Giovanni Merlo has argued that a currently popular way to interpret Kit Fine's fragmentalism about tensed facts (which he calls ‘unstructured fragmentalism’) is threatened by the problem of ‘tensed belief explosion’. I argue that such an explosion of belief poses no problem to unstructured fragmentalists.

n the philosophy of language, there are many ongoing controversies that stem from relying too heavily on an utterance-based framework. The traditional approach of rigidly partitioning the utterance’s meaning into what is grammatically determined from what is not may not fully capture the complexity of human language in real-world communicative contexts. To address this issue, we suggest shifting focus toward a broader analysis level encompassing conversations and discourses. From this broader perspective, it is possible to obtain a more integrated view (...) of how linguistic and extra-linguistic aspects dynamically interact and thus reconsider semantics/pragmatics dichotomy as complementary dimensions. Meaning is not confined to linguistic structures alone but emerges from the dynamic interplay of words, sociocultural knowledge, discursive situations, and psychological dispositions of speakers. Substantiating this perspective calls for embracing an interdisciplinary approach that synthesizes research from various domains, including linguistics, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of language. This paper focuses on a particularly compelling case study: aphasia. Speeches produced by individuals with aphasia represent complex scenarios where the balance between linguistic and extra-linguistic aspects is notably compromised, often to the former’s detriment. Aphasics’ productions represent a vivid example of how the interpretation of speeches can be far from involving fixed and static operations. Instead, it entails continuously reallocating cognitive resources toward the most readily available and accessible sources for the speakers. This case study ultimately demonstrates that the influence of semantic and pragmatic processes in shaping and conveying meanings displays remarkable adaptability, continuously adjusting to the ever changing demands placed upon speakers. -/- . (shrink)

At De Principiis II, p. 75.10-11 Westerink, Damascius states that ‘Being will be that which provides being itself to each thing, καὶ καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστι’. The modern reference translation of the De Principiis, that of Joseph Combès for the Collection des Universités de France, renders the phrase left here in Greek as ‘et selon ce qu’elle est comme être’. Combès interprets it by stating that being is here conceived of as the constitutive unity of each form, at once (...) responsible for both its essence and existence. I argue that both a translation and an interpretation of καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστι of the type suggested by Combès are untenable and I defend an alternative construal. The two other main modern translations, those of Ahbel-Rappe and Galpérine, are also critically assessed. The translation of the relevant phrase I propose is: ‘and in virtue of which something is a being’. I argue that being – that is the property bestowed by the Kind or Form of Being, a notion that Damascius draws from Plato’s Sophist – is here conceived of as that which is metaphysically responsible only for the fact that something is (or is a being), not also for what something is. This construal does justice to the grammar of Damascius’ text and fits better with the argument of De Principiis II, pp. 56-99 Westerink. (shrink)

Resenha do livro de Loparic, Zeljko. Ética e finitude . Sáo Paulo: Escuta, 2004, 120 páginas.

Roberto Gronda & Tullio Viola – Your work is frequently referred to as “pragmatic history.” This notion, however, is by no means a new one: Polybius spoke of pragmatikê historia, Germany had pragmatische Geschichte in the tradition of Kantian anthropology. Can you tell us something about how you understand this label, and about your own encounter with “pragmatic history”? Simona Cerutti – Personally, I had quite an idiosyncratic introduction to pragmatic history, although this encounter was n...

Kant was never satisfied with the version of his “Refu- tation” published in 1787 (KrV, B 275-279). His dissatisfaction is already evident in the footnote added to the preface of the second edition of the Critique in 1787. As a matter of fact, Kant continued to rework his argument for at least six years after 1787. The main exegetical problem is to figure out who is the target of the “Refutation”: a non-skeptic idealist, a global skeptic of Cartesian provenance or (...) both. In this last case, the related problem is to know whether either of them is the Cartesian skeptic of the first Meditation, the idealist skeptic of the second Meditation and first part of the third Meditation, or some other non-skeptic idealist. I present and defend a new reconstruction of Kant’s “Refu- tation” as a successful argument against Mendelssohnian idealism of Cartesian provenance. This defense is based on a simple logical sketch of the proof provided by Dicker but essentially modified in light of Dyck’s insight about Kant’s opponent. How shall I support my reading? First, by appealing to overwhelming textual evidence according to which the proof is of the existence of mind-independent things, showing that Kant’s main opponent is Mendelssohn’s idealism of Cartesian provenance. Finally, I support my reading by showing that Kant’s “Refutation” is doomed to fail against all forms of global skepticism but is quite successful against Mendelssohn’s idealism. (shrink)

