What kind of moral principle could be sufficiently restrictive to avoid the kind of large-scale risks that have resulted in catastrophe in the past, while at the same time not be so restrictive as to halt desirable progress? Is there such a principle that is not merely a precautionary principle, but one that could be based on firm moral grounds? In this article, I set out to explore a simple idea: might it be the case that reparability could serve as (...) a moral constraint against risky policy decisions? The idea is simple, but comes in two forms. First, that it is morally wrong to impose a risk for harm that is, in principle, irreparable, such that it would bring about a permanent loss of a kind qua kind. Second, that it is morally wrong to impose a risk for a reparable (but not compensable) harm that exceeds what realistically could be repaired. I set out here to do two things. First, I describe the moral problem to be addressed for any principle-guiding decisions about risk. A central claim in this article is that risk decisions are epistemically impaired decisions, and that we must, alongside outcome uncertainty, also take both epistemic uncertainty and moral uncertainty into account. Second, I introduce the idea of reparability as a moral constraint in the form of two versions of the Reparability Principle. Such a principle, I argue, could have some interesting advantages that seem both morally intuitive and that come with some advantages against some of the epistemic challenges posed by risk impositions. (shrink)

Various authors hold that what is wrong with risk imposition is that being at risk diminishes the opportunities available to an agent. Arguably, even when risk does not result in material or psychological damages, it still represents a setback in terms of some legitimate interests. However, it remains to be specified what those interests are. This article argues that risk imposition represents a diminishment of overall freedom. Freedom will be characterized in empirical terms, as (...) the range of unimpeded actions available to an agent. After briefly outlining the main characteristics of overall freedom as defended by Hillel Steiner and Ian Carter, the article shows that this notion is able to capture many of our intuitions about when and how risk imposition disadvantages an agent, without reference to welfare indicators. The article argues that if this non-welfarist perspective can be defended, then it would be easier to approach a number of applied questions about risk, including the questions of when risk imposition is permissible or legitimate, in which ways risk can be an object of distributive justice and how one can be compensated for being subject to a risk. (shrink)

According to Jonathan Quong’s _moral status account_ of liability to defensive harm, an agent is liable to defensive harm only when she mistakenly treats others as if their moral status is diminished (for example, as if they lack a right that they in fact possess). Quong argues that, by the lights of the moral status account, a conscientious driver (Driver) who faultlessly threatens to kill Pedestrian is not liable to defensive harm. Quong argues that Driver’s action is evidence-relative permissible, despite (...) the risks it imposes, because the general practice of prudent driving is permissible. The practice is permissible because (a) its risks do not disproportionately fall on some groups rather than others, (b) the threatened harms are incidental, and (c) the risk that driving imposes is acceptable in light of the benefits everyone derives from driving. Because the correct moral theory tells us that prudent driving is permissible, Pedestrian lacks a right that Driver refrain from driving. Hence, Driver does not, by driving, treat Pedestrian as lacking a right that Pedestrian in fact possesses. Driver is not liable to defensive force. I argue, against Quong, that cost–benefit analyses of types of risky activity cannot justify individual tokens of risk imposition. Actions that risk incidentally harming others must be justified by the prospective benefits of that token action. Hence, Driver’s imposition of risk on Pedestrian cannot be justified by the benefits of the general practice of driving. I argue that the permissibility of Driver’s imposing risk on Pedestrian via prudent driving turns on whether Driver is willing to internalise at least the foreseeable costs of that risky action. One can lack a right that a person refrain from performing a risky action whilst possessing a right not to be harmed by that risky action. Even if Pedestrian cannot reasonably demand that Driver refrain from driving, she can reasonably demand that Driver refrain from forcing her to bear the costs of his driving. (shrink)

Where artificial agents are not liable to be ascribed true moral agency and responsibility in their own right, we can understand them as acting as proxies for human agents, as making decisions on their behalf. What I call the ‘Moral Proxy Problem’ arises because it is often not clear for whom a specific artificial agent is acting as a moral proxy. In particular, we need to decide whether artificial agents should be acting as proxies for low-level agents — e.g. individual (...) users of the artificial agents — or whether they should be moral proxies for high-level agents — e.g. designers, distributors or regulators, that is, those who can potentially control the choice behaviour of many artificial agents at once. Who we think an artificial agent is a moral proxy for determines from which agential perspective the choice problems artificial agents will be faced with should be framed: should we frame them like the individual choice scenarios previously faced by individual human agents? Or should we, rather, consider the expected aggregate effects of the many choices made by all the artificial agents of a particular type all at once? This paper looks at how artificial agents should be designed to make risky choices, and argues that the question of risky choice by artificial agents shows the moral proxy problem to be both practically relevant and difficult. (shrink)

Suppose you perform two actions. The first imposes a risk of harm that, on its own, would be excessive; but the second reduces the risk of harm by a corresponding amount. By pairing the two actions together to form a set of actions that is risk-neutral, can you thereby make your overall course of conduct permissible? This question is theoretically interesting, because the answer is apparently: sometimes Yes, sometimes No. It is also practically important, because it bears (...) on the moral status of practices such as offsetting personal greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In this article we propose a criterion for distinguishing between cases where pairing risk-increasing and risk-reducing actions makes each action permissible, and those where it does not: the Principle of Aggregate Risk-Imposition. We work towards this by considering a range of examples that illustrate various illegitimate ways of pairing risk-increasing actions with risk-reducing ones, and asking what goes wrong in each case. We then use this criterion to evaluate GHG offsetting. Is offsetting a legitimate way of removing the risk-imposition associated with GHG emissions, or not? Controversially, we argue that this turns out to depend on the form that the offsetting takes. (shrink)

