Merleau-Ponty. Une conception de l’empathie non centrée sur le sujet?Cet article étudie l’émergence du terme « empathie » dans les textes de Merleau-Ponty. Il souligne que le concept n’est pas avant tout présenté comme une catégorie épistémologique, remettant en question si et comment nous pouvons éventuellement connaître les autres. Au contraire, il est conçu comme une catégorie ontologique, pour dire notre appartenance à une nature commune. De ce point de vue, il propose une façon sensible pour comprendre les autres, basée (...) sur une proximité et un partage physiques.Mais, avec des références à l’actuel débat, le texte suggère que, dans les réflexions du phénoménologue français, il est possible de trouver un paradigme qui n’est pas centré sur une conception subjective de l’empathie – c’est a dire qu’il s’agit d’un paradigme qui ne suppose pas toujours une projection subjective de ma sensibilité sur celle des autres. Plutôt, il peut à la fois consister en un sentiment commun, prépersonnel, qui constitue l’arrière-plan de nos sensibilités conscientes, et aussi proceder de l’autre être humain à moi, alors que souvent je sens et comprendre moi-même par differentiation des autres personnes, qui s’imposent sur mes sentiments et sur mes mots.Merleau-Ponty. A Conception of Empathy not centered on the Subject?This paper investigates the emergence of the term “empathy” in Merleau-Ponty’s texts. It points out that the concept is not primarly introduced as an epistemological category, questioning if and how eventually we can know the others. On the contrary it is meant as an ontological category, in order to say our belonging to a common nature. From this point of view he proposes a sensible way to understanding the others, based on a bodily closeness and sharing.But, with references to the current debate, the text suggests that in the reflections of the French phenomenologist it is possible to find a not subjectively centered paradigm for understandig empathy – that is a paradigm which does not always presuppose a subjective projection of my sensibility on that of the other ones. It can rather both consist in a common, prepersonal feeling, costituting the background of our conscious sensitivities, and proceed from the other human being to me, so that I often feel and understand myself by differing from the other individuals, who impose themselves on my senses and on my words. (shrink)

I examine recent debates in the philosophy of biology over the determinism or indeterminism of the evolutionary process, focusing on two papers in particular: Glymour 2001 and Stamos 2001. I argue that neither of these papers succeeds in making the case for the indeterminism of the evolutionary process, and suggest that what is needed is a detailed analysis of the causal processes at every level from the quantum mechanical to the evolutionary.

The latter half of the twentieth century has been marked by debates in evolutionary biology over the relative significance of natural selection and random drift: the so-called “neutralist/selectionist” debates. Yet John Beatty has argued that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the concept of random drift from the concept of natural selection, a claim that has been accepted by many philosophers of biology. If this claim is correct, then the neutralist/selectionist debates seem at best futile, and at worst, (...) meaningless. I reexamine the issues that Beatty raises, and argue that random drift and natural selection, conceived as processes, can be distinguished from one another. (shrink)

Population genetics attempts to measure the influence of the causes of evolution, viz., mutation, migration, natural selection, and random genetic drift, by understanding the way those causes change the genetics of populations. But how does it accomplish this goal? After a short introduction, we begin in section (2) with a brief historical outline of the origins of population genetics. In section (3), we sketch the model theoretic structure of population genetics, providing the flavor of the ways in which population genetics (...) theory might be understood as incorporating causes. In sections (4) and (5) we discuss two specific problems concerning the relationship between population genetics and evolutionary causes, viz., the problem of conceptually distinguishing natural selection from random genetic drift, and the problem of interpreting fitness. In section (6), we briefly discuss the methodology and key epistemological problems faced by population geneticists in uncovering the causes of evolution. Section (7) of the essay contains concluding remarks. (shrink)

Recent discussions in the philosophy of biology have brought into question some fundamental assumptions regarding evolutionary processes, natural selection in particular. Some authors argue that natural selection is nothing but a population-level, statistical consequence of lower-level events (Matthen and Ariew [2002]; Walsh et al. [2002]). On this view, natural selection itself does not involve forces. Other authors reject this purely statistical, population-level account for an individual-level, causal account of natural selection (Bouchard and Rosenberg [2004]). I argue that each of these (...) positions is right in one way, but wrong in another; natural selection indeed takes place at the level of populations, but it is a causal process nonetheless. (shrink)

Given the role of values in the deployment of GMOs, given the lack of mandatory and long-term testing of GMOs with outside oversight, and given the demonstrated environmental harms, it is not anti-science to want to GMOs labelled as GMOs. People who would like to avoid GMOs, whether out of concerns for potential health harms or concerns over actual environmental harms, are not being allowed to judge the risks and make choices for themselves and their families. For these reasons—so that (...) people can follow their reasonably held values—we ought to label GMOs as GMOs. (shrink)

The first work to offer a comprehensive pragmatist anthropology focusing on sensibility, habits, and human experience as contingently yet irreversibly enlanguaged.

