In his book After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux criticizes post-Kantian philosophy for its inability to explain how science is able to describe a world without human beings. This paper addresses that challenge through a consideration of Heidegger’s thought and his thinking about science. It is argued that the disagreement between Meillassoux and Heidegger comes down to a question of first philosophy and the priority of logic or ontology in philosophy. Ultimately, Heidegger’s emphasis on ontology in philosophy is superior in its ability (...) to give a more comprehensive account of science and thinking about things themselves. (shrink)
Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency advocates a “speculative materialism” or what has come to be called “speculative realism” over against “correlationism” (his term for [nearly] all post-Kantian philosophy). “Correlationism” is “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other.” As part of his criticism of “correlationism,” Meillassoux argues that it necessarily leads to fideism, referencing the return (...) of the religious in contemporary phenomenology and the fundamentalist fanaticisms of contemporary religion to make his point. It is this criticism of “correlationism” that I will explore in this paper—in two ways. On the one hand, I argue that, at least in the work of thinkers like Nietzsche and Heidegger, what Meillassoux calls “correlationism” leads to faith in doubt rather than fideism. On the other hand, I argue that “correlationism” has resulted in fideism only to the extent that it follows Hegel and becomes speculative, which raises questions for Meillassoux’s own “speculative realism” and his faith in mathematics as the means to accessing reality in itself. (shrink)
Through an analysis of key themes in Heidegger's work, the book challenges the traditional theological appropriation of Heidegger and the usual characterizations of religious thinking in terms of faith or belief in, or experience of, some ultimate reality. Heidegger, it is argued, offers a unique approach to a variety of issues and problems in contemporary religious thought and philosophy of religion that results in understanding religious thinking as a resolute openness to the holiness and meaningfulness of the world.
Despite his extended readings of parts of the Antigone of Sophocles, Heidegger nowhere explicitly sets about giving us a theory of tragedy or a detailed analysis of the essence of tragedy. The following paper seeks to piece together Heidegger's understanding of tragedy and tragic experience by looking to themes in his thinking – particularly his analyses of early Greek thinking – and connecting them both to his scattered references to tragedy and actual examples from Greek tragedy. What we find is (...) that, for Heidegger, tragedy is an interruption of speculation, a refusal to philosophize, a way of showing how things are that resonates with the goal of Heidegger's own thinking. (shrink)
The paper explores the way in which we can make sense of the seemingly contradictory presentations of God and the gods in tragic literature by looking to the thought of Martin Heidegger. The duplicity of the gods in tragedy is found to be a function of the uncertainty and questionworthiness of being.
Drawing upon the thought of Jacques Derrida and Martin Heidegger, the paper argues that contemporary discussions of religious experience and religious thought as two separate parts of religious practice and tradition--with religious experience as the "heart" of religion--is erroneous. Instead, it is argued, religious experience and religious thought are woven together in practice, the one implicating the other.
At one time or another, most Contemporary Continental philosophers of religion make reference to Nietzsche’s announcement that “God is dead.” However, their interpretation and treatment of that announcement owes nothing to Nietzsche. Instead, they see the death of God as Hegel did, as a moment in a transition to a new way of talking and thinking about God or the Absolute. Their faith in God or the Absolute is not in doubt in the end. We argue that if one hears (...) and thinks Nietzsche’s word “God is dead”—along with Heidegger’s critique of onto-theo-logy-then faith in the end is in doubt. Any affirmation or profession of faith is questionable; there is no promise that all conflicts will be resolved and that all will be saved and forgiven. Nietzsche’s saying that “God is dead” calls for thinking and questioning; it calls not for faith, but faith in doubt. (shrink)
The paper is critical of John Caputo's misunderstanding Martin Heidegger's criticism of metaphysics and ontotheology that leads to Caputo's understanding mysticism as a non-metaphysical, non-ontotheological thinking.
The paper explores the practice of philosophy of religion, arguing that, as philosophy about religion and religious philosophy, it challenges the assumptions of both philosophy and religious thinking and belief.
This paper is a response to Professor Nancy Hudson’s paper “Divine Immanence: Nicholas of Cusa’s Understanding of Theophany and the Retrieval of a ‘New’ Model of God,” (Nancy Hudson, “Divine Immanence: Nicholas of Cusa’s Understanding of Theophany and the Retrieval of a ‘New’ Model of God,” Journal of Theological Studies 56.2 (October 2005): 450–470). Hudson claims that an ecologically promising vision of nature and an environmentally friendly God lies undiscovered withing the mystical theology of Nicholas of Cusa. However, this paper (...) questions whether Cusa's theology is the best way to develop a Christian understanding of God that is environmentally friendly, pointing to alternatives inside and outside the Christian tradition that may hold more promise. (shrink)
Traditional approaches to the fact that there are different religions with different characterizations of what is divine---exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism---live in fear of religious diversity and the possibility that what is divine is not one, not many, but diverse, i.e., that there are different gods that are potentially incompatible and conflicting. In this paper, I argue that this alternative--–religious diversity and an acknowledgment of the diversity of the divine--–is a more “realistic” approach to our understanding of religion and our experience (...) of what is divine. (shrink)
The purpose here is to recall the diversity of our experience, particularly the archaic experience, of what is divine, through Motoori Norinaga and Martin Heidegger and their considerations of the archaic notions of kami and daimōn. Using their insights and other sources also becomes a means for reconfiguring our understanding of philosophy of religion as a thinking that enacts what it is about, drawing no hard and fast distinctions between thinking and practice, in the hope of seeing religion as it (...) is. (shrink)