This paper surveys the current philosophical discussion of the ethics of risk imposition, placing it in the context of relevant work in psychology, economics and social theory. The central philosophical problem starts from the observation that it is not practically possible to assign people individual rights not to be exposed to risk, as virtually all activity imposes some risk on others. This is the ‘problem of paralysis’. However, the obvious alternative theory that exposure to risk (...) is justified when its total benefits exceed its total costs faces the standard distributional challenges of consequentialism. Forms of contractualism have been proposed as a solution, but how exactly such theories can be formulated remains problematic, especially when confronted with the difficult cases of mass, novel, risk such as climate change. (shrink)

The article investigates the resources of contractualist moral theory to make sense of the ethics of risk imposition. In some ways, contractualism seems well placed to explain how it can be reasonable to accept exposure to risk of harms whose direct imposition would not be acceptable. However, there are difficulties getting clear about what directness comes to here, especially given the difficulty of adequately motivating traditional views that assign ethical significance to what the agent intends as (...) opposed to merely foreseeing. The article considers two principles which might help the contractualist: the Redistribution Principle, which, while attractive, is perhaps somewhat too restrictive, and the Aim Consistency Principle, which grants ethical significance to the aims with which our actions are in principle consistent whatever our actual intentions may be. The article also considers the relative significance of ex ante and ex post perspectives from which to evaluate actions and principles. Key Words: contractualism • Doctrine of Double Effect • ethics • intention • justice • risk • T.M. Scanlon • utilitarianism. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the prospects for a rights-based approach to the morality of pure risk-imposition. In particular, I discuss a practical challenge to proponents of the thesis that we have a right against being imposed a risk of harm. According to an influential criticism, a right against risk-imposition will rule out all ordinary activities. The paper examines two strategies that rights theorists may follow in response to this “Paralysis Problem”. The first strategy introduces (...) a threshold for when a risk-imposition is a rights violation. The second strategy drops the claim that rights are absolute and maintains that all rights infringements generate compensation duties. It is argued that both strategies face significant practical problems of their own and that the Paralysis Problem seems fatal for a right against risk-imposition in the absence of an adequate account of the morally relevant threshold risk. (shrink)

This paper surveys the current philosophical discussion of the ethics of risk imposition, placing it in the context of relevant work in psychology, economics and social theory. The central philosophical problem starts from the observation that it is not practically possible to assign people individual rights not to be exposed to risk, as virtually all activity imposes some risk on others. This is the ‘problem of paralysis’. However, the obvious alternative theory that exposure to risk (...) is justified when its total benefits exceed its total costs faces the standard distributional challenges of consequentialism. Forms of contractualism have been proposed as a solution, but how exactly such theories can be formulated remains problematic, especially when confronted with the difficult cases of mass, novel, risk such as climate change. (shrink)

In this article, I argue for a distinct and novel right-based account of risks and I call it the Sophisticated High-risk Thesis. I argue that there is a distinction between rights-infringing risk impositions and no-rights-infringing risk impositions. An action imposing a high risk of harm infringes rights, whereas an act imposing a low risk of harm does not. I also suggest three principles that govern the permissibility of highly risky actions. If a highly risky action (...) meets the conditions specified by any of these three principles, it can be justified. These principles are the consent principle*, the prevent disaster principle* and the reciprocity principle**. I show that the Sophisticated High-risk Thesis is, in general, better than the alternative Risk Thesis defended by McCarthy. (shrink)

We frequently engage in activities that impose a risk of serious harm on innocent others in order to realise trivial benefits for ourselves or third parties. Many moral theories tie the evidence-relative permissibility of engaging in such activities to the size of the risk that an individual agent imposes. I argue that we should move away from such a reliance on quantified individual risks when conceptualising morally permissible risk imposition. Under most circumstances of interest, a conscientious (...) reasoner will identify a gap between the factors they deem potentially relevant to the riskiness of an agent’s behaviour, and the factors they are reasonably able to quantify. This then leads a conscientious reasoner to conclude that they cannot, in good faith, come up with a quantitative risk estimate that is genuinely tailored to the agent’s particular situation. Based on this, I argue that principles of morally permissible risk imposition fail to provide us with practical guidance if they ask us to take into account our agent-specific risks in a quantified manner. I also argue that principles of permissible risk imposition which appeal to quantified individual risks implausibly imply that it is frequently indeterminate whether engaging in some risky activity is morally permissible. For both of these reasons, I contend that principles of morally permissible risk imposition should make no reference to quantified individual risks. They should instead acknowledge that any quantitative estimates that an agent might usefully be able to consider will likely not be tailored to the agent’s idiosyncratic situation. (shrink)

Many philosophers accept that, as well as having a right that others not harm us, we also have a right that others not subject us to a risk of harm. And yet, when we attempt to spell out precisely what this ‘right against risk imposition’ involves, we encounter a series of notorious puzzles. Existing attempts to deal with these puzzles have tended to focus on the nature of rights – but I propose an approach that focusses instead (...) on the nature of risk. The key move is to distinguish two different ways in which to conceptualise the risk that a given action presents – one of which is linked to the notion of probability and the other to the notion of normalcy. (shrink)