How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of Dretske’s displaced perception model. The guiding line is the key Wittgensteinian insight of his Private Language Argument, namely the claim that no inner perception of qualia can justify our corresponding qualia beliefs. My reworking of the original model starts with the rejection of Dretske’s representationalism, (...) as well as any other metaphysical views about the ultimate nature of qualia. The reworking of the displaced perception model I am proposing is supposed to be compatible with any available metaphysical view on qualia. The second step consists of rejecting the epistemological misgivings of the original model, namely the view that knowing qualia requires “connecting beliefs” along with “meta-representations.” Yet, Dretske’s crucial mistake has been to force knowledge of qualia into the “belief-box.” As a matter of fact, there is only one belief involved in introspecting qualia, namely the qualia-belief itself. The third final step is this. Assuming the key Wittgensteinian insight, I argue that introspection of qualia is a process that is both epis- temically reliable and automatic. It is reliable because it dispenses with justification of any beliefs whatsoever. Moreover, it is automatic because it also dispenses with reflexive connecting beliefs. For example, it takes nonconceptual awareness of the color blue as an input and automatically yields the belief that phenomenal blue is the conscious character of my experience of the sky as an output just by employing the concept BLUE. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to offer a new view of the key relation between the content and the conscious character of visual experience. The author aims to support the following claims. First, the author rejects the qualia realist claim that conscious character is an intrinsic, nonrepresentational property of visual experience, for example, a pattern of activation of neurons. However, the author also rejects the rival widespread representationalist claim that the conscious character of visual experience is identical to, or (...) supervenes on, any specific property represented by visual experience. The positive proposal is the following. Conscious character is identical to those patterns of activation of neurons that are referentially or representationally alive. Conscious redness, for example, is a pattern of activations of neurons that is normally created only when brains of physical duplicates come in visual contact with some distal property. This pattern of activation is recruited by natural selection to represent that property. This is called meaning representationalism. (shrink)

From the second half of the last century, there has been a widespread view in the Anglophone world that Kant’s transcendental deduction (aka TD) aims to vindicate our common-sense view of the world as composed of public and objective particulars against some unqualified forms of skepticism. This widespread assumption has raised serious doubt not only about the success of TD but also about the very nature of its argument in both editions of the Critique. Yet, if there is a connection (...) between TD and global skepticism, the intriguing question is: Who is this skeptic? According to Strawson, “the skeptic” is a hypothesis of a purely sense-datum experience. In contrast, the fact that TD turns on the key notion of self-consciousness has induced several other scholars to assume that the skeptic is no none but a Cartesian external-world skeptic. None of those readings find textual support or are compatible with the very structure of the first Critique. The question is: Does this mean that TD aims only to undermine empiricism, as Guyer suggests? I do not believe so. I am pretty convinced that TD addresses a peculiar form of global skepticism, namely “Hume’s challenge to reason.” Assuming that we cognize (erkennen) and experience (erfahren) appearances as objects as a requirement of Newtonian physics, TD aims to provide a justification of the principle that nature is uniform that is superior to Hume’s justification. (shrink)

This paper presents a new cognitivist account for the old puzzle of self-consciousness or knowing self-reference. Knowing self-reference does not rely on reflection on some putative pre-existent pre-reflexive self-consciousness, nor is it the result of a process of identification of oneself as the employer of the relevant token of “I” according to the token-reflexive rule of the first-person pronoun. Rather, it relies on the architecture of the cognitive system. By exploiting the acquaintance relation that every brain has to one’s own (...) body, a “mental file” is opened in a subliminal way to house information about oneself gained through the appropriate proprioceptors. Knowing self-reference based on self-files dispenses with self-identification because the opening of the file in the same brain/body is not a deed of the cognitive system but rather something that takes place sub-personally. (shrink)