The paper aims to show how and to what extent social and cultural cues influence figurative language understanding. In the first part of the paper, we argue that social-contextual knowledge is organized in “schemas” or stereotypes, which act as strong bias in speaker’s meaning comprehension. Research in Experimental Pragmatics has shown that age, gender, race and occupation stereotypes are important contextual sources of information to interpret others’ speech and provide an explanation of their behavior. In the second part of the (...) paper, we focus on gender stereotypes and their influence on the comprehension of figurative language, to show how the social functions of figurative language are modulated by gender stereotypes. We provide then an explanation of gender stereotypical bias on figurative language in terms of possible outcomes in the social context. (shrink)

The intellectual act of imposing borders to contain and delimit objects has been a constituent factor in physics since its origins, and is also fundamental for philosophical reflection. However, the characteristics of the conceptual universe thus constructed (tendency towards the ideal limit, invariance in variation, a conception of matter as residue, etc.) seem inadequate in biology. The essential characteristic of the living thing is, in fact, that of having a history: that is, of being the concrete trace of a memory. (...) Making an epistemology of the living thing (and not of the inert) means identifying new categories which, being radically antithetical to disembodied notions like that of program and information, take account of the unpredictability and creativity which time introduces. This essay aims to bring some of these fundamental categories into focus. (shrink)

Biologists studying ecology and evolution use the term “population” in many different ways. Yet little philosophical analysis of the concept has been done, either by biologists or philosophers, in contrast to the voluminous literature on the concept of “species.” This is in spite of the fact that “population” is arguably a far more central concept in ecological and evolutionary studies than “species” is. The fact that such a central concept has been employed in so many different ways is potentially problematic (...) for the reason that inconsistent usages (especially when the usage has not been made explicit) might lead to false controversies in which disputants are simply talking past one another. However, the inconsistent usages are not the only, or even the most important reason to examine the concept. If any set of organisms is legitimately called a “population,” selection and drift processes become purely arbitrary, too. Moreover, key ecological variables, such as abundance and distribution, depend on a nonarbitrary way of identifying populations. I sketch the beginnings of a population concept, drawing inspiration from the Ghiselin-Hull individuality thesis, and show why some alternative approaches are nonstarters. (shrink)

Biologists and philosophers have been extremely pessimistic about the possibility of demonstrating random drift in nature, particularly when it comes to distinguishing random drift from natural selection. However, examination of a historical case-Maxime Lamotte's study of natural populations of the land snail, Cepaea nemoralis in the 1950s - shows that while some pessimism is warranted, it has been overstated. Indeed, by describing a unique signature for drift and showing that this signature obtained in the populations under study, Lamotte was able (...) to make a good case for a significant role for drift. It may be difficult to disentangle the causes of drift and selection acting in a population, but it is not impossible. (shrink)

Il tema dell'articolo è il massiccio incremento di elettori del Partito Liberale Austriaco FPÖ, comunemente classificato come partito populista di destra. La prospettiva scelta per analizzare tale successo elettorale consiste nell'esaminare la comunicazione pubblica della FPÖ. La tesi presentata è che la strategia discorsiva della FPÖ comprende da un lato la contrapposizione insanabile di un indistinto "noi" ad un altrettanto indistinto "loro" e dall’altro il livellamento del "loro" fino a costruire delle reti di colpevole complicità tra tutti i soggetti che (...) non siano il "noi" rappresentato nella volontà del capo. (shrink)

The third edition of this popular reader reflects considerable changes. With over seventy readings representing a wide diversity of theorists, it offers a breadth of coverage not available in other collections. The framework for understanding theory as a set of conversations over time is maintained and deepened, with a focus on key transitional theorists who helped pave the way from classical to contemporary theory. New contextual and biographical materials surround the primary readings, and each chapter includes a study guide with (...) key terms, discussion questions, and innovative classroom exercises. The result is a fresh and expansive take on social theory that foregrounds a plurality of perspectives and defines contemporary trends in the field, while being both an accessible and manageable teaching tool. (shrink)

As a number of biologists and philosophers have emphasized, ‘chance’ has multiple meanings in evolutionary biology. Seven have been identified. I will argue that there is a unified concept of chance underlying these seven, which I call the UCC (Unified Chance Concept). I will argue that each is characterized by which causes are consid- ered, ignored, or prohibited. Thus, chance in evolutionary biology can only be under- stood through understanding the causes at work. The UCC aids in comparing the different (...) concepts and allows us to characterize our concepts of chance in probabilistic terms, i.e. provides a way to translate between ‘chance’ and ‘probability’. (shrink)

Links relating to the history and philosophy of biology, assembled by Roberta L. Millstein: reference works, societies, journals, historians and philosophers of biology with papers online, blogs, other resources in the history and philosophy of biology.