Existing accounts of social insurance tend to treat social risks as given and ask whether it is justified for the state to deal with these risks for its citizens. They ignore that many common risks are in fact imposed on citizens as a byproduct of the institutional choices of the society, which call for justification in the first place. In this paper, I use the Scanlonian contractualist framework to develop an account of just social risk imposition which implies (...) a demand for fair risk sharing by all members of a society. In particular, I defend a compensation principle which requires that compensation be paid to victims of risk materialisation. This duty of paying should be shared by all those who benefit from the imposition of the relevant risk. I suggest that this provides a case for social insurance as a way of fairly sharing the burden of social risks. (shrink)

This paper examines whether an agent becomes liable to defensive harm by engaging in a morally permissible but foreseeably risk-imposing activity that subsequently threatens objectively unjustified harm. It first clarifies the notion of a foreseeably risk-imposing activity by proposing that an activity should count as foreseeably risk-imposing if an agent may morally permissibly perform it only if she abides by certain duties of care. Those who argue that engaging in such an activity can render an agent liable (...) to defensive harm ground this liability in the luck egalitarian thought that we may justly hold individuals responsible for the consequences of their voluntary choices. Against this, I argue that a luck egalitarian commitment to holding people responsible cannot, by itself, ground liability to defensive harm. It can help ground such liability only against the backdrop of a distributively just society, and only if further considerations speak morally in favour of attaching certain well-defined costs to individuals’ risk-imposing choices. I conclude by suggesting that if an account of liability applies robustly across distributively just and unjust contexts alike, then what grounds an agent’s liability is plausibly not her responsibility for threatening objectively unjustified harm, but her culpability for doing so. (shrink)

The COVID-19 global pandemic has shone a light on several important ethical questions, ranging from fairness in resource allocation to the ethical justification of government mandates. In addition to these institutional issues, there are also several ethical questions that arise at the interpersonal level. This essay focuses on several of these issues. In particular, I argue that, despite the insistence in public health messaging that avoiding infecting others constitutes ‘saving lives’, virus transmission that results in death constitutes an act of (...) killing. Whether this killing is wrongful depends on several factors. I consider one intuitively plausible view—namely, that in many cases, killing via unintentional transmission is not wrongful, because the parties in question have implicitly waived their rights against this harm, often via reciprocal risk imposition. I argue that this view is mistaken, but that its central insight can be better captured by identifying the appropriate standards of blame that we ought to apply during a pandemic. I conclude by showing how these conclusions can be fruitfully applied to certain institutional questions, such as helping to justify restricting government mandates. (shrink)

Several authors have argued that contractualism faces a dilemma when it comes to justifying risks generated by socially valuable activities. At the heart of the matter is the question of whether contractualists should adopt an ex post or an ex ante perspective when assessing whether an action or policy is justifiable to each person. In this paper I argue for the modest conclusion that ex post contractualism is a live option notwithstanding recent criticisms raised by proponents of the ex ante (...) perspective. I then consider how an ex post contractualist can best respond to the problem that it seems to prohibit a range of intuitively permissible and socially valuable activities. (shrink)

There is a difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to who is harmed, and worsening someone’s prospect. This difference is relevant to debates about the ethics of offsetting, since it means that showing that emitting-and-offsetting has the first feature is not a way of showing that it has the second feature. In an earlier paper, we illustrate this difference with an example of a lottery in which you shake the bag from which a ball will be (...) drawn to determine the identity of the person who will suffer a harm. Here, we reply to Stefansson and Willners’ criticism of that example, explaining how their reply makes a mistake about the point of the example. (shrink)

I consider cases where you increase the risk that, e.g., someone will die, without increasing the risk that you will kill them: in particular, cases in which that increasing of risk is accompanied by a decreasing of risk of the same degree such that the risk imposition has been offset. I defend the moral legitimacy of such offsetting, including carbon-offsetting.

We subject others and are ourselves subjected to risk all the time - risk permeates life. Despite the ubiquity of risk and its imposition, philosophers and legal scholars have devoted little of their attention to the difficult questions stimulated by the pervasiveness of risk. When we impose risk upon others, what is it that we are doing? What is risking's moral significance? What moral standards govern the imposition of risk? And how should (...) the law respond to it? This book highlights these important but neglected questions and offers novel answers to them in a systematic way, constructing a normative framework of risk imposition that draws upon a wide range of insights from diverse sources within philosophy and legal theory.Oxford Legal Philosophy publishes the best new work in philosophically-oriented legal theory. It commissions and solicits monographs in all branches of the subject, including works on philosophical issues in all areas of public and private law, and in the national, transnational, and international realms; studies of the nature of law, legal institutions, and legal reasoning; treatments of problems in political morality as they bear on law; and explorations in the nature and development of legal philosophy itself. The series represents diverse traditions of thought but always with an emphasis on rigour and originality. It sets the standard in contemporary jurisprudence. (shrink)