The aim of this paper has been to present a new reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism. I have considered several different targets of the Refutation, five of them mentioned by Kant himself. I believe that I have shown that the Refutation of Idealism is best considered only as a sound argument against Mendelssohnian subjectivist idealism, against Mendelssohnian immaterialism, and against Mendelssohnian realist idealism. First, Kant’s Refutation is a sound argument in favor of the claim that the outer things represented (...) in our minds are real rather than ideal; that is, they exist mind-independently as noumena. And second, Kant’s refutation is a sound argument for a fundamental ontology of noumena: the ultimate nature of reality and of our minds is neither material nor mental but made up of things in themselves. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende ofrecer una visión alternativa tanto de la lectura conceptualista tradicional de Kant como de la nueva lectura no conceptualista. En contra de las lecturas conceptualistas tradicionales sostengo que confunden las condiciones para la representación sensible de los objetos (tesis de la intencionalidad) con las condiciones para el reconocimiento (Erkenntnis) de que representamos objetos mediante intuiciones sensibles (tesis del reconocimiento). En contra de las lecturas no conceptualistas sostengo que no distinguen el no conceptualismo -propio de la filosofía contemporánea (...) de la mente- de las tesis antiintelectualistas de Kant. Tales lecturas fracasan porque se equivocan al atribuir un contenido representacional a las intuiciones sensibles de Kant. Las intuiciones sensibles, según Kant, no presentan el mundo según ciertas condiciones de satisfacción que podrían o no ser satisfechas por el mundo. Por lo tanto, no son ni verídicas ni non verídicas. Se limitan a presentar el mundo de una manera directa, independiente de los conceptos, lo que llamaré aquí la presentación de re de los objetos. En mi lectura, la oposición entre intuiciones y conceptos es la oposición entre la presentación de re de um objeto y el reconocimento proposicional de dicto de que representamos algo como um objeto. (shrink)

I aim to develop an alternative theoretical model for the direct cognition of the elementary states of others called the theory of interaction (henceforth TI), also known as the “second person” approach. The model I propose emerges from a critical reformulation of the displaced perception model proposed by FRED DRETSKE (1995) for the introspective knowledge of our own mental states. Moreover, against Dretske, I argue that no meta-representation (second-order representation of a first-order representation as a representation) is involved in the (...) process, but only concepts, rudimentary enough, of others’ emotions: contentment and discontentment. Strictly speaking, all the empirical data and findings in developmental psychology only support the hypothesis that children in the pre-linguistic phase understand perceptual facial expressions of contentment and discontentment. My proposal consists of the following thesis: The direct perception of others' elementary mental states is not a perception in the usual sense of the word according to which we just perceive things, but rather a “perception of facts.” But how to understand that? It is nothing more than an epistemological process that is automatic and reliable at the same time. It is reliable in the epistemological-externalist sense of not involving any inference, reflection, theorizing or epistemic justification: a baby’s perception of her mom’s facial expression of discontentment (in the usual sense of “per- ception”) does not constitute a reason supporting the belief that mommy is discontent. The very word “belief” should not be understood in the usual sense but rather in the sense of a natural inclination for truth. But at the same time, it is automatic because the belief is a result or output of a process entirely subliminal and computational in nature. Thus, for instance, a child perceives that her mom is discontent (fact-awareness) by perceiving consciously (“perception” in the usual sense) a facial expression of discontentment (sensorial input) but recognizes that her mother is discontent as a result (output) of an entirely subliminal process. (shrink)

Cuando en el año 1989 comencé mis estudios universitarios en la licenciatura de Geografía e Historia uno de los hechos que más me sorprendió fue la ausencia de interés de los historiadores españoles por áreas que a mí me parecían fascinantes: Asia Central, Japón o China. Esa omisión pude suplirla entonces gracias a la colección Historia Universal Siglo XXI, que incluía interesantes volúmenes sobre esos territorios, o la maravillosa obra de Paul Akamatsu Meiji:1868. Revolución y contrarrevolución en Japón.

