A standard objection to act utilitarian theories is that they are not helpful in deciding what it is morally permissible for us to do when we actually have to make a choice between alternatives. That is, such theories are worthless as decision procedures. A standard reply to this objection is that act utilitarian theories can be evaluated solely as theories about right-making characteristics and, when so evaluated, their inadequacy as decision procedures is irrelevant. Even if somewhat unappealing, this is an (...) effective reply to the standard objection. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is twofold: to provide an account of what makes properties morally relevant, and to indicate the role such properties have in our moral thinking.

Among the divers factors that have encouraged and sustained scientific inquiry through its long history are two pervasive human concerns which provide, I think, the basic motivation for all scientific research. One of these is man's persistent desire to improve his strategic position in the world by means of dependable methods for predicting and, whenever possible, controlling the events that occur in it. The extent to which science has been able to satisfy this urge is reflected impressively in the vast (...) and steadily widening range of its technological applications. But besides this practical concern, there is a second basic motivation for the scientific quest, namely, man's insatiable intellectual curiosity, his deep concern to know the world he lives in, and to explain, and thus to understand, the unending flow of phenomena it presents to him. (shrink)

To have a duty is, above all, to be subject to a binding, normative requirement. This means that unless there are exculpating reasons, someone who has a duty is required satisfy it, and can be justifiably criticized for not doing so. Having a duty to do something is like having been given a command to do it by someone who has a right to be obeyed: it must be done.

To intuit something is to apprehend it directly, without recourse to reasoning processes such as deduction or induction. Intuitionism in ethics proposes that we have a capacity for intuition and that some of the facts or properties that we intuit are irreducibly ethical. Traditionally, intuitionism also advances the important thesis that beliefs arising from intuition have direct justification. This means that such beliefs do not need to be justified by appeal to other beliefs or facts because the proposition believed is (...) either self-evident or can have justification without being supported by evidence. So, while intuitionism in ethics is about the apprehension of ethical facts or properties, traditional intuitionism is principally a view about how ethical beliefs are justified: those arising from intuition have direct justification. (shrink)

To have a duty is, above all, to be subject to a binding, normative requirement. This means that unless there are exculpating reasons, someone who has a duty is required satisfy it, and can be justifiably criticized for not doing so. Having a duty to do something is like having been given a command to do it by someone who has a right to be obeyed: it must be done.

Tackles the problem of fixing the tenacity of believers in forming, holding, and modifying beliefs. in conversation with the history of philosophy and religion, the author attempts to expose and refute some aspects of the dominant epistemological framework for engaging belief fixation and improvement. In contrast to this framework, Dr. Frazier provides a model of responsible believing agent rooted in an ethic of the intellectual virtue tradition. In dialog with Aristotle, he proposes three principal virtues, which he calls the generative, (...) the transmissive, and the metamorphic. The author's alternative framework includes an examination of the role that intellectual passions play in the melioration of belief. This text considers whether Dostoevsky's claim that "Beauty will save the world" has a place in discussions of belief formation and revision and offers an account of its vitality in addressing the concerns raised in the book. (shrink)

Our most basic moral intuition, according to Feldman, is simply stated: we ought to do the best we can. And, according to him, it is this intuition that underlies the utilitarian doctrine. However, Feldman thinks it is no easy task to develop a theory that adequately expresses this intuition. Indeed, he thinks that many philosophers “have vigorously defended ‘utilitarianism’ without succeeding in formulating the doctrine precisely”. He describes debating the merits of utilitarianism before it is adequately formulated as “Rambo philosophy”, (...) and says that “we have a duty to see our theoretical targets clearly before we pull our argumentative triggers”. (shrink)