This paper considers the moral status of bystanders affected by medical research trials. Recent proposals advocate a very low threshold of permissible risk imposition upon bystanders that is insensitive to the prospective benefits of the trial, in part because we typically lack bystanders' consent. I argue that the correct threshold of permissible risk will be sensitive to the prospective gains of the trial. I further argue that one does not always need a person's consent to expose her (...) to significant risks of even serious harm for the sake of others. That we typically need the consent of participants is explained by the fact that trials risk harmfully using participants, which is very hard to justify without consent. Bystanders, in contrast, are harmed as a side-effect, which is easier to justify. I then consider whether the degree of risk that a trial may impose on a bystander is sensitive to whether she is a prospective beneficiary of that trial. (shrink)

The case "Caprica Energy and Its Choices" concerns a fictionalized energy corporation choosing between three potential drilling sites. According to the published Teaching Note, the case is an exercise in the stakeholder approach to business: it requires balancing profit considerations with potential harm to those who live near those drilling sites. Though unintended, the case raises a further question not addressed in the case or in the Teaching Note: what gives Caprica Energy the right to impose risk on members (...) of the communities surrounding its drilling sites? The first section of the present article argues that, in such cases, manage- ment can only justify imposing risk on the local community by securing those stakeholders' consent. The second section outlines the implications for stakeholder theory and stake- holder management. The third section outlines one con- nection between this material and recent literature on the imposition of risk and moral theory; that section offers an account of what make this particular instance of imposing risk morally problematic, with reference to the directedness of the imposition. (shrink)

This paper investigates the circumstances under which it is morally permissible to impose non-negligible risks of serious harm on innocent civilians in order not to endanger tangible cultural heritage during armed conflict. Building on a previous account of the value of cultural heritage, it is argued that tangible cultural heritage is valuable because of how it contributes to valuable and meaningful human lives. Taking this account as the point of departure I examine the claim that commanders should be prepared to (...) risk lives of innocent civilians in order to avoid harm to tangible cultural heritage. I argue that imposing high risks of serious harm on innocent civilians without their consent constitutes a wrong that can be justified only in order to avoid a greater evil. It is then argued that damage to cultural heritage sites rarely constitutes the greater evil when weighed against the imposition of non-consensual risks of serious harm on innocent civilians, especially when the risk is substantial. Still, imposing substantial risks might be morally permissible under the condition that they are consensually imposed, even if they are not the lesser evil. However, I argue that even if one has reason to suspect that there are civilians who might consent to at least some significant risks in order to avoid damage to their cultural heritage, it is not clear that commanders should take this into account when deciding what to do. Unless all of those who are at risk consent, the fact that some of those whose lives are at risk consent to the risk of being killed do not make it morally permissible to impose this risk on the group as a whole. (shrink)

This work shows that two problems—the reference class and the mental state of the agent—undermine the plausibility of the ‘blameworthiness tracks risk thesis’ (BTRT), which states, prima facie, an agent is more blameworthy for imposing a greater rather than smaller risk. The article first outlines core concepts. It then shows how the two problems undermine BTRT; namely, (1) no blame attribution based on risk imposition is unequivocal; (2) when the materialization of risk is subject to (...) chance, an agent’s decision can ground an equal degree of blameworthiness regardless of whether the risk is greater or lesser. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose and defend a distinct and novel approach to compensation for risk impositions. I call it the Risk-Pooling System of compensation. This system suggests that when X performs an action that imposes a risk of harm to Y, then X is liable to Y, and is therefore obliged to make an ex ante compensation that is roughly equivalent to the expected cost of potential harm to a social- risk pool. If and when (...) Y suffers harm as a result of the risk imposed by X, they then receive an ex post compensation roughly equivalent to the cost of actual harm suffered. This system of compensation creates a social buffer between the risk imposer – the one who has the duty to pay compensation into the pool – and the victim – the one who has the right to receive compensation from the social pool. I contend that the Risk-Pooling System is an improvement over its alternatives due to its capacity to produce the best social utilities, particularly, in terms of reducing information costs, obtaining optimal deterrence in the society and creating incentives for people to be engaged in social activities. (shrink)

Theories of rights seem well equipped to explain widely accepted claims about the morality of harming. But can they explain popular claims about the morality of imposing risks of harm? Many think not. But a plausible theory of rights can explain those claims if it says we have the right that others not impose risks of harm upon us. That is a good reason to believe we have that right. There are many objections to the claim that we have that (...) right, but none of them are sound. Among the topics covered are: the permissibility of rights infringements, trivial rights infringements, the permissibility of risk impositions, the aggregation of rights, consent, self-defense, punishment, and compensation. (shrink)

Many healthcare practices expose people to risks of harmful outcomes. However, the major theories of moral philosophy struggle to assess whether, when and why it is ethically justifiable to expose individuals to risks, as opposed to actually harming them. Sven Ove Hansson has proposed an approach to the ethical assessment of risk imposition that encourages attention to factors including questions of justice in the distribution of advantage and risk, people’s acceptance or otherwise of risks, and the scope (...) individuals have to influence the practices that generate risk. This paper investigates the ethical justifiability of preventive healthcare practices that expose people to risks including overdiagnosis. We applied Hansson’s framework to three such practices: an ‘ideal’ breast screening service, a commercial personal genome testing service, and a guideline that lowers the diagnostic threshold for hypertension. The framework was challenging to apply, not least because healthcare has unclear boundaries and involves highly complex practices. Nonetheless, the framework encouraged attention to issues that would be widely recognised as morally pertinent. Our assessment supports the view that at least some preventive healthcare practices that impose risks including that of overdiagnosis are not ethically justifiable. Further work is however needed to develop and/or test refined assessment criteria and guidance for applying them. (shrink)