El presente trabajo versa sobre cómo se construye una cierta identidad y, por tanto un cierto tipo de sujeto, a partir de los sistemas normativos propios de la adivinación en la santería cubana. Este análisis se realiza a partir de las experiencias en el trabajo de campo del autor durante cinco años en una “casa de santo” en Remedios, Villa Clara y del estudio exhaustivo de las llamadas “letras” de Ifá. La adivinación en esta religión no solo resulta un acto (...) predictivo, sino una manera de conformar un tipo de personalidad, a partir de un conjunto de reglas y recomendaciones individualizadas para cada creyente. (shrink)

Corrado Gini was a key intellectual in the Fascist establishment. His scientific programme included statistics, demography, eugenics, economics, and sociology, as well as occasional forays into political thought and anthropology. Historians have focused on his statistics and eugenics, in connection with his spell as head of the Italian bureau of statistics. This article, integrating economics with the other threads of Gini’s programme, takes economic anthropology as a standpoint to reassess the inspiration behind his whole oeuvre. That anthropology consisted of two (...) parts: the criticism of economists’ ‘economic man’ and the attempt to replace it with an instinctual economic agent, inspired by the nationalist rhetoric of ‘young peoples’ bound to conquer the world. Once the perspective is enlarged, the usual definition of Gini as a technocrat proves insufficient, for his science incorporated essential pieces of Fascism’s political ideology and cultural legitimacy. (shrink)

El presente trabajo analiza el debate reciente sobre operatividad, técnica y cultura en la Teoría de los medios alemana, en el cual se enfrentan, por un lado, el enfoque tecnicista radical, y por el otro, el giro antropológico de los Estudios de las técnicas culturales. Asimismo, analiza la manera en que Simondon fue recientemente incorporado a la discusión y propone, en distancia crítica con ello, un nuevo modo de considerar los posibles aportes simondonianos al debate. Uno de los principales aportes (...) que el presente trabajo destaca es el siguiente: la noción simondoniana de operación técnica ofrece un enfoque no antropológico sobre la técnica y a la vez una consideración no tecno-céntrica de la dimensión técnica de la cultura. (shrink)

Based on the notion of time translation, we develop a formalism to deal with the logic of quantum properties at different times. In our formalism it is possible to enlarge the usual notion of context to include composed properties involving properties at different times. We compare our results with the theory of consistent histories.

In quantum information and computation, entanglement is a resource. When combining concepts, the application of entanglement outside of micro-physical systems is an useful tool. We suggest new cognitive image-based tests that do not need to be translated. No prior knowledge of terms related to the concepts is required, therefore the choice is more intuitive. We examine the merging of two concepts that establish non-classical statistical correlation and present an entanglement-aware vector encoding algorithm. This research’s added value results in an automated (...) system that teaches artificial intelligence to identify and handle entangled concepts. (shrink)

This article develops the hypothesis that the intensified self-portraying and self-exhibition so characteristic of many of today’s social-media practices do not correlate with intensified self-reflection but, on the contrary, indicate a tendency towards self-loss. However, it would be wrong-headed to blame the social networks for distracting from real life. Rather, it is the loss of reality in the real life of contemporary life-worlds that renders social networks an enticing narcissistic way out of an existential horror vacui manifesting itself in new (...) ways within digital culture. In diagnostic terms we can speak of a cultural change towards a posthuman narration of the self. Three vectors of this posthuman narration of the self are distinguished: From word to number, from mechanism to automatism, and from option to obligation. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: accent. Accent is a fallacy of pragmatics. The fallacy of accent takes place when a premise in an argument seems to rely for its meaning on one possible vocal emphasis, but a conclusion is drawn that relies on an extrapolation from a different vocal emphasis of the same phrase. Such ambiguities are often the result of unacknowledged differences in background beliefs, attitudes, and expectations that people may implicitly bring (...) to the reading of a passage. The fallacy of accent can also be committed, therefore, when a passage is quoted without its original context, and erroneous inferences are drawn based on this (often deliberate) distortion. A classic example of this kind of deliberate form of quote mining is often used by creationists in their attempt to discredit Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. (shrink)

