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation.Lisa Bortolotti & Rochelle E. Cox - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):952-965.
    There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient (...)
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  2.  99
    Can we recreate delusions in the laboratory?Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131.
    Clinical delusions are difficult to investigate in the laboratory because they co-occur with other symptoms and with intellectual impairment. Partly for these reasons, researchers have recently begun to use hypnosis with neurologically intact people in order to model clinical delusions. In this paper we describe striking analogies between the behavior of patients with a clinical delusion of mirrored self misidentification, and the behavior of highly hypnotizable subjects who receive a hypnotic suggestion to see a stranger when they look in the (...)
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  3. Rationality and self-knowledge in delusions and confabulations: Implications for autonomy as self-governance.Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox, Matthew Broome & Matteo Mameli - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 100-122.
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    Distributed Cognition in Sports Teams: Explaining successful and expert performance.Kellie Williamson & Rochelle Cox - 2014 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 46 (6):1-15.
    In this article we use a hybrid methodology to better understand the skilful performance of sports teams as an exemplar of distributed cognition. We highlight key differences between a team of individual experts and an expert team, and outline the kinds of shared characteristics likely to be found in an expert team. We focus on the way that shared knowledge contributes to expert team performance. In particular, we suggest that certain kinds of shared knowledge and shared skill, potentially developed through (...)
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    A laboratory analogue of mirrored-self misidentification delusion: The role of hypnosis, suggestion, and demand characteristics.Michael H. Connors, Amanda J. Barnier, Robyn Langdon, Rochelle E. Cox, Vince Polito & Max Coltheart - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1510-1522.
    Mirrored-self misidentification is the delusional belief that one's own reflection in the mirror is a stranger. In two experiments, we tested the ability of hypnotic suggestion to model this condition. In Experiment 1, we compared two suggestions based on either the delusion's surface features (seeing a stranger in the mirror) or underlying processes (impaired face processing). Fifty-two high hypnotisable participants received one of these suggestions either with hypnosis or without in a wake control. In Experiment 2, we examined the extent (...)
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    Using hypnosis to model Fregoli delusion and the impact of challenges on belief revision.Jocelyn M. Elliott, Rochelle E. Cox & Amanda J. Barnier - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 46:36-46.
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    Using hypnosis to disrupt face processing: mirrored-self misidentification delusion and different visual media.Michael H. Connors, Amanda J. Barnier, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon, Rochelle E. Cox, Davide Rivolta & Peter W. Halligan - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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    Transmitting delusional beliefs in a hypnotic model of folie à deux.Luke P. Freeman, Rochelle E. Cox & Amanda J. Barnier - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1285-1297.
    Folie à deux is the transference of delusional ideas from one 'primary' individual to one or more 'secondary' individuals (Lasègue & Falret, 1877). However, it is difficult to investigate experimentally because often only one patient is identified as delusional. We investigated whether hypnosis could model the experiences of the secondary in this delusion. Our primary was a confederate, who displayed two delusional beliefs and attempted to transmit them to hypnotised subjects. We manipulated the status of the confederate so that they (...)
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