The author argues for a theory of responsibility for outcomes of imposed risk, based on whether it was permissible to impose the risk. When one tries to apply this persuasive model of responsibility for outcomes of risk imposition to procreation, which is a risk imposing act, one finds that it doesn’t match one’s intuitions about responsibility for outcomes of procreative risk. This mismatch exposes a justificatory gap for procreativity, namely, that procreation cannot avail itself (...) of the shared vulnerability to risks and their constraints—to the balance one is forced to strike between one’s interest in being free to impose risks on others and one’s interest in being safe from harm resulting from the risk imposed by others—which serves to justify risk imposition, generally. Whereas most risk impositions involve trade-offs of liberty and security among people who share the vulnerabilities associated with the taking, imposing, or being constrained from imposing risks, procreation involves the introduction of people into that position of vulnerability in the first place. Thus, when one procreates, one imposes risks in the absence of the shared vulnerability that usually serves as a justification for risk imposition. Procreative risks may not be wrongfully imposed, but they aren’t permissibly imposed in a manner fully comparable to other permissibly imposed risks. This makes procreation a unique form of risk imposition, with unique implications for its justification and for one’s responsibility for its outcomes. This insight can help explain several puzzling procreative asymmetries. (shrink)

Systemic risks are risks produced through interconnected non-wrongful actions of individuals, in the sense that an individual's action is a negligible cause of the risk. Due to scale effects of interaction, their consequences can be serious but they are also difficult to predict and assess via a risk assessment. Since we can have good reason to engage in the interconnected activities giving rise to systemic risk, we incur a concurrent collective responsibility to ensure that the risks are (...) fairly distributed and well regulated. James argues that fairness in this context requires taking reasonably available precautions ensuring for each risk-bearer a favourable ratio of expected benefits over expected losses. In sections 2 and 3 we argue that such a conception of fairness applies but only on the condition that the systemic risks created are irreversible risks and that the general background conditions of justice are imperfectly fair. When risks are reversible, compensatory justice can correct for unfairness in risk imposition. Where risks are irreversible, compensatory justice necessarily fails, giving rise to a collective responsibility to regulate fairly ex ante. Additionally, where background conditions of justice are fully fair and the systemic risk is well understood, risk bearers can be said to have consented to the systemic risk. If they are not fair, we argue that the primary political obligation should lie in fixing the fairness of the backgrounds of justice. A related reason for addressing the general background conditions of fairness is that James’ account of fairness in systemic risk imposition encounters a baseline problem. If expected risks and benefits are calculated again an unfair historic background condition, systemic risk imposition would not be fully fair. Section 4 shows why differences in evidentiary uncertainty as to probability and levels of harm and effective responses require a normatively appropriate response in the form of additional precautions. We show that the evidentiary standards set for risk-based cost-benefit analysis have a connection with deontology because they express a postulate of equal treatment in formal terms. Systemic risks can have different possible degrees of epistemological certainty due to factors of social and natural origin, such as more available research funding or higher degrees of complexity for some systemic risks but not others. These differences have to be mitigated by taking even greater precautions in difficult-to-research systemic risks. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We have previously argued that there are forms of greenhouse gas offsetting for which, when one emits and offsets, one imposes no risk. Orri Stefansson objects that our argument fails to distinguish properly between the people who stand to be harmed by one’s emissions and the people who stand to be benefited by one’s offsetting. We reply by emphasizing the difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to the distribution of harm and acting in a (...) way that worsen’s someone’s prospect. (shrink)

Risk decisions often appear unsatisfactory after a calamity has taken place. This holds even when they are products of systematic risk analysis. Yet, if relevant considerations available to be known pre-accident were adequately taken into account and safety measures implemented accordingly, nobody seems morally blameworthy. In this paper, I advance a two-way argument. Firstly, I show how analysis of post-accident apologizing sheds new light on vexed tensions in ethical assessment of risk impositions. This amounts to exposing conflicting (...) moral intuitions in risk decisions, discussing problematic tenets in risk analysis as well as outlining three lines of arguments that destabilize the very notion of correct risk analysis. The analysis indicates that bringing different discussions of moral blameworthiness together facilitates resolving the tensions. It also calls for further and early-on collaboration between risk theorists and ethicists in order to carry these insights to risk analysis. Secondly, I argue that analysis of risk decisions, in part, reveals a discrepancy between the definitional work done on apology and what is required by ethics. Virtually every suggestion for the gold standard for apology involves moral blameworthiness as a necessary condition. I highlight different kinds of cases in which nobody is culpable, but an apology can be morally fitting or required. It would be nonsensical to say that, in these cases, one ought to apologize, but in a disingenuous manner. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Nature of Risk The Moral Significance of Risk.

