I argue that the truth of knowledge claims is relative to what I shall call 'standards of caution'--so that a person with a given body of evidence might know a proposition relative to a relaxed standard of caution but not know the same proposition relative to a more rigorous one--and also that standards of caution themselves vary depending on a host of pragmatic considerations. I do not, of course, expect this thesis to sound natural at the beginning. However, I hope (...) to show that it is true and also that its truth is of consequence for epistemology. (shrink)

An objection is offered to the Frege-Russell definition, which identifies the number 1 with the set of all unit sets. It is argued here that the identity conditions for sets require that if any member of a set had not existed, the set itself would not have. Therefore, had any object whatever not existed, the unit set containing it would not have either, and thus the set with which the definition identifies 1 would not have. But then, 1 either would (...) not have existed or would have been a different entity than it is, and it is argued that neither alternative is acceptable. (shrink)

Critics following Hume argue that miracles by nature violate regularities which are as well established as any and which therefore cannot be overthrown by testimony. It is argued here, however, that such criticisms involve errors of inductive reasoning and that if there is even a remote chance that a non-deistic god exists, miracles simply would not be that extraordinary, so that often strong testimony will provide good reason to believe them.

In his essay "Of Miracles" Hume derives the conclusion that testimony cannot provide adequate reason to believe in a miracle from two principles: a general one concerning the conditions under which testimony should be accepted, and the principle that to be believed properly to be a miracle, an event would have to violate principles as well established as any can be by inferences from experience. Here it is argued that both of Hume’s principles are false, after which a positive account (...) is sketched of the conditions under which belief in a miracle would be reasonable. (shrink)

The argument from design for God's existence is involved with important questions about the conditions under which it is reasonable to believe that a state of affairs was brought about intentionally. In this paper I shall offer a version of the argument and defend it, if not quite in the sense of trying to show conclusively that it succeeds, then, at least, in the sense of trying to show that it deserves to be taken seriously. In Part I, I shall (...) present a number of objections to the argument that, for the most part, are quite well known and, I think, quite weighty. Most are descendants of objections to be found in the writings of David Hume.l Then, in Part II, I shall present the specific version of the argument I wish to offer here and, finally, in Part III, try to show that it does not succumb to the objections raised at the start. (shrink)

The author discusses solutions to Moore’s Paradox by Moore and Wittgenstein and then offers one of his own: ‘I believe that P’ and ‘not-P’ can both be true but nonetheless are not epistemically compatible; that is, it is logically impossible simultaneously to have sufficient evidence to justify assertions of each. The author then argues that similar transgressions are committed by other “paradoxical” utterances whose paradoxicality cannot be explained by the Moore or Wittgenstein solutions and also that this provides a technique (...) that can be useful in studying the epistemic requirements for justified assertion. (shrink)