Even if Peirce were well understood and there existed· general agreement among Peirce scholars on what he meant by his semiotics, or philosophy of signs, the undertaking of this book-wliich intends to establish a theoretical foundation for a new approach to understanding the interrelations of law, economics, and politics against referent systems of value-would be a risky venture. But since such general agreement on Peirce's work is lacking, one's sense of adventure in ideas requires further qualification. Indeed, the proverbial nerve (...) for failure must in any case be attendant. If one succeeds, one has introduced for further inquiry the strong possibility that should our social systems of law, economics, and politics---our means of interpersonal transaction as a whole-be understood against the theoretical back ground of a dynamic, "motion-picture" universe that is continually becoming, that is infinitely developing and changing in response to genuinely novel elements that emerge as existents, then the basic concepts of rights, resources, and reality take on new dimensions of meaning in correspondence with n-dimensional, infinite value judgments or truth-like beliefs which one holds. If such a view, as Peirce maintained, were possible and tenable not only for philosophy but as the basis for action and interaction in the world of human experience and practical affairs, one would readily say that risk taking is a small price for the realization of such possibility. (shrink)

When philosophers of physics explore the nature of chance, they usually look to quantum mechanics. When philosophers of biology explore the nature of chance, they usually look to microevolutionary phenomena, such as mutation or random drift. What has been largely overlooked is the role of chance in macroevolution. The stochastic models of paleobiology employ conceptions of chance that are similar to those at the microevolutionary level, yet different from the conceptions of chance often associated with quantum mechanics and Laplacean determinism.

At the time of the fragile Weimar Republic, when the crisis of parliamentary democracy was accompanied by a “frightening massification of life” and of public opinion, Scheler posed a challenge: How to achieve a cultural and spiritual transformation that can contribute to a true rebirth of Germany and Europe? If this renaissance is to be achieved, Germany and Europe must be examined as a whole, and the ideas underlying their institutions must be renewed. Cosmopolitanism and the age of integration – (...) for example the integration of rationalism, which has traditionally characterized Europe, and irrationalism, of which the “revolt of pulsions” is, according to Scheler, an eloquent testimony – impose this renewal. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the possible “costs and benefits” of a Freudian-inspired sublimation from a Schelerian perspective, with particular attention to the problem of Bildung. (shrink)

Evolutionary theory (ET) is teeming with probabilities. Probabilities exist at all levels: the level of mutation, the level of microevolution, and the level of macroevolution. This uncontroversial claim raises a number of contentious issues. For example, is the evolutionary process (as opposed to the theory) indeterministic, or is it deterministic? Philosophers of biology have taken different sides on this issue. Millstein (1997) has argued that we are not currently able answer this question, and that even scientific realists ought to remain (...) agnostic concerning the determinism or indeterminism of evolutionary processes. If this argument is correct, it suggests that, whatever we take probabilities in ET to be, they must be consistent with either determinism or indeterminism. This raises some interesting philosophical questions: How should we understand the probabilities used in ET? In other words, what is meant by saying that a certain evolutionary change is more or less probable? Which interpretation of probability is the most appropriate for ET? I argue that the probabilities used in ET are objective in a realist sense, if not in an indeterministic sense. Furthermore, there are a number of interpretations of probability that are objective and would be consistent with ET under determinism or indeterminism. However, I argue that evolutionary probabilities are best understood as propensities of population-level kinds. (shrink)

“Modal logic was conceived in sin: the sin of confusing use and mention.” So quips Quine. The stigma stuck with modal logic for a while. But by the mid-sixties, a whole cluster of mathematically elegant interpretations of modal logic became available. All are natural extensions of the classical Tarskian semantics of predicate logic. By the mid-seventies, Quine’s criticisms seemed obsolete. Today, we teach the model theory of modal logic as a matter of course. Quine’s “interpretive problem” is just forgotten. The (...) purpose of my dissertation is to revamp Quine’s thesis: the very foundations of modal logic—simple propositional modal logic, even before quantifiers are added—are shaky. Quine holds that the natural interpretation of the operator “necessarily” is in terms of a full-blooded metaphysical notion of real necessity. Such a notion, Quine conjectures, is committed to the “metaphysical jungle of Aristotelian essentialism”. Hence, the intended interpretation is to be rejected. Thus Quine: so much the worse for real necessity. An alternative comes to mind: a meta-level, formal rather than real, semantic interpretation of the operator of necessity. In the late forties, Carnap developed this line of interpretation which culminates in the aforementioned model theory (“Kripke’s possible world semantics”) in the sixties. On this basis a formal interpretation is introduced: it grounds necessity in the notion of model theoretic validity. As pointed by friends of the formal interpretation (Marcus, Parsons and Kaplan), no invidious essentialist claim is verified. But have Quine’s concerns been answered? Yes and no. Technical problems regarding quantification across modal operators, substitutivity, matters of scope, and the basis of cross-world identification have indeed been solved. However, no real interpretation of “necessarily” has been provided. I argue that the seeds of such an interpretation are present in Kripke’s philosophical discussion of de re necessities in Naming and Necessity. It is not model theoretic, and it does not reduce necessity to some non-modal notion, just as Quine predicted. Even more in his vein, the real interpretation is (i) metaphysically, grounded indeed in essentialist theses, and (ii) epistemologically, forced to give up Kant’s ideal that all necessities are known a priori. (shrink)