Though the duties of care owed toward innocents in war and in civil life are at the bottom univocally determined by the same ethical principles, Bazargan-Forward argues that those very principles will yield in these two contexts different “in-practice” duties. Furthermore, the duty of care we owe toward our own innocents is less stringent than the duty of care we owe toward foreign innocents in war. This is because risks associated with civil life but not war (a) often increase the (...) expected welfare of the individuals upon whom the risk is imposed, (b) are often imposed with consent, and (c) are often imposed reciprocally. The conclusion—that we have a pro tanto reason for adopting a more stringent standard of risk imposition toward foreign innocents in war—has implications for not only what standards of risk we should adopt in war, but also how we should weigh domestic versus foreign civilian lives. (shrink)

This essay answers two questions that continue to drive debate in moral and legal philosophy; namely, ‘Is a risk of harm a wrong?’ and ‘Is a risk of harm a harm?’. The essay’s central claim is that to risk harm can be both to wrong and to harm. This stands in contrast to the respective positions of Heidi Hurd and Stephen Perry, whose views represent prominent extremes in this debate about risks. The essay shows that there is (...) at least one category of risks – intentional impositions of risk on unconsenting agents – which can be both wrongful and harmful. The wrongfulness of these risks can be established when, on the balance of reasons, one ought not to impose them. The harmfulness of these risks can be established when the risks are shown to set back legitimate interests. In those cases where risks constitute a denial of the moral status of agents, risks set back agents’ interest in dignity. In these ways, the essay shows that there are instances when a risk can constitute both a wrong and a harm. (shrink)

Many activities impose risks of harm on other people. One such class of risks are those that individuals culpably impose on others, such as the risk arising from reckless driving. Do such risks in themselves constitute a harm, over and above any harm that actually eventuates? This paper considers three recent views that each answer in the affirmative. I argue that each fails to overcome what I call the ‘interference objection’. The risk of harm itself, whether taken as (...) a subjective or an objective risk, is unable to interfere with the interests of victims in order to constitute a harm. This does not mean that a risk of harm cannot itself be wrongful, but the conclusion does weaken the moral objectionableness of impositions of risks of harm. (shrink)

What makes careless conduct careless is easily one of the deepest and most contested questions in negligence law, tort theory, and moral theory. Answering it involves determining the conditions that make the imposition of risk unjustifiable, wrong, or impermissible. Yet there is a still deeper as well as overlooked and undertheorized question: Why does subjecting others to risk of harm call for justification in the first place? That risk can be impermissibly imposed upon otherspresupposes that imposing (...) risk is the kind of thing that can be impermissible. Unless imposing risk can be impermissible after all, unjustified risking is literally impossible. In this discussion, I explore what I call the moral significance of risking, arguing that the moral significance of risking resides in a certain kind of nonmaterial autonomy interest that is implicated whenever one imposes risk of harm on another. (shrink)

What is wrong with imposing pure risks, that is, risks that don’t materialize into harm? According to a popular response, imposing pure risks is pro tanto wrong, when and because risk itself is harmful. Call this the Harm View. Defenders of this view make one of the following two claims. On the Constitutive Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk constitutes diminishing one’s well-being viz. preference-frustration or setting-back their legitimate interest in (...) autonomy. On the Contingent Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk has harmful consequences for the risk-bearers, such as psychological distress. This paper argues that the Harm View is plausible only on the Contingent Claim, but fails on the Constitutive Claim. In discussing the latter, I argue that both the preference and autonomy account fail to show that risk itself is constitutively harmful and thereby wrong. In discussing the former, I argue that risk itself is contingently harmful and thereby wrong but only in a narrow range of cases. I conclude that while the Harm View can sometimes explain the wrong of imposing risk when risk itself is contingently harmful, it is unsuccessful as a general, exhaustive account of what makes pure imposition wrong. (shrink)

This paper argues that some of the major theories in current business ethics fail to provide an adequate account of moral responsibility for the creation of systemic financial risk. Using the trading of credit default swaps during the 2008 financial crisis as a case study, I will formulate three challenges that these theories must address: the problem of risk imposition, the problem of unstructured collective harm and the problem of limited knowledge. These challenges will be used to (...) work out key shortcomings of stakeholder approaches and Integrative Social Contracts Theory. I will argue that pluralist connection models used in political theory can help to overcome these shortcomings. Adopting an approach based on these models shows that financial institutions incur obligations in five main areas: managing their own risk profile; remedying some of the harms caused by financial crises; supporting the development of better epistemic methods; curbing the transmission and amplification of initial losses; and instigating structural reforms. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that dominant conceptions of intelligence used in artificial intelligence (AI) are biased by normative assumptions that originate from the Global North, making it questionable if AI can be uncritically applied elsewhere without risking serious harm to vulnerable people. After the introduction in Sect. 1 we shortly present the history of IQ testing in Sect. 2, focusing on its multiple discriminatory biases. To determine how these biases came into existence, we define intelligence ontologically and underline its (...) constructed and culturally variable character. Turning to AI, specifically the Turing Test (TT), in Sect. 3, we critically examine its underlying intelligence conceptions. The test has been of central influence in AI research and remains an important point of orientation. We argue that both the test itself and how it is used in practice risk promoting a limited conception of intelligence which solely originated in the Global North. Hence, this conception should be critically assessed in relation to the different global contexts in which AI technologies are and will be used. In Sect. 4, we highlight how unequal power relations in AI research are a real threat, rather than just philosophical sophistry while considering the history of IQ testing and the TT’s practical biases. In the last section, we examine the limits of our account and identify fields for further investigation. Tracing colonial continuities in AI intelligence research, this paper points to a more diverse and historically aware approach to the design, development, and use of AI. (shrink)