This paper addresses Fichte’s puzzle of self-consciousness. I propose a new reading of “Fichte’s original insight,” inspired by Pareyson’s general reading, which I call here the “Fichtean metaphysical turn in transcendental philosophy.” Against the mainstream view in Fichte’s scholarship, I argue that Fichte’s and Kant’s views do not concur regard- ing the primary reference of the “I”, namely spontaneous agency in thinking, which Fichte calls “Tathandlung”. Yet, their views do, in fact, concur when Fichte claims that this spontaneous agency in (...) thinking is the “essence” or the underlying nature of the self, which Kant denies. Regarding this, I take the side of Fichte. But how is Fichte’s original insight supposed to solve the puzzle of self-consciousness? At that transcendental level, the puzzle does not arise because there is no need for self-identification in the first place. Transcendental self-knowledge results from the sui generis intellectual Selbstanschauung that everyone has of oneself as sheer spontaneous agency in thinking. But at the empirical level, the puzzle does not arise either and for the same reason. Reference to the embodied self dispenses with any self-identification because it is based on the fundamental metaphysical relation everybody has to their own body, namely identity. (shrink)

Resumo: Palavras-chave Keywords : Children’s literature. Storytelling. Reading. : Literatura infantil. Contação de histórias. Leitura..: Storytelling is considered nowadays a proper strategy to encourage children to develop literary taste and reading and it is therefore being broadly practiced within educational spaces. Within this framework the present article deals with 140 reports on storytelling observation in schools for children’s education and first classes. These reports were carried out in different places in Porto Alegre and its surroundings. It was possible to observe (...) that despite the joyful characteristic of the storytelling moment – that involves costumes, scenarios, puppets – the way this activity has been conducted turned out to be very pedagogical in three dimensions. In the first place, the choice of many narratives and books reveals an explicit tendency to "civilize" the child or to form a certain kind of subject. In the second place, this pedagogical tendency becomes evident in the conversations carried out between storytellers and children after the storytelling. In this context certain "messages" of the narrative are frequently stressed. At last, in the interviews many storytellers explained their criteria to choose books and stories according to "the project that is being presently developed in the school" or according to "problems that are taking place in the classroom" and so on. In spite of this tendency, however, some reports allow to infer that many teachers are escaping the deliberate pedagogization the stories and are therefore siding with a (new) discourse wherein pedagogical aspects are minimized. A contação de histórias é considerada, atualmente, uma estratégia adequada para iniciar as crianças no gosto pela leitura, sendo uma atividade generalizada nos espaços educativos. Dentro desse quadro, o artigo discute 140 relatos de observação de contação de histórias na Educação Infantil e anos iniciais, realizadas em espaços da região metropolitana de Porto Alegre (RS). Assim, observou-se que, malgrado o caráter lúdico das horas do conto – com fantasias, cenários, fantoches –, há nelas uma evidente pedagogização, através de três dimensões: a primeira é a escolha de algumas histórias e/ ou livros que pretendem abertamente civilizar ou formar um determinado tipo de sujeito. Em segundo lugar, a pedagogização fica evidente nas conversas que a contadora de histórias realiza com crianças após a contação, uma vez que, frequentemente, se enfatizam as mensagens da história. Por fim, nas entrevistas realizadas com as contadoras, ao falarem dos critérios de escolha dos livros e das histórias, várias sinalizaram uma escolha de acordo com o "projeto que está sendo desenvolvido", com "problemas que estão ocorrendo na sala de aula", etc. Mesmo assim, algumas práticas observadas fugiram à pedagogização deliberada, mostrando que muitas professoras estão inseridas em outro (e novo) discurso, em que a pedagogização é minimizada. (shrink)

Among many other things, Margolis’ new book, Pragmatism Ascendent: A Yard of Narrative, A Touch of Prophecy, is a successful attempt to articulate in a thoroughly naturalistic way the fundamental tenet of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy – that is, the idea that idealism and realism are not two alternative metaphysical options, but rather two ways of dealing with the very same thing, the concrete experience that human beings have of their world. One of the most characteristic errors of tra...