Can world peace come about through a world federation of governments? Is growing agreement and appreciation for, throughout the world, the doctrine of equal human rights inevitable? Such questions are raised by Mortimer Adler in How to Think about War and Peace. Adler argues in this book that both are possible, and in doing so he argues that the insights of liberal contract thinkers, particularly Immanuel Kant, are essentially true. Kant argues that each person has the capacity to discover within (...) himself the foundation for human rights because they are self-evident. It follows that over time inequalities and prejudices will disappear, and people will gain the freedom to advance the cause of peace. About this account of the possibility of world peace I ask the question: is it indeed reasonable? For if it is reasonable, it is not reasonable for the reasons that would have been advanced by Aristotle or Plato or their medieval followers. In older political philosophy it is agreement about the unchanging truth of things that can bring peace. To seek the unchanging truth of things, philosophical speculation about God and things divine, is the highest human activity. It is that end to which life in this world is directed, and upon which human flourishing depends. Freedom depends upon our openness to unchanging eternal truth, even more than self-evident rights; the exercise of speculative reasoning allows for political discourse and an open society. (shrink)

James Wilson (1742-1798), lawyer, Justice of the first Supreme Court of the United States, and Constitutional Framer argued, as did Étienne Gilson, that a citizenry who have adopted philosophical skepticism will lose their political freedom, as self-rule requires that citizens be able to reason rightly about the natural law. He advocated a common sense philosophical education in natural law for all lawyers, so that they might know the first principles of moral reasoning.

This paper considers some thesis proposed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty during his lessons on sleeping and dreaming in the mid fifties, also with reference to the contemporary scientific debate. Dreaming and sleeping constitute a privileged perspective for considering the characteristic human interweaving of natural and cultural aspects, of animality and meaning. The immediate association of sleeping with a suspension of consciousness and with an absence of worldly contacts seems problematic. Furthermore the dualistic opposition between conscious activity and bodily passivity seems far (...) less obvious. Besides it appears as not taken for granted that human acting and experiencing could be always considered as first person's phenomena. (shrink)

However, it became apparent shortly after the establishing of the Center that not only were all methods of legal semiotics not Peircean in origin, but were in their respective foundational assumptions not likely to be compatible with Peirce's semiotics without some radical, transforming development of the idea, 'legal semiotics'. It was clear that if one would intend to be faithful to Peircean semiotics then holding a fixed notion of what an idea of Peircean semiotics of law means would be a (...) violation of the spirit of Peirce's thought; this above all emphasizes the growth and development of initiative ideas and also the stricture that all leading principles must be subject to revision. Even the idea of Peircean semiotics, as leading principle, must itself be an open idea, the meaning of which must be transformable through the process of defining it. A metasemiotics view of a semiotics of law must leave open the possibility for revision of the leading principle of the term, "legal semiotics. " Therefore, if legal semiotics is an idea which accumulates and evolves its meaning in the very process of self-examination, then a process of investigating law investigates itself as well in any semiotic process of inquiry. It became apparent that the most appropriate contribution the Center could make to the area of a Peirce an semiotics would be to act as a sponsor, an inclusive rather than exclusive agent for inquiry of all kinds into the general topic of law and semiotics. (shrink)

Indigenous knowledge is the dynamic information base of a society, facilitating communication and decision-making. It is the cornerstone of many modern-day innovations in science and technology. It is also a ready and valuable resource for sustainable and resilient livelihoods, and attracts increasing public interest due to its applications in bio-technology, health, bioprospecting, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, food preparation, mathematics and astronomy. INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE OF NAMIBIA is a fascinating compendium aimed at a wide readership of academics and students, government officials, policy makers, and (...) development partners. The 17 chapters examine the indigenous knowledge of medicinal plants for treating HIV/AIDS, malaria, cancer, and other microbial infections of humans and livestock; indigenous foods; coping and response strategies in dealing with human-wildlife conflicts, floods, gender, climate change and the management of natural resources. A new rationalisation of adolescent customary and initiation ceremonies is recommended in response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic; and a case study of the San people of Namibia speaks to the challenges of harmonising modern education with that of indigenous people. (shrink)