This paper argues that some of the major theories in current business ethics fail to provide an adequate account of moral responsibility for the creation of systemic financial risk. Using the trading of credit default swaps (CDS) during the 2008 financial crisis as a case study, I will formulate three challenges that these theories must address: the problem of risk imposition, the problem of unstructured collective harm and the problem of limited knowledge. These challenges will be used (...) to work out key shortcomings of stakeholder approaches and Integrative Social Contracts Theory. I will argue that pluralist connection models used in political theory can help to overcome these shortcomings. Adopting an approach based on these models shows that financial institutions incur obligations in five main areas: managing their own risk profile; remedying some of the harms caused by financial crises; supporting the development of better epistemic methods; curbing the transmission and amplification of initial losses; and instigating structural reforms. (shrink)

The theory of epistemic vigilance posits that -- to quote the eponymous paper that introduced the theory -- “humans have a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance, targeted at the risk of being misinformed by others." Despite the widespread acceptance of the theory of epistemic vigilance, however, I argue that the theory is a poor fit with the evidence: while there is good reason to accept that people ARE vigilant, there is also good reason to believe that their (...) vigilance is NOT epistemic. Rather, the evidence actually supports an alternative theory, one that I dub the theory of "Machiavellian vigilance": humans have a suite of cognitive mechanisms for Machiavellian vigilance, targeted at tracking others' relative social status and maintaining or enhancing one's own status. The evidence against epistemic vigilance stems from three sources: (a) data demonstrating that people are terrible at detecting honesty or competence, (b) data demonstrating that our vigilance is phylogenetically prior to the development of homo sapiens, and therefore was not designed to be sensitive to linguistic communication, and (c) data demonstrating that people's sources of information are distributed, and not detectable through individual vigilance. The evidence in favor of Machiavellian vigilance is the mirror image of the evidence against epistemic vigilance: (a) data demonstrating that people are very accurate at detecting status, (b) data demonstrating that social species, including bonobos and chimps, track the social status of their conspecifics, and (c) data demonstrating that people can quickly track status even in new social groups. (shrink)

This paper offers a relatively comprehensive assessment of government anti-smoking policies (both taxation and other regulatory measures). I conclude that interventions to engender in smokers and prospective smokers an accurate perception of tobacco's health risks are justified, that except in the case of adolescents addiction by itself does not justify intervention beyond providing adequate information, that the proper goal of tobacco taxation policy should be to recoup only the extra costs that smokers place on others (at most a $1/pack tax (...) on cigarettes), and that passive smoke's imposition of harm on unconsenting others strongly supports at least the development of a safe-to-others smokeless cigarette, if not direct intervention. (shrink)

Mandatory vaccination, including for COVID-19, can be ethically justified if the threat to public health is grave, the confidence in safety and effectiveness is high, the expected utility of mandatory vaccination is greater than the alternatives, and the penalties or costs for non-compliance are proportionate. I describe an algorithm for justified mandatory vaccination. Penalties or costs could include withholding of benefits, imposition of fines, provision of community service or loss of freedoms. I argue that under conditions of risk (...) or perceived risk of a novel vaccination, a system of payment for risk in vaccination may be superior. I defend a payment model against various objections, including that it constitutes coercion and undermines solidarity. I argue that payment can be in cash or in kind, and opportunity for altruistic vaccinations can be preserved by offering people who have been vaccinated the opportunity to donate any cash payment back to the health service. (shrink)

This thesis engages with the following three questions. First, how should the presence of risk and ambiguity affect how we distribute a benefit to which individuals have competing claims? Second, what is it about the imposition of a risk of harm itself, such as the playing of Russian roulette on strangers, which calls for justification? Third, in the pursuit of the greater good, when is it permissible to foreseeably generate harms for others through enabling the agency of (...) evildoers? Chapters 1 through 3 of the thesis provide an answer the first question. Chapter 1 defends the importance of a unique complaint of unfairness that arises in risky distributive cases: that sometimes individuals are better off at the expense of others. Chapter 2 defends a view called Fairness as Proper Recognition of Claims which guides how a decision-maker ought to act in cases where individuals have unequal claims to a good. Chapter 3 considers how the presence of ambiguity affects distributive fairness, and defends an egalitarian account of the evaluation of ambiguous prospects. Chapter 4 provides an answer to the second question through a defence of the Insecurity Account, which is a unique way in which impositions of risks of harm can be said to harm individuals, namely by rendering the victim’s interests less secure. Chapter 5 provides an answer to the third question by defending what I call the Moral Purity Account, to explain when it is permissible to provide aid in cases where individuals are harmed as a foreseeable consequence of the provision of such aid. (shrink)