Donald Morse’s Faith in Life. John Dewey’s Early Philosophy is an important and controversial book. As the author openly claims, his is the first attempt to offer a comprehensive account of Dewey’s early thought which does not simply consist in a teleological interpretation of his philosophical development. Traditionally, Dewey’s early writings have been considered interesting only because, and insofar as, they are believed to reveal something about Dewey’s particular version of empirical nat...

SummaryThe idea of interdisciplinarity can be articulated in different ways. The aim of the article is to criticise the view that interdisciplinarity is to be treated as a quality of the historian's approach to his subject-matter, and to argue for a constructivist interpretation of that notion. A constructivist account of interdisciplinarity relies on the thesis that the latter is one of the manifold ways in which it is possible to give sense to the historical records of which the historian wants (...) to gain knowledge. In the paper it is maintained that the function of the notion of interdisciplinarity is to account for the clash of languages that can be found when disciplines converge. This new paradigm is highlighted by taking into consideration the history of American pragmatism. (shrink)

When Dewey started working on Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy (UPMP), he was well aware that the main aim of his new book should have been that of providing a clear and comprehensive exposition of the philosophical views that he had formulated in his previous works. At that time – around 1939 – Dewey was in his eighties and he had already published almost all the great books that contributed to establish his reputation as the most distinguished American philosopher. However, (...) his tho... (shrink)

The book reviewed here makes available an important lecture on Hegel’s philosophy of spirit that Dewey delivered at the University of Chicago in 1897. Less than one hundred pages long, the lecture aimed to introduce students to a critical understanding of the third part of Hegel’s Encyclopedia of Philosophical Science. It is preceded by two introductory essays written by the editors – namely, Shook’s Dewey’s Naturalized Philosophy of Spirit and Religion and Good’s Rereading Dewey’s “Permanent...

In the last fifteen years, John Dewey’s early philosophy received considerable attention. John Shook’s Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality, Jim Good’s The Search for “Unity in Diversity”: the “Permanent Deposit” of Hegel in John Dewey’s Philosophy, Donald Morse’s Faith in Life: John Dewey’s Early Philosophy, on the top of many articles, critical editions, and reviews: all these texts have contributed to a better understanding of many important aspects of Dewey’s early thought. T...

In this paper, I address the question of the nature and ground of objectivity, with the aim to develop a pragmatist account of its distinctive features. Traditionally, pragmatism has been considered as an alternative to Kantian approaches. The aim of the paper is to argue that, contrary to the received view, a consistent pragmatist theory of objectivity should preserve many insights of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. My thesis is that Kantian notions of spontaneity, activity and objectivity can be fruitfully reformulated (...) and translated into pragmatist terms. The key notion here is that of practices. It is only within the context of a practice that concepts can be successfully applied to experience. The intrinsic normativity of practices establishes different levels of objectivity. The paper defends a pluralistic view of reality, insisting on the irreducibility of common-sense objectivity to scientific objectivity. At the same time, it is maintained that common-sense practices have a primacy over scientific practices, and that scientific objects are constructed out of common-sense objects through a process of articulation of the potentialities of the latter. (shrink)

The article deals with John Hermann Randall’s theory of history, namely, the philosophical account of what it takes for an object to be a historical object. The goal of the article is to highlight the deep connections existing between Randall’s philosophical views on history and the writing of history, heavily indebted to Dewey’s and Woodbridge naturalism (the so-called Columbia Naturalism), and his historiographical work. In the first section, I briefly sketch some major aspects of originality of Randall’s historiographical work, as (...) well as the intellectual context to which he belonged. In the second section I lay out the most important features of Columbia Naturalism. In the third section I discuss in detail Randall’s theory of history, focusing on its ontological, epistemic, and epistemological features. In the fourth section, I confront Lovejoy and Randall’s historiographical works in order to show how philosophical theories affect historiographical practices. (shrink)

In Pragmatism. The Restoration of Its Scientific Roots (P) and The Pragmatic Vision. Themes in Philosophical Pragmatism (PV) Rescher continues the work of analysis and assessment of the pragmatist tradition that he started more than thirty years ago with the publication of his The Primacy of Practice (1973). The thirty essays that compose the two books (some of them already published elsewhere) deal with a large number of issues, ranging from axiology to epistemology, from art to religion. Th...

In our paper we aim to update and revise the pragmatist conception of the relationship between science and common sense. First of all, we introduce two technical notions (MI and SI), with which we identify the normative spaces of the manifest and the scientific image, and we highlight the differences between these two notions and their Sellarsian cognates. Secondly, within each normative space we investigate the connections between languages and practices: we ground linguistic contents on the normative relations that are (...) established in the practices of the corresponding normative space. Finally, we rely on Brandom’s meaning-use analysis to provide a representation of the different ways in which MI and SI practices and languages may interact. Our pragmatist proposal is to trace back the ontological conflict that is usually believed to exist between scientific and common sense objects to the differences between scientific and common sense practices. (shrink)

La formación inicial docente resulta clave para una educación inclusiva. Sin embargo, esta formación suele orientarse por estándares de la política y estar desvinculada de las experiencias de sus actores. Mediante un estudio de caso de un programa de Pedagogía en Artes Visuales chileno, se interrogan las propuestas formativas a partir de experiencias biográficas de formadores y profesores en formación. Se describen aspectos no considerados sobre la concepción de diversidad e inclusión, la corporalidad, la identidad y la autonomía docente. Asimismo, (...) se delinean posibilidades de hacer sentido a las experiencias de los actores y orientar su enseñanza desde la inclusión. (shrink)

This article explores a promising theoretical approach for reassessing the relationship between inequality and economic growth. The article draws some insights from the influential inverted U-curve hypothesis originally advanced by Simon Kuznets, but drastically recasts the original arguments by shifting two fundamental premises. First, retaining Kuznets’s emphasis on the importance of economic growth in generating demographic transitions between existing and new distributional arrays, we argue that a “constant drive toward inequality” results after replacing a Schumpeterian notion of “creative destruction” for (...) the dualistic assumptions in Kuznets’s model. Second, while Kuznets devoted considerable attention to the impact of institutions on distributional outcomes, we argue that institutions should be understood as relational and global mechanisms of regulation, operating within countries while simultaneously shaping interactions and flows between nations. The article argues that economic growth, unfolding through institutions embedded in time and space, produces a constant drive towards inequality that results in a multiple and overlapping matrix of distributional arrays, an overall income distribution (e.g., within and between countries) that is both systemic and historical. (shrink)

This paper presents the interface of two major representatives of contemporary hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. Without intending to reconstruct the genesis of the theoretical positions in litigation, analyzes different aspects of it pointing to similarities and differences. After a brief introduction (first part), develops, in the second part, of more analytical form, the crossing of the positions of the interlocutors in seven main topics. The third part takes a moment of distancing itself from the hermeneutic tradition of Gadamer, (...) through the critical mediation of Hans Ineichen and Paul Ricoeur. With them we support the necessity of herme-neutics of traditions include the idea of critique and dialogue with the linguistic and analytic philosophy, position which converges in favor of critical hermeneutics of Ricoeur which we intend to highlight it in their specific contribution in rela-tion to the hermeneutic tradition of Gadamer. (shrink)

The theory of logical gates in quantum computation has inspired the development of new forms of quantum logic where the meaning of a formula is identified with a density operator and the logical connectives are interpreted as operations defined in terms of quantum gates. We show some relations between the Bertini gate and many valued connectives by probability values. On this basis, one can deal with quantum circuits as expressions in an algebraic environment such as product many valued algebra for (...) combinational circuits. As can be expected, we show that the compositional logic characterized by the qubit semantics is stronger than the compositional Łukasiewicz quantum computational logic by a counterexample. But, in the holistic case, we conjecture that they can characterize the same logic. (shrink)