Reigning regulatory frameworks for biomedical research impose on researchers and research ethics committees an obligation to protect research participants from risks that are unnecessary, disproportionate to potential research benefits, and non-minimized. Where the research has no potential to produce results of direct benefit to the subjects and the subjects are unable to give consent, these requirements are strengthened by an additional condition, that risks should not exceed a certain minimal threshold. In this article, I address the question of whether there (...) should be limits of permissible risks in non-therapeutic research involving competent and healthy subjects. Some commentators argue that competent and informed individuals should have a right to participate even in extremely risky research and that research ethics committees should never reject studies because they are too dangerous. To use David Shaw's expression, competent volunteers should have ‘a right to participate in high-risk research’. I argue that this idea is ill-founded, as it does not take into account the social mission and complex collaborative nature of research practice as well as the inequity of power between researchers and subjects. Imposition of limits on permissible risks for healthy volunteers is justified by the need to protect research enterprise and the need to protect the weaker party, namely the subjects. Also, I suggest that the best way to set boundaries on research risks is to leave the judgment of risk acceptability to research ethics committees. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the risk arising from technological devices, such as closed circuit television and nuclear power plants and the consequent effect on the rights to privacy and security of individuals.Design/methodology/approachThe paper presents critical and conceptual analyses of CCTV, nuclear power plants and the rights of individuals. It also analyses how communitarianism and liberal individualism would respond to right‐infringements and risk‐imposition. It draws on W.D. Ross's prima facie and actual duties to explain (...) the pre‐eminence of duty when certain duties conflict in a bid to improve technology.FindingsThe paper discovers the importance of rights to individuals, particularly the rights to privacy and security. It shows that, in some situations, government's duty to respect the right to the privacy of individuals conflicts with the duty to provide public goods, such as CCTV. The paper, therefore, stresses that one duty has greater moral force than the other. In essence, the more incumbent duty can be employed by government in justifying right‐infringement and risk‐imposition, though this does not disvalue the rights of individuals.Originality/valueThe paper offers insight into ways of addressing questions such as: when is it morally acceptable or justifiable to expose others to risk? When is infringement on people's rights permissible? Also, the paper is relevant to those in the areas of ethics and technology because it offers an ethical analysis of risk‐imposition and right‐infringement by examining how ethical theories, such as communitarianism and liberal individualism, would assess risks resulting from CCTV and nuclear energy. It argues that consent is not enough to justify risk‐imposition and right‐infringement. It concludes by drawing on W.D. Ross's prima facie and actual duties as a means of justifying risk‐imposition and right‐infringement by government. (shrink)

Efforts to improve public health, both in the context of infectious diseases and non-communicable diseases, will often consist of measures that confer risk on some persons to bring about benefits to those same people or others. Still, it is unclear what exactly justifies implementing such measures that impose risk on some people and not others in the context of public health. Herein, we build on existing autonomy-based accounts of ethical risk imposition by arguing that considerations of (...) imposing risk in public health should be centered on a relational autonomy and relational justice approach. Doing so better captures what makes some risk permissible and others not by exploring the importance of power and context in such deliberations. We conclude the paper by applying a relational account of risk imposition in the cases of (a) COVID-19 measures and (b) the regulation of sugar-sweetened beverages to illustrate its explanatory power. (shrink)

During times of emergency like the pandemic itself, governments are often seen as exercising “exceptional power”. Given the state of growing urgency in responding to the pandemic, there is a worry that governments may resort to exercising their exceptional power arbitrarily—either willingly, unintentionally or perhaps even negligently. When power is exercised by states or even by non-state actors arbitrarily over a person or group, that is, at their own will in the absence of appropriate institutional checks and balances, republican theorists (...) argue that we are confronted with a threat to our freedom as non- domination. In this chapter, I explore whether, and in what ways, worries about domination could surface in the context of government’s enforcement of risk- containment measures in response to the pandemic. While imposition of these measures is deemed necessary and important for reducing risks in response to the pandemic, their imposition is prima facie problematic if it constitutes or entails wrongful exercise of arbitrary power, thereby risking domination of citizens. I motivate this claim by examining India’s initial response to the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly focussing on the public health emergency legislature (or lack thereof) authorising the implementation of emergency risk-containment measures. (shrink)

The precautionary principle (PP) has been criticised for almost every intellectual sin one may imagine: unclarity, impracticability, rigidity, implausibility etc. Recognising the rather obvious fact that there is no such thing as one PP, this paper attempts to address this criticism on a more constructive note than merely view it as forcing us to be "for or against" precaution. This is done by connecting an underlying ethical ideal regarding the imposition of risks present in most formulations of PP to (...) the criticism and use the latter for discussing how such an idea may be plausibly designed and used for underpinning policies that may plausibly be said to express the spirit of PP. It is argued that the most important issue regarding this is to recognise that there is something to the idea that imposing risks on people has a morally significant price, but that we must also acknowledge that taking precautionary measures to avoid or decrease such risks has such a price. The critical issue in the ethics of risk of relevance for PP thus becomes what constitutes a proper price of precaution. It is demonstrated how two simple constraints on this amkes it easy to meet many typical arguments against PP, but also how this issue must be further attacked by means transcending the traditional tools of normative ethics and decision theory, as well as how further reflection along such lines connects PP to issues of international.. (shrink)

This paper suggests that “systemic risk” has a distinctive kind of moral significance. Two intuitive data points need to be explained. The first is that the systematic imposition of risk can be wrongful or unjust in and of itself, even if harm never ensues. The second is that, even so, there may be no one in particular to blame. We can explain both ideas in terms of what I call responsibilities of “Collective Due Care.” Collective Due Care (...) arguably precludes purely aggregative cost-benefit decision-making and requires one kind of “precautionary” attitude in public choice